Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526

Mailing Address: Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302

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L. T. Cucwa Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing

> SL-1290 0166C

September 22, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Inspection and Enforcement Region II - Suite 2900 101 Marietta Street, NW Atlanta, Georgia 30323 REFERENCE: RII: JNG 50-321 Special Report 1986-003

ATTENTION: Dr. J. Nelson Grace

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is Special Report No. 50-321/1986-003. This report is required by Hatch Unit 1 Technical Specifications Section 3.13.2 Action b.1 Hatch Unit 2 Technical Specifications Section 3.7.6.1 Action b.2.c.

Sincerely,

At Am

L. T. Gucwa


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Enclosure

c: Mr. J. P. O'Reilly
Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.
Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr.
NRC Document Control Desk
GO-NORMS

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Special Report 50-321/1986-003 (Enclosure to SL-1290)

LICENSEE:

GEORGIA POWER COMPANY ET AL

FACILITY NAME:

EDWIN I. HATCH Unit 1

DOCKET NUMBER:

50-321

On 9/7/86 at approximately 0230 CDT, with Unit 1 at 2436 MWt (approximately 100 percent of rated thermal power) and Unit 2 at 1902 MWt (approximately 78 percent of rated thermal power), the volume in both fire protection water storage tanks dropped to less than 270,000 gallons. The Technical Specifications for Unit 1 (3.13.2.b) and Unit 2 (3.6.7.1.b) require the minimum volume in each tank to be 270,000 gallons.

The low tank level was caused by the activation of the deluge valves on the south end of the IB cooling tower. This activation caused a low fire water pressure condition, which automatically started the diesel fire pumps. The level in both fire protection water tanks dropped below the Technical Specifications limit before the deluge valves could be isolated.

The level in both fire protection water tanks was returned to within Technical Specifications limits in approximately 30 minutes.

Maintenance personnel investigated the event and determined that the 1B cooling tower south end air compressor had failed. This compressor supplies air to the fire suppression valves. As the air supply decreased, the deluge valves activated, as designed.

The air compressor was repaired and the fire protection system was returned to normal at 0445 CDT on 9/7/86. Additionally, plans are currently in progress to improve and upgrade the existing cooling tower fire protection installations.