EUA Power Corporation
Docket No. EL85Exhibit No. (EUA-100)

PREPARED DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. G. EICHORN, JR.

I. INTRODUCTION

Qualifications

- Q. Please state your name and business address?
- 2. A. My name is John F. G. Eichorn, Jr., and my business address is
- One Liberty Square, Boston Massachusetts 02107.
- 4. Q. Mr. Eichorn, what are your present positions?
- 5. A. I am President and Chief Executive of Eastern Utilities Associates
- 6. ("EUA"). I am also a Trustee of EUA. I hold the following
- 7. positions in EUA subsidiaries: President and a Director of Montaup
- 8. Electric Company and EUA Service Corporation and Chairman and a
- 9. Director of Blackstone Valley Electric Company and Eastern Edison
- 10. Company.
- 11. I also am a Director of four nuclear generating companies in
- 12. which Montaup Electric Company has an ownership interest: Yankee
- 13. Atomic Electric Company, Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Company,
- 14. Maine Yankee Atomic Power Company and Vermont Yankee Nuclear
- Power Corporation.
- 16. Q. What position do you hold with the applicant here, EUA Power
- 17. Corporation ("EUA Power")?
- 18. A. I am President and a Director of that company.
- 19. Q. Are you a member or officer of any utility groups?

 Management Committee for the Seabroom 	ok project and a member of the
3. Management Committee. The Joint Or	wners' Management Committee
4. has oversight responsibility for the	management of the Seabrook

5. project. The Executive Committee develops and presents proposals

to the Management Committee for its action.

7. I am a member of the New England Power Pool Executive
8. Committee and Vice Chairman of its Management Committee. I serve
9. as a Director of the Electric Council of New England. Also, I
10. represent my company on the Northeast Power Coordinating Council.

11. Q. What is your educational background?

- 12. A. I graduated from the University of Maine in 1949 with a Bachelor of

 13. Science degree in Mechanical Engineering. I have since completed

 14. various technical and business courses, including Northeastern

 15. University's Management Development Program. I am a Registered

 16. Professional Engineer in Massachusetts.
- 17. Q. Will you please briefly describe your business experience?
- 18. Upon graduation in 1949, I joined the New England Electric System 19. ("NEES") as an engineer-in-training. I held many progressively 20. more responsible positions in several subsidiary companies 21. throughout the NEES system, leading up to Vice President and 22. Regional Executive, which position I held before joining Eastern 23. Utilities Associates as Executive Vice President in 1969. I was 24. elected President of EUA in 1972 and assumed the additional duties 25. of Chairman when that position became vacant in 1975.
- Q. What have been the major organizational and business initiatives that
 EUA has undertaken since you became President in 1972?

A. During the 1970s EUA established the EUA Service Corporation and
 reorganized itself into an integrated system. Previously, EUA had
 two retail distribution companies in Massachusetts, and these were
 consolidated into a single company, Eastern Edison Company. At the
 same time, EUA simplified its holding company structure by making
 Montaup Electric Company a subsidiary of only Eastern Edison
 Company.

After accomplishing the corporate simplification, EUA concentrated on improving its capital structure by issuing more common equity and improving the quality of earnings. A major part of this effort was to obtain rate base treatment of construction work in progress. Mainly as a result of the Commission's allowance of rate base treatment of CWIP, EUA has been able to reduce its short-term (unsecured) bank loans from a high of 44% of its total capitalization at the end of 1974 to zero at the end of 1982.

16. Determinations Sought

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- Q. Mr. Eichorn, please summarize the determinations sought in this
 docket.
- EUA Power proposes to acquire the shares in the Seabrook project of 19. three Maine utilities (Bangor Hydro Electric Company, Central Maine 20. 21. Power Company and Maine Public Service Company) and one Vermont utility (Central Vermont Public Service Corporation). These 22. companies I shall refer to as "the Sellers." Collectively, the Sellers 23. own approximately 11.3% of the Seabrook project. In connection with 24. its acquisition of the Sellers' shares, EUA Power seeks two 25. 26. determinations:

1. First Determination

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EUA first seeks a determination that the market in wholesale coordination power in New England is sufficiently active and open that EUA Power, as a speculative entrant in the market without any existing customer base, will be allowed to sell power from Seabrook to non-affiliates at market-based prices, without cost-based ratemaking limitations.

Second Determination

EUA second seeks a determination on certain ratemaking and accounting matters which would have consequence only if cost-based ratemaking limitations apply. Such limitations would apply to (1) all EUA Power sales if the Commission declines to allow the market-based pricing to non-affiliates requested in the first determination and (2) any EUA Power sales to an affiliate, regardless of whether the Commission grants or denies market-based pricing for sales to non-affiliates.

The second determination consists of the following four elements:

(1) Approval of the Debt/Equity Ratio. EUA Power plans that the initial capital structure would be 80% debt and 20% equity. There may be temporary variations in this ratio during the construction period as a result of the timing of financings. Thereafter, when Seabrook No. 1 comes on line, the common equity portion of the capital structure may increase relative to the

1. debt portion as a result of the accumulation of
2. retained earnings and possible contributions of
3. common equity by EUA. The debt capital is to
4. be raised in the private placement market, and
5. the equity/capital is to be supplied by EUA.
6. The debt capital will not be guaranteed in any

way by EUA.

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(2) Approval of the Equity Structure. EUA Power plans that virtually the entire equity portion of the initial capital structure would be supplied through preferred stock. Common stock would be issued by EUA Power to EUA to preserve EUA's voting control, but the amount of capital supplied through this issue would be nominal, some \$10,000. The purpose of capitalizing the equity portion through preferred stock is to establish a fixed dividend rate.

dividend rate on the preferred stock issued by
EUA Power to EUA prior to commercial operation
of Seabrook No. 1 would be 25% per annum.

The rate of return on the nominal amount of
common equity portion of the capital structure
would also be 25% per annum. As shown by
evidence offered here, this rate reflects the
risks of EUA's acquisition of the Sellers' shares
in the Seabrook project prior to its completion.

The rate of return on debt would be established 1. 2. by the Commission's usual procedures -- that is, 3. at the weighted average of the actual interest costs of the various issues. The return on debt 5. issued during the construction period might be as high as 30% per annum. After three to ten 7. years, the initial debt would be refinanced and 8. the rate of return would be much closer to, but 9. still higher than, a typical rate of return for 10. utility debt.

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In the event that, upon any rate filing by EUA
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incurred before the date of closing were to be
disallowed as imprudently incurred, the
disallowance would not be used to reduce EUA
Power's rates unless the disallowance reduced
rate base in the plant as it existed at the
closing date to a level below EUA Power's
acquisition price for the plant at that date.

Q. Mr. Eichorn, what role do the above determinations play in EUA's
 consideration of whether to go forward with the acquisition of the
 Sellers' Seabrook shares?

24. A. A favorable decision on both determinations, or on the second
25. determination, is prerequisite to EUA's proceeding with the
26. acquisition. As I shall explain later, EUA regards the investment as
27. involving risks that exceed the usual level of risks assumed by

- 1. utilities and therefore requires the opportunity to earn a return that
- 2. exceeds the usual level of returns allowed utilities. Without the
- 3. determinations sought here, EUA would have no basis on which to
- 4. believe that such opportunity would be allowed, and it will not go
- 5. forward.
- 6. Q. Do you understand that no determination by the Commission can be
- 7. binding upon future Commissions?
- 8. A. Yes, I have been advised of that principle. I also have been
- 9. advised that the courts have held that the Commission is required to
- 10. give weight to determinations of past Commissions that have induced
- 11. reliance. EUA Power is prepared to proceed on the basis that the
- 12. determinations sought here are not binding on future Commissions
- but will be accorded the weight required by law.

14. The NuMaineCo Order

- 15. Q. Mr. Eichorn, has EUA Power previously sought declaratory relief
 - 16. from this Commission in connection with the acquisition of shares in
 - 17. Seabrook No. 1?
 - 18. A. Yes. EUA Power Corporation is the new name of NuMaineCo
 - 19. Corporation ("NuMaineCo"), which sought declaratory relief of this
 - 20. Commission in Docket No. EL85-21-000. The relief was sought in
 - 21. connection with a plan by NuMaineCo to acquire the shares of the
 - 22. Maine utilities in Seabrook No. 1. The plan was to capitalize
 - 23. NuMaineCo through combined debt and equity investments raised in
 - 24. the venture capital markets. The Commission denied NuMaineCo's
 - 25. petition for declaratory relief by an order issued on June 19, 1985.
 - 26, The basis for the denial was that, at that point, the scope of

- 1. NuMaineCo's proposal was inadequately delineated. The Commission
- 2. stated that the denial of the petition was without prejudice to
- refiling when the scope of the proposal was precisely established.
- 4. Q. Has the scope of the proposal now been precisely established?
- 5. A. Yes. The scope of the proposal set out in the petition refiled here
- 6. is precisely delineated in letter agreements between EUA and the
- Sellers. These letter agreements are presented and explained later
- in my testimony.
- 9. Q. In denying NuMaineCo's petition in the earlier proceeding, did the
- 10. Commission give any guidelines for refiling?
- 11. A. Yes. It indicated that the refiled petition should be accompanied by
- 12. evidence supporting the request for relief and made several remarks
- 13. relevant to such evidence. It noted, first, that it supported and
- 14. encouraged innovative solutions to issues. It then said that rates of
- 15. return should be commensurate with the risks involved and that, for
- 16. a proposal to acquire shares in Seabrook No. 1, the Commission
- 17. would consider, as relevant risks, the possibility that the unit would
- 18. not be completed, potential cost overruns or delays, the inability to
- 19. charge losses from cancellation against other sales, and uncertainties
- 20. in marketing project power (at 7-8). The Commission also said that,
- 21. if the power sold was coordination-type power, the rates might,
- 22. under Commission policy, exceed fully distributed costs (at 8). The
- Commission said that it would consider the competitive environment
- 24. "in connection with a request to market power from the project at
- 25. such rates" (id.). It said that a refiled petition might present
- 26, evidence on "cost, non-cost, value, market or competitive factors"
- 27. (at 9).

1.	The petition	filed in	this	docket	and	the	accompanying	evidence
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- 2. have been prepared in the light of the Commission's remarks.
- 3. Q. Does the petition refiled here closely resemble the petition previously
- 4. filed by NuMaineCo?
- 5. A. It resembles the previous petition in that it seeks determinations on
- 6. the basis of which investment will be made. But there are major
- 7. differences in the determinations sought. First, the present
- 8. petition, unlike its predecessor, does not seek a determination that
- 9. the rate base will be established by the selling utilities' investment
- 10. in unfinished plant rather than by the price paid by the purchaser
- 11. for such plant. Second, since the financing proposal here is
- 12. entirely different than the previous financing proposal, the refiled
- 13. petition seeks a different set of determinations on such matters as
- 14. capital structure and rates of return.
- 15. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 16. as Exhibit No. __ (EUA-101) a document entitled "Federal Energy
- 17. Regulatory Commission Order in NuMaineCo Corporation."
- 18. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify this exhibit.
- 19. A. The exhibit contains, for convenience of reference, the Commission's
- 20. order of June 19, 1985 to which I have referred and the order of
- 21. August 5, 1985 denying renearing of the earlier order.

22. Witnesses' Responsibilities

- 23, Q. What is the division of responsibility among the witnesses in this
- 24. Case?
- 25. A. I describe the background of EUA's offer to acquire the Seller's
- 26. shares. I then provide details on how agreement on the acquisition

was reached between EUA and the Sellers and set out and explain
 the terms of the agreement. Finally, I describe EUA's objective in
 pursuing the acquisition.

Mr. Pardus sponsors exhibits presenting data on the cost to EUA Power of acquiring the Sellers' Seabrook shares. He also explains the selection of the capital structure and rates of return embodied in EUA's proposal here. Finally, he describes the effect of the acquisition on ratepayers in Maine and Vermont and ratepayers elsewhere in New England.

Mr. Benderly presents evidence that a 25% per annum dividend on the preferred and return on common stock held by EUA is just and reasonable in the light of the risks assumed by EUA.

Mr. Hildreth describes how debt capital will be raised in the market to finance 80% of the acquisition price and estimates the cost of the debt. He also estimates what would be the cost of raising equity capital in the market, were the remaining 20% of the capital requirement to be raised in that manner rather than being put up by EUA.

Mr. Hatch describes the open and competitive character of the market for wholesale power in New England and EUA Power's plans to sell in that market.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

23. The EUA System

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24. Q. As a preliminary matter, Mr. Eichorn, would you please describe the 25. EUA system?

The system, as it exists today, consists of a holding company 1. (EUA), two retail electric companies (Blackstone Valley Electric 2. Company and Eastern Edison Company), a wholesale power supply 3. company for the system (Montaup Electric Company) and a company which provides various services to the other subsidiaries (EUA 5. Service Corporation). The new company which will purchase the 6. Sellers' shares in the Seabrook project and sell the output from 7. Seabrook No. 1 in the New England market will be EUA Power 8. 9. Corporation.

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EUA, the parent, was organized in 1928 and is registered as a holding company under the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. It is a Massachusetts Business Trust and is governed by a board of trustees. EUA holds all of the common stock of Blackstone Valley Electric Company. Eastern Edison Company and EUA Service Corporation and will own EUA Power Corporation.

Blackstone Valley Electric Company ("Blackstone Valley") is a Rhode Island corporation providing retail electric service in the Cities of Pawtucket, Woonsocket, Central Falls and four adjacent towns in northern Rhode Island. Blackstone Valley's service area has a population of approximately 201,000. Blackstone Valley's rates are regulated by the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities and Carriers.

Eastern Edison Company ("Eastern Edison") is a Massachusetts corporation providing retail electric service in southeastern Massachusetts to the Cities of Fall River, Brockton and 20 other towns. Eastern Edison's service area has a population of approximately 438,000. Its rates are regulated by the Massachusetts

Department of Public Utilities. Eastern Edison owns all of the
 permanent securities of Montaup Electric Company ("Montaup").

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Montaup is a Massachusetts corporation which provides the total generation and transmission power requirements of Blackstone Valley and Eastern Edison and sells wholesale power to non-affiliated wholesale customers at the same price as to affiliates. Montaup's rates are regulated by this Commission.

EUA Power will be the new subsidiary acquired by EUA to purchase the Sellers' shares in Seabrook, complete that portion of the project and market the project power. EUA Power is a New Hampshire corporation, which, as I have said, was previously named NuMaineCo Corporation. NuMaineCo was established by Merrill Lynch Capital Markets ("Merrill Lynch") earlier this year. As originally conceived, NuMaineCo was to be a vehicle for investment of venture capital in the Maine utilities' shares of Seabrook No. 1, if the Maine utilities chose or were forced to disengage from the project. When EUA became the prime candidate to invest in those shares, NuMaineCo was renamed EUA Power Corporation. While Mr. Pardus and I are officers of EUA Power, the company has not yet been acquired by EUA, since that step requires action by the Securities and Exchange Commission. I expect that the action will be taken within several months. Since EUA Power will not sell at retail, its rates will be subject to regulation exclusively by this Commission. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification as Exhibit No. (EUA-102) a document entitled "Eastern Utilities

27. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify this exhibit.

Associates Annual Report 1984."

- 1. A. The exhibit is a copy of EUA's annual report for 1984.
- 2. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 3. as Exhibit No. _ (EUA-103) a document entitled "Securities and
- 4. Exchange Commission, Form 10-K, 1984 Annual Report Pursuant to
- 5. Section 13 or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Eastern
- 6. Utilities Associates."
- 7. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify this exhibit.
- 8. A. The exhibit is EUA's most recent Form 10-K filed with the Securities
- 9. and Exchange Commission.
- 10. Q. What is the purpose of Exhibit Nos. __ (EUA-102) and __ (EUA-103)?
- 11. A. They provide recent background information on the financial position
- of EUA and the EUA system.

13. The Seabrook Project

- 14. Q. Mr. Eichorn, I ask you now to turn to the Seabrook project. Please
- describe the project and its present status.
- 16. A. The Seabrook project consists of two nuclear units at Seabrook, New
- 17. Hampshire, each having a capacity of 1150 megawatts. The project
- 18. was conceived in 1970 as one of several nuclear projects to be jointly
- 19. owned by New England utilities. Public Service Company of New
- 20. Hampshire ("PSNH"), which now holds a 36% share in the project,
- 21. became the lead participant and manager of the project. The
- 22. remaining ownership is spread among 15 other utilities. The Sellers'
- 23. shares are as follows:

1.	Bangor Hydro-Electric Company	6.04178%
2.	Central Maine Power Company	2.17391%
3.	Central Vermont Public Service	
4.	Corporation	1.59096%
5.	Maine Public Service Company	1.46056%
6.	Total	11.26721%

- 7. Q. Does Montaup currently have a share in the Seabrook project?
- 8. A. Yes, it does. Montaup owns a 2.89989% share in the project.
- Needless to say, none of the determinations sought in this docket
- 10. relate to Montaup's share.
- 11. COUNSEL: May we please have marked for identification as Exhibit
- 12. No. _ (EUA-104) a document entitled "Seabrook Joint Ownership
- 13. Agreement."
- 14. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify the exhibit.
- 15. A. The exhibit consists of the Seabrook joint ownership agreement of
- 16. May 1, 1973 and all amendments thereto. It sets out the rights and
- obligations of the joint owners.
- 18. Q. Has the Seabrook project encountered difficulties?
- 19. A. Yes. The project has experienced repeated schedule delays and
- 20. increases in estimated construction costs. A new estimate in March
- 21. 1984 raised the total estimated costs from \$5.2 billion to \$9 billion,
- 22. and PSNH was thrown into a financial crisis. We were forced to
- 23. substantially reduce construction on the project in April. The joint
- 24. owners then undertook to reorganize and strengthen the management
- 25. of the project, and each owner was required to develop a plan to
- 26. finance its portion of the remaining construction of the first unit.
- 27. Construction of the second unit has ceased and the unit has
- 28. effectively been cancelled.

- Q. What was done to reorganize and strengthen the management of the
 project?
- The joint owners approved the phased transfer, subject to regulatory 3. A. 4. approvals, of responsibility for directing the management of the 5. project from the lead participant, PSNH, to New Hampshire Yankee 6. Electric. Also, the construction management of the project as 7. transferred from United Engineers and Constructors to New Hampshire Yankee. At the present, New Hampshire Yankee Electric 8. 9. remains a division of PSNH, but the management of the division is 10. substantially independent of PSNH's management and is answerable to the joint owners' management committee. In due course, New 11.

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In addition to creation of New Hampshire Yankee Electric Corporation, a joint owners' executive committee was created to oversee the Seabrook budget and make recommendations to the management committee. An inderendent consulting firm, Management Analysis Corporation, was hired to review cost estimates. A new project manager, William B. Derrickson, was hired. Mr. Derrickson had built Florida Power & Light Company's 802 megawatt St. Lucie nuclear unit in a period of six years, a benchmark in expeditious nuclear construction. Finally, each owner agreed to present to the joint owners' management committee a plan to finance completion of its portion of Seabrook No. 1.

Hamrshire Yankee Electric will become an independent corporation.

- 24. Q. What was the result of these changes in management and financial 25. arrangements?
- 26. A. The changes in management and financial arrangements made it
 27. possible for increased construction of Seabrook No. 1 to resume in

- 1. August 1984. Construction of the first unit is now over 90%
- 2. complete. Fuel loading is scheduled to commence June 1986 and the
- 3. commercial operation is scheduled for October 31, 1986. No further
- 4. construction work is being done or is planned on the second unit,
- 5. which is approximately 25% complete. Montaup and other joint
- 6. owners have sought write-off of their investment in the second unit
- 7. as if it were cancelled.
- 8. Q. Mr. Eichorn, do you believe that the scheduled completion date of
- 9. October 31, 1986 for Seabrook No. 1 is realistic?
- 10. A. I do, assuming timely regulatory approvals.
- 11. Q. What is the basis of your judgment in this respect?
- 12. A. The management of New Hampshire Yankee has established a record
- 13. of setting realistic schedules and budgets and effectively holding to
- 14. those schedules and budgets. As the Chairman of the Executive
- 15. Committee of the Seabrook Joint Owners' Management Committee, I
- 16. have observed its performance closely. My observation causes me to
- 17. have very considerable confidence in the ability of Mr. Derrickson
- 18. and his team to do what they say they will do, when they say they
- 19. will do it, and at the cost they say will be incurred.
- 20. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 21. as Exhibit No. _ (EUA-105) a document entitled "Seabrook Unit 1 &
- 22. Common Target Budget and Schedule Update, July 24, 1985."
- 23. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify this exhibit.
- 24. A. This is the most recent forecast of the cost to complete Seabrook No.
- 25. 1 and the schedule of work to completion. It was prepared by New
- 26. Hampshire Yankee Electric.
- 27. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please summarize the main conclusions of the forecast.

- 1. A. The previous budget, prepared in August 1984, called for a
- cash-to-go cost (that is, cash to complete the project) of \$830.3
- 3. million. Cash expenditures from August 1984 to June 1, 1985
- 4. amounted to \$206.1 million, leaving a cash-to-go budget as of June
- 5. 1, 1985 of \$624.2 million. The revised forecast lowers this
- 6. cash-to-go estimate to \$617.5 million. The \$617.5 million includes a
- 7. contingency provision of \$149.6 million. The remaining \$467.9 million
- 8. consists of projected monthly expenditures from June 1, 1985
- 9. through December 1986. Those projected expenditures assume that
- 10. existing limitations will be removed. At present, PSNH has some
- 11. restrictions imposed by the New Hampshire Public Utilities
- 12. Commission which we believe will be lifted beginning in September
- 13. 1985.
- 14. The schedule has been revised to slip the commercial operation
- 15. date by two months from August 31, 1986 to October 31, 1986. Fuel
- 16. loading has also been delayed from May 1986 to June 1986.
- 17. Q. Has the estimated total cost of the project changed since August 1984
- 18. budget?
- 19. A. Only slightly, from \$4.48 billion to \$4.56 billion. The increase is
- 20. due to higher AFUDC as a result of the two month delay in the
- 21. commercial date.
- 22. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 23. as Exhibit No. _ (EUA-106) a letter to Mr. Edward A. Brown of
- 24. New Hampshire Yankee from J.W. Briskin of Management Analysis
- 25. Company, dated July 25, 1985.
- 26. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify this exhibit.

- 1. A. The exhibit is a letter from Management Analysis Company ("MAC")
- 2. to New Hampshire Yankee stating that MAC has reviewed the updated
- 3. estimates presented here as Exhibit No. (EUA-105) and finds the
- 4. estimates to be detailed, thorough and reasonable. It will be
- 5. recalled that MAC is the organization hired by the joint owners to
- given an independent review regarding Seabrook.

7. State Regulatory Developments

- 8. Q. Are there any clouds on the horizon with respect to timely
- 9. completion of the project?
- 10. A. Yes, and they are very troubling clouds. They arise from the
- 11. breakdown of support for the project among the state commissions
- 12. which regulate the joint owners. This breakdown is significant in
- 13. this proceeding in two respects. First, it explains how the Sellers'
- 14. shares in the Seabrook project came to be offered for sale. Second,
- 15. it bears on the risks assumed by EUA in purchasing the shares.
- 16. Q. Would you please describe the developments to which you refer?
- 17. A. Yes. I shall start with developments in Maine and then proceed to
- 18. those in Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Vermont. The key
- 19. documents to which I refer will be offered at the end of the
- 20. discussion of developments in each state.
- 21. Q. What are the Maine developments?
- 22. A. In June 1984, the Maine Commission instituted a proceeding on the
- 23. reasonableness of the Maine utilities' participation in the Seabrook
- 24. project. In an order in the proceeding issued on December 13,
- 25. 1984, the Maine Commission concluded that "the risks associated with
- 26. further participation in Seabrook 1 may well outweigh the benefits

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for Maine consumers, and further expenditures by Maine utilities under such circumstances would be an unreasonable act under 35 M.R.S.A. \$294" (at 1). The Maine Commission ordered the Maine utilities to obtain, by January 11, 1985, "credible firm offers to buy their complete ownership shares ... " (id.). The Maine Commission found that the Maine utilities by offering their share in Seabrook No. 1 for sale to other New England utilities, "will minimize the adverse impact of their disengagement from Seabrook on the other Joint Owners and on the region" (at 3). The Maine Commission indicated that if credible firm offers to purchase were not obtained by January 11, 1985, it would "unequivocally require the Maine utilities to present plans for their complete disengagement from Seabrook within a short time after January 11th" (id.). If such offers were obtained, the Maine Commission indicated, the Maine utilities would be permitted to continue to participate in Seabrook No. 1 pending completion of the sale (at 1).

The Maine utilities sought to sell their shares in Seabrook No. 1 to other New England and New York utilities. They reported to the Maine Commission on January 11, 1985 that they had received some expressions of interest in buying approximately one-third of their shares in Seabrook No. 1 but that none of the expressions could be described as a "credible firm offer." Central Maine requested the Maine Commission to refrain from ordering submission of a disengagement plan and to allow, instead, the Maine utilities to continue their efforts to find buyers.

On January 16, 1985, five days after the Maine utilities' report was filed, the Maine Commission issued an order concluding that

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none of the expressions of interest was, indeed, a "credible firm offer." Adhering to its earlier order, it directed the Maine utilities to submit, by February 8, 1985, "detailed plans to achieve their complete and timely disengagement from Seabrook" (at 2). The Maine Commission, however, granted permission to the Maine utilities to continue to seek buyers for their interests in the project while they put together a disengagement plan. The Maine Commission said, "A sale of the Maine utilities' shares on favorable terms remains a desirable outcome of these proceedings" (at 2). It ordered the Maine utilities to report on their further efforts to find purchasers when they submitted their disengagement plan on February 8, 1985 (id.). The Maine Commission stated that it would issue a final order after reviewing the disengagement plan and the report on the further efforts to find purchasers (at 3). The Maine utilities have appealed the Maine Commission's December 1984 and January 1985 orders to the Maine Supreme Court, where the appeal is pending.

EUA, through Montaup, then made an offer to the Maine utilities to purchase 34.5 megawatts of Seabrook No. 1, together with 34.5 megawatts of Maine Yankee. Canal Electric Company made an offer to purchase 20 megawatts of Seabrook No. 1. NuMaineCo offered to acquire the Maine utilities' entire ownership interests in Seabrook No. 1 in exchange for subordinated preferred stock. The Maine utilities forwarded these offers to the Maine Commission on February 8, 1985.

Then there transpired a long period in which the Maine

Commiss a took no action in regard to Seabrook disengagement.

There were, however, a series of tangential developments before the
 Maine Commission.

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On April 17, 1985, the Maine Commission issued a proposed decision dealing with prudence issues relating to the Seabrook project. The proposed decision was issued in the same docket as the disengagement proceeding, but in a different aspect of the docket. It was prepared by a single commissioner and was promulgated as the equivalent of an examiners report, subject to written comments by the parties. It recommended that varying portions of Seabrook No. 1 costs (depending on which of various alternative findings were selected) be disallowed as imprudently incurred.

The next development occurred in a Central Maine Power Company retail rate proceeding. In that proceeding, the utility, the Maine Commission staff, and the Maine Public Advocate entered into a stipulation in the character of a settlement agreement on Seabrook No. 1 costs. The stipulation disallowed the recovery of certain investment in Seabrook No. 1 and provided terms for the recovery of other investment in the unit, including future investment. The stipulation also specifically contemplated that Central Maine might sell its share of the project with the Maine Commission's approval.

- 22. Q. Would you briefly summarize the provisions of the stipulation?
- A. Yes. They are somewhat complicated but may be briefly summarized
 as follows:
- 25. 1. Central Maine agreed to write off on its books
 26. and not to recover in retail rates 30% of its
 27. Seabrook No. 1 investment, net of investment in

1.	fuel, incurred through year-end 1984. The
2.	remaining 70% is to be included in rate base
3.	immediately. Whether or not the unit is
4.	completed, the 70% is to be recovered over a 30
5.	year period. If the unit is cancelled, the
6.	unamortized balances of the write-off amount are
7.	to earn carrying charges equal to Central Maine's
8.	allowed cost of capital.
9.	2. The Seabrook No. 1 investment incurred after
10.	1984 and all investment in fuel whenever incurred
11.	is to be treated as follows:
12.	(a) If the unit is completed, Central Maine is to
13.	receive full recovery through rates of
14.	post-1984 investment and all investment in
15.	fuel. The rates, however, are to be capped
16.	at a so-called "benchmark" level for various
17.	years as set out in an exhibit of the
18.	stipulation. The "benchmark" level
19.	represents an avoided cost rate for
20.	cogeneration purposes.
21.	(b) If the unit is cancelled, the post-1984
22.	investment in plant and all investment in fuel
23.	is to be treated as follows:
24.	(1) investment incurred through May 1985
25.	is to be treated as determined by the
26.	MPUC under state law; and

1.	(2) 50% of investment incurred after May
2.	1985 is to be recovered over 30 years
3.	with carrying charges on unamortized
4.	balances; the remaining 50% is to be
5.	written off the books and not recovered

- 6. in retail rates.
- 7. 3. If the unit is sold for a cost in excess of the 8. post-1984 investment in plant and all investment 9. in fuel, the excess is to be applied to reduce retail rates.
- Q. Among the above provisions, which do you believe to be most
 significant for purposes here?
- Probably the provision that the agreed-to Seabrook No. 1 costs 13. incurred through 1984 are to be included in rate base immediately 14. and recovered over 30 years, whether or not the unit is ever put in 15. 16. service for Maine customers. This means that, with the approval of 17. the Mair : Commission, Central Maine Power Company can sell its 18. share in the project with assurance that it will recover its 19. pre-1985 costs at the same level as if the share had been retained 20. and the project put in service to Maine customers.
- 21. Q. Did the Maine Commission approve the stipulation?
- 22. A. Yes. The Maine Commission approved the stipulation on May 31,
- 23. 1985 without issuing an order on that date. It issued an
- 24. saplanatory order on June 3, 1985.
- 25. Q. was occurred next?
- 26. A. The Maine Commission issued an order in the disengagement
 27. proceeding on July 18, 1985. It said that its view of the economics

- 1. of Seabrock for the Maine utilities remained fundamentally
- unchanged: "the Maine utilities remain better off without Seabrook
- as long as they can arrange a sale on reasonable terms" (at 2-4).
- 4. The Maine Commission asserted that it had authority to order
- 5. disengagement, but chose not to do so at the time. It authorized
- 6. the Maine utilities to continue their efforts to dispose of their
- 7. Seabrook shares and to continue participation in the project in the
- 8. meantime.
- 9. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 10. as Exhibit No. _ (EUA-107) a document entitled "Maine Public
- 11. Utilities Commission Orders Regarding the Seabrook Project."
- 12. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify this exhibit.
- 13. A. The exhibit contains various orders of the Maine Commission which I
- 14. have discussed and the stipulation on the treatment of Seabrook No.
- 15. 1 costs in Central Maine Power Company's retail rates.
- 16. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please now turn to developments in Massachusetts.
- 17. A. In July 1984 Fitchburg Gas and Electric Light Company
- 18. ("Fitchburg"), Canal Electric Company, New England Power Company
- 19. and the Massachusetts Municipal Wholesale Electric Company
- 20. ("MMWEC") jointly requested the Massachusetts Department of Public
- 21. Utilities ("the DPU") to initiate a generic proceeding to examine their
- 22. Seabrook No. 1 financings, and the DPU in August 1984 opened a
- 23. proceeding on the request. The DPU issued its decision on the
- 24. merits on April 4, 1985. The DPU held that it would approve the
- 25. financing plans of the three investor-owned Seabrook owners only if
- 26. they were willing to give enforceable assurances and binding
- 27. obligations committing themselves to the following (at 73):

1. In the event Seabrook 1 does not become commercially operable, cost recovery from ratepayers will be limited solely to those expenditures which were prudently incurred before the date of this Order.

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- 2. In the event that Seabrook becomes commercially operable, cost recovery from ratepayers will be limited to the marginal costs of capacity and energy that would otherwise be faced by the utility, but in no event more than the amount which would be collected by placing the prudently incurred, used and useful portion of the cost of the plant in rate base and no less than the amount that the company would be entitled to collect if the plant were abandoned as of the date of this Order.
- 3. In the alternative, a company may choose to receive an as-available marginal cost rate for electricity produced throughout the life of Seabrook 1, without a constraint on the minimum and maximum levels of cost recovery.

In the same decision, the DPU refused to authorize the MMWEC to issue bonds to pay for further construction costs of Seabrook No. 1. The three investor-owned utilities and MMWEC have appealed the DPU decision to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. No decision has issued.

At the time the generic proceeding was opened, Fitchburg had pending at the DPU a request for approval of a \$18 million financing. Thereafter, Fitchburg reduced the amount of its requested financing to \$5 million, asserted not to be related to Seabrook, and requested immediate approval for that amount on an emergency basis. The DPU October 26, 1984 denied the request on the ground that Fitchburg had not assured that some portion of the \$5 million might not be used for Seabrook purposes. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court sustained the decision in an opinion issued on May 3, 1985. The court held that the DPU had

- 1. ample discretion to deny Fitchburg's interim financing request and
- adequate basis to find no impending financial emergency. The DPU
- 3. has since allowed Fitchburg to finance, but only with agreement that
- 4. Fitchburg will make no further payments for Seabrook No. 1
- 5. construction costs. This order was issued on July 30, 1985.
- 6. Fitchburg is currently in default in its payments to the project.
- 7. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 8. as Exhibit No. _ (EUA-108) a document entitled "Massachusetts
- 9. Department of Public Utilities and Massachusetts Superior Judicial
- Court Decisions Regarding Seabrook Project Financings."
- 11. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify the exhibit.
- 12. A. The exhibit contains the decisions of the Massachusetts DPU and
- Supreme Judicial Court which I have discussed.
- 14. Q. Please now describe developments in New Hampshire.
- 15. A. The New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission ("the New Hampshire
- 16. Commission") on April 18, 1985 issued an order approving a
- 17. Seabrook No. 1 financing of \$525 million by Public Service Company
- 18. of New Hampshire as consistent with the public good. The New
- 19. Hampshire Commission, however, approved the additional financing
- 20. only on the condition that the securities not be marketed until
- 21. necessary regulatory approvals or financial commitments have been
- 22. made regarding joint owners in Maine, Massachusetts and Vermont
- 23. and restricted the amount of the funds that PSNH could contribute
- 24. to construction of the project. The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League,
- 25. one of the intervenors in the proceeding, appealed the portion of the
- 26. order approving the financing to the New Hampshire Supreme
- 27. Judicial Court, which has not issued a decision. PSNH is currently

- 1. applying to the New Hampshire Commission to lift the funding
- 2. limitation in Seabrook No. 1 to allow the joint owners to go to full
- construction spending. No decision has been issued.
- 4. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 5. as Exhibit No. __ (EUA-109) a document entitled "New Hampshire
- 6. Public Utilities Commission Order Regarding Seabrook Project
- 7. Financings."
- 8. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify the exhibit.
- 9. A. The exhibit consists of the New Hampshire Commission's order of
- April 18, 1985 which I just discussed.
- 11. Q. Now, Mr. Eichorn, would you turn to developments in Vermont?
- 12. A. The Vermont Public Service Board ("the Vermont Board") in
- 13. December 1984 had acted favorably on continued investment by
- 14. Vermont utilities in Seabrook No. 1, contingent upon the joint
- 15. owners' securing financing, including all necessary regulatory
- 16. approvals, by mid-April 1985. As mid-April approached, it was
- 17. obvious that the regulatory approvals in some of the other states
- 18. would not be in place. The Vermont Board then called a hearing on
- 19. the status of the financing plans and related regulatory approvals
- 20. for the out-of-state owners. On May 3, 1985, the Vermont Board
- 21. concluded that a number of participants had not yet obtained
- 22. regulatory approval of their financings and that, given the
- 23. regulatory delays in other jurisdictions, the prospect that Seabrook
- No. 1 could be completed at a cost making the project economically
- 25. beneficial to Vermont ratepayers was "infinitesimally small" (at 10).
- 26. The Vermont Board continued (at 10):

There is no point, at this juncture, in attempting to assign blame for the dismal facts with which we, and Vermont ratepayers, are thus faced. Rather, the task now is to take a frank and realistic appraisal of Vermont's own best interests. The apparent anomaly of considering the abandonment of a nearly completed multi-billion dollar construction project must not influence the decision: the plain fact is that it now appears that it will be cheaper for Vermont to write off all of its expenditures to date and to acquire new power from other sources than to stick with Seabrook to its completion.

The Vermont Board directed the Vermont joint owners to seek cancellation by whatever means might be available under their contractual arrangements and also to offer their interests for sale. Recognizing, however, that it was unlikely that the Vermont utilities could either force cancellation or make sales, the Vermont Board required them to "pursue prudent means available, including, if possible, the termination of further expenditures in support of the project" (at 11). The Vermont Board ordered the Vermont participants "to prepare for a show cause hearing at which the issue will be whether we should enter an order requiring a cessation of future payments" (id.). Further, it ordered the Vermont utilities to show cause why they should not be required to cease accruing AFUDC on Seabrook No. 1 as of May 9, 1985. Subsequently, testimony was ordered filed, and the proceeding remains open. Central Vermont has appealed the Vermont Board's order to the Vermont Supreme Court, which has not issued a decision. Your honor, may we please have marked for identification COUNSEL:

30. as Exhibit No. __ (EUA-110) a document entitled "Vermont Public 31. Service Board Orders Regarding Seabrook Project."

32. Q. Please identify the exhibit.

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- 1. applying to the New Hampshire Commission to lift the funding
- 2. limitation in Seabrook No. 1 to allow the joint owners to go to full
- construction spending. No decision has been issued.
- 4. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification
- 5. as Exhibit No. __ (EUA-109) a document entitled "New Hampshire
- 6. Public Utilities Commission Order Regarding Seabrook Project
- 7. Financings."
- 8. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify the exhibit.
- 9. A. The exhibit consists of the New Hampshire Commission's order of
- April 18, 1985 which I just discussed.
- 11. Q. Now, Mr. Eichorn, would you turn to developments in Vermont?
- 12. A. The Vermont Public Service Board ("the Vermont Board") in
- 13. December 1984 had acted favorably on continued investment by
- 14. Vermont utilities in Seabrook No. 1, contingent upon the joint
- 15. owners' securing financing, including all necessary regulatory
- 16. approvals, by mid-April 1985. As mid-April approached, it was
- 17. obvious that the regulatory approvals in some of the other states
- 18. would not be in place. The Vermont Board then called a hearing on
- 19. the status of the financing plans and related regulatory approvals
- 2C. for the out-of-state owners. On May 3, 1985, the Vermont Board
- 21. concluded that a number of participants had not yet obtained
- 22. regulatory approval of their financings and that, given the
- 23. regulatory delays in other jurisdictions, the prospect that Seabrook
- No. 1 could be completed at a cost making the project economically
- 25. beneficial to Vermont ratepayers was "infinitesimally small" (at 10).
- 26. The Vermont Board continued (at 10):

There is no point, at this juncture, in attempting to assign blame for the dismal facts with which we, and Vermont ratepayers, are thus faced. Rather, the task now is to take a frank and realistic appraisal of Vermont's own best interests. The apparent anomaly of considering the abandonment of a nearly completed multi-billion dollar construction project must not influence the decision: the plain fact is that it now appears that it will be cheaper for Vermont to write off all of its expenditures to date and to acquire new power from other sources than to stick with Seabrook to its completion.

The Vermont Board directed the Vermont joint owners to seek cancellation by whatever means might be available under their contractual arrangements and also to offer their interests for sale. Recognizing, however, that it was unlikely that the Vermont utilities could either force cancellation or make sales, the Vermont Board required them to "pursue prudent means available, including, if possible, the termination of further expenditures in support of the project" (at 11). The Vermont Board ordered the Vermont participants "to prepare for a show cause hearing at which the issue will be whether we should enter an order requiring a cessation of future payments" (id.). Further, it ordered the Vermont utilities to show cause why they should not be required to cease accruing AFUDC on Seabrook No. 1 as of May 9, 1985. Subsequently, testimony was ordered filed, and the proceeding remains open. Central Vermont has appealed the Vermont Board's order to the Vermont Supreme Court, which has not issued a decision.

29. COUNSEL: Your honor, may we please have marked for identification

30. as Exhibit No. _ (EUA-110) a document entitled "Vermont Public

31. Service Board Orders Regarding Seabrook Project."

Q. Please identify the exhibit.

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- 1. A. The exhibit consists of the Vermont Board's orders which I just
- discussed.

3. III. THE PROPOSED ACQUISITION

4. The Negotiations between EUA and the Sellers

- 5. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please describe the events that result in EUA's
- 6. agreement to purchase the Sellers' shares in the Seabrook project.
- 7. A. The discussion of a sale was initiated by Central Maine Power
- 8. Company ("Central Maine"). Central Maine personnel asked if they
- 9. could come to our offices in Boston on June 27, 1985 to discuss the
- 10. possibility of a sale. I said that we would be pleased to meet with
- 11. them.
- 12. Q. What occurred at the meeting?
- 13. A. Central Maine indicated its interest in selling its entire share in the
- 14. Seabrook project. I responded that, if the price were attractive,
- 15. EUA might be interested in the purchase, but that I would have to
- 16. explore various alternatives so that our existing customers would not
- 17. take any of the additional risks. That result, I thought, might be
- 18. achieved by creating a new subsidiary, which had implications under
- 19. the Public Utility Holding Company Act. After the meeting, I
- 20. satisfied myself that there were no obstacles to the purchase under
- 21. that Act and that a new subsidiary could be conveniently set up
- 22. under the Act to accomplish the purchase. EUA retained Merrill
- 23. Lynch to assist in analyzing the feasibility of financing the
- 24. acquisition.
- 25. Q. What occurred next?

- 1. A. A second meeting was held with Central Maine on July 10, 1985 at
- Logan Airport in Boston. Both sides were represented by counsel.
- 3. Merrill Lynch was also present. The details of the acquisition were
- 4. negotiated at the meeting. At the close of the meeting, an
- 5. agreement in principle had been reached, subject to approval of the
- 6. Central Maine Board of directors and the EUA board of trustees.
- 7. Counsel for EUA was asked to prepare promptly a draft letter
- 8. agreement setting forth the terms of the understanding.
- 9. Immediately after the meeting, I called Bangor Hydro Electric
- 10. Company ("Bangor Hydro") and Maine Public Service Company
- 11. ("Maine Public Service") and told them that EUA had reached an
- 12. agreement in principle to purchase Central Maine's share in the
- 13. Seabrook project and inquired whether they would be interested in
- 14. having an offer to purchase on the same terms. They said they
- 15. would be interested, and we arranged to meet at EUA's offices on
- 16. the following day, July 11, 1985.
- 17. Q. What happened at that meeting?
- 18. A. I explained the terms of the agreement in principle and gave Bangor
- 19. Hydro and Maine Public Service a copy of the draft letter agreement
- 20. that had been drafted by EUA's counsel. Both Maine utilities
- 21. expressed interest in the proposal and said that it would be
- 22. promptly presented to their boards of directors.
- 23. Q. At what point were the discussions with the three Maine utilities
- 24. made public?
- 25. A. The Maine utilities issued press releases on July 12, 1985. News
- 26. reports were carried in New England newspapers and in the national
- business press.

- 1. Q. What occurred then?
- 2. A. Apparently as a result of the press coverage, Central Vermont
- 3. Public Service Corporation ("Central Vermont") called to request a
- 4. meeting concerning a possible sale of their share in the Seabrook
- 5. project. The meeting was held July 16, 1985 in EUA's offices.
- 6. Central Vermont asked if EUA would be interested in purchasing
- 7. Central Vermont's share on the same terms offered to the Maine
- 8. utilities. On July 19 we agreed to extend to Central Vermont the
- 9. same proposal and to seek authorization to purchase its share from
- 10. the EUA board.
- 11. Q. What actions did the board of directors of the various utilities take?
- 12. A. The boards of the three Maine utilities approved the agreement in
- 13. principle and authorized management to negotiate and execute letter
- 14. agreements on the basis of the agreement in principle. The boards
- 15. of Bangor Hydro and Maine Public Service took that action on July
- 16. 17, 1985; the board of Central Maine on the following day, July 18.
- 17. Central Vermont's board was not scheduled to meet immediately.
- 18. but on July 18, 1985 the executive committee of the its board
- 19. authorized management to proceed with negotiations.
- 20. EUA's board of trustees endorsed the acquisition of both the
- 21. Maine utilities' shares and Central Vermont's share on July 22,
- 22. 1985. It authorized management to enter into letter agreements on
- 23. the terms of the acquisition.

24. The Letter Agreements

25. Q. Were letter agreements then executed?

1.	Α.	Yes.	The	letter	agreements	were	executed	by	the	Sellers	on	the
2.		follow	ing d	ates:								

3.	Bangor Hydro	July 25, 1985
4.	Central Maine	July 31, 1985
5.	Central Vermont	July 25, 1985 */
6.	Maine Public Service	July 24, 1985

- Since the Central Vermont board had not yet met, Central Vermont's
 execution was made subject to the approval of its board. The board
 gave its approval on July 29, 1985.
- The letter agreements with the Sellers are similar in terms, and the terms of all of the letter agreements are consistent with the terms negotiated between Central Maine and EUA at the meeting of July 10, 1985.
- 14. COUNSEL: Your Honor, may we please have marked for identification
 15. as Exhibit No. __ (EUA-111) a document entitled "Letter Agreements
 16. on EUA's Acquisition of Seabrook Ownership Interests from Maine
 17. and Vermont Owners."
- 18. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please identify the exhibit.

- A. The exhibit contains the four letter agreements to which I just
 referred.
- 21. Q. Do the letter agreements represent the final agreement between EUA and the Sellers?
- 23. A. No. The letter agreements express an agreement in principle that is
 24. subject to the execution and delivery of a definitive agreement of
 25. purchase and sale. Such purchase and sale agreements, however,
- 26. are to be consistent with the terms of the letter agreements. The

^{28.} Central Vermont's letter agreement does not bear a date, but Central Vermont has informed us that it was executed on July 25, 1985.

- 1. purchase and sale agreements are to be prepared and executed
- 2. within 60 to 90 days of the dates of the letter agreements, unless
- the parties agree otherwise.
- 4. Q. Mr. Eichorn, would you please summarize the terms of the letter
- 5. agreements?
- 6. A. Yes. I shall start with the price provisions. The price is to
- 7. consist of four components: (1) a stated amount for the Sellers'
- 8. shares in the Seabrook project as of June 1, 1985; (2) the amount of
- 9. the Sellers' progress payments from June 1, 1985 through the date
- 10. of closing; (3) accrued interest on the purchase price and progress
- 11. payments through the date of closing; and (4) certain specified
- 12. further payments for each month that the date of closing is delayed
- 13. beyond October 31, 1985. The payment of all of the above
- 14. components is to be made on the date of closing between EUA Power
- 15. and the Sellers.
- 16. Q. What amounts are to be paid the Sellers for the first component?
- 17. A. This component, representing payment for the Sellers' shares as of
- 18. June 1, 1985, is divided into two parts. One part represents the
- 19, payment for nuclear fuel, and the other part represents the payment
- 20. for Seabrook No. 1 plant. The payments are as follows:

21.		Nuclear Fuel	Plant	Total
22. 23. 24. 25.	Bangor Hydro Central Maine Central Vermont Maine Pub. Serv.	\$ 5,617,000 15,836,000 4,144,000 3,844,000	\$ 6,983,000 19,164,000 5,156,000 4,656,000	\$12,600,000 35,000,000 9,300,000 8,500,000
26.	Total	\$29,441,000	\$35,959,000	\$65,400,000

- 27. The payment for nuclear fuel is made dollar for dollar on the Sellers'
- 28. investment in such fuel as of June 1, 1985. The payment for plant

- 1. represents the value that EUA attaches to the unfinished
- construction work as of that date in light of the risks and potential
- rewards of assuming ownership. No part of the payment for plant is
- 4. attributable to Seabrook No. 2 plant, since, as a result of the
- 5. indefinite postponement of Seabrook No. 2, the unfinished Seabrook
- 6. No. 2 plant is valueless.
- 7. Q. How much is EUA paying on the dollar to acquire the Sellers' shares
- as of June 1, 1985?
- 9. A. The Sellers' investment in nuclear fuel and in plant for Seabrook No.
- 10. 1 totals \$463 million as of that date. Thus, the price of \$65.4
- 11. million represents a payment of 14.2 cents on a dollar of investment.
- 12. If only the investment in Seabrook No. 1 plant is included, the
- 13. Sellers' total investment as of June 1, 1985 is \$434 million, and
- 14. EUA's price of \$36.1 million is 8.3 cents on a dollar of investment.
- 15. The fuel price of \$29.3 million equals the Sellers' value at that date.
- 16. Q. Will you provide further information on the second through fourth
- 17. components of the price.
- 18. A. The Sellers commit themselves in the letter agreements to continue to
- 19. support the project financially from June 1, 1985 to the date of
- 20. closing. This financial support consists of progress payments made
- 21. to New Hampshire Yankee. The second component of the price
- 22. consists of reimbursement to the Sellers for progress payments from
- June 1, 1985 through the date of closing.
- 24. The third component of the price consists of interest accrued
- 25. on the first and second components. The accrued interest is to be
- 26. equivalent to the AFUDC that the Seller has booked.

1.		The fourth	component o	of the price	consists of	additional
2.		payments that ar	e to be made	for each n	onth throug	h March 1986
3.		that the date of	closing is de	layed past C	october 1985.	. The amount
4.		of the additional	payments is	\$1.9 million	per month	for November
5.		and December 198	35 and \$4.7 m	illion per mo	onth for Jan	uary, February
6.		and March 1986.	Any partial	month is to	be prorated.	
7.	Q.	Do you have esti	mates of the	payments th	nat EUA will	make to the
8.		Sellers for the se	cond through	fourth com	ponents of p	rice?
9.	A.	The amounts of t	hose payment	ts will vary	depending	upon (1) the
10.		monthly cost of	constructing	Seabrook No	. 1 and (2)	the date of
11.		closing on the sa	ale. If the	costs estima	ted in Exhil	bit No
12.		(EUA-105) are ex	perienced, an	nd if the clo	sing occurs	on March 31,
13.		1986, the paymen	ts to the Sell	ers under t	he second th	rough fourth
14.		components will be	e \$78,448,000	for plant as	nd \$4,943,00	0 for fuel:
15.			Plant			
16.			Progress		Delay	
17.			Payments	Interest	Payments	Total
18.		Bangor Hydro	\$10,214,000	\$1,455,000	\$ 3 417 000	\$15,086,000
19.		Central Maine	28,384,000	4,017,000	9,500,000	
20.		Central Vermont	7,473,000	1,076,000	2,700,000	
21.		Maine Pub. Serv.	6,861,000	976,000	2,375,000	
22.			\$52,92,000	\$7,524,000	\$17,992,000	\$78,448,000
23.			Fuel			
24.			Progres	S		Fuel
25.			Paymen		nterest	Total
26.		Bangor Hydre	\$ 308,0	2 00	639,000	\$ 947,000
27.		Central Maine	855,0		800,000	2,655,000
28.		Central Vermont	225,0		471,000	696,000
29.		Maine Pub. Serv.	208,0		437,000	845,000
30.		Total	\$1,596,0	93,	347,000	\$4.943,000

The above data have been developed by Mr. Pardus.

- 1. Q. What would be the total price to EUA of acquiring the Sellers' shares
- 2. if the above payments are experienced?
- 3. A. By adding the purchase price for the shares as they existed on June
- 4. 1, 1985 to the above payments, the total purchase price is
- 5. determined to be:

6.		Plant	Fuel	Total
7. 8. 9.	Bangor Hydro Central Maine Central Vermont Maine Pub. Serv.	\$ 22,069,000 61,065,000 16,405,000 14,868,000	\$ 6,564,000 18,491,000 4,840,000 4,489,000	\$ 28,633,000 79,556,000 21,245,000 19,791,000
11.	Total	\$114,407,000	\$34,384,000	\$148,791,000

- 12. Q. Mr. Eichorn, using the costs estimated in Exhibit No. _ (EUA-105),
- 13. what is your estimate of the final cost of the 129 megawatts of
- 14. capacity EUA Power will be purchasing in Seabrook No. 1?
- 15. A. Based on the cost estimate included in Exhibit No. _ (EUA-105) and
- 16. assuming a March 31, 1986 closing and a cost of debt and preferred
- 17. stock of 25% after March 31, 1986, the total plant cost is estimated to
- 18. be \$147,920,000. In addition, the total fuel cost is etimated to be
- 19. \$40,286,000. The total investment at the October 31, 1986
- 20. commercial operation date will thus be \$188,206,000.
- 21. Q. What will the cost per Kw be using the above plant cost?
- 22. A. It works out to be \$1,142 per Kw.
- 23. Q. Mr. Eichorn, please proceed to describe the major non-price terms of
- 24. the letter agreements.
- 25. A. The letter agreements contemplate that the date of closing will most
- 26. likely be between October 31, 1985 and March 31, 1986. In the
- 27. event that the closing has not occurred by the latter date, the
- 28. Sellers have the option to terminate the purchase and sale. This

1.		option is to be exercised by April 15, 1986. In any event, the
2.		purchase and sale agreements are to expire on June 30, 1986 if th
3.		closing has not occurred by that date. Upon closing, EUA Power
4.		will have the Sellers' rights and obligations in Seabrook No. 1 and
5.		and will assume the obligation to complete Seabrook No. 1 and mak
6.		all progress payments after the date of closing.
7.	Q.	Are there other significant non-price terms?
8.	A.	Yes. A critical non-price term is that the obligation to consummat
9.		the purchase and sale is made subject to a series of conditions. The
10.		most important of these conditions are:
11.		1. Approval by the boards of EUA and the Sellers
12.		of the purchase and sale agreements developed
13.		pursuant to the letter agreements.
14.		2. Favorable orders from the Securities and
15.		Exchange Commission, the Federal Energy
16.		Regulatory Commission and state regulatory
17.		
18.		commissions on various subjects raised by the
19.		proposed transactions. These orders are to
20.		include an order from this Commission "providing
21.		rate treatment for Subsidiary [EUA Power] with
22.		respect to the purchase and sale on terms and
23.		conditions satisfactory to EUA" (at 2).
24.		3. Obtaining of financing by EUA Power on terms
24.		satisfactory to it

Obtaining requisite releases, consents, waivers

or approvals of the Sellers' lenders or investors.

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1.		EUA Power and the Sellers at	their option may waive conditions
2.			conditions have not been fulfilled.
3.	Q.		
4.	A.		
5.		1. The Sellers remain list	ole for claims and causes of
6.		action against parties	other than EUA and its
7.		subsidiaries existing a	
8.		2. The Sellers agree to i	ndemnify EUA Power from
9.			Bation costs related to
10.		Seabrook No. 2 incurr	ed within five years of the
11.		date of closing. Such	indemnification payments
12.			lesser of stated amounts.
13.		as follows,	
14.		Danger Under	네 그 네네이네네이스 바로 그 이번
15.		Bangor Hydro	\$1,619,000
16.		Central Maine	4,500,000
		Central Vermont	1,000,000
17.		Maine Pub. Serv.	1,100,000
18.		Total	\$8,219,000
19.		or all costs incurred b	y the Seller on Seabrook
20.		No. 1 in June, July an	d August, 1985.
21.		IV. EUA's	OBJECTIVE
22.	Q.	Mr. Eichorn, I ask you now to	elaborate on EUA's objective in
23.			ional shares in the Seabrook project
24.		through EUA Power.	

A. EUA's objective is to earn a relatively high profit on a relatively

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risky investment.

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The opportunity to earn the profit arises because the Sellers perceive the risks of continuing in Seabrook to greatly outweigh the potential benefits. The risks as perceived by the Sellers could relate, on the one hand, to potential delays or cost overruns in construction leading to cancellation of the project or, on the other, to the possibility that, if the project is completed, the power may not be needed by the Sellers or may not be the least expensive power available to them. I do not know which of these considerations, or what mix of them motivates the Sellers, but I do know that they perceive the risks of continued participation to outweigh the potential benefits. This is demonstrated by the fact that they are willing to dispose of their shares at 8.3 cents on a dollar of investment as of June 1, 1985 to be free of the obligation to continue with the project. I note that since the letter agreements provide that the purchase and sale is contingent upon the approval of the Sellers' respective state commissions, the transaction cannot go forward unless the state commissions concur in the Sellers' assessment of the merits of disengaging from the project.

EUA sees the risks of acquiring the Sellers' shares as substantial but believes that the potential benefits outweigh the risks if power from the project can be sold at market-based prices or cost-based prices that reflect the high risks involved. EUA Power is prepared to assume the risks if the Commission allows such prices by making the determinations sought here.

Q. Mr. Eichorn, you said earlier that the investment in the Sellers'
Seabrook shares is a relatively risky investment. What do you
perceive those risks to be?

I perceive two major risks to EUA. The first is that Seabrook No. 1 1. could be significantly delayed, driving up costs to levels that would 2. make the unit uneconomic and result in its cancellation. In my view 3. any significant delay will likely come from regulatory developments 4. rather than from construction problems, but the possibility of 5 regulatory delays is very substantial. There are five states with 6. oversight of joint owners (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New 7. Hampshire and Vermont), and the problem of obtaining coordinated, 8. timely action by the states on matters relating to Seabrook is 9. formidable. The project has already been significantly delayed as 10. various proceedings on the financing plans of individual joint owners 11. 12. have taken their separate procedural courses. There is long-standing political opposition to the project in New England. 13. 14. The regulatory developments which I recounted earlier reveal, I believe, an erosion of will to see Seabrook No. 1 completed, and that 15. 16. erosion is very troubling. If Seabrook No. 1 is cancelled, EUA Power will lose its entire 17. equity investment, since the salvage value of the unit is 18. non-existent or negative. Even the nuclear fuel will be essentially 19. valueless, since the fuel is fabricated to the unique specifications of 20. the unit and is not usable in other units. The fabrication of the 21. 22. fuel is about to commence. 23. Would the risks posed to EUA Power by a cancellation of Seabrook Q. 24. No. 1 be greater than the risks posed to a typical joint owner?

Yes. A typical joint owner can write off investment in cancelled

plant to its existing retail and wholesale customer base. Since EUA

Power has no committed customer base, such write-off is not

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- 1. available to it, and the entire abandonment loss would be borne by
- 2. EUA Power's investors.
- 3. Q. Are all risks of delay attributable to actions of state commissions?
- 4. A. By no means. There could be delays in licensing at the Nuclear
- 5. Regulatory Commission. Also, there could be delays involving direct
- 6. political opposition such as Long Island Lighting Company is
- experiencing in bringing into operation its completed Shoreham plant.
- 8. Also, one can never discount entirely the possibility of delays for
- 9. purely technical reasons having to do with construction, although I
- 10. know of no reasons to anticipate any such delay at this time.
- 11. Q. If the first major risk involves cancellation, what is the second major
- 12. risk?
- 13. A. The second major risk is the risk that if Seabrook No. 1 is brought
- 14. on line, EUA Power's share of the power cannot be sold or cannot be
- 15. sold at compensatory costs. Having no existing retail and wholesale
- 16. customer base, EUA Power must sell its power entirely on the open
- 17. market. EUA Power bears the risk that the market will not accept
- 18. the power, or will not accept it at compensatory prices, when the
- 19. power is offered from time to time over the life of the project.
- 20. EUA's ability to market the power at compensatory prices depends
- 21. not only on transient supply and demand conditions which are
- 22. difficult if not impossible to predict accurately but also on the cost
- 23. of completing Seabrook No. 1. Delays and cost overruns in
- 24. construction could impair or destroy EUA Power's ability to market
- 25. the power at compensatory rates, even if it did not cause
- 26. cancellation of the unit. For a typical utility, the fixed costs of
- 27. unused capacity are spread among the committed retail and wholesale

1.	customers;	for	EUA	Power,	lacking	such	customers,	the	costs	of

- 2. unused capacity must be borne entirely by EUA Power's. Moreover,
- because of the 20%/80% debt/equity ratio, any deficiency in revenues
- 4. from inability to market power at compensatory rates would have an
- 5. early and severe impact on dividends to the equity holder.
- 6. Q. Mr. Eichorn, if the sale is accomplished, will EUA Power sell any
- Seabrook No. 1 power to Montaup or other affiliates?
- 8. A. Any sales to affiliates would be to Montaup as the system power
- 9. supply utility. The sales would be made on the following conditions:
- The sale would not be made at above the cost-based rate.
- 11. This condition is necessary because of the lack of arm's
- 12. length bargaining necessary to e tablish a marekt price.
- 13. 2. EUA Power would sell to Montaup only if EUA Power had
- 14. no buyers for the power at above the cost-based rate.
- 15. 3. Montaup would buy power from EUA Power only if the
- 16. power represented the most economical option available to
- 17. Montaup The prudence of Montaup's purchases from EUA
- 18. Power would be subject to review in Montaup's rate
- 19. proceedings.
- 20. Q. Do you expect that there will be any sales to Montaup?
- 21. A. Not for several years at least. Montaup presently has sufficient
- 22. capacity to meet its projected load growth through 1989.
- 23. Q. Mr. Eichorn, does that complete your testimony?
- 24. A. Yes, it does.

AFFIDAVIT

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

John F. G. Eichorn, Jr., being duly sworn, deposes and says: that he has read the foregoing questions and answers labeled as his testimony, and if asked the questions therein his answers in response would be as shown: that the facts contained in said answers are true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

John F. G. Eichorn, Jr.

Subscribed and sworn before me this 26 th day of Arrest 1985.

William F. O'Connor Notary Public

My Commission Expires: May 23, 1991.