April 29, 1987 ST-HL-AE-2129 File No.: G9.17 10CFR50

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attention: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

South Texas Project
Units 1 and 2
Docket Nos. STN 50-498, STN 50-499
FSAR Revision Concerning
the CR/EAB FMEA

Enclosed is a annotated revision to FSAR Table 9.4-5.1 regarding the control room and electrical auxiliary building FMEA. The attached revision clarifies the effect of inadvertent energization of the control room heater. The attached is provided for the staff's immediate use and will be incorporated in a future FSAR amendment. We believe that this change does not impact conclusions previously documented in the Safety Evaluation Report.

If you should have any questions on this matter, please contact Mr. M. E. Powell at (713) 993-1328.

Deputy Project Marager

MEP/yd

Attachment: Annotated revision to FSAR Table 9.4-5.1

Bool

Houston Lighting & Power Company

cc:

Regional Administrator, Region IV Nuclear Regulatory Commission 611 Ryan Plaza Drive, Suite 1000 Arlington, TX 76011

N. Prasad Kadambi, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814

Robert L. Perch, Project Manager U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 7920 Norfolk Avenue Bethesda, MD 20814

Dan R. Carpenter
Senior Resident Inspector/Operations
c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission
P.O. Box 910
Bay City, TX 77414

Claude E. Johnson Senior Resident Inspector/Construction c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 910 Bay City, TX 77414

M.D. Schwarz, Jr., Esquire Baker & Botts One Shell Plaza Houston, TX 77002

J.R. Newman, Esquire Newman & Holtzinger, P.C. 1615 L Street, N.W. Washington, DC 20036

T.V. Shockley/R.L. Range Central Power & Light Company P. O. Box 2121 Corpus Christi, TX 78403 M.B. Lee/J.E. Malaski City of Austin P.O. Box 1088 Austin, TX 78767-8814

A. von Rosenberg/M.T. Hardt City Public Service Board P.O. Box 1771 San Antonio, TX 78296

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street Washington, DC 20555

TABLE 9.4-5.1 (Continued)

CONTROL ROOM & ELECTRICAL AUXILIARY BUILDING HVAC

FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS

DESCRIPTION OF COMPONENT	SAPETY	PLANT OPERAT- ING MODE	PAILURE MODE(s)	METHOD OF FAILURE DETECTION	FAILURE EFFECT ON SYSTEM SAFETY FUNCTION CAPABILITY
Duct reheat coils (typical) (i.e., room heaters)	Road	1 - 6*	One heater fails to deenergize	· ESF status monitoring	None - Thermostatic control will act as a back-up.
Toilet/Kitchen exhaust Dampers (typical) (normally open)	To close and isolate	1 - 6*	One damper fails to close	Position indication ESF status monitoring	None - The damper in series will close.
Toilet/Kitchen exhaust Fan	To stop running	1 - 6*	Pails to deenergize	• Status indication	None - The isolation dampers will have closed
DC Power Source (Channels I, II, IV)	Provide DC power	1 - 6*	Lose one DC Channel	ESF status monitoring DC trouble alarm	None - All components fail in their safe emergency state.
Essential Chilled Water pumps (typical)	Operate and deliver cooling water	1 - 6*	One pump fails to provide adequate flow	Status indication ESF status monitoring	None - Each train is 50% thus loss of one train will leave 100% capacity.

^{*}Note (Modes)
1. Power Operation
2. Startup
3. Hot Standby

Rot Shutdown Cold Shutdown Refueling

ATTACHMENT ST.HL.AE. 2129 PAGE & OF 2

Note

Should the main control room heater inadvertently energize, manual action can be initiated in 30 min. to deenergize the heater thereby reducing the control room temperature. Peak temperature will not affect the operability of control room equipment.