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maintenance of the system and decreasing the number of isolations.	approx: power) Water ( isolate inboard close. Invest: piping by: 1 the sys partia indical Other system include trap al valves invest	mate power level Plant personne Cleanup (RWCU) de ed on a high diff and outboard is This was an unp ogation of the ev It is conclude the RWCU resin stem in service, Cly open. These tions are sometim CERS have reporte The corrective is 1) modifying and associated pip to ensure proper	of 1552 MM l were in of mineralize erential f olation val lanned Eng ent showed d that Eng ent showed d that the trap not be or 2) the valves are es inaccur d high dif actions for the demine ing are fi positioni recommend	Wt (64 per the proce r into se low signal lves, 2G ineered s that the isolatic eing fill resin tra- ball val ate. ferential or this l ralizer p lled and ng, and ations of	ercent ess of ervice al. Th 31-F001 Safety ere was on sign led and ap isol lves an l flow LER to procedu vented 3) form n impro	of rated placing t when the ne isolati l and 2G31 Feature ( s no break hal was ca d vented p lation val d the pos isolation prevent r ire to ins d, 2) modi ning a RWC oving the	thermal he "2A" RWCU sys on cause -F004, t ESF) act of the used eit rior to ves bein dition as of the ecurrence sure the fying th U team to operation	Reactor stem ed the co cuation. system ther placing ng e RWCU se resin he ball co on and				

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NRC Form 386A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REP	ORT (LER) TEXT CONTINU	ATIO	N		U.S	APP	PROVED O	MB NO			SION
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Α.	REQUIREMENT FOR REPORT											
	This report is required puplanned actuation of an							red.				
в.	UNIT(S) STATUS AT TIME OF	EVENT										
	Unit 2 was in the run mode MWt (64 percent of rated		wer 1	leve	e1	of :	155	2				
с.	DESCRIPTION OF EVENT											
	On 8/10/86 at approximate. (RWCU) system isolated du differential flow network to the return flow to the of 65 gpm for a duration isolation. The inboard an and 2G31-F004) closed and At the time that the isola the process of placing the	e to a high differenti compares the RWCU pum reactor and condenser of 45 seconds will ini nd outboard isolation the "2B" RWCU pump tr ation occurred, plant	al fl p dis • A • iate valve ipped perso	flo flo a s ( pe	si arg ow sy (2G er el	gna: e pr misr ster 31-1 dest were	1. ress mato FOOJ ign. e ir	The sure ch				
D.	CAUSE OF EVENT											
	The differential flow trip in the system piping. Pla problem and determined that trip:	ant engineering person	nel i	nve	est	igat	ted	the				
	34SO-G31-002-2 requiplown down prior to The procedure does no piping to be filled of this piping when possibly cause a dificause a trip. A difi	er Cleanup Demineraliz ires the demineralizer placing the demineral not call for the trap and vented after blow the system is placed fferential flow of suf fferential flow signal onds will initiate a s	resi izer and i down in se ficie of 6	n t in ts rvi nt 5 g	ra se as Th ce du	p to rvio soci e fi cou rati whi	o be ce. iate illi uld ion ich	ed ing				
	are remotely operate handwheels through a through 360 <sup>0</sup> , it is Additionally the pos valves were partiall	solation valves 2G31-F ed ball valves. They a wall. Since these v possible for them to sition indication is u ly open when the system cause a flow differention.	are o alves overt nreli m was	per wi rav abl	at 11 el .e.	ed t rot If ed i	by tate f th in	nese				

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NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REP	ORT (LER	) TEX	тсо	NTIN	NUA	TION	V	U.S	APP	ROVED O	MB NO			IION
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	There is an operator aid verified closed. However difficult to determine th	, the lo	catio	on o	f the										
E.	ANALYSIS OF EVENT														
	There were no safety cons were the health and safet system isolated as it sho in system integrity.	y of the	pub	lic	affe	cted	d si	nce	the F	WCU					
F.	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS														
	The isolation was cleared 2200 CDT on 8/10/86.	and the	syst	tem	was	retu	irne	d to	serv	vice	e at				
	The "Reactor Water Cleanu is being revised to requi piping to be filled and w expected to be in place by	re the r ented af	esin ter 1	tra	p an	d it	s a	ssoc	iated	£					
	The ball valves will be m This modification is expe- upcoming outage.				-										
	A RWCU team has been char the operational and maint system. This team was for recommendations on how to number of isolations.	enance p rmed on	roble 8/8/8	ems 36 a	asso nd w	ciat ill	for	with mula	the		e				
G.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION														
	1. FAILED COMPON	ENTS IDE	NTIFI	ICAT	ION										
	None														

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/85 DOCKET NUMBER (2) FACILITY NAME (1) LER NUMBER (6) PAGE (3) SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER YEAR 010 014 OF 01 EDWIN I. HATCH, UNIT 2 0 |5 |0 |0 |0 |3 | 6 |6 | 8 6 0 | 1 | 8 4 TEXT (If more spece is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17) 2. PREVIOUS SIMILAR EVENTS Previous similar events where the RWCU system isolated on a high flow signal were reported in the following LERs: 50-366/1984-010 (dated 10/24/84), 50-321/1985-012 (dated 4/19/85), 50-366/1985-008 (dated 5/20/85), 50-366/1985-021 Rev. 1 (dated 10/18/85), 50-366/1985-020 (dated 8/21/85), 50-366/1985-031 (dated 10/7/85), 50-366/1985-032 (dated 11/1/85), 50-366/1986-002 (dated 2/14/86), 50-366/1986-008 (dated 3/20/86), and 50-366/1986-005 (dated 4/28/86). The events described by these LERs showed a variety of causes for the isolations, such as flow fluctuations, mis-aligned position indicators on valves, valves left partially opened after operations, leaking valves, and operator in-attention to detail. The corrective actions for these LERs included replacing manual isolation valves with air operated valves, realigning local position indicators, posting operator aids to aid in the correct operation of the system, repairing damaged valves, counseling of personnel and observation of personnel in the course of valve lineups. Based on the high numbers of isolations of the system, plant management has formed a RWCU team. This team was formed on 8/8/86 and consists of engineering, operations, and maintenance personnel. This team is chartered to develop a plan for resolving the RWCU operational and maintenance problems, both long term and short term. They are tasked with addressing system isolations, pump seal failures, leaks, demineralizer/valve operability, and system modification. This team could not have prevented the event described in this LER because the event occurred only two days after they received their charter. It is anticipated that once the team has completed its review and investigation into the RWCU system operational problems, that spurious isolations will be minimized.

NRC Form 366A (9-83)	LICENSEE EVENT REPO	ORT (LER	) TEX	т	CONT	INU	ATIO	N		U.S. 1	APPROVEI EXPIRES:	DOM	8 NO. 3		
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E.	ANALYSIS OF EVENT														
	There were no safety conse were the health and safety system isolated as it show in system integrity.	of the	pub	lic	aff.	ect	ed s	ince	th	e RV	VCU				
F.	CORRECTIVE ACTIONS														
	The isolation was cleared 2200 CDT on 8/10/86.	and the	sys	tem	n was	re	turn	ed to	0 5	ervi	ce at				
	The "Reactor Water Cleanup is being revised to requir piping to be filled and ve expected to be in place by	re the r ented af	esin ter	tr	ap an	nd	its	asso	cia	ted					
	The ball valves will be mo ensure proper positioning. completed by the end of th	This	modi	fic	ation										
	A RWCU team has been chart the operational and mainte system. This team was for recommendations on how to number of isolations.	mance p med on	rob1 8/8/	ems 86	and w	vil	ated 1 fo	with	h th ate	ne	ate				
G.	ADDITIONAL INFORMATION														
	1. FAILED COMPONE	NTS IDE	NTIF	ICA	TION										
	None														

Georgia Power Company 333 Piedmont Avenue Atlanta, Georgia 30308 Telephone 404 526-6526

Mailing Address: Post Office Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302

L. T. Gucwa Manager Nuclear Safety and Licensing



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September 8, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D. C. 20555

Attached is Licensee Event Report 50-366/1985-018. This report meets the reporting requirements of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).

Sincerely,

FT Quan

L. T. Gucwa

LGB/1c

Enclosure

c:	Georgia Power Company	Nuclear Regulatory Commission									
	Mr. J. P. O'Reilly Mr. J. T. Beckham, Jr.	Dr. J. N. Grace, Regional Administrator Mr. P. Holmes-Ray									
	Mr. H. C. Nix, Jr. GO-NORMS	Mr. F. Hornies-Kay									