Sargent & Lundy LLC

Don K. Schopfer
Vice President
312-269-6078

September 9, 1997
Project No. 9583-100

Docket No. 50-423

Northeast Nuclear Energy Company
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 3
Independent Corrective Action Verification Program

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Attention: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

I have enclosed the following twenty six (26) discrepancy reports (DRs) identified during our review activities for the ICAVP. These DRs are being distributed in accordance with the Communications Protocol, PI-MP3-01.

DR No. DR-MP3-0006
DR No. DR-MP3-0029
DR No. DR-MP3-0037
DR No. DR-MP3-0039
DR No. DR-MP3-0040
DR No. DR-MP3-0041
DR No. DR-MP3-0042
DR No. DR-MP3-0048
DR No. DR-MP3-0053
DR No. DR-MP3-0056
DR No. DR-MP3-0058
DR No. DR-MP3-0074
DR No. DR-MP3-0079
DR No. DR-MP3-0094
DR No. DR-MP3-0095
DR No. DR-MP3-0097
DR No. DR-MP3-0100
DR No. DR-MP3-0101
DR No. DR-MP3-0104
DR No. DR-MP3-0105
DR No. DR-MP3-0114
DR No. DR-MP3-0115
DR No. DR-MP3-0117
DR No. DR-MP3-0135
DR No. DR-MP3-0136
DR No. DR-MP3-0146

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PDR ADOCK 05000423
Q PDR

I have also enclosed the following two (2) DRs that have been determined to be invalid. No action is required from Northeast Utilities for these two DRs. The basis for their invalid determination is included on the document.

DR No. DR-MP3-0102
DR No. DR-MP3-0133

Please direct any questions to me at (312) 269-6078.

Yours very truly,

D. K. Schopfer
Vice President and ICAVP Manager

DKS:spr
Enclosures
Copies:
E. Imbro (1/1) Deputy Director, ICAVP Oversight
T. Concannon (1/1) Nuclear Energy Advisory Council
J. Fougere (1/1) NU
m:\icavp\corr\97\nr0909a.doc

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0006

Review Group: Programmatic
Review Element: Change Process
Discipline: Other
Discrepancy Type: Design Control Procedure
System/Process: N/A
NRC Significance level: 3

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: PORC/SORC Review of Minor Modifications

Description: Safety-related MMODS are not required to be PORC/SORC reviewed.
Revision 5 to the Design Control Manual (DCM) Chapter 1.0, Section 1.7 establishes the following bases for design changes being Minor Modifications (MMODs):

- o A MMOD typically involves non-complex/minor design changes affecting either non-safety or safety-related systems, structures, or components described in engineering design documents.
- o MMODs may be only used for design changes (non-safety or safety-related) that DO NOT require a 10 CFR 50.59 safety evaluation.

The note under DCM Chapter 3, Section 3.0, Task 10 states "MMODs do not require PORC/SORC review and Unit Director approval; the design change can be directly implemented per Section 4.0." Technical Specification 6.5.1.6.d establishes PORC responsibility for review of all proposed changes or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety, and TS 6.5.2.6.g establishes SORC responsibility for review of all common site proposed changes or modifications to systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety.

Furthermore, the NRC I&E Enforcement Manual STS-Section 6.5.1.1. provides clarification on the Licensee's review responsibility for matters related to nuclear safety. The discussion states, "...the on-site committee is responsible for the review of all proposed changes or modifications to plant systems or equipment that affect nuclear safety. It is the NRC position that this requirement applies to all proposed changes or modifications that can affect the safety related functions of plant structures, systems and components. Such changes and modifications can involve plant systems and equipment which are not required to be covered by the quality assurance program. Regardless of the components or systems involved, changes or modifications that can affect safety-related functions must be subjected to on-site committee action." The discussion continues with an example of the installation of roof drain piping over electrical equipment that has a safety function.

Based on the DCM definition of MMODs and the Note included in Chapter 3, Section 3.0 of the DCM, the design change program is discrepant with respect to PORC/SORC review requirements for safety-related MMODS which may affect nuclear safety. The 50.59 screening in DCM for safety related or

non safety related modification may not always show that a 50.59 safety evaluation is required when a MMODS affects nuclear safety.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Wrona, S. P.	☒	☐	☐	8/28/97
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Wrona, S. P.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0029

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Mechanical Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 3

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
(●) Yes
( ) No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation Calculation Discrepancy

Description: The following calculations were reviewed to verify that the correct heat load from the service water pump motors were used in determining the service water pump room ventilation requirements:

Calculation P-198 Rev. 0, dated July 10, 1973, Ventilation - Circulating & Service Water Pump House
Calculation P(B)-901 Rev. 0, dated 12/14/83, 3HVY*FN2A/2B Cycling Frequency
Calculation P(B)-920 Rev. 0, dated 12/14/83, Recommended Period of Operation of the Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation Recirculation Mode
Calculation P(B)-925 Rev. 0, dated 12/14/83, Service Water Pumphouse Ventilation Requirements

The review identified the following descrepancies:

1) Calculation P-198 used 800 hp for calculating the heat loss from one service water pump motor. Plant Design Data System (PDDS) data for service water pump 3SWP*P1A and 3SWP*P1B states that the motor rating is 600 hp with a brake HP requirement of 555 hp.Two pumps operate post-LOCA per FSAR section 9.2.1.2 while the calculation only considered one operating. This would result in higher than calculated heat loss to the pump room from the service water pump motors.

Calculation P(B)-901 indicates that P(B)-906 supersedes calculation P-198. However, calculation P-198 is still shown as an active calculation in the calculation database and P(B)-906 has been superseded by P(B)-925.

2) Calculation P(B)-901 considered only one pump operating with a bhp of 561. Two pumps operate post-LOCA per FSAR section 9.2.1.2 which would result in higher than calculated heat loss to the pump room from the service water pump motors.

3) Calculation P(B)-920 considered only one pump operating while two pumps operate post-LOCA per FSAR section 9.2.1.2

4) Calculation P(B)-925 used motor load values from calculation P(B)-901 which only considered one pump operating Per FSAR Section 9.2.1.2, two pumps on the same division are required to operate post-LOCA.

The discrepancy is assigned a significance level 3 because the discrepancy may result in a higher Servive Water Pumphouse

(SWP) room temperature than the design basis temperature required to support the SWP equipment operation.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Stout, M. D.	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Stout, M. D.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0037

Review Group: Programmatic
Review Element: Corrective Action Process
Discipline: Other
Discrepancy Type: Corrective Action
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Inadaquate response for resolving the final status of the Auxiliary Building □Ventilation Heaters.

Description: The ACR # M3-96- 0310 Initiator recommends adding the safety-related Auxiliary Building Ventilation Heaters as a "required load" for coping with a SBO.

The ACR Causal Factor Corrective Action Plan's Item 1A is not clear if an evaluation will be made to determine whether or not the safety-related Auxiliary Building Ventilation Heaters are a "required load" for supporting the SBO Safe Shutdown..
The Corrective Action must include this determination along with any necessary revision to the appropriate calculation.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Caruso, A.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date: 9/3/97

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Caruso, A.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0039

Review Group: Configuration
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Drawing
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Upper Tier To Lower Tier Drawings Review For SWP In Diesel Generator Building

Description:

The Upper Tier to Lower Tier drawings review found the following drawing discrepancies between the P&IDs and the as built isometric drawings:

1. The following line number discrepancies were found on the drawings as noted:

On P&ID EM-133D Rev 23 versus Isometric CI-SWP-35S Sht 2 Rev 10:
3-SWP-010-264-3 (P&ID H-9) vs. 3-SWP-010-26-3 (ISO)
3-SWP-010-25-3 (P&ID H-9) vs. 3-SWP-010-264-3 (ISO)
3-SWP-010-26-3 (P&ID H-7) vs. unidentified (ISO)
3-SWP-010-40-3 (P&ID H-1) vs. 3-SWP-010-265-3 (ISO)
3-SWP-010-265-3 (P&ID H-1) vs. unidentified (ISO)

2. CI-SWP-35S Sht 2 Rev 10 shows line 3-SWP-010-41-3 before valve V-49 versus after V-49 on P&ID EM-133D Rev 23 (H-3).
3. EM-133D Rev 23 line 3-SWP-010-44-3 (J-1) is shown as 3-SWP-010-266-3 on CI-SWP-34 Sht 6 Rev 7.
4. EM-133D Rev 23 line 3-SWP-010-25-3 (J-9) is shown as 3-SWP-010-267-3 on CI-SWP-34 Sht 6 Rev7.
5. No isometric drawings found for lines 3-SWP-008-416-3 and 3-SWP-008-289-3.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0040

Review Group: Configuration
Review Element: System Installation
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Installation Implementation
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 3

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
(●) Yes
( ) No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Walkdown Discrepancies Of The SWP In The Diesel Generator Building

Description: The following discrepancy items were found during the walkdown of the piping and mechanical equipment of the SWP in the Emergency Diesel Generator Building:

1. 3SWP*RV90A (Relief Valve) missing from line 3-SWP-001-186-4. Flanges covered with cloth but no Tag for Work in Progress.
2. For line 3-SWP-010-264-3 shown on CI-SWP-35S Sht 2 Rev 10, the support shown on drawing BZ-60A-33 has one additional support attached and the support shown on drawing BZ-60A-32 has two additional supports attached that are not shown on the support drawings.
3. Lines 3-SWP-010-28-3 and 3-SWP-010-109-3 have missing insulation (from floor to AOV39A,approximately 13 ft).
4. Line 3-SWP-002-249-3 is missing insulation.
5. Valve 3SWP*AOV39A shows gland packing leakage has occurred resulting in corrosion deposit.
6. 3SWP*RO39A (Restricting orifice) is installed backwards (inlet side is facing downstream).
7. Valve 3SWP*V298 is missing insulation and the bottom flange shows rust and corrosion.
8. Valve 3SWP*V16 is missing insulation.
9. Valves V-111, V-986, V-110, and V-988 are shown per "GRIT3" and Manufacture's drawing to be flanged valves and in the field were found to be socket welded valves.
10. Drain valve 3SWP*V111 are located at Heat Exchanger (3EGS*E1B) outlet head. P&ID EM-133D Rev 23 shows the valve to be on the inlet head.
11. Valve 3SWP*AOV39A gland packing shows leakage/corrosion.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/9/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ( ) Yes (●) No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					
SL Comments:					

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0041

Review Group: Configuration
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Drawing
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Upper Tier to Lower Tier Drawings Review for SWP in Pump House

Description: The following drawing discrepancies were found in reviewing the P&IDs with the as builtIsometrics:

1. P&ID EM-133A Rev 26 does not show the 1/2 inch capped line on line3-SWP-030-7-3 (I-2) as shown on the isometric CI-SWP-18 Sht 4 Rev 11.

2. P&ID EM-133A Rev 26 shows the instrument line to PT26B on line 3-SWP-030-2-3 after the tee to 3-SWP-030-7-3 (K-2) versus before the tee as shown on the isometric CI-SWP-18 Sht 4 Rev 11.

3. DCN DM3-00-1469-96 changed the flanged connections on strainers 3SWP*STR1B and 3SWP*STR1D to be blanked off on P&ID EM-133A Rev 26. Isometric CI-SWP-18 Sht 4 Rev 11 was not changed.

4. DCN DM3-00-1468-96 changed the flanged connections on strainers 3SWP*STR1A and 3SWP*STR1C to be blanked off as shown on P&ID EM-133A Rev 26. Isometric CI-SWP-19 Sht 4 Rev 11 was not changed.

5. Isometric CI-SWP-18 Sht 4 Rev 11 continuation line shown as 3-SWP-030-190-3 should be 3-SWP-030-256-3.

6. Valves V992, V993, V72, V73, MOV24D and MOV24B on isometric CI-SWP-247 Sht 5 Rev 11 are safety related and should be designated with a (*).

7. Line 3-SWP-003-256-3 on P&ID EM-133DRev 23 (B-2) should be shown as 3-SWP-030-256-3.

8. Line 3-SWP-003-257-3 on P&ID EM-133D Rev 23 (B-10) should be shown as 3-SWP-030-257-3.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0042

Review Group: Configuration
Review Element: System Installation
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Installation Requirements
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Walkdown Discrepancies of the SWP in the Pump House - Trains B & D

Description: The following discrepancy items were found during the walkdown of the piping and mechanical equipment of the SWP Trains B & D in the Pump House:

1. Valve *V77 on PI23B instrument line was in the closed position with pump 3SWP*PIB running. Pressure gage PI23B was showing pressure indicating possibly a poor valve seat.

2. Line 3-SWP-003-10 appears (pipe is insulated) to have a flanged joint in the pipe between pipe support PSA033 and the elbow before the strainer 3SWP*STR1B that is not shown on the isometric CI-SWP-247 SHT 5 Rev 11.

3. The insulation is coming off of the flanged end of line 3-SWP-003-247.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0048

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Structural Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Discrepancy in pipe support calculation 12179-NP(F)-Z019R-014-H003

Description: We have reviewed the Pipe Support Calculation No. 12179-NP(F)-Z019R-014-H003, Rev.6 and note the following discrepancy:

Pipe thermal displacement in z direction at support CP-319014-H003 is 0.08" (Calculation 12179-NP(F)-X1913, Rev. 5). Design Criteria NETM-45,Rev.1 requires that friction loads should to be considered when the pipe thermal displacements at the support in the unrestraind direction(s) exceed 1/16".

The calculation for support CP-319014-H003 does not include the friction load due to pipe thermal displacements as required by the Design Criteria.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☒	☐	☐	9/2/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0053

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Structural Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Pipe support calculation NP(F)-Z019B-405 discrepancy

Description: Wehave reviewed Pipe Support Calculation NP(F)-Z019B-405, Rev.7 and note the following discrepancies:

1. On page 17, the Load factor should be 1.24 and not 0.41 based on Change Factor on page 13.

2. On page 30 the dimension A should be 8.64" and not 8.34". This is a math error.

3. Loads on page 35 utilized in the analysis of the base plate correspond to the loads on voided page 3 of ATT. "A". No justification is given for base plate loads used in the calculation.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0056

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Structural Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
● No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Pipe support calculation NP(F)-Z19B-035 discrepancy

Description: We have reviewed Pipe Support Calculation NP(F)-Z19B-035, Rev.7 and note the following discrepancies:

1. On page 9D, the joint 8 coordinate in Y direction is 36" based on the support sketch. The computer model uses 33" as the Y coordinate.

2. On page 9E, loading case 4, load force in Y direction at joint 7 should be '-100#' and not '100#' based on the loading case 4 definition.

3. On page 16, the Fz = -11,712#. The latest load comparision per page 9B show the load to be '-9,226#'.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ● No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0058

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Mechanical Design
Discrepancy Type: Licensing Document
System/Process: RSS
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: The RSS Pump Starting and Spray Effective time documentation discrepancy

Description: Multiple values for the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) pump starting and spray effective times after the Containment Depressurization Actuation (CDA) signal are reported in the FSAR and the Design Basis Summary document as follows:

Reference	RSS Pump Start Time After CDA Signal
FSAR Sec 6.2.2.2 3DBS-NSS-003 Sec 8.6	approximately 779 seconds (14 sec. DG start time + 655 sec. time delay ± 20 sec.timer tolerance)
3DBS-NSS-003 Sec 12.2.6	(660 sec. time delay ± 20 sec. timer tolerance)
FSAR Sec 6.2.2.3	approximately 660 sec. (~11 minutes)
FSAR Sec 6.2.2.4.2	Two time delay relays, one set at 650 sec.and one set at 660 sec.
NRC SER, Supplement 4 PI6 Commitment Record 13791	pump starting times of 660 sec. and 670 sec.

Reference	RSS Spray Effective Time After CDA Signal
FSAR Sec 6.2.2.3	max of 750 sec. (max. 12.5 minutes)
3DBS-NSS-003 Sec 8.6 & 12.2.6	779 sec.
FSAR Table 6.2-16 ESF	780 sec. with minimum

Also, NRC Letter A05461 dated 12/17/85, PI6 Commitment Record 13843, requires that FSAR Table 6.2-10 be revised to reflect the RSS pump start delay following a CDA signal. However, no FSAR Table 6.2-10 exists in the UFSAR.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Feingold, D. J.	☒	☐	☐	9/5/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/5/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K				9/5/97

VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Feingold, D. J.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0074

Review Group: Configuration
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Drawing
System/Process: RSS
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Upper Tier To Lower Tier Drawing Review for RSS-QSS in ESF Bldg.

Description: The following drawing discrepancies were found in reviewing the P&ID with the as built Isometrics:

1. P&ID EM-112C Rev 16 shows line 3-RSS-750-129-2 connected to 3-RSS-010-19-2 after 3-RSS-004-122-2 (H-10). Isometric CI-RSS-11 Sht 3 Rev 6 shows the connection before 3-RSS-004-122-2.
2. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducers before lines 3-RSS-004-122-2 (H-10) and 3-RSS-008-55-2 (I-10) connect to 3-RSS -010-19-2. CI-RSS-11 Sht 3 Rev 6 shows reducers.
3. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducers on line 3-RSS-008-54-2 before 3-RSS-010-14-2 (I-8). CI-RSS-010 Sht 3 Rev 5 shows reducer.
4. EM-112C Rev 16 shows 3-RSS-001-117-2 connected to 3-RSS-010-18-2 (G-9) between expansion joint 3RSS*EJ2A and reducer. CI-RSS-18 Sht 4 Rev 4 shows the line connected to the reducer.
5. EM-112C Rev 16 shows 3-RSS-001-113-2 connected to 3-RSS-010-13-2 (G-8) between expansion joint 3RSS*EJ2C and reducer. CI-RSS-19 Sht 3 Rev 3 shows the line connected to the reducer.
6. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-750-78-4 before it connects to 3-RSS-150-79-4 (I-7). CP-379004 Sht 4 Rev 5 shows reducer.
7. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-750-73-4 (I-8). CP-379704 Sht 3 shows reducer in Fantom Line and one is required. CP-379005 Sht 4 Rev 6 should show the reducer on line 3-RSS-750-073-04 connection to 3-RSS-001-071-04.
8. EM-112C Rev 16 shows line from V937 connected to 3-RSS-002-89-4 (F-6). CP-379013 Sht 3 Rev 5 shows it connected to a 3/4 inch line to V938 (F-6).
9. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on 3-RSS-750-91-4 before it connects to 3-RSS-002-89-4 (D-10).CP-379013 Sht 3 Rev 5 shows the reducer.
10. CP-379013 Sht 3 Rev 5 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-150-79-4 before it connects to 3-RSS-002-89-4. Reducer needs to be added. It also needs to be added to EM-112C Rev 16 (G-6).
11. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on 3-RSS-150-85-4 before connection to 3-RSS-002-86-4 (D-8). CP-379015 Sht 2 Rev 3 shows the reducer.
12. EM-112C Rev 16 shows line 3-RSS-001-109-2 (G-4) connected to 3-RSS-010-8-2 before reducer. CI-RSS-21 Sht 4 Rev 5 shows the connection at the reducer.
13. EM-112C Rev 16 shows line 3-RSS-750-127-2 (H-4) to be connected after line 3-RSS-004-124-2. CI-RSS-8 Sht 3 Rev 6

shows the connection before 3-RSS-004-124-2.
14. CI-RSS-8 Sht 3 Rev 6 shows a reducer on line 3-RSS-004-124-2 before connection to line 3-RSS-010-9-2. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer.
15. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-008-46-2 (J-4). CI-RSS-8 Sht 3 Rev 6 shows a reducer before connection to 3-RSS-010-9-2.
16. EM-112C Rev 16 at (J-3) shows no capped line between 3-SSP-001-155-2 and check valve *V55 as shown on CI-RSS-9 Sht 5 Rev 8.
17. EM-112C Rev 16 shows line 3-RSS-001-105-2 (C-2) connected to 3-RSS-010-3-2 before reducer. CI-RSS-20 Sht 4 Rev 6 shows the connection at the reducer.
18. EM-112C Rev 16 shows Flow Elements at (F-2, F-4, F-7, F-9), but does not call them out as *FE40D, *FE38B, *FE40C, and *FE38A.
19. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-008-52-2 (J-2). CI-RSS-7 Sht 3 Rev 5 shows a reducer before the connection to 3-RSS-010-11-2.
20. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-750-49-2 (D-5). CP-379709 Sht 3 Rev 4 shows a reducer before the line connects to 3-RSS-002-57-4.
21. EM-112C Rev 16 shows at (D-5) a reducer on the 1 inch line to V939. CP-379014 Sht 3 Rev4, Detail B, shows no reducer.
22. CP-379014 Sht 3 Rev 4 does not call out STR2B (D-4) shown and called out on EM-112C Rev 16 (D-5).
23. EM-112C Rev 16 shows the line to valve 3RSS-V942 (D-5) connected directly to line 3-RSS-002-57-4. CP-379014 Sht 3 Rev 4 Detail C shows the line for valve 3RSS-V942 connected to the line to 3RSS-V943.
24. CP-379014 Sht 3 Rev 4 shows reducers that are not shown on EM-112C Rev 16 at the following locations: Line 3-RSS-150-67-4 before it connects to line 3-RSS-002-57-4 (D-5); line 3-RSS-750-75-4 before it connects to line 3-RSS-150-67-4 (I-4); line 3-RSS-001-66-4 between3-RSS-001-59-4 and 3-RSS-150-67-4 (I-4); and line 3-RSS-001-59-4 before it connects to line 3-RSS-001-66-4 (I-4). EM-112C-16 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-750-61-4 at (I-2) but CP-379009 Sht 3 shows a reducer between line 3-RSS-001-59-4 and *V978.
25. EM-112C Rev 16 shows no reducer on line 3-RSS-150-67-4 before connection to 3-RSS-002-57-4 (D-5). CP-379016 Sht 2 Rev 4 shows the reducer.
26. CP-379008 Sht 3 Rev 9 does not identify instrument PI-42B.
27. CP-379008 Sht 3 Rev 9 note that line 3-SSP-500-126-4 continues on CP-394753 should be removed because the line is no longer on EM-112C Rev 16 (D-6).

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0079

Review Group: Programmatic
Review Element: Corrective Action Process
Discipline: Mechanical Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: DGX
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Procedural Controls for Revising Station Procedures Affected by Calculation Change Notices (CCNs)

Description: In response to "State how the corrective action will effectively prevent or reduce the possibility of the same or similar event or adverse condition from happening again", block 7 of form RP-4-7 page 4 0f 4, of Adverse Condition Report ACR M3-96-0485 states "The CCN that affected the aforementioned surveillance procedure forms did not catch the impact to these forms. Per DCM (Design Control Manual) Rev. 3, the independent review process is sufficient to reduce the possibility of the same or similar event from happening again."

Our review of the DCM Rev. 3, chapters 4 and 5 did not identify sufficient controls in the independent review process for Calculation Change Notices (CCNs) to prevent or provide added assurance that this event would not be repeated. New calculations or actual revisions to calculations include a specific check for procedural impact (see NUC DCM FORM 5-1A item 5) which receives independent review, however the form used for CCNs (see NUC DCM FORM 5-5A) includes no such specific check in the independent review process. In addition, with exception of the requirement to consider "Are adequate preoperational and subsequent periodic testing requirements appropriately specified?", specific guidance for independent reviewers of CCNs provided in Chapter 4 of the DCM does not include consideration of impact to station procedures.

There is a check in Chapter 4 of Rev. 3 of the DCM by the independent reviewer that asks "has the integrated design package review considered appropriate supplemental reviews by other engineering disciplines (seismic, electrical, etc.) and affected departments (Operations, maintenance, etc.)?" This could be one link to help ensure the CCN would go to the Operations Department for their review and the assumption would then have to made that the affected surveillances would be identified for revision, however this link in and of itself does not go right to the issue of whether or not station procedures are affected. In any case , the statement in the ACR (block 7 of form RP4-7) of sufficient controls in the DCM for Rev. 3 for the CCN process with respect to flagging needed changes to station procedures has not been found. In addition, our review of the current Revision 5 of the DCM for the CCN process also did not find sufficient controls which would prevent recurrence of the event documented in the aforementioned ACR.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Navarro, Mark	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97

VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date: 9/3/97

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Navarro, Mark	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0094

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Structural Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
- ○ Yes
- ○ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Pipe Support Calculation Discrepancy

Description: We have reviewed Pipe Support calculation no. 12179-NP(F)-Z19A-135
REV.3. Based on this review, we have noted the following discrepancies.

1. The load tabulation on page-7, shows the stress calculation Rev.2. Latest stress
calculation is rev.3. The rev.3 loads are increased and not incorporated in the calculation.

2. Incorrect page reference on page-17:
see page 18 should be see page-19.

3. Incorrect page reference on page-20:
see page-21 should be see page-22.
see page-20 should be see page-21

4. Drafting error on page-14:
F = 534 #/in should be 543 #/in.

5. Thickness value (T=0.38 in) of run pipe, used on page 16 does not match with the value shown on page-8, which shows T=0.187 in.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/9/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0095

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Structural Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: RSS
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
○ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Structural Steel Calculation Discrepancy

Description: We have reviewed Pipe Support calculation no. 12179-SEO-BZ-79B.4 REV.1. Based on this review we have noted the following discrepancy.

1. Page-9 of the calculation has mathematical errors. It will not have any impact on result.
   I = 9.27 in4, should be 11.78 in4
   S = 2.42 in3, should be 3.07 in3
   Tcap = 52.3 in-k, should be 66.31 in-k

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/9/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Patel, A.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0097

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: QSS
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Calculation NP(F)-X7926 - Pipe Supports and valve accelerations not evaluated for current loads

Description: In the process of reviewing Calculation 12179-NP(F)-X7926 Rev. 2, including Calculation Change Notice (CCN) No.'s 1 through 6 we noted the following discrepancies:

(i) CCN #6, dated 9/13/96 revised the piping stress analysis to incorporate containment displacement effects associated with various accident scenarios, as defined by Calculation No. 12179-NS(B)-168, Rev. 1, 'Containment Displacement Profiles'. The NUPIPE piping model has been reanalyzed to address the containment displacement effects. Consequently pipe support loads are revised based on the new analysis. However, no support summary has been provided in the calculation, and there is no indication that the revised support loads have been transmitted to Pipe Support Engineering for evaluation.

(ii) CCN #6, dated 9/13/96 references Stress Data Package SDP-QSS Rev. 0, dated 1-14-83. However, CCN #3, dated 9/17/85 already evaluated the impact of revisions 1 through 3 of the Stress Data Package. CCN#6 does not reflect the appropriate revision of the stress data package.The latest revision of the Data Package is Rev. 6.

(iii) CCN #1, dated 7/16/85 states that 'valve accelerations due to time history forces exceeded allowables of 3.0 g's for valves 3QSS*V7 and 3QSS*V3. The calcuation recomputes reduced acceleration values, however, the reduced acceleration levels reported in CCN #1 still exceed the allowable of 3.0 g's. There is no justification provided for accepting these higher acceleration values.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Jain, R. C.	☒	☐	☐	8/29/97
VT Lead:	Nori, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/2/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Jain, R. C.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					
SL Comments:					

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0100

Review Group: Operations & Maintenance and Testing
Review Element: Operating Procedure
Discipline: Operations
Discrepancy Type: O & M & T Procedure
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VAI ID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Surveillance SP 3626.13, S.W. Fouling is not consistent with response to Generic Letter 89-13.

Description: NU response to Generic Letter 89-13 committed to implement a program which will detect and control flow blockage problems due to biofouling. As part of the implementation of the GL 89-13 program, surveillance procedure SP 3626.13, Service Water Heat Exchangers Fouling Determination, was revised to collect data and provide the Operations Department with initial criteria for determination of degraded and inoperable heat exchangers in the Service Water System. Three discrepancies were noted with Rev. 15 Change 1 of SP 3626.13 and the associated Forms.

1. Not all service water heat exchanges are flushed as part of the fouling determination. This surveillance procedure requires flushing of only the 3HVQ*ACUS1A&B, 3HVQ*ACUS2A & B, and 3EGS*E1&2 A & B heat exchangers. The stated purpose of the blowdown is to remove any minor mussel growth, debris, and to establish Hypochlorite residual. Removing minor mussel growth, debris, and establishing Hypochlorite residual is important for service water heat exchangers which have low service water flow or have stagnant water due to being isolted or in standby.
2. Adequate acceptance criteria is not provided. Steps 4.2.4, 4.8.1.d and 4.8.2.d of surveillance procedure SP 3626.13 identify, respectively the flushing of the heat exchangers identified in item 1 above, but do not give acceptance criteria, adequate guidance to the operator describing what he should be looking for, or adequate time and flow rate to accomplish the required flushing.
3. The associated OPS Forms only require signoff verifying the position of drain valve and does not require the operator to record the results of the flushing and what if anything was flushed from the heat exchanger.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Spear, R.	☒	☐	☐	8/26/97
VT Lead:	Bass, Ken	☒	☐	☐	8/26/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	8/28/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/5/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Spear, R.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Bass, Ken	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					
SL Comments:					

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0101

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Mechanical Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: QSS
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: QSS/RSS Pump Room Ventilation Calculation Discrepancy

Description: Calculation P(B)-1001 Rev. 0 & CCN 1 were reviewed to verify that the correct heat load from the Quench Spray System (QSS) pumps 3QSS*P3A/B and the Recirculation Spray System (RSS) pumps 3RSS*P1A/B/C/D were used in determining the ventilation requirements for the pump rooms. The review identified the following discrepancies:

1. The motors for pumps 3QSS*P3A/B have a 500 hp nameplate rating with a required bhp of 470 per PDDS. The pump brakehorse power requirements shown in specification 2214.602-040 are 386 bhp rated, 470 bhp maximum. The calculation uses 386 bhp when calculating the motor heat load. Using the maximum bhp shown in Plant Design Data System (PDDS) and the specification increases the motor heat load to 90,033 Btu/hr from 73,942 Btu/hr.

2. The motors for RSS pumps 3RSS*P1A/B/C/D have a 500 hp nameplate rating with a required bhp of 458 per PDDS. The pump brakehorse power requirements shown in specification 2214.602-044 are 443 bhp design, 458 bhp maximum.The calculation uses 443 bhp when calculating the motor heat load. Using the maximum bhp shown in PDDS and the specification increases the motor heat load to 162,063 Btu/hr from 156,750 Btu/hr.

This was classified as a level 4 since the discrepancy does not increase the heat loads in the rooms above the capacity of the HVAC equipment shown on page 67 of the calculation.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Stout, M. D.	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/4/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Stout, M. D.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A				

VT Lead: Nair, Shridhar K
VT Mgr: Schopfer, Don K
IRC Chmn: Singh, Anand K
Date:
SL Comments:



Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0104

Review Group: Accident Mitigation
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Other
Discrepancy Type: Licensing Document
System/Process: N/A
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Incorporation of Westinghouse Revisions to Plant Safety Evaluation and FSAR §15.4.8

Description: Westinghouse Letter 91NE*-G-0001, "Northeast Utilities Service Company Millstone Unit 3 - Revisions To PSE and Supplemental Data For Vantage 5H," dated January 9, 1991, provides revised pages to the Plant Safety Evaluation (PSE) and other documents supporting the licensing of the VANTAGE 5H fuel upgrade at Millstone Unit 3. The purpose of these revisions is to correct errors in certain non-limiting cases for the non-LOCA analyses related to the Rod Cluster Control Assembly ejection event.

The revisions attached to 91NE*-G-0001 identify changes to the initial conditions, nominal values and results of the accident analyses reported in Plant Safety Evaluation and §15.4.8 of the FSAR. These changes have not been incorporated into the FSAR. Therefore, the FSAR is inconsistent with the supporting analysis for the plant.

A review of applicable corrective action databases for Millstone 3 has not identified any pending FSAR or PSE change notice items that will incorporate the Westinghouse identified revisions.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0105

Review Group: Accident Mitigation
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Other
Discrepancy Type: Licensing Document
System/Process: N/A
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Westinghouse Comments On Safety System Functional Requirements Document and FSAR Chapter 15

Description: Westinghouse Letter NEU-96-614, "Northeast Utilities Service Company Millstone Unit 3 - Review of Safety Systems Functional Requirements," dated October 25, 1996, provides comments on the sections of the Safety System Functional Requirement report related to: Reactor Coolant System, Chemical Volume and Control System, Emergency Core Cooling System, Main Steam System, Main Feedwater System, Auxiliary Feedwater System, Containment Systems, Reactor Protection Systems, and Emergency Safety Features Actuation System. The comments were provided by the Westinghouse non-LOCA and LOCA analysis groups. Westinghouse provided these comments at the request of Northeast Utilities Service Company (NU).

Westinghouse Letter NEU-96-622, "Northeast Utilities Service Company Millstone Unit 3 - Review of Safety System Functional Requirements," dated November 15, 1996, provides comments on information contained in the Millstone 3 Safety Systems Functional Requirements Document from the Westinghouse Fluid Systems Group. Westinghouse provided these comments at the request of NU.

Westinghouse Letter NEU-97-536, "Northeast Utilities Service Company Millstone Unit 3 - Review of FSAR Chapter 15," dated April 8, 1997, provides comments on the accident analyses reported in FSAR §§15.0 and 15.4. Westinghouse provided these comments at the request of NU.

Westinghouse Letter NEU-97-537, "Northeast Utilities Service Company Millstone Unit 3 - Review of Steam Line Break M&E Information in FSAR Chapter 15," dated April 8, 1997, provides comments with respect to the steam and feedwater releases used in the radiological evaluations at Millstone 3. Westinghouse provided the comments at the request of NU.

The comments contained in NEU-96-614, NEU-96-622, NEU-97-536, and NEU-97-537 identify revisions to the initial conditions and nominal values used by Westinghouse in the analyses supporting the licensing of the Millstone 3 plant. These changes have not been incorporated into the FSAR. Therefore, the FSAR is inconsistent with the supporting analysis for the plant.

A review of applicable corrective action databases for Millstone 3 has not identified any pending FSAR change notice item that will incorporate the Westinghouse comments.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0114

Review Group: Configuration
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Drawing
System/Process: SWP
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Upper Tier to Lower Tier Drawing Review for SWP in ESF Bldg.

Description: The following drawing discrepancies were found in reviewing the P&ID with lthe as built Isometric drawings:

1. On CP-319768 Sht 3 Rev 8 line 3-SWP-002-206-3 should be 3-SWP-002-380-3 and line 3-SWP-002-206-3 shown in note as continuation on CP-319015 Sht 3 should be 3-SWP-002-381-3 per P&ID EM-133D Rev34 (L-2).

2. On CP-319015 Sht 3 Rev 9 line 3-SWP-002-206-3 should be 3-SWO-002-381-3 up to valve 3SWP*V19 and then should be 3-SWP-002-206-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-2). Also the note on the isometric CP-319015 Sht 3 Rev 9 for line 3-SWP-002-206-3 to continue on CP-319768 should be changed to line 3-SWP-002-380-3.

3. CP-319757 Sht 3 Rev 5 shows drain line from valve 3SWP*V838 to be capped and P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (M-1) shows it not capped.

4. CI-SWP-27 Sht 8 Rev 13 shows drain line with valve 3SWP*V974 and P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 shows nothing.

5. P&ID EM-133b Rev 34 (I-2) shows instrument 3SWP-FT59D to be non safety related but CI-SWP-27 Sht 8 Rev 13 has it (*) safety related.

6. P&ID EM-133D Rev 34 (J-5) shows valves 3SWP*V810, *V303, and *V57 to be safety related and isometric CI-SWP-33 Sht 7 Rev 8 should also show them to be safety related with a (*).

7. Isometric CP-319025 Sht 3 Rev 6 calls out in the continuation note for line 3-SWP-002-63-3 and it should be 3-SWP-002-387-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-4).

8. On isometric CP-319765 Sht 4 Rev 7 line 3-SWP-002-387-3 should be 3-SWP-002-386-3 and the continuation note line 3-SWP-002-63-3 should be 3-SWP-002-387-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-4).

9. On isometric CP-319012 Sht 3 Rev 8 the section of line between valve 3SWP*V54 and the tee to 3SWP*RV92B should be labeled 3-SWP-002-387-3 and at the continuation note the unlabeled line at the tee opposite 3-SWP-002-387-3 should be labeled 3-SWP-002-386-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-4).

10. On CP_319014 Sht 3 Rev 8 line 3-SWP-002-69-3 before

valve *V12 should be labeled 3-SWP-002-385-3 and the drawing continuation line 3-SWP-002-69-3 should be 3-SWP-002-384-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-6).

11. On CP-319021 Sht 3 Rev 6 the continuation note line 3-SWP-002-69-3 should be 3-SWP-002-385-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-6).

12. On CP-319767 Sht 3 Rev 7 line 3-SWP-002-69-3 in the continuation note should be 3-SWP-002-385-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-6).

13. On CP-319013 Sht 3 Rev 10 the section of line between valve *V52 and the tee to line 3-SWP-002-401-3 should be labeled 3-SWP-002-390-3 and line 3-SWP-002-146-3 of the drawing continuation note should be 3-SWP-002-382-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-7).

14. On CP-319020 Sht 4 Rev 7 line 3-SWP-002-146-3 in the drawing continuation note should be 3-SWP-002-390-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-7).

15. On CP-319766 Sht 3 Rev 8 line 3-SWP-002-146-3 in the drawing continuation note should be 3-SWP-002-390-3 per P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-7).

16. On CI-SWP-28 Sht 7 Rev 9 safety related equipment 3SWP*RO125A and *EJ8E as shown on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (H-8) should be designated with (*).

17. On CI-SWP-28 Sht 8 Rev 9 safety related equipment 3SWP*RO125C and *EJ8G as shown on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (H-10) should be designated with (*).

18. On CI-SWP-29S Sht 3 Rev 10 safety related valves 3SWP*V25 (*MOV-54A) and *V27 (*MOV-54C) as shown on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (J-7) (J-9) should be designated with (*).

19. On CI-SWP-33 Sht 6 Rev 9 safety related valves 3SWP*V811, *V304, *V809 and *V24 as shown on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (J-6) should be designated with (*).

20. On CP-319026 Sht 3 Rev 9 safety related valve 3SWP*V313 (*RV94C) as shown on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (I-8) should be designated with (*).

21. CI-SWP-27 Sht 8 Rev 13 Shows drain line with valve 3SWP*V974 that is not shown on the P&ID EM-133B Rev 34.

22. CP-319757 Sht 3 Rev 5 shows drain line with valve 3SWP*V838 to be capped that is not capped on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (M-1).

23. Per isometric CP-319012 Sht 3 Rev 3 and CP-319765 Sht 4 Rev 7 line 3-SWP-002-403-3 connects to 3-SWP-002-387-3 before the tee to line 3-SWP-002-386-3 and not to 3-SWP-002-

386-3 on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-4).

24. Per isometric CP-319015 Sht 3 Rev 9 and CP-319768 Sht 3 Rev 8 line 3-SWP-002-400-3 connects to 3-SWP-002-381-3 after the tee to line 3-SWP-002-380-3 and not to 3-SWP-002-380-3 on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34 (L-2).

25. Per isometrics CP-319766 Sht 3 Rev 8 and CP-319013 Sht 3 Rev 10 line 3-SWP-002-401-3 connects to 3-SWP-002-382-3 after the tee to 3-SWP-002-333-3 instead of before the tee on P&ID EM-133B Rev34 (L-8).

26. Per isometrics CP-319767 Sht 3 Rev 7 line 3SWP-002-402-3 connects to line 3-SWP-002-384-3 after the tee to 3-SWP-002-388-3 instead of before the tee on P&ID EM-133B Rev 34.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Read, J. W.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0115

Review Group: Accident Mitigation
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Mechanical Design
Discrepancy Type: Licensing Document
System/Process: N/A
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Containment Purge Isolation Valve Closure Time Discrepancy in Technical Requirements Manual

Description: In our review of FSAR Section 15.7.4.2.2, FSARCR 97-MP3-4, and Technical Requirements Manual a discrepancy in the containment purge isolation valves 3HVU*CTV32A/32B/33A/33B closure time was noted.

FSAR Change Request FSARCR 97-MP3-4 increases the required containment purge isolation valve closure time from the value of 3 seconds given in FSAR Section 15.7.4.2.2 and FSAR Table 6.2-65 to less than or equal to 3.89 seconds. This increase in required valve closure time is incorporated in the purge isolation time presented in the Technical Requirements Manual (TRM) Section 3TRM-3.3.2 (page 5 of 6)

TRM Table 3.6.3-1 (page 5 of 9) of the Technical Requirements Manual, which references FSAR Table 6.2-65, indicates a required valve closure time of 3.0 seconds.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Kane, T. J.	☒	☐	☐	9/6/97
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☒	☐	☐	9/6/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Kane, T. J.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SI. Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0117

Review Group: Accident Mitigation
Review Element: Maintenance Procedure
Discipline: Maintenance
Discrepancy Type: Test Implementation
System/Process: N/A
NRC Significance level: 3

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Notification of Failed Surveillance Test for 3MSS*RV26C

Description: On 13APR95, Surveillance Procedure 3712G, "Main Steam Code Safety Valve Surveillance Test (IPTE)", was performed on the main steam safety valves (3MSS*RV22A,B,C,D, 3MSS*RV23A,B,C,D, 3MSS*RV24A,B,C,D, 3MSS*RV25A,B,C,D and 3MSS*RV26A,B,C,D).

During the performance of the test on 3MSS*RV26C, the setpoint could not be adjusted to meet the acceptance criteria. The test was terminated. The surveillance cover sheet (Maintenance Form 3712G-1, Rev 6) indicate that the acceptance criteria were not met. The surveillance cover sheet requires that the shift supervisor be notified of a failed surveillance. The data sheet does not indicate this action.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0135

Review Group: Accident Mitigation
Review Element: Test Procedure
Discipline: Mechanical Design
Discrepancy Type: Design Control Procedure
System/Process: N/A
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Discrepancy in Documenting Fuel Building Filter Flow Rate Surveillance Testing

Description: Surveillance Procedure SP3614C.2 lists steps for in-place vendor flow rate testing for Fuel Building filters. Step 4.3.6 is applicable for Train A and Step 4.4.6 is for Train B. The procedure requires using OPS Form 3614C.1-1 and corresponding OPS Forms 3614C.2-3, 3614C.2-5, 3614C.2-7 and 3614C.2-9 for Train A. Similarly for Train B, OPS Form 3614C.1-2 and corresponding OPS Forms 3614C.2-4, 3614C.2-6, 3614C.2-8 and 3614C.2-10 must be completed. These forms are used for determining and documenting system flow rates. Although the appropriate OPS Forms were used for Train B, for Train A the OPS Form 3614C.1-1 was not used.

Therefore, for Train A, the requirements of the Surveillance Procedure are not met. In addition, no basis is provided for the computed system flow rates reported in OPS Forms 3614C.2-3, 3614C.2-5, 3614C.2-7 and 3614C.2-9.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Kane, T. J.	☒	☐	☐	9/5/97
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☒	☐	☐	9/6/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously Identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Kane, T. J.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0136

Review Group: Accident Mitigation
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Mechanical Design
Discrepancy Type: Calculation
System/Process: N/A
NRC Significance level: 4

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Feedwater Calculation 12179-735P(T) Discrepancy

Description: While reivewing the calcualtion 12179-735P(T): "Failure of Feedwater Regulating Valve at Zero Power Level", Revision 0, dated 03DEC81, a math error was discovered on page 10 of the calculation. The Steam Generator Inlet Pressure is calculated to be 1313 psia. The computed value is 1213 psig when the math error is corrected. As this value is the basis for the remainder of the branch flow and pump curve adjustments, it could not be verified that the feedwater flow to a steam generator does not increase by more than 100% after the postulated failure of the feedwater regulating valve as required by the analysis assumptions stated in FSAR §15.1.2.2, Case 2, Item 2.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☒	☐	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Peebles, W. R.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Raheja, Raj D	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0146

Review Group: Programmatic
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: I & C Design
Discrepancy Type: Licensing Document
System/Process: DGX
NRC Significance level: 3

DR VALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Incomplete response to ACR # M3-96-0928

Description: Condition Report has a Significance Level of "B" and requires a Root Cause Analysis; however, only an Apparent Cause Analysis was attached to the package.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Dombrowski, Jim	☒	☐	☐	9/2/97
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☒	☐	☐	9/2/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☒	☐	☐	9/8/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☒	☐	☐	9/9/97

Date:

INVALID:

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Dombrowski, Jim	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	

Date:

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0102

Review Group: System
Review Element: System Design
Discipline: Electrical Design
Discrepancy Type: Drawing
System/Process: QSS
NRC Significance level: 4

DR INVALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Omission on Logic dwg (LSK-27-12A & F) - logic for the reset of motor relays (86E) is not provided.

Description: A review of the schematic diagram versus the logic diagram for 3QSS*P3A and 3QSS*P3B resulted in the identification of the following:

a) Quench Spray Pump 3QSS*P3A (schematic ESK-5DG, logic LSK-27-12F) -

The schematic diagram ESK-5DG identifies interlocks from two handswitches to allow the reset of the motor protection lockout relay 86E. The logic diagram LSK-27-12F does not provide the "logic" for the reset of relay 86E. LSK-27-12F only indicates that the motor protection lockout relay is in the "reset" position in order to allow the start of the motor.

b) Quench Spray Pump 3QSS*P3B (schematic ESK-5DH, logic LSK-27-12A) -

The schematic diagram ESK-5DH identifies interlocks from two handswitches to allow the reset of the motor protection lockout relay 86E. The logic diagram LSK-27-12A does not provide the "logic" for the reset of relay 86E. LSK-27-12A only indicates that the motor protection lockout relay is in the "reset" position in order to allow the start of the motor.

Note, the logic diagrams for the Service Water System Pump Motors (e.g., 3SWP*P1A, logic diagrams LSK-9-10H & J) provide the required "logic" to reset the motor protection lockout relay (86E). The logic diagrams for the QSS pump motors (identified above) do not. The schematics for the QSS and SWP pump motors are similar in regard to the operation of the motor protection lockout relay (86E).

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Morton, R.	☐	☒	☐	9/3/97
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☒	☐	9/3/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☒	☐	8/29/97
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☐	

Date: 8/29/97

INVALID: This DR invalid. The QSS logic diagram shows less detail on the reset of the motor relay; however, the schematic diagram properly implements the function.

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Morton, R.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Neri, Anthony A	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments:

Northeast Utilities
Millstone Unit 3

ICAVP
Discrepancy Report

DR No. DR-MP3-0133

Review Group: Programmatic
Review Element: Corrective Action Process
Discipline: Piping Design
Discrepancy Type: Corrective Action
System/Process: RSS
NRC Significance level: 3

DR INVALID

Potential Operability Issue
○ Yes
◉ No

Date FAXed to NU:

Date Published:

Discrepancy: Corrective action not adequately addressed for ACR

Description: ACR M3-96-0416, which identifies overlstressed tie-rods for service water expansion joints, identifies the cause of the condition as engineering personnel oversight during the original design review of the joint design. The corrective action in the ACR addresse the issue of overstress but does not address the programmatic issue of inadequate design reviews.

		Valid	Invalid	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Wrona, S. P.	☐	☒	☐	9/5/97
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☐	☒	☐	9/5/97
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☐	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☐	

Date: 9/5/97

INVALID: Additional review of the condition and the identified corrective action verified that an extent of condition was performed on other expansion joints. Additionally, a review of the current Design control manual indicates that the procedures ae sufficient to prevent recurrence of the problem.

Date:

RESOLUTION:

Previously identified by NU? ○ Yes ◉ No

		Acceptable	Not Acceptable	Review Needed	Date
Initiator:	Wrona, S. P.	☐	☐	☒	
VT Lead:	Ryan, Thomas J	☐	☐	☒	
VT Mgr:	Schopfer, Don K	☐	☐	☒	
IRC Chmn:	Singh, Anand K	☐	☐	☒	
Date:					

SL Comments: