

## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Palisades Nuclear Plant										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 5 5 1 OF 0 2										PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2	
TITLE (4) Inadvertent Safety Injection Signal Actuation																					
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)											
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES					DOCKET NUMBER(S)							
0 8	1 8	8 6	8 6	0 3 0	0 0	0 9	1 7	8 6	NA					0 5 0 0 0							
OPERATING MODE (9) N			THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5: (Check one or more of the following) (11)																		
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0			20.402(b)				20.408(e)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)						
			20.408(a)(1)(i)				80.38(a)(1)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(e)						
			20.408(a)(1)(ii)				80.38(a)(2)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vi)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 388A)						
			20.408(a)(1)(iii)				80.73(a)(2)(i)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)										
			20.408(a)(1)(iv)				80.73(a)(2)(ii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)										
			20.408(a)(1)(v)				80.73(a)(2)(iii)				<input type="checkbox"/> 80.73(a)(2)(ix)										
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																					
NAME Keith E Osborne, Technical Engineer, Palisades										TELEPHONE NUMBER 6 1 6 7 6 4 - 8 9 1 3											
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																					
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRC											
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)										EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)				MONTH	DAY	YEAR					
<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO											

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 18, 1986, an inadvertent right channel Safety Injection Signal (SIS) occurred during the test of a plant modification. The Plant was in cold shutdown condition at the time of occurrence.

All appropriate plant personnel will be informed of the importance of ensuring that Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations occur only as a necessary and desired result of the associated activity.

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## LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Palisades Nuclear Plant	0 5 0 0 0 2 5 5	8 6	— 0 3 0	— 0 0	0 2	OF	0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Description

On August 18, 1986, at 1705, the performance of a written test procedure associated with a modification to the component cooling water [CC] containment isolation valve [INV] actuation logic generated an inadvertent right channel safety injection signal (SIS). The Plant was in cold shutdown condition at the time of the occurrence. The procedure called for the activation of a relay [RLY;JE] to simulate a containment [NH] high pressure signal. In addition, however, the relay also activated the right channel SIS circuitry.

The spurious SIS was subsequently reset. Major equipment which functioned (Boric Acid Pump P-56A [P;CB], Bus 1-E breaker 152-303 [BV;EA], Boric Acid Pump Feed Valve MO-2140 [20;CB] and Charging Pump P-55B [P;CB]) was restored to normal status. All other major components were either already running, or were not expected to function, given the shutdown condition of the Plant.

Cause

The cause of the occurrence is twofold. First, the procedure employed no special means to avert the SIS actuation, listing the SIS as a potential outcome of test performance. The procedure directed the Shift Supervisor to utilize preventive measures at his own discretion to preclude undesired equipment operation. Secondly, the Shift Supervisor incorrectly reasoned that no SIS would occur because the SIS function was already blocked in the given plant condition. A more thorough review of the involved circuitry, however, would have revealed that the SIS would indeed occur.

Corrective Action

All plant personnel who have occasion to prepare, review, approve or authorize the performance of activities which could result in undesired Engineered Safety Feature (ESF) actuations will be counselled, in writing, on the importance of taking sufficient measures to ensure that ESF actuations occur only as a necessary and desired result of the associated activity.

Administrative Procedures will also be revised to reflect this information.

Analysis

The event does not involve any adverse safety consequences. Review of the SIS actuation identified no malfunctions. No equipment was rendered inoperable.

Additional Information

Related occurrences were reported in LERs 85-11 and 85-28.



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September 17, 1986

US Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Document Control Desk  
Washington, DC 20555

DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 - PALISADES PLANT -  
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 86-030 - INADVERTENT SAFETY INJECTION SIGNAL ACTUATION

Licensee Event Report (LER) 86-030, (Inadvertent Safety Injection Signal Actuation) is attached. This event is reportable to the NRC per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv).

*Brian D. Johnson*

Brian D Johnson  
Staff Licensing Engineer

CC Administrator, Region III, USNRC  
NRC Resident Inspector - Palisades

Attachment