TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
SPECIAL PROGRAM

REPORT NUMBER:
80000-SQN
REVISION NUMBER:
3
PAGE 1 OF 14

REPORT TYPE
Element Report
TITLE:
General Management and Policy

REASON FOR REVISION: Rewritten to comply with Writer's Guide and incorporate of any SRP and TAS comments.

Deletion of issue.

Revision indicators are not shown on each page as the reformatting entailed a complete rewrite.

Note: Sequoyah Applicability Only

PREPARATION

PREPARED BY: Wayne M. Akeley/Ronald D. Halverson

Wayne M. Akeley — SIGNATURE — 1/28/87 — DATE

REVIEWS

PEER:

SIGNATURE — 1/28/87 — DATE

TAS:

RDH 1/30/87 KBJ 1/30/87 — SIGNATURE — 2/2/87 — DATE

CONCURRENCES

		CEG-H: Robert K. Mott	1-28-87
SIGNATURE	DATE	SRP: Jimmie W Joyce SIGNATURE*	2-2-87 DATE

APPROVED BY:

M W Rubin — ECSP MANAGER — 2/2/87 — DATE

N/A — MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER — DATE
CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

*SRP Secretary's Signature denotes SRP concurrence are in files.

8702110266 870205
PDR ADOCK 05000327
P PDR

1.0 CHARACTERIZATION OF ISSUE

1.1 Introduction

The issues described in this element report were derived from employee concerns generated as a result of the Watts Bar Employee Concern Special Program. The issues were determined to be applicable to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) and were investigated and evaluated on that basis.

1.2 Description of Issues

The conditions reported by concerned employees are:

a. A nonchalant regard for quality sets an example for subordinate employees to likewise promote and tolerate poor quality at Sequoyah. (XX-85-116-005)

b. During the exit interview the concerned individual (CI) expressed the concern that mistakes made at SQN and other plants are not corrected. (WBN-86-066-001)

c. Electrical General Foreman was reprimanded for using Non-'Q' materials in 'Q' systems, but continued to tell his workers to do this. (XX-85-033-006)

d. CI was requested by supervisors to sign-off data sheets on defective equipment. CI initially refused to sign because corrective action had not been taken. CI was asked second time to sign the data sheets and did so to avoid getting a letter for insubordination. (XX-85-027-X07)

e. TVA informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that cable had been removed from the site in 1981. When in fact the cable was still being removed in 1984. This is documented on Nonconformance Report (NCR) SQN EEB 8019R1. (XX-85-027-X03)

f. Process for evaluation of 10CFR21 applicability. (BFN-IESC-85-03)

g. Inadequate understanding of the level of control required in nuclear parts program is indicative of weakness in NQAM. (BFN-IESC-85-03)

h. The issue of "configuration control" was not evaluated as this issue is adequately covered in operations Element Report 307.13-SQN. (BFN-IESC-85-03)

2.0 SUMMARY

2.1 Summary of Characterization of Issues

Principal issues raised by concerned employees are: nonchalant regard for quality, mistakes are not corrected, Non-Q materials are used in Q systems, improper sign-off on data sheets, the NRC was misinformed of cable removal, the process for evaluating 10CFR21 applicability is questioned, inadequate understanding of the nuclear parts program, and configuration control.

2.2 Summary of Evaluation Process

Upper tier and lower tier documents were reviewed to determine requirements and responsibilities along with the procedural direction. Correspondence, codes, standards, procedures, instructions, inspection reports, nonconformance reports, and memorandums were also reviewed to determine the full extent of the concerns and their overall significance to the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Additionally, discussions were held with various TVA personnel pertaining to specific problem areas regarding electrical cables, spare parts, procurement, and battery inspections.

2.3 Summary of Findings

The conclusions reached as a result of the Quality Assurance Category Evaluation Group (QACEG) evaluations of these issues are:

The issues regarding "nonchalant regard for quality promotes poor quality" and "mistakes made were not corrected" could not be properly evaluated due to the vagueness and lack of specific information.

The issue of using "Non-'Q' materials in 'Q' systems" was substantiated in that a general foreman instructed craft personnel to use a QA Level I or II part which did not have the required documentation.

The issue of "improper sign-offs on data sheets" could not be substantiated. The sign-offs required of the inspector did not signify QA acceptance, but rather documents the identity of the inspector performing and documenting the results of the inspection.

The issue that "TVA informed the Nuclear Regulatory Commission that cable had been removed from the site in 1981 when in fact the cable was still being removed in 1984" is substantiated, in that SQN Nonconformance Report (NCR) 8019 improperly stated that all PJJ and PNJ cable had been removed as documented by Transfer Requisition 858512.

The issue of "Process for evaluation of 10 CFR 21 applicability" is unsubstantiated in that documentation pertaining to these reviews was available and that procedural guidelines were properly followed.

The issue of "inadequate understanding of the control required for the nuclear parts program" is substantiated. Personnel did not fully understand procurement requirements due to program inadequacies.

2.4 Summary of Corrective Action

Regarding the use of Non-"Q" materials it was determined that an isolated instance did exist where Non-"Q" Material was improperly installed in a "Q" System. However, the part was replaced and appropriate disciplinary action taken. With respect to the PJJ and PNJ cable, it was determined that all cable had not been removed which has resulted in Environmental Qualification for those type cables. In addition, a CATD has been initiated to provide expected completion dates for cable testing. Responses to this CATD were evaluated and results concurred with the QACEG. Corrective actions towards improving the Procurement Program have been initiated which should help streamline the system.

3.0 LIST OF EVALUATORS

W. M. Akeley
R. D. Halverson

4.0 EVALUATION PROCESS

4.1 General Method of Evaluation

This evaluation was performed by reviewing many documents such as inspection reports, Inspection Instructions/Guidelines, Notice of Indications (NOI), Construction Procedures/Specifications, Quality Assurance Procedures, American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel codes, Design Standards, Work Requests, Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM), Nonconformance Reports (NCR), memorandums, and TVA's QA Topical Report. In addition, discussions with cognizant personnel were held pertaining to specific problem areas regarding each issue.

4.2 Specifics of Evaluation

4.2.1 Issue - Nonchalant Regard for Quality

Reviewed Employee Concern File including Confidential Files for any additional information pertaining to this concern. No additional information was available.

4.2.2 Issue - Mistakes Not Corrected

Reviewed Employee Concern File including Confidential Files for any additional information pertaining to this concern. No additional information was available.

4.2.3 Issue - Use of Non-"Q" Materials in "Q" Systems

Reviewed Employee Concern Files including Confidential Files for any additonal information pertaining to this concern. Nuclear Safety Review Staff (NSRS) Report I-85-814-SQN was reviewed documenting the investigation and findings of this concern. Codes, standards, procedures, instructions, and reports reviewed during this investigation are included in the NSRS Report.

4.2.4 Issue - Data Sheet Sign Off

Reviewed Employee Concern Files including Confidential Files for any additional information pertaining to this concern. Quality Technology Company (QTC) Report XX-85-027-X07 documenting the investigation and findings of this concern was reviewed. This report was utilized during the evaluation process of this concern and its contents re-evaluated by QACEG. This report draws the same conclusion as the QACEG evaluation.

In conjunction with the QTC Report, Inspection Instruction No. 19, Revision 9, "Battery Inspection", Inspection Instruction No. 30, Revision 7, "Receipt Inspection", and Nonconformance Report 2803, were also reviewed during this investigation.

4.2.5 Issue - Nonconforming Cable Not Removed From Site.

Reviewed Employee Concern File including Confidential Files for additonal information pertaining to this concern. NSRS Report I-85-218-SQN, documenting the investigation and findings of this concern, was used as the basis of the Summary and Findings section of this report and includes various documents reviewed during this investigation.

4.2.6 Issue - Process For Evaluation of 10 CFR 21 Applicability.

Reviewed Employee Concern File including Confidential Files for any additional information pertaining to this concern. The Nuclear Operations Quality Assurance Manual (NOQAM) Part III Section 2.1, entitled "Procurement of Materials, Components, Spare Parts, and Services" was reviewed in conjunction with Appendix F, Attachment 1 of NOQAM Part III, Section 2.1 to determine if appropriate requirements were contained in NOQAM and implementing procedures. SQNP SI-114.1 "Inservice Inspection" in conjunction with NOQAM Part III, Section 7.2 was also reviewed to ascertain if unacceptable indications noted during random inspections were in fact evaluated for significance and for potential reportability.

Four Notice of Indications (NOIs) and associated documentation of unacceptable conditions, identified by liquid penetrant methods, were reviewed to assure that these indications were properly evaluated for 10 CFR 21 applicability in accordance with the site inservice inspection program. Additionally, six purchase requsitions were also reviewed attesting to the implementation of 10 CFR Part 21 requirements.

Reviewed Engineering Procedure NEP-4.1 Revision 0, "Procurement", and recently prepared material requsitions to determine engineering involvement as it also applies to the requirements of 10CFR21.

4.2.7 Issue - Inadequate Understanding of Level of Control Required in Nuclear Parts Program

The initial investigation was spent gaining an understanding of the basic mechanics of site procurements (forms used, terminology, and coordination required) and reviewing procurement files. Four Quality Control personnel were interviewed to ascertain their understanding of the total procurement system and to identify their specific responsibilities.

5.0 FINDINGS

5.1 Findings on Issue - Nonchalant regard for Quality

Discussion

This issue, can not be properly investigated or evaluated due to the vagueness and lack of specific information.

5.2 Findings on Issue - Mistakes are not corrected.

Discussion

This issue, can not be properly investigated or evaluated due to the vagueness and lack of specific information.

5.3 Findings on Issue - Use of Non-"Q" materials in "Q" systems

Discussion

Further information was requested from the Employee Response Team (ERT) to identify the approximate time frame to which the concerned individual was referring. The ERT indicated that the events occurred sometime between February 1984 and early 1986.

QACEG utilized NSRS Report I-85-814-SQN in the evaluation of this concern. On May 9, 1985, during maintenance on solenoid valves 2-FSV-1-183A, an electrical general foreman in the Sequoyah Electrical Maintenance Section instructed craft personnel to use a QA level I or II part (diode) which did not have required documentation. This work was being performed under maintenance request MR A-300161. Solenoid valve 2-FSV-1-183A is a critical component as defined by Sequoyah Standard Practice SQA134, Appendix A, part III, "Critical Structures, Systems, and Components CFC List". MR A-300161 stipulated the specific use of Maintenance Instruction MI-6.20 and Modification and Addition Instruction MAI-12. These procedures require, among other things, that QA personnel inspect the crimping of the diode. Contrary to these requirements, the general foreman instructed craft personnel to install the diode without proper documentation and QA inspection. This action by the general foreman resulted in a formal reprimand.

MR A-201208 was submitted and work initated on May 10, 1985, to inspect and replace the Non-Q diode with a diode having the proper documentation. On May 16, 1985, the Electrical Maintenance Section Supervisor discussed the gravity of the general foreman's failure to follow procedures and his responsibility. Based on this discussion and the formal reprimand, the section supervisor was of the opinion that the general foreman clearly understood the significance of his actions and what is expected in the future. The section supervisor is not aware of any additional instances where this or any other electrical general foreman has instructed craft to use Non-Q parts in QA systems. The Electrical Maintenance Section Craft Unit Supervisor directly supervises the section's electrical general foreman. The unit supervisor recommended the disciplinary action to the section supervisor following the May 9, 1985 incident. To the best of the unit supervisor's knowledge, the practice of instructing the craft to violate plant procedures has not continued.

The Electrical Maintenance Section is staffed with seven electrical crew foreman and approximately 42 journeyman electricians. Interviews were conducted with two of the crew foremen from day shift, the evening shift crew foreman, a dual rate foreman, and the day shift general foreman. In additon, three electricians were interviewed from the day shift and four electricians from the evening shift. These individuals were selected at random. None of the individuals interviewed stated that they were ever instructed to use Non-Q parts in QA systems nor were they aware of any electrical general foreman currently doing so.

Conclusion

The concern of record is substantiated in part. It was substantiated that a situation occurred in which craft personnel had been instructed to install a QA level part without proper documentation and to proceed with its installation in violation of approved plant procedures. Action was taken immediately to replace the part and action was taken to discipline the responsible electrical general foreman. The disciplinary action appears to have been effective. No evidence exists that the general foreman continued to tell of his workers to do this or similar failure to follow plant procedures.

5.4 Findings on Issue - Data sheets sign-off

Discussion

This issue is based upon SQN NCR 2803 written on July 21, 1982 identifying unacceptable electrolyte level with the fifth diesel generator battery cells. This nonconforming condition was originally identified in accordance with SNP Inspection Instruction No. 19 and documented on Data Sheet 1, "Battery Inspections", dated 6/18/82. Office of Nuclear Power (ONP) disposition to NCR 2803 was to reduce the specific gravity of the battery electrolyte by using the "Approved Power System Procedure" (MEB '811230 995). This disposition, Rev. 1, was written 12/22/82. However, it wasn't approved by the Design Project Organization and assigned to disposition Block 6 of NCR 2803 until 6/14/83. As evidenced by the NCR (Block 8), the assigned disposition was completed and the batteries released from a nonconforming status on 7/5/83. During the period when the nonconforming condition was identified (6/18/82) and when corrective actions were completed (7/5/83), periodic inspections (bi-weekly, monthly, and quarterly) were being performed as required by SNP Inspection Instruction No. 19. This procedure required the Electrical Engineering Unit to issue Data Sheet 1, "Battery Inspection," and the Inspection Group inspector to document the results of this inspection on this form. On the bottom of Data Sheet 1, there is an area provided for the signature of the inspector and the date the inspection was performed. In this instance, this signature and date does not signify QA acceptance, but rather documents the identity of the inspector performing the periodic inspections.

Conclusions

The concern indicates the Concerned Individual (CI) is reluctant to sign off data sheets when the acceptance criteria of SNP Inspection Instruction No. 19 has not been met was unsubstantiated. The concerned employee has no valid reason to refuse to sign the data sheet as the signature on Data Sheet 1 is for identifying the inspector entering the inspection results and does not signify acceptance of the item.

5.5 Findings on Issue - NRC misinformed of cable removal

Discussion

As a result of OE evaluations of NUREG-0588, specific applications of PJJ and PNJ types of cable were identified as not qualified for the accident environmental condition. This entailed the issuance of NCR SQN EEB 8019 and various TVA letters to the NRC informing them of 10 CFR 50.55 (e) deficiencies. Between June 16, 1980 and June 29, 1981, five status reports concerning NCRs issued on environmental qualification were sent to the NRC. However, none addressed PJJ and PNJ cable nor contained any information that indicated to NRC that issued PJJ and PNJ cables had been removed from SQN in order to prevent further installation. The disposition of NCR 8019 required removal of all remaining cable of type PJJ and PNJ. Although this was not completed in a timely manner, a majority of PJJ and PNJ cable was removed from Sequoyah as evidenced by Transfer Requisition 828512. However, NCR 8019 improperly stated that all PJJ and PNJ cable had been removed by Transfer Requisition 828512.

Conclusion

This issue is substantiated in that all PJJ and PNJ cable was not removed from the site as stated in the NCR. Five status reports from June 16, 1980 to June 29, 1981 concerning NCRs written on environmental qualification were sent to the NRC. However, all five did not address PJJ and PNJ cables.

5.6 Findings on Issue - Process for evaluation of 10 CFR 21 applicability

Discussion

It was determined from reviewing all pertinent correspondence and information provided in the Confidential Files that the concerned individual was concerned with the 10 CFR Part 21 reportability of vendor supplied items.

There are two distinct groups within the Sequoyah organization currently purchasing material. The Nuclear Power Division procures items in accordance with Part III of the Nuclear Quality Assurance

Manual, supplemented with Standard Practice SQA45 ("Quality Control of Materials and Parts and Services") and the Nuclear Engineering Group procures material for modifications in accordance with NEP-4.1, entitled "Procurement". Each group determines whether 10CFR21 requirements are applicable to the supplier for procurement of items and services. The Nuclear Engineering Group, is required in accordance with Section 3.0, paragraph 3.6 of NEP-4.1, and Attachment 24, "10CFR21 Applicability" to assure that TVA procurement specifications and requisition packages for nuclear safety-related items meet the reporting requirements of 10CFR21.

This concurrence is documented on material requisitions. Ten SQN requisitions prepared during 1979-1981, and five recently prepared requisitions of material purchased by the Design Engineering Group, were reviewed to assure that documentation attesting to 10CFR21 applicability was available. All documentation reviewed was satisfactory. The Nuclear Power Group currently purchases items in accordance with Nuclear Operations Quality Assurance Manual (NOQAM) Part III, Section 2.1, evaluates each item or service for 10CFR21 applicability by the use of Attachment 1, Appendix F entitled "Determination of Basic Component Status and 10CFR Part 21 Applicability". The review of the fifteen SQN Purchase Requisitions prepared between 1979-1986 revealed that all had been appropriately reviewed for 10CFR Part 21 applicability with corresponding documentation substantiating all reviews.

Further investigation was conducted to assure that the process for evaluation of 10CFR Part 21 applicability was conducted regarding the Inservice Inspection (ISI) Program. Surveillance Instruction SI-114.1, Section 17.0 entitled "Notification of Indication" requires the organization assigned responsibility for repair within NUC PR to determine if the unacceptable condition is significant and potentially reportable in accordance with the requirements of NOQAM, Part III, Section 7.2. A review of four of 34 Notification of Indication forms reporting unacceptable indications identified by the liquid penetrant examination method, indicated each had been evaluated for 10CFR Part 21 applicability as required.

Conclusion

This issue is unsubstantiated at SQN, based on the fact that the appropriate documentation prepared by each purchasing group was reviewed and found satisfactory. Additionally, the process by which determinations of 10CFR Part 21 applicability are made was found to be satisfactory.

5.7 Findings on Issue - Inadequate understanding of the level of control in the nuclear parts program.

Discussion

The issue of whether inadequate understanding of the level of control in the Nuclear Parts Program was indicative of a NQAM programmatic weakness was substantiated by the QACEG investigation.

Part III, Section 2.1 of the Nuclear Quality Assurance Manual (NQAM) provides the methods for controlling the procurement of materials components and spare parts. A review of the NQAM determined that it assigns responsibilities and provides interpretation of regulatory requirements, invokes the applicable quality assurance program requirements listed in ANSI N45.2, Appendix B to 10CFR50, ASME Section III and Section XI, and further implements the requirements of ANSI N45.2.13.

Prior to 1984, TVA recognized that the procurement program was in need of strengthening. This was further substantiated by the fact that the NSRS investigation performed during June 11, 1984 and December 5, 1985 also reiterated the fact that deficiencies did exist with various aspects of the program. The problems were categorized into five areas:

a. General unfamiliarity with procurement cycle

b. Excessive and/or ineffective review of Purchase Requests and requisitions

c. Ineffective use of the available procurement system

d. Apparent lack of planning, and

e. Quality Assurance

These deficient areas were also addressed and recommendations provided. These recommendations consisted of:

a. Establish a planning group

b. Improve Purchasing/site communications

c. Eliminate unncesssary procurement cycle steps, and

d. Better utilize automated systems

Additionally, interorganizational communications and working relationships were developed to help solve problems and streamline operations. With respect to previously identified weaknesses within

the NQAM, several revisions have been issued which provide for additional training requirements, organizational changes, review approval cycles, and current commitments. The QACEG evaluation concentrated on interviews with six personnel in the Sequoyah Procurement Program. These interviews indicated that although weaknesses have been identified as previously noted, the program has been expanded and enhanced to comply with procurement commitments. Also, the personnel actually involved currently in day to day procurement activities appeared to have adequate knowledge of the level of control regarding nuclear parts. Additionally, SQA45, entitled "Quality Control of Material, Parts and Services", dated May 30, 1984 and Administrative Instruction AI-11 entitled "Receipt Inspection Nonconforming Items, QA Level/Description Changes and Substitiutes", dated May 21, 1984 with recent revisions, were reviewed to determine program compliance. It would appear that the many problems previously experienced with the NQAM prior to 1984 caused confusion among those involved in daily procurement activities. With recognition of these program inadequacies by management and site personnel, and the retraining and program manual revisions, indications are that the program is better organized and capable of controlling materials at SQN.

Conclusion

This issue is substantiated by the fact that the many problems identified with the NQAM did in fact cause confusion and contribute to the misunderstanding of the control requirements by the the procurement program.

5.8 Corrective Actions

This section encompasses corrective measures taken and the results achieved to date on behalf of TVA and also those corrective actions identified during this evaluation.

Issue - Use of Non-"Q" materials in "Q" systems

Maintenance Request (MR) A-201208 was submitted and worked on May 10, 1985, to replace the Non-QA diode with a diode having proper documentation and required inspections were performed. On May 16, 1986, the general foreman responsible was formally reprimanded by the Maintenance Section Supervisor for not following site procedures. The results of the QACEG investigation indicates this was an isolated incident with no further corrective actions necessary.

Issue - NRC was misinformed of cable removal all PJJ and PNJ cable was not removed from the site as stated in the NCR.

At the time of NCR 8019 closing, inadequate action was taken to prevent further installation, and action was not taken to ensure that

all unused cable had been removed from the site. Failure to write a site NCR and to quickly remove from the site these cables resulted in its noncontrolled use. However, the adequacy of PJJ and PNJ cables installed at SQN has been evaluated as part of the electrical equipment Environmental Qualification Project. Corrective action regarding this issue was determined to be required. SQN EQ Project has demonstrated Environment Qualification for TVA Type PJJ Cable installed in 50.49 circuits. Review of the SQN Electrical Equipment List shows that no PNJ Cables (or cables of the same family) has been installed in 50.49 circuits.

Issue - Inadequate understanding of level of control required in the Nuclear Parts Program.

Corrective actions regarding the procurement program are presently ongoing in that improved interorganizational communications and working relationships have been developed to help streamline operations. Additionally, several recommendations directed toward changing and improving the system have also been initiated. The results of the QACEG investigation indicates that these corrective actions are all essential elements within the procurement process.

A Corrective Action Tracking Document (CATD) No. 80000-SQN-01 was initiated to provide an expected completion date for testing the cable in question.

A response to this CATD was prepared and acknowledged by the Watts Bar ECTG on 11/21/86. Corrective action regarding this issue was determined not to be required. The SQN EQ Project has documentation to demonstrate environmental qualification for TVA type PJJ cable installed in 50.49 circuits at SQN. This documentation is contained in Sequoyah Environmental Packages SQNEQ-CABL-001, -015, -020, and -034. Review of the Sequoyah Electrical Equipment List (SQEL) shows that no PNJ cables (or cables from the same family) has been installed in 50.49 circuits. The QACEG has evaluated this response and concurs with it's conclusion.

Attachment A, identified the issues as potentially safety-significant or safety related. However, QACEG evaluation concludes that only issue XX-85-027-X03 was potentially safety-significant. This identifies that unacceptable cable was not properly controlled which resulted in its subsequent use. This issue was determined to have no impact on safety and although some of the remaining issues were substantiated, they were not considered detrimental to the safe or reliable operation of the Sequoyah Nuclear Plant.

6.0 ATTACHMENTS

A. Employee Concern Program System (ECPS) List of Employee Concern Information

B. Corrective Action Tracking Document (CATD) No. 80000-SQN-01

ATTACHMENT A

FULL SUB

REFERENCE - ECPS120J-ECPS121C
FREQUENCY - REQUEST
ONP - ISSS - RWM

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY
OFFICE OF NUCLEAR POWER
EMPLOYEE CONCERN PROGRAM SYSTEM (ECPS)
EMPLOYEE CONCERN INFORMATION BY CATEGORY/SUBCATEGORY

CATEGORY: QA QA/QC PROGRAMS
SUBCATEGORY: 80000 GENERAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY

CONCERN NUMBER	CAT	SUB CAT	SHR D	PLT LOC	1 REPORT APPL 2 SAF RELATED 3 FIND CLASS BF BL SQ WB	HISTORICAL REPORT	CONCERN ORIGIN	CONCERN DESCRIPTION
BFNIESC-85-03 01	✓ OP	30713	S	BFN	1 2 3		OECP	CONCERNS EXPRESSED REGARDING: 1. PROCESS FOR LUATION OF 10CFR21 APPLICABILITY. 2. INADEQUA UNDERSTANDING OF THE LEVEL OF CONTROL REQUIRED NUCLEAR PARTS PROGRAM IS INDICATIVE OF WEAKNESS NQAM. 3. CONFIGURATION CONTROL.
02	QA	80000	S	BFN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA 3 NA NA C NA			
WBN-86-066-00101	✓ QA	80000	S	WBN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SR NA 3 NA NA A NA		NSRS	DURING THE EXIT INTERVIEW THE CI EXPRESSED CONC THAT MISTAKES MADE AT SQN AND OTHER PLANTS ARE T CORRECTED. THESE SAME MISTAKES ARE ALSO MADE WBN.
02	QA	80601	S	WBN	1 Y Y N Y 2 SR SR NA SR 3 NA			
XX -85-027-X0301 T50056	✓ QA	80000	N	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA 3 NA NA E NA	I-85-218-SQN	QTC	TVA INFORMED THE NRC THAT CABLE HAD BEEN REMOVE ROM THE SITE IN 1981. WHEN IN FACT THE CABLE W STILL BEING REMOVED IN 1984. THIS IS DOCUMENTE N AN NCR SGNEEB8019R1. BACKUP/ADDITIONAL INFOR ION IN FILE.
XX -85-027-X0701 T50078	✓ IH	60400	S	SQN	1 2 3	XX-85-027-X07	QTC	CI WAS REQUESTED BY SUPERVISOR TO SIGN OFF DATA EETS ON DEFECTIVE EQUIPMENT. CI INITIALLY REFU TO SIGN BECAUSE CORRECTIVE ACTION HAD NOT BEEN KEN. CI WAS ASKED SECOND TIME TO SIGN THE DATA EETS AND DID SO TO AVOID GETTING A LETTER FOR I BORDINATION. (NAMES, EQUIPMENT, AND OTHER ADDIT AL INFORMATION ARE KNOWN)
02	QA	80000	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA 3 NA NA B NA			
XX -85-033-00601 T50181	✓ IH	60400	S	SQN	1 2 3	I-85-814-SQN	QTC	SEQUOYAH: ELECTRICAL GENERAL FOREMAN (KNOWN) WA EPRIMANDED FOR USING NON-"Q" MATERIALS IN "Q" S EMS, BUT CONTINUED TO TELL HIS WORKERS TO DO TH (CONSTUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN) C/I HAS NO F HER INFORMATION.
02	QA	80000	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA 3 NA NA C NA			
XX -85-116-00501 T50271	✓ QA	80000	S	SQN	1 N N Y N 2 NA NA SS NA 3 NA NA A NA		QTC	A NONCHALANT REGARD FOR QUALITY SETS AN EXAMPLE R SUBORDINATE EMPLOYEES TO LIKEWISE PROMOTE AND LERATE POOR QUALITY AT SEQUOYAH. NUCLEAR POWER PARTMENT CONCERN. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHE DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. NO FURTHER INFORMATION Y BE RELEASED. CI REQUESTS THAT QTC PERFORM TH INVESTIGATION.
02	QA	80605	S	SQN	1 Y Y N Y 2 SS SS NA SS 3 NA			

6 CONCERNS FOR CATEGORY QA SUBCATEGORY 80000

ATTACHMENT B

~~ATTACHMENT Q~~
1/30/87

ECSP CORRECTIVE
Action Tracking Document
(CATD)

INITIATION

1. Immediate Corrective Action Required: /_/ Yes /N/ No
2. Stop Work Recommended: /_/ Yes /X/ No
3. CATD No. 80000-SQN-01 4. INITIATION DATE 10/1/86
5. RESPONSIBLE ORGANIZATION: ONP
6. PROBLEM DESCRIPTION: /X/ QR /X/ NQR

Failure to write a site NCR and to quickly remove from the site PJJ and PNJ cables resulted in its subsequent noncontrolled use. Testing was recently conducted to qualify the cables identified in SQN-EQ-CABL-034, and the cables have a qualified life of 20 years. However, additional testing has been deemed required to extend the life of these cables however, this extension is not required prior to start up.

//ATTACHMENTS

7. PREPARED BY: NAME Wayne M. Akeley DATE: 10/1/86
8. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H R. K. Maxon DATE:
9. APPROVAL: ECTG PROGRAM MGR: DATE: 2/2/87

CORRECTIVE ACTION

10. PROPOSED CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN:

~~Provide an expected completion date as to when the required will be completed.~~

SEE CAP TRANSMITTED BY MEMORANDUM B70 861114 002

/ /ATTACHMENTS

11. PROPOSED BY: DIRECTOR/MGR: DATE: 11-20-86
12. CONCURRENCE: CEG-H DATE:
SRP: DATE:
ECTG PROGRAM MGR: DATE:

VERIFICATION AND CLOSEOUT

13. Approved corrective actions have been verified as satisfactorily implemented.

SIGNATURE TITLE DATE

TVA 40 100-0-000

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

QA Record

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

B70 861114 002

TO : R. C. Denney, Employee Concerns Special Project Manager, OWP, DSC-P, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

FROM : D. W. Wilson, Project Engineer, DNE, DSC-E, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

DATE : NOV 14 1986

861121R0408 (3)

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG) ELEMENT REPORTS - REPORT 800.00 SQN - REVIEW AND CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP) INITIATION

Attached is the CAP for ECTG Element Evaluation Report (800.00 SQN) which was requested by your memorandum to me dated October 16, 1986 (803 861016 802). If you have any questions, please contact W. E. Deen, extension 7225 or D. B. Arp, extension 6559.

D. W. Wilson

DWW:CJS
Attachments
cc (Attachments):
DCS, M 26 C-K
E. L. Abercrombie, OWP, OLPS-4, Sequoyah w/o Attachments)
W. E. Andrews, OWP, OLPS-3 Sequoyah
C. H. Buchanan, OWP, OLPS-3, Sequoyah (w/o Attachments)
W. L. Elliott, DNE, DSC-E, Sequoyah
R. W. Glenn, DNE, SD-E, Sequoyah
J. H. Sullivan, OWP, SD-E, Sequoyah
P. H. Wallace, OWP, PSD-E, Sequoyah
E. C. Williams, DSC-P, Sequoyah

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

8030061118 803

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : W. R. Brown, Program Manager, Employee Concerns Task Group, ONP, Watts Bar Nuclear Plant

FROM : H. L. Abercrombie, Site Director, ONP, O&PS-4, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

DATE : November 20, 1986

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - EMPLOYEE CONCERNS TASK GROUP (ECTG) ELEMENT REPORT 800.00 SQN - QA/QC CATEGORY - CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP)

Reference: Your memorandum to me dated October 14, 1986, "Watts Bar Nuclear Plant - Employee Concerns Task Group (ECTG) Element Report 80000-SQN - General Management and Policy (Sequoyah)" (T25 861014 944)

I acknowledge receipt of your element report and in accordance with your request (see reference), Element Report 800.00 SQN has been reviewed for applicable corrective action.

By way of this memorandum I am endorsing the site line organization CAP, returning your Corrective Action Tracking Document No. 80000-SQN-01, and attaching the CAP for your review/concurrence. This CAP is not a restart requirement.

If you agree with the proposed CAP, please sign the ECTG concurrence space below item 9 on the CAP tracking checklist and return the CAP tracking checklist.

for H. L. Abercrombie

RCD:JDS:JB:CS
Attachments
cc (Attachments):
RIMS, MR 4N 72A-C
T. C. Price, 5-212 SB-K

0340T



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Attachment A
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Corrective Action Plan of Employee Concern Investigation
Tracking Checklist

ECTG Report/CATD Number 800.00 - SQN/CATD #80000 - SQN-01
Lead Organization Responsible for Corrective Action ENG
Initiation Date 10-16-86

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN (CAP)

1. Does this report require corrective action? Yes ____ No X
(If yes, describe corrective action to be taken, if no, provide justification)

The SQN EQ project has documentation to demonstrate environmental qualification for TVA-type PJJ cable installed in 50.49 circuits at SQN. This documentation is contained in Sequoyah Environmental Packages SQNEQ-CABL-001, -015, -020, and -034. Review of the Sequoyah Electrical Equipment List (SQEL) shows that no PNJ cables (or cables from the same cable family) has been installed in 50.49 circuits.

2. Identify any similar item/instances and corrective action taken.

Refer to W. L. Elliott's memo to G. T. Hall dated February 11, 1986 (B70 860211 001). This memorandum identified all cables in the current cable yard inventory that were considered by EQP as not suitable for installation in new 50.49 circuits. In addition, the memorandum recommended that cable in this category be "properly dispositioned and moved to a non-nuclear site." The yard inventory at that time showed that no type PJJ or PNJ was on site. The inventory did show that type PN (same family as PNJ) was on site. The type PN cable was included in the group of cable that EQP recommended to move off site.

3. Will corrective action preclude reccurrence of findings? Yes X No ____
4. Does this report contain findings that are conditions adverse to quality (CAQ) as defined by AI-12 or NEP 9.1? Yes ____ No X
5. IF a CAQ condition exists, what CAQ document was initiated? ____
6. Which site section/organization is responsible for corrective action? ____
7. Is corrective action required for restart? Yes ____ No ____
(This determination is to be made using Attachment C of SQA166.)
8. P2 zone number for restart corrective action? Zone ____
9. Estimate completion date for corrective action. ____

Completed By Tony Ayo Date 11/18/86
Approved By W H Dean Date 11/18/86
ECTG Concurrence ____ Date ____

ATTACHMENT A
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CAP CLOSURE

10. Was your corrective action initiated and completed in accordance with step 1? Yes ____ No ____
11. If step 10 is no, describe the corrective action taken.

_____
_____
_____
_____

12. Is the corrective action implementation complete? Yes ____ No ____
13. Is the corrective action documentation closed? Yes ____ No ____
14. What documents were used to implement the corrective action? _____

Completed By: _____ Date _____
Verified By: _____ Date _____
ECTG Closure: _____ Date _____

(Step No.)	Description