

SALP BOARD REPORT

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

SYSTEMATIC ASSESSMENT OF LICENSEE PERFORMANCE

50-454/86001; 50-455/86001
Inspection Report No.

Commonwealth Edison Company
Name of Licensee

Byron Nuclear Station
Name of Facility

May 1, 1984 through October 31, 1985
Assessment Period

8605050038 860430
PDR ADOCK 05000454
Q PDR

Byron Nuclear Station
Facility

- A. Summary of Meeting with Commonwealth Edison Company on February 3, 1986. The findings and conclusions of the SALP Board are documented in Reports No. 50-454/86001; No. 50-455/86001, and were discussed with the licensee on February 3, 1986, at the Byron Nuclear Plant, 4446 German Church Road, Byron Illinois. The licensee's regulatory performance was presented in each functional area. Overall regulatory performance was considered to be acceptable but does warrant improvement in each of the areas rated as Category 3. Your programs to improve operations, surveillance, security, and radiation protection will be followed closely.
- B. While this meeting was primarily a discussion between the licensee and NRC, it was open to members of the public as observers.

The following licensee and NRC personnel were in attendance on February 3, 1986. Media representation is also noted.

Commonwealth Edison Company

N. E. Wandke, Assistant Vice President
T. Maiman, Manager of Projects
B. Thomas, Executive Vice President
K. Graesser, Division Vice President, Nuclear Division
C. Reed, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
R. E. Querio, Byron Station Manager
R. Ward, Services Superintendent
E. Fitzpatrick, Braidwood Station Manager
A. J. Chernick, Compliance Supervisor
L. E. Gerner, Superintendent, Regulatory Assurance
W. J. Shewski, Manager, Quality Assurance
J. S. Bitel, Operations QA Manager
D. Farrar, Director of Nuclear Licensing
S. L. Turbatch, Legal Department
and other staff members

Nuclear Regulatory Commission

James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
E. G. Greenman, Deputy Director, Division of Reactor Projects
R. F. Warnick, Chief, Projects Branch 1
J. Hinds, Senior Resident Inspector
P. Brochman, Resident Inspector
R. Lerch, Project Inspector
L. N. Olshan, Project Manager, NRR
R. J. Marabito, Public Affairs Officer

Media and Members of the Public

R. McLaughlin, WKRC-TV
B. Simms, WREX-TV

- L. Maye, WIFR-TV
- N. Wells, NCAP-Tempo
- E. McGreenry, Rockford League of Women Voters
- P. Morrison, HWV-Rockford
- B. Johnson, HWV-Rockford
- P. Gerson
- S. Person
- G. Jaeotsey
- K. Tatlon, SAFE
- D. Chavez, SAFE
- S. Campbell, SAFE
- M. Buntaine, DeKalb Area Alliance for
Responsible Energy
- E. Peterson
- V. Hutcherson, Rockford Register Star

ERRATA SHEET

Facility: Byron Nuclear Station

SALP Report No.: 50-454/86001; 50-455/86001

<u>Page</u>	<u>Line</u>	<u>Now Reads</u>	<u>Should Read</u>
29	Paragraph 1.b., Line 4	4 hours (Report No. 454/84085).	four hours (Report No. 454/85012).

Basis for Change: A typographical error was identified.

strength of the emergency preparedness training program, as evidenced during walkthroughs and exercises; the licensee's ability to monitor its own activities and take timely, appropriate corrective actions; and the timely and accurate reporting of emergency plan activations to the NRC and State agencies.

3. Board Recommendations

None.

I. Security

1. Analysis

During this assessment period, eight inspections were conducted by region bases inspectors. Three routine preoperational inspections were conducted by regional based prior to license issuance. Two routine and three special inspections were conducted subsequent to licensee issuance. The assessment in this functional area was divided into two phases - those issues of the security program required to be completed prior to fuel load, and the full implementation of the security plan after license issuance.

Three violations, subsequent to the issuance of the license were identified as follows:

- a. Severity Level IV - Adequate protected and vital area access controls in the form of physical barriers were not provided (Report No. 454/84085).
- b. Severity Level III - The locked status of vital area doors was not properly verified following a computer outage, resulting in two unlocked doors for approximately four hours (Report No. 454/85012).
- c. Severity Level IV - Failure to provide adequate access controls to two vital areas because of inadequate physical barriers (Report No. 454/85046).

Violation a. represented a significant breakdown in the security system that occurred prior to initial reactor startup. Due to the status of the plant, an act of radiological sabotage was not possible; consequently, enforcement actions were not escalated. Violation b. represented a personnel error that led to the inadequacy of two of the three elements of access control for the affected vital area. A proposed imposition of civil penalty in the amount of \$25,000 was issued. At the close of the assessment period, the NRC was evaluating the licensee's response to the Notice of Violation. Violation c. represented a disregard for security procedures by both station and contractor employees. These three violations were

strength of the emergency preparedness training program, as evidenced during walkthroughs and exercises; the licensee's ability to monitor its own activities and take timely, appropriate corrective actions; and the timely and accurate reporting of emergency plan activations to the NRC and State agencies.

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- c. Severity Level IV - Failure to provide adequate access controls to two vital areas because of inadequate physical barriers (Report No. 454/85046).

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