NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 3	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)

Safety Injection Due To Low Steam Line Pressure

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	0 1	8 6	8 6	— 0 2 1	— 0 0	0 3	2 7	8 6		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	3	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Timothy W. Kulterman, Senior Engineer	2 0 3 4 4 7 - 1 7 9 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A				N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At 0050 on 03/01/86, with the plant in the Hot Standby Mode, at normal operating temperature and pressure, a Safety Injection (SI) signal was received from the rate compensated low steam line pressure actuation logic. All Engineered Safety Features Systems actuated properly. The restoration from the SI was performed in accordance with plant procedures.

The cause of this event was operator error in failing to assure a steam generator atmospheric dump valve controller output was at zero prior to resetting a Steam Line Isolation (SLI) signal.

As corrective action, Plant Emergency Operating Procedures have been revised and the incident has been reviewed with all operating shifts. Additionally, the plant is continuing to pursue resolution of the rate sensitive SI Feature on low steam line pressure.

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv).

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 3	8 6	- 0 2 1	- 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At 0050 on 03/01/86, with the plant in the Hot Standby Mode, at normal operating temperature and pressure, a Safety Injection (SI) signal was received from the rate compensated low steam generator pressure actuation logic. All Engineered Safety Features Systems actuated properly. The restoration from the SI was performed in accordance with plant procedures.

The Balance of Plant (BOP) operator was attempting to control Reactor Coolant System (RCS) temperature by using the atmospheric dump valve on Steam Generator 1. The operator was very sensitive to the possibility of generating an SI signal by opening the atmospheric dump valve too rapidly.

The BOP operator adjusted the controller setting just above the steam generator pressure, but the valve was being held shut by a Steam Line Isolation (SLI) signal that had been generated earlier in the evening. The operator requested that the SLI be reset so that the steam line drain traps could be opened. Due to the integrating function in the atmospheric dump controller, it is estimated that the dump valve had a 50% open signal. When the SLI was reset, the dump valve on Steam Generator 1 opened to the demand signal. The sudden pressure transient resulted in an SI from the rate compensated low steam line pressure signal.

The root cause of the incident was operator error in failing to assure the Steam Generator 1 atmospheric dump valve controller output was at zero prior to resetting an SLI signal.

Corrective action included a review of this event with all operating shifts. Additionally, plant emergency operating procedures were changed to provide more specific guidance in recovering from an SLI to assure that the steam dump valves were specifically addressed. In addition, the plant is continuing to pursue resolution of the rate sensitive SI feature on low steam line pressure.

There were no safety implications to the public. All equipment performed its intended safety function.

This report is being submitted as required by 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv).

NORTHEAST UTILITIES

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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March 27, 1986
MP-8863

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-49
Docket No. 50-423
Licensee Event Report 50-423/86-021-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 86-021-00 required to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (iv), any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF).

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Wayne D. Romberg
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

WDR/TWK:pdm

Attachment: LER 86-021-00

cc: Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I

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