NRC Form 366 (9-83) BD1

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
LaSalle County Station Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 3	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)
Containment Isolation During Performance of Surveillance Due to Grounded Jumper

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	0 4	8 6	8 6	0 1 0	0 0	0 3	2 5	8 6	Unit 2	0 5 0 0 0 3 7 4
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	5	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	X 50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Kenneth J. Kalmon, Technical Staff Engineer, extension 325	AREA CODE 8 1 5 — 3 5 7 - 6 7 6 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
B	J M			N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e. approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 4, 1986, at 1241 hours during the performance of LIS-PC-15, "Reactor Vessel Low-Low Water Level Isolation Response Time Test", a Primary Containment Isolation System Group IV and Group II isolation occurred on Unit 1.

The isolation occurred because a jumper being installed for the test became grounded on one end causing a fuse to blow. The degree of difficulty encountered when trying to install the jumper caused this occurrence.

Reactor Building Ventilation trains on both units isolated and Standby Gas Treatment trains started on both units as required.

The blown fuse was replaced and Reactor Building Ventilation trains were restarted. A Work Request is outstanding and has been given a higher priority to install banana plug jacks at the terminals to be jumpered in LIS-PC-15. This will make it easier to install the jumper and prevent similar occurrences.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

I. EVENT DESCRIPTION

On March 4, 1986, at 1241 hours with LaSalle Unit 1 defueled and LaSalle Unit 2 in Mode 3, Hot Shutdown, a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS, JM) actuation occurred on Unit 1 Division 2 (Group II and Group IV) valves. The isolation occurred during the performance of LIS-PC-15, "Reactor Vessel Low-Low Water Level Isolation Response Time Test", on Unit 1. It was caused when one end of a jumper being installed for LIS-PC-15 became grounded causing a fuse for a number of isolation relays to blow.

Reactor Building Ventilation (VR, VA) dampers on both units isolated [Secondary Containment (NG) Isolation], both Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT, BH) trains started, and inboard valves in Unit 1 PCIS Groups II and IV isolated as required. This event was an actuation of an ESF system.

II. CAUSE

Instrument Maintenance personnel were performing LIS-PC-15 on instruments 1B21-N026CB and 1B21-N026DB. Per this surveillance a jumper is to be installed across certain relay contacts to prevent Reactor Building Ventilation isolations and Standby Gas Treatment train initiations when instruments 1B21-N026CB and 1B21-N026DB are actuated. One end of the jumper was installed when the other end touched a metal relay clamp and provided a path to ground. This short to ground caused the fuse for a number of PCIS Division 2 isolation relays to blow. When this fuse blew the relays de-energized resulting in a Reactor Building Ventilation isolation, initiation of both Standby Gas Treatment trains, and isolation of Unit 1 PCIS Group II and IV inboard valves.

The degree of difficulty encountered when installing a jumper on the required relay terminals caused this occurrence. The relay that the jumper was to be installed on, 1B21H-K66X1, is mounted on the back wall of a panel enclosure that is 10 3/4" wide and 34" deep. It is also partially behind a terminal block panel. Because of the location of the relay it is difficult to install the jumper needed for LIS-PC-15. Furthermore, relay 1B21H-K66X1 is an Agastat relay. Terminals on Agastat relays are small and difficult to install jumpers on. The degree of difficulty encountered when trying to install the jumper on 1B21H-K66X1 caused this occurrence.

III. PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCURRENCE

The probable consequences of this occurrence are minimal because LOA-VR-01, "Recovery from a Group IV Isolation or Spurious Trip of Reactor Building Vent", was initiated at 1250 hours shortly after the cause of the Reactor Building Ventilation isolation was determined. Reactor Building Ventilation on Unit 2 was restarted at 1322 hours before main steam tunnel ambient and differential temperatures became excessive. It is not expected that this event would have been worse at high power levels.

The probable consequences of this occurrence are minimal for Unit 1 because this unit was defueled at the time.

IV. CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

The fuse that blew because of the short was replaced. Unit 1 Reactor Building Ventilation was restarted at 1319 hours on March 4, 1986. Unit 2 Reactor Building Ventilation was restarted at 1322 hours on March 4, 1986. Unit 2 Standby Gas Treatment train was shutdown at 1243 hours the same day. Unit 1 Standby Gas Treatment train was left running for ten hours in accordance with LOS-VG-M1, Standby Gas Treatment System Operability Test.

Work Request L54141 is outstanding to install banana plug jacks on the terminals used on relay 1B21H-K66X1 and also the corresponding relay on Unit 2, 2B21H-K66X1. The priority of this Work Request has been upgraded. Other banana plug jacks will be installed under Work Request L54141 on terminals frequently used in surveillances (AIR 373-200-86-02700).

V. PREVIOUS OCCURRENCES

A similar event occurred on February 25, 1986, and was reported under LER 373/86-009-00. A jumper falling off during the performance of LOP-RP-04, RPS (Reactor Protection System) Bus B Transfer, resulted in a Reactor Building Ventilation isolation and Standby Gas Treatment initiation.

VI. NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF PREPARER

Kenneth J. Kalmon, Technical Staff Engineer, 815/357-6761, extension 325.

Commonwealth Edison
LaSalle County Nuclear Station
Rural Route #1, Box 220
Marseilles, Illinois 61341
Telephone 815/357-6761

March 25, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Sir:

Reportable Occurrence Report #86-010-00, Docket #050-373 is being submitted to your office in accordance with 10CFR 50.73.

R. D. Bishop
for G. J. Diederich
Station Manager
LaSalle County Station

GJD/DRR/kg

Enclosure

xc: NRC, Regional Director
INPO-Records Center
File/NRC

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