



LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY

SHOREHAM NUCLEAR POWER STATION

P.O. BOX 618, NORTH COUNTRY ROAD • WADING RIVER, N.Y. 11792

9-22-86

JOHN D. LEONARD, JR.
VICE PRESIDENT - NUCLEAR OPERATIONS

SNRC-1276

Mr. Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Submittal of Revision 8: Local Offsite
Radiological Emergency Response Plan
Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1
Docket No. 50-322

Dear Mr. Denton:

Revision 8 of the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan is being issued to respond in part to the FEMA Region II Post Exercise Assessment and to replace the Nassau Coliseum with LILCO facilities as evacuee reception centers. By separate letter dated September 16, 1986 the Commissioners and all parties were notified that WALK has withdrawn from it's agreement to serve as the Shoreham Emergency Broadcast primary station. A future revision to the LERO plan will provide a suitable alternative agreement.

For convenience, Attachment I provides a description of Revision 8 and how the modifications respond to the FEMA Assessment 'Area(s) Requiring Corrective Action' (ARCA) and a summary of the revised reception center plan.

Attachment II contains instructions for insertion of Rev. 8 into the plan and procedures. Please find attached six sets of the revised pages that make up Revision 8.

We ask that you cause a request to be made to FEMA, pursuant to the NRC-FEMA Memorandum of Understanding, for a expedited review of Revision 8. To this end, we are forwarding under separate cover, consistent with past practice and in conformance to our controlled copy distribution, a total of sixteen (16) controlled copies of Rev. 8 directly to members of the RAC.

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
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SNRC-1276

Page 2

Should you have any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,



John D. Leonard, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear Operations

DMC/js

Enclosures

cc: J. A. Berry
R. Lo

REVISION SIGNOFF FORM

To: Holder, Manual No. 55 Local Offsite Emergency Plans
and Implementation Procedures

From: Emergency Planning Coordinator

Subject: REVISION TRANSMITTAL

Attached is Revision No. 8 to the Local Offsite Radiological
Emergency Response Plan and Implementation Procedures for insertion
into your Controlled Copy. Two copies of this memorandum have been
provided. Once you have complied with the instructions presented
below, sign one copy and place it in front of your controlled copy
of the Manual. Sign the second copy of the memorandum and return it
within seven (7) working days to:

Emergency Preparedness Coordinator
LILCO
175 East Old Country Road
Hicksville, New York 11801

The undersigned acknowledges completion of the following actions:

1. The receipt and incorporation of this revision into my copy of
the Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and
Implementation Procedures.
2. Destruction of all pages which have been superceded by this
revision.

Signature _____ Date _____

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
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SNRC-1276
Page 2

Should you have any questions, please contact this office.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "John D. Leonard, Jr.", is written over the typed name.

John D. Leonard, Jr.
Vice President - Nuclear Operations

DMC/js

Enclosures

cc: J. A. Berry
R. Lo

TO: Recipients of Revision 8 of the Shoreham Offsite Emergency Plan

**SHOREHAM OFFSITE EMERGENCY PLAN:
REVISION 8**

This attachment describes the modifications made to the plan and procedures by Revision 8.

PART I - RESPONSE TO FEMA EXERCISE ASSESSMENT

PART II - REVISED RECEPTION CENTER

PART III - REVISED RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY DATA FORM

PART I - LILCO Response to FEMA Assessment of February 13, 1986 Emergency Exercise items defined as Area Requiring Corrective Action.

<u>*ITEM #</u>	<u>RAC RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>LILCO RESPONSE</u>
EOC-2	There was some confusion regarding the method for notifying the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).	The FAA will be contacted as part of FEMA's FRERP response. Plan and procedures revised in Revision 7. Training material has been revised accordingly.
	(1) The LERO procedures should be reviewed and revised as necessary to ensure that a point of contact with the FAA has been designated.	Plan: Figure 2.1.2, 2.2-1, 2.2-2a, 2.2-4, Figure 2.2.1, Attachment 2.2.2, Figure 3.3.3, Figure 3.3.4, Figure 3.3.5, Figure 3.4.1
	(2) The LERO EOC staff should be trained in the appropriate procedures so that the FAA can be notified in a timely manner.	Proc.: OPIP 3.3.2, page 11, 15 OPIP 3.6.3, page 2

*NOTE: The item numbers used correspond to Tables 3.1 - 3.10 in the FEMA report.

ITEM #RAC RECOMMENDATIONLILCO RESPONSE

EOC-3

Since there are no procedures for notification of the Long Island Railroad (LIRR) in the Plan, the LIRR was not notified during the exercise.

- (1) The LERO procedures should be revised to establish a point of contact and a means for notifying the LIRR.
- (2) The LERO EOC staff should be trained in the revised procedures so that the LIRR can be notified in a timely manner.

The Long Island Railroad is now called and informed of the emergency. Plan and procedures revised in Revision 8.

Plan: Figure 3.3.4,
Figure 3.3.5
Proc.: OPIP 3.3.2,
page 5, 14

Training material has been revised accordingly.

EOC-4

The dose assessment status board in the accident assessment area had to accommodate both DOE RAP and LILCO field monitoring data. There were not enough columns on the board to keep the two (2) sources of data separated. LERO should enlarge the dose assessment status board to accommodate a clear separation between the data reports from the DOE RAP and LILCO field monitoring teams.

The dose assessment status board has been revised to separate data from the DOE RAP and LILCO field monitoring teams.

EOC-5

The downwind distance of the sample was incorrectly reported to be 7,000 meters instead of 700 meters for one of the thyroid doses reported by a DOE-RAP field monitoring team. This error was caused by a decimal point misplaced during the conversion of the distance units and meant that the initial calculation of thyroid dose based on this measurement was 9,000 mRem/hr. at 4.3 miles downwind instead of 9,000 mRem/hr. at about 0.5 miles downwind. About five (5) minutes elapsed before this error was found and corrected. All downwind distance from the field should be reported consistently in either miles or meters.

The field teams will transmit data in miles to minimize confusion. A precaution has been placed in Revision 8.

ITEM #RAC RECOMMENDATIONLILCO RESPONSE

EOC-6

During the reporting of the initial DOE RAP thyroid doses, only one field measurement, the 1400 mRem/hr measurement made at about 1204 at two (2) miles from the plant, was available. This value was used at the LERO EOC to extrapolate doses at other distances. These extrapolated data were reported as actual measurements at other distances rather than as projected data on the dose assessment status board. It took two and one half (2.5) hours to identify and correct this error. LERO reporting procedures should be reviewed to ensure proper coordination and proper reporting.

Dose projections based upon extrapolated field data will be reported as 'projected' and posted in the projected data column. A precaution has been placed in Revision 8.

Proc.: OPIP 3.5.2, page 2.

EOC-7

Although he later quoted the PAG correctly when asked to do so by a Federal evaluator, during a briefing held at the LERO EOC at about 1110, the Health Services Coordinator misstated the EPA PAG as being mandatory evacuation when the projected thyroid dose was five (5) Rem. The Health Services Coordinator should review the EPA PAG guidance in order to avoid any possible confusion that could result due to misinformation given during briefings.

The Health Services Coordinator has been provided with review material on the use and meaning of the EPA PAG's.

EOC-8

Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the decision that the siren system would not be activated as part of the February 13, 1986 exercise. Activation of the siren system should be actually tested in the future.

The siren system will be activated as part of a prompt notification test, prior to commercial operation.

ITEM #RAC RECOMMENDATIONLILCO RESPONSE

EOC-9

There was a delay of about forty-five (45) minutes between the LERO EOC's first attempt to have Route Spotter #1005 verify the fuel truck impediment and the dispatch of that spotter from the Port Jefferson Staging Area. This delayed timely verification of the impediment. Personnel need to be trained in the development of alternative approaches when delays are reasonably anticipated in the field verification of impediments to evacuation. Development of alternatives should include consultation between, at a minimum, the Evacuation Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator.

Traffic Control procedure has been revised to direct expedited dispatch of personnel responding to incidents identified by the EOC. Procedures revised in Rev. 7 and 8.

Proc.: OPIP 3.6.3,
page 2, 3a, 8

EOC-10

Only the Shoreham-Wading River School District participated in the February 13, 1986 exercise. Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the decision that other school districts were not to be included in the exercise. In the future all schools must be included in all Federally evaluated exercises and drills.

Schools will be requested to participate in future exercises.

EOC-11

Dosimetry and training have not been provided to the Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.

- (1) Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should be trained in the use of dosimeters.
- (2) Adequate supplies of dosimetry should be provided for Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.

LILCO is ready to abide by its commitment to provide training in basic principles of radiation and dosimetry use and to provide personal dosimeters and KI tablets to all school bus drivers upon request.

EOC-12

Some of the Ambulette Drivers were not aware of when to take their KI. Training on KI procedures should be given to the Ambulette Drivers.

Training of ambulance/ambulette drivers is being scheduled and has been revised to provide increased emphasis on dosimetry and radiological protective actions for emergency workers.

ITEM #RAC RECOMMENDATIONLILCO RESPONSE

EOC-13	Bus Drivers used for school evacuation have not been trained in KI policy and the use of KI. Sufficient supplies of KI are not available for School Evacuation Bus Drivers. (1) Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should be trained in KI policy and the use of KI. (2) Adequate supplies of KI should be provided for Bus Drivers used for school evacuation.	See EOC Item 11.
EOC-14	Ambulette Drivers were not all trained regarding who can authorize doses in excess of and what to do in the event of exposure above the general public PAGs. Ambulette Drivers should be trained on excessive exposure authorization and applicable procedures.	See EOC Item 12.
EOC-15	Bus Drivers used for school evacuation have not been trained regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs. Bus Drivers used for school evacuation should receive training regarding who can authorize exposure in excess of the general public PAGs.	See EOC Item 11.
ENC-2	Maps and displays in the media briefing room were insufficient. The following displays should be posted in an area easily visible to reporters: o An EPZ map which tracks protective actions and plume pathway. o A status board which provides ECLs and their times of declaration.	The suggested additional displays and status boards have been provided to the ENC.
ENC-3	Some hard copies of EBS messages that were provided to the press contained extraneous information (clearly marked for deletion) that should have been omitted to avoid possible confusion. Hard copies of EBS messages posted in the ENC for use by the press should contain only that information which was broadcast to the public.	The emergency press releases, which do not contain deleted material, will be posted in the ENC. Procedures revised in Revision 7. Proc.: OPIP 3.8.1, page 3, 4, 5

<u>ITEM #</u>	<u>RAC RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>LILCO RESPONSE</u>
PORT. JEFF-1	One (1) Bus Driver neglected to read his DRD at anytime during the seventy-five (75) minutes he was working in the EPZ. All Bus Drivers should be trained to read their DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes as described in LERO Procedures.	Training materials have been revised to provide additional emphasis on radiation and dosimetry.
PATCH.-2	OPIP 4.7.1 specifies that the only personnel entrance is to be the Main Entrance on the Conklin Avenue side of the building. The entrance actually used for this purpose was the one on the north side of the building (Main Street). Since the system actually used seems to be superior to the Plan due to reduced congestion, OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised to indicate that personnel are to enter the Patchogue Staging Area through the Main Street entrance to the building.	Procedure 4.7.1 has been revised in Revision 8 to indicate actual flow of personnel. Proc.: OPIP 4.5.1 page 7, 8 OPIP 4.7.1, page 28, 38, 39, 40, 41
PATCH.-3	LERO personnel entered the upper floor repeatedly to use telephones for emergency notification. This practice is explicitly prohibited by OPIP 4.7.1 (page 38, item #3). Either OPIP 4.7.1 should be revised to reflect the actual practice of using telephones on the second floor of the Patchogue Staging Area building, or more telephones should be provided on the first floor for LERO personnel to perform their emergency notifications.	Procedure 4.7.1 has been revised in Revision 8 to indicate access to upstairs areas. Proc.: OPIP 4.7.1, page 38
PATCH.-4	The south door was not locked for security as specified in OPIP 4.7.1. All doors required to be locked by the Plan should be verified as actually locked by the Staging Area Coordinator or a designee.	Procedure 4.7.1 has been revised in Revision 8 to ensure south door is closed and guarded. Proc.: OPIP 4.7.1, page 40
PATCH.-5	Unauthorized entrance to the staging area could be achieved through the open fire escape on the second floor of the east side of the building. The fire escape on the second floor of the east side of the building should be designated as a guard post in the Plan and individual should be assigned to Staff this guard post.	Procedure 4.7.1 has been revised in Revision 8 to ensure the entrance on the northeast corner of the second floor is locked.

ITEM #RAC RECOMMENDATIONLILCO RESPONSE

- PATCH-7 Traffic Guides do not have complete or correct information on the appropriate destination for evacuees. All Traffic Guides should be trained to advise motorists with questions to tune to the EBS station (WALK-FM) for the latest information on all matters related to the emergency, including the location of the Reception Center.
- The Traffic Guide Procedure has been modified in Rev. 8 to have evacuees listen to WALK for emergency information.
- Proc.: OPIP 3.6.3,
page 18.
- PATCH-8 Appropriate personnel and equipment were not dispatched to clear the multiple vehicle accident simulated as an impediment to evacuation. The appropriate personnel at the Patchogue Staging Area should be trained to request more information from the LERO EOC when impediments to evacuation are indicated.
- After road crews are dispatched to their field positions they communicate via radio with the EOC. The Lead Traffic Guides at the Staging Area do not decide which trucks are to be dispatched to a particular impediment.
- PATCH-9 Instructions for the driver of the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired bus to proceed to the Reception Center were not properly transmitted to the Bus Driver at the Brookhaven National Laboratory transfer Point. Transfer Point Coordinators should be trained to follow instructions forthcoming from the staging area regarding directions that are to be given to special population evacuation route Bus Drivers, since they are trained to return to the transfer point for instructions as specified in the LERO Plan.
- The Transfer Point Coordinators' training material has been modified to ensure the relay of instructions from the SAC's to the bus drivers.
- PATCH-10 Residences of some non-institutionalized mobility-impaired persons were difficult to find. Drivers designated to pick up non-institutionalized mobility-impaired evacuees at their residences should be provided with more detailed maps and clearer descriptions of pickup points.
- The maps used to find homes in the EPZ are being reviewed for clarity. Where applicable, the number of the utility pole that services the residence or other landmarks will be included.
- PATCH-11 It took forty (40) minutes from receipt of a LERO request to dispatch a Bus Driver to simulate the evacuation of forty (40) school children. The Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area should be provided with trained staff support so that Bus Drivers can be dispatched in a more timely manner.
- Rev. 8 has been revised to indicate an additional LERO Staff person will assist the Special Populations Bus Dispatcher.
- Proc.: OPIP 3.6.5,
page 11, 12

ITEM #RAC RECOMMENDATIONLILCO RESPONSE

- PATCH.-12 The Patchogue Staging Area Bus Dispatcher made repeated statements with a bullhorn which emphasized only that general population evacuation Route Bus Drivers were to call in if a reading of 3.5 was reached on their DRD; he did not give the units associated with the 3.5 number nor mention the use of the 0-200 mRem DRD which is supposed to trigger the first call-in at a reading at or above 200 mRem. The verbal instructions given to the general population evacuation route Bus Drivers by the Patchogue Bus dispatcher over the bullhorn should be more precise to emphasize the proper use of both dosimeters and the careful reading of exposure control instructions for emergency workers.
- PATCH.-13 One general population evacuation route Bus Driver read DRDs only twice at the instructions of the Transfer Point Coordinator and another read his DRDs only when it was convenient. General population evacuation route Bus Drivers should be trained to read their dosimeters approximately every fifteen (15) minutes when they are inside the 10-mile EPZ, stopping the bus to do so if necessary.
- PATCH.-14 Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not know dose authorization limits. Train the Traffic Guides so that they know the dose authorization limits.
- PATCH.-15 The Route Alerting Driver observed believed he would receive KI authorization in an EBS message. This is inconsistent with OPIP 3.3.4, Attachment 1, Item #9. Route Alert Drivers should be trained to know that KI authorization is to be issued to them by their supervisor as specified in the LERO Plan.
- All personnel going into the field receive a dosimetry briefing when they are issued their dosimetry.
- The Lead Traffic Guides and Bus Dispatchers training has been modified to emphasize the need to be more precise with their information.
- Training material will be modified to emphasize the importance of reading the DRD and other aspects of KI and dosimetry.
- See Patchogue S.A. Item 13.
- See Patchogue S.A. Item 13. Route Alert Drivers consume their KI tablet when they hear a General Emergency declared on the radio.
- See OPIP 3.3.4, Attachment 1, Step 9.
- Training material has been modified accordingly.

ITEM #RAC RECOMMENDATIONLILCO RESPONSE

- PATCH-16 Traffic Guides at two (2) TCPs did not fully understand that the chain of command for excess exposure authorization gives the Lead Traffic Guide authority to authorize excess exposure by radio, and some Traffic Guides indicated that they might question the authority of the Lead Traffic Guide to issue the authorization for excess exposure. All Traffic Guides should be trained to know that the Lead Traffic Guide can authorize exposure in excess of the general population PAGs by radio. See Patchogue S.A. Item 13.
- RIVER-1 While the status board was updated periodically, the time was not always included when new information was posted. Personnel should be trained to record the time that updated information is posted on the status board. Training material has been modified to ensure S.A. personnel record the time that updated information is posted on the status board.
- RIVER-3 The access road at the Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point was narrow and curving and could be impassable in inclement weather. Consideration should be given to relocating the Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point to a different location. Brookhaven Substation T.P. is LILCO property and is cleared regularly by LILCO plows. This facility, which is at a central and convenient location, was not a problem when used during the drill on 1/30/86 immediately following a snow storm.
- RIVER-4 One (1) of the drivers for the general population evacuation bus routes dispatched from the Riverhead Staging Area did not read his DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes as stated in OPIP 3.9.1. Bus Drivers for the general population bus routes should be given additional training to read their low and mid-range DRDs every fifteen (15) minutes. Training material has been modified to emphasize the importance of reading the DRD and other aspects of KI and dosimetry.
- RIVER-5 Two (2) of the eight (8) Traffic Guides did not fully understand the difference between low and mid-range DRDs. Traffic Guides should be given additional training in the use of low and mid-range DRDs. See Riverhead S.A. Item 4.

<u>ITEM #</u>	<u>RAC RECOMMENDATION</u>	<u>LILCO RESPONSE</u>
RIVER-6	One (1) Bus Driver simulated the ingestion of his KI tablet prematurely, prior to being assigned an evacuation route. Bus Drivers should be given additional training in procedures for ingesting KI.	See Riverhead S.A. Item 4.
REC. CTR.-1	On several occasions, personnel radiological monitoring took approximately four (4) to five (5) minutes per individual, which is considerably longer than the ninety (90) seconds specified in the LERO Procedures. All monitoring personnel assigned to the Reception Center should be trained to monitor individuals within ninety (90) seconds as prescribed in the LERO Procedures.	Training has been modified to emphasize that monitoring must be completed within the time specified in the procedure.
CONG. CARE-1	Neither of the two (2) congregate care facilities activated for the February 13, 1986 exercise are identified in the latest submission of the LERO Plan. The Plan should be revised to include all facilities intended for use as shelter facilities during a radiological emergency at SNPS. These facilities should be included in the list attached to LERO's letter of agreement with the American Red Cross.	The Red Cross has the responsibility for maintaining a list of congregate care centers. Since the list is revised periodically (as particular centers become unavailable or as new ones are added), it is not included in the LERO Plan but rather is maintained at Red Cross Headquarters. A new letter from the Red Cross, dated August 21, 1986, has been added to Appendix B. This letter states that the earlier letter of July 25, 1984 is a statement of Red Cross policy rather than an "agreement".

PART II - Revision to Reception Center Planning Basis

The LERO Reception Center, previously located at the Nassau Coliseum, has been revised in Revision 8. LERO will now use three LILCO facilities as reception centers. These facilities are located in Bellmore, Hicksville and Roslyn. In addition to just changing the location of the facilities, LERO has modified the procedure for monitoring incoming evacuees. Incoming vehicles will be directed to monitoring stations where the vehicle and the vehicle driver will be checked for contamination. If contamination, above acceptable limits, is found the vehicle will be directed to another area for detailed monitoring. If contamination is below limits, the passengers will also be assumed uncontaminated and a clean tag will be issued.

The revised Plan and Procedures pages are:

Plan: Fig. 2.1.1, 2.2-2, 2.2-2a, Fig. 3.3.3, Fig. 3.3.4, Fig. 3.3.5, Fig. 3.3.6, Fig. 3.4.1, 3.6-7, 3.9-5, Table 3.9.1, 4.2-1, Fig. 4.2.1, 4.7-1, 4.8-1, Fig. 5.1.1, Fig. 5.2.1, B-vi

App. A: III-36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, IV-4, 73, 74, 74a, 75, 77, 79, 81, 82a, 84, 86, 88, 90, 92, 94, 95, 96, 96a, 101, 103, 104, 107, 108a, 109, 111, 113, 116, 118, 121, 123, 123a, 124, 129, 131, 133, 135, 138, 140, 142, 144, 147, 149, 152, 154, 154a, 156, 158, 160, 162, 164, 165a, 166a.

Proc: OPIP 2.1.1 pgs. 3, 4, 16a, 17, 30, 60, 61, 76, 77,
OPIP 3.1.1 pgs. 22, 32, 35, 53, 56
OPIP 3.3.2 pgs. 2, 3, 4, 13
OPIP 3.3.3 pgs. 4, 6, 12
OPIP 3.3.5 pgs. 13, 28, 39, 41
OPIP 3.6.1 pg. 2
OPIP 3.6.4 pg. 2
OPIP 3.9.2 pgs. 1 through 6, 9 through 17, 23, 24, 27a, 49a
OPIP 4.2.2 pg. 2a
OPIP 4.2.3 pgs. 1 through 29
OPIP 4.3.1 pgs. 2, 6
OPIP 5.1.1 pgs. 17, 18, 19

Appendix B (Not a controlled document, limited distribution)

- Table of Contents
- Support Organizations (Public)

PART III - Revised Radiological Emergency Data Form

New York State has developed and issued a new Radiological Emergency Data Form. In order to ensure consistency with state procedures LILCO has revised their documents accordingly. The revised procedure pages are:

Plan: Fig. 3.3.1

OPIP 3.1.1, Pages 78, 79, 80
OPIP 3.3.1, Pages 7, 8, 9
OPIP 3.3.5, Page 40
OPIP 3.5.2, Pages 113, 114, 115

SNPS Local Offsite Radiological
Emergency Response Plan

Insertion Instructions For Revision 8

Plan

1. Replace List of Effective Pages: viii, ix, x, xi
2. Replace pages: Fig. 2.1.1, pgs. 1, 2; 2.2-2; 2.2-2a; Fig. 2.2.1;
Fig. 3.3.1, pgs. 1, 2, 3; Fig. 3.3.3, pgs. 1, 2, 3;
Fig. 3.3.4, pgs. 1, 2, 4; Fig. 3.3.5; Fig. 3.3.6,
pg. 1; Fig. 3.4.1; 3.6-7; 3.9-5
3. Delete and discard page: 3.9-6
4. Replace pages: Table 3.9.1, 4.2-1
5. Delete and discard page: 4.2-2
6. Replace page: Fig. 4.2.1
7. Delete and discard page: Fig. 4.2.2
8. Replace pages: 4.7-1; 4.8-1; Fig. 5.1.1, pgs. 1, 2; Fig. 5.2.1,
pg. 1; B-vi

Procedures

1. Replace List of Effective Pages: ii, iii, iv, v, vii, viii
2. Replace pages: OPIP 2.1.1, pgs. 3, 4
3. Add new page: OPIP 2.1.1, pg. 16a
4. Replace pages: OPIP 2.1.1, pgs. 17, 30, 60, 61, 76, 77
OPIP 3.1.1, pgs. 22, 32, 35, 53, 56, 78, 79, 80
OPIP 3.3.1, pgs. 7, 8, 9
OPIP 3.3.2, pgs. 2, 3, 4, 5, 11, 13, 14
OPIP 3.3.3, pgs. 4, 6, 12
OPIP 3.3.5, pgs. 13, 28, 39, 40, 41
OPIP 3.5.2, pg. 2
5. Add new page: OPIP 3.5.2, pg. 2a
6. Replace pages: OPIP 3.5.2, pgs. 113, 114, 115
OPIP 3.6.1, pg. 2
OPIP 3.6.3, pgs. 2, 18
OPIP 3.6.4, pg. 2
OPIP 3.6.5, pgs. 11, 12
OPIP 3.9.2, pgs. 1-6, 9
7. Add new page: OPIP 3.9.2, pg. 9a

8. Replace pages: OPIP 3.9.2, pgs. 10-17, 23, 24
9. Add new page: OPIP 3.9.2, pg. 27a
10. Replace pages: OPIP 3.9.2, pg. 49a
OPIP 4.2.2, pg. 2a
OPIP 4.2.3, pgs. 1-29
11. Delete and discard page: OPIP 4.2.3, pg. 30
12. Replace pages: OPIP 4.3.1, pgs. 2, 6, 6a
OPIP 4.5.1, pgs. 7, 8
OPIP 4.7.1, pgs. 28, 29, 38, 39, 40, 41
OPIP 5.1.1, pgs. 17, 18, 19

APPENDIX A

1. Replace List of Effective Pages: 1, 2, 3, 4
2. Replace pages: ii, iia, iii, III-36, III-37, III-38, Fig. 7.2
3. Add new pages: Fig. 7.3, Fig. 7.4
4. Replace pages: IV-4, IV-73, IV-74, IV-74a, IV-75, Fig. 9, IV-79, Fig. 10, IV-82a, Fig. 11, IV-86, Fig. 12, IV-90, Fig. 13, IV-94, IV-95, IV-96, IV-96a, Fig. 14, IV-103, IV-104, Fig. 15, IV-108a, IV-109, Fig. 16, IV-113, Fig. 17, IV-118, Fig. 18, IV-123
5. Add new page: IV-123a
6. Replace pages: IV-124, Fig. 19, IV-131, Fig. 20, IV-135, Fig. 21, IV-140, Fig. 22, IV-144, Fig. 23, IV-149, Fig. 24, IV-154, IV-154a, Fig. 25, IV-158, Fig. 26, IV-162, Fig. 27, Fig. 27.2
7. Delete and discard pages: IV-165b, IV-165c, IV-165d
8. Replace page: IV-166a

APPENDIX B

(Not a Controlled Document,
Limited Distribution)

1. Replace Table of Contents: pg. 1, B-vi
2. Replace pages: B-11, 11a, 11b, 11c, 11d
3. Delete and discard: B-12, 12a, 12b, 24, 24a