NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Wolf Creek Generating Station	0 5 0 0 0 4 8 2	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Discovery Of Breached Fire Barrier Seal

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 1	0 7	8 7	8 7	—	0 0 1	—	0 0	0 2	0 6	8 7		0 5 0 0 0
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	1 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(c)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Merlin G. Williams - Superintendent of Regulatory, Quality and Administrative Services	AREA CODE 3 1 6 — 3 6 4 - 8 8 3 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

At approximately 1145 CST, on January 7, 1987, a fire barrier penetration was found to be breached. The Fire Protection Coordinator and the Control Room were notified, a fire impairment permit was issued, and a fire watch was put into effect until the penetration was sealed on January 13, 1987. This occurrence is considered to be a violation of Technical Specification 3.7.11, which requires that certain fire barrier penetrations be operable, or that a fire watch be established. The unit was in Mode 1, at 100 percent power when the event was discovered.

The cause of the event is considered to be personnel error in removing and not replacing a fire barrier, although specific details could not be reconstructed. Twenty percent of all sealed penetrations have been inspected per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements with no breached penetrations being discovered. There were no similar instances of missing fire barriers found, therefore, discovery of the breached penetration on January 7, 1987, is considered to be an isolated incident.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event. At no time did conditions develop that may have posed a threat to the health or safety of the public.

There have been no previous similar occurrences.

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

At approximately 1145 CST, on January 7 1987 piping penetration seal OP133W2104 was found to be breached. This breach was discovered by the auxiliary building watch operator. The Fire Protection Coordinator and the Control Room were notified, a fire impairment permit was issued, and a fire watch was established. The fire watch was maintained until the penetration was sealed on January 13, 1987. Penetration OP133W2104 is a nominal four inch inside diameter (ID) opening, which is located on the 2000' level of the Auxiliary Building [NF] and penetrates the wall between the south penetration room (1322) and the auxiliary building hallway. This occurrence is considered to be a violation of Technical Specification 3 7.11 which requires that certain fire barrier penetrations be operable, or that a fire watch be established.

This penetration was verified operable in late December, 1984, by contractor personnel. Subsequently, a Non Conformance Report (NCR) was issued to resolve documentation discrepancies concerning this and other penetrations. A walkdown of the other barriers listed in the NCR was conducted in January, 1987, and no similar problems were found. Subsequent investigation failed to reveal when this barrier had been removed. The unit was in Mode 1, Power Operation, at 100 percent power when this event was discovered.

The cause of this event is considered to be cognitive personnel error in removing and not replacing a fire barrier, although specific details could not be accurately reconstructed. Ten percent of sealed penetrations were inspected in September, 1986, per Technical Specification Surveillance Requirements. After finding one damaged penetration, an additional 10 percent of sealed penetrations were inspected. This inspection of 20 percent of all sealed penetrations showed no similar instances of missing barriers, therefore, discovery of the breached penetration on January 7, 1987, is considered to be an isolated incident. Requirements for removing or defeating fire barriers are discussed in General Employee Training.

There was no damage to plant equipment or release of radioactivity as a result of this event. At no time did conditions develop that may have posed a threat to the health or safety of the public. There have been no previous similar occurrences.

WOLF CREEK
NUCLEAR OPERATING CORPORATION

February 6, 1987

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Letter: WM 87-0036
Re: Docket No. 50-482
Subj: License Event Report 87-001-00

Gentlemen:

The attached Licensee Event Report is submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (i) concerning a Technical Specification violation.

Yours very truly,

Bart D. Withers
President and Chief
Executive Officer

BDW:see

Enclosure

cc: PO'Connor (2)
JCummins
RMartin

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