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August 8, 1997

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
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Washington, DC 20555-0001

Subject: Additional Actions Related to NRC Issue on Safety Relief Valve Spurious Operation  
River Bend Station - Unit I  
License No. NPF-47  
Docket No. 50-458

Reference: Fire Protection Functional Inspection, 50-458/97-201

File Nos.: G9.5, G15.4.1


RBG-44108  
RBF1-97-0279

Gentlemen:

During performance of the River Bend Station (RBS) Fire Protection Functional Inspection (FPFI), an issue was identified regarding the potential spurious operation of RBS's Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) during a fire event. On July 25th, during a conference call between the NRC and RBS personnel, the SRV issue and associated actions were discussed. Subsequent to the call, Mr. Dwight Chamberlain, NRC Region IV, requested that RBS submit our actions being taken until final resolution of the SRV issue is reached. The attached information identifies our actions discussed during the July 25th conference call.

Should you have any questions or require additional information, please contact me at (504) 336-6225.

Sincerely,



RJK/WJF/mbp

attachment

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## Attachment to RBG-44108

### Additional Actions:

At the Fire Protection Functional Inspection Exit Meeting on July 3, 1997, River Bend Station committed to issue a condition report which would serve as the location for collecting and documenting RBS actions resulting from this issue. Condition Report (CR) #97-0991 was issued during the afternoon of July 3rd. The CR operability assessment concluded that the Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) and the logic associated with the transmitters are operable and capable of performing their safety function. The CR contains the RBS position related to this issue and identifies immediate actions which had been completed at the time the CR was issued. Actions to-date include:

- 1) Identified and confirmed that one-hour roving fire watches are currently assigned to the potential areas affected. The fire watches were in place due to other reasons. However, prior to the release of the fire watches, RBS has committed to specifically consider each fire area where the SRV cable is located to determine whether they should continue until resolution of the SRV issue. To assure consideration, CR 97-0991 was added to the applicable documents list for the primary fire barrier Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO 95-00350).
- 2) Reviewed mechanistic failure scenarios to ensure that conditions were within the capability of the redundant Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) design criteria.
- 3) Verified that operator training and guidance was sufficient to cope with the postulated condition.
- 4) Established crew briefings to alert operators and ensure they were aware of the NRC postulated condition and failure mode.
- 5) Reviewed the circuit design to ensure the configuration was within existing design criteria.
- 6) Obtained additional information from the equipment vendor regarding potential failure modes of the SRV cable, given the postulated conditions, and provided this information to the inspection team on the day of the exit meeting [7/3/97].
- 7) Performed a review of AOP-0031, "Shutdown From Outside The Main Control Room" and AOP-0035, "Safety Relief Valve Stuck Open", to identify if additional operator actions for the subject event were necessary if inadvertent opening occurs. The evaluation concluded that no changes were necessary. Procedures AOP-0031 and AOP-0035 provide shutdown strategies for safe shutdown and identify adequate operator actions in their current revisions.
- 8) To reinforce existing training, simulator demonstrations of this event are being presented to operating crews during the current continuing training module. Discussion accompanying the demonstrations ensures the operators are reminded of the expected plant response and actions required to mitigate the event.