

May 16, 1986

DISTRIBUTION

RFBurnett

SG R/F

~~GMcCorkle~~

ETenEyck

RErickson

WBrown

*Kasuy*

MEMORANDUM FOR: John G. Davis, Director  
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards

FROM: Robert F. Burnett, Director  
Division of Safeguards, NMSS

SUBJECT: INCIDENT AT PALO VERDE

During the evening of May 14, 1986, power from three of four transmission lines to the Palo Verde site was interrupted by deliberate acts by unknown persons. The FBI has the matter under active investigation.

Power was interrupted at three separate locations. Circumstances suggest that this was a coordinated attack. Neither of the two licensed units were operating at the time of the incident. The diesels were checked and were found to be operational.

Attached is a copy of a message generated by the FBI, Phoenix Field Office. Although the first part of the FBI message is somewhat garbled, it does reflect the essential facts as we know them. The message was transmitted to 12 other FBI field offices which were asked to provide any information that might be related to this matter. We are keeping in close contact with the FBI concerning developments.

Also attached is a copy of a brief summary we have furnished to Public Affairs for use in the event of any inquiry.

*Robert F. Burnett*

Robert F. Burnett, Director  
Division of Safeguards, NMSS

Enclosures:

1. FBI Message
2. Prepared Statement for  
PA's Use

8702050544 870202  
PDR FOIA  
AFTERG086-774 PDR

*A-12*

OFFICE	SGRT <i>ANC</i>	SG <i>ET</i>	SG <i>RB</i>			
SURNAME	GMcCorkle; dan	ETenEyck	RFBurnett			
DATE	5/16/86	5/16/86	5/16/86			

DURING THE EVENING OF MAY 14, 1986 POWER FROM THREE OF THE FOUR TRANSMISSION LINES TO THE PALO VERDE NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION WAS INTERRUPTED BY WHAT APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DELIBERATE ACTS BY UNKNOWN PERSONS. THIS INCIDENT IS BEING ACTIVELY INVESTIGATED BY THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT THE TWO REACTORS THAT HAD BEEN LICENSED WERE SHUT-DOWN. HOWEVER, EVEN IF THE PLANT HAD BEEN OPERATING AND ALL OFF-SITE POWER SOURCES HAD BEEN INTERRUPTED THE PLANT WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAINTAIN SAFE OPERATION USING REQUIRED SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO ASSURE CONTROL IN SUCH AN EVENTUALITY.

ENCLOSURE 2

WATCH RELIEF: DATE 5/15/86 TIME 1150

OFF Going 1 ON Coming AC9

1200 Smith departed.

1305 Palo Verde - Call from Fulkembury Reg 5 stating that last night there was an apparent sabotage attempt on 3 of the 4 off site power lines coming into the site. At 2100 MT 5/14 the first line was knocked out by someone climbing the structure and throwing something over the lines and shooting them out. Three min. later the second line was knocked out apparently by gun shots at the insulator and at 2130 PT the third line was knocked out also due to gun shots at the insulator. Reg 5 notified NMSS (Gaskins) and will issue a PNS. The plant will issue a press release. Reg 5 found out about this morning. Both units are S/D.

1412 Palo Verde site (Gross) Security Report  
~~Apparent~~ Sabotage (see above). Plant experienced a ground fault on 3 of 4 off site power lines 5/14 @ 2059 MT. Today at 10:35 MT it was apparent that a sabotage attempt was made. The found a copper <sup>in the line</sup> ~~up~~ in the tower about 35-40 miles <sup>North</sup> from plant. A second line <sup>had</sup> had a wire found <sup>on</sup> over the line and was about 40 miles from the plant. The problem with the third line, has not been



found. local law enforcement was notified. The areas are scattered about 85 miles apart -

1530 Commissioners Asst Briefing by Fulkemberry on Palo Verde Sabotage

1505 Palo Verde, (Chernich) Security Report

Last key card found in Rad controlled area. Compensatory measures taken. History check made. Card taken out of system

/ / / / / / / / / /

RBC( POTE )

2100

Notice to HOO

From: D. Allison, EO

Subject: ~~Palo Verde~~ restart requirements

The licensee has agreed upon the following items prior to changing modes.

1. All four offsite power lines operable
2. DGs and support systems verified operable
3. Detection circuits for switchyard faults available
4. Security alerted
5. Walkdown of safety related systems
6. Increased surveillance of offsite power lines
7. Report any suspected tampering to Ops Center

The FBI was asked by NRC to investigate the event. Be sensitive to potential sabotage events



A-1

ARIZONA PUBLIC  
SERVICE COMPANY  
PVNGS #1, 2 & 3  
DN 50-528  
50-529  
50-530

TELEPHONE CALL FROM  
RESIDENT INSPECTOR  
AT APPROX. 8:00 AM  
PDT ON 05/15/86

APPARENT SABOTAGE OFFSITE:  
AT APPROXIMATELY 9:00 PM MST ON MAY 14, 1986, THE  
SITE EXPERIENCED THE SEQUENTIAL LOSS OF 3 OF THE 4  
SOURCES OF OFFSITE POWER. PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION  
REVEALED THAT AT LEAST ONE OF THE LINES MAY HAVE BEEN  
DELIBERATELY DAMAGED.

A PN IS BEING  
PREPARED; THE DAT AND  
URNS CENTER HAVE BEEN  
NOTIFIED.  
FOLLOWUP PER KC 0515

(X)

(S)

DISCUSS & INFORM GROUP

cc Bailey

Reportable Event Number 04650

Facility : PALO VERDE

Unit : 1 2 & 3

Region : 5

Vendor : C-E, C-E, C-E

Operations Officer : Chauncey Gould

NRC Notified By : GROSS

Rad Release : No

Cause : SECURITY EVENT

Component :

Date Notified : 05/15/86

Time Notified : 14:12

Date of Event : 05/15/86

Time of Event : 13:35

Classification : Phys. Sec./Safeguard

Category 1 : Security

Category 2 :

Category 3 :

Category 4 :

SECURITY EVENT. NOTIFIED REG 5, IE JORDAN/SCHWARTZ, IAT NOTIFIED

A-2

Reportable Event Number 04651

Facility : PALO VERDE	Date Notified : 05/15/86
Unit : 1	Time Notified : 15:05
Region : 5	Date of Event : 05/14/86
Vendor : C-E,C-E,C-E	Time of Event : 18:52
Operations Officer : Chauncey Gould	Classification : Phys.Sec./Safeguard
NRC Notified By : CHERNICK	Category 1 : Security
Rad Release : No	Category 2 :
Cause : SECURITY EVENT	Category 3 :
Component :	Category 4 :

SECURITY EVENT. COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN. NOTIFIED REG 5 MCQUEEN

Reportable Event Number 04658

Facility : PALO VERDE	Date Notified : 05/15/86
Unit : 1	Time Notified : 18:52
Region : 5	Date of Event : 05/15/86
Vendor : C-E,C-E,C-E	Time of Event : 14:01
Operations Officer : Chauncey Gould	Classification : Phys.Sec./Safeguard
NRC Notified By : CHERNICK	Category 1 : Security
Rad Release : No	Category 2 :
Cause : SECURITY EVENT	Category 3 :
Component :	Category 4 :

SECURITY EVENT. COMPENSATORY MEASURES TAKEN. NOTIFIED RDO PATE

APS RELEASE  
May 15, 1986  
Brad Parker, Media Rel.  
(602) 230-2377

LINES SUSPECTED TO BE DELIBERATELY DAMAGED

Three transmission lines leading in and out of the Palo Verde nuclear plant 55 miles west of Phoenix are currently out of operation and officials strongly suspect that sabotage was involved.

The three lines are 300 kv transmission lines which carry electricity throughout the state and to California. A fourth line is unaffected. The incident has had no effect on the APS electrical system. Two of the lines are operated by the Salt River Project and one is by Arizona Public Service.

APS discovered its damaged line at 8:58 p.m. last night and this morning located a rope or strap thrown over the Palo Verde North Gila Line southwest of the nuclear plant. This line carries power to the Yuma and San Diego areas. Power to this area was also not affected.

The other two lines were discovered damaged by SRP at 9:02 p.m. and 9:23 p.m..

According to officials at ANPP, NRC regulations require that two separate outside sources of power be available before Unit 2 at the Palo Verde nuclear plant is allowed to start.

The company is currently investigating the incident and the appropriate law enforcement agencies have been notified.



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

# STATUS BRIEF

Arizona Nuclear Power Project • P.O. Box 52034 • Phoenix, Arizona • 85072

For Release: May 27, 1986

Contact: ANPP COMMUNICATIONS 250-1530

ANPP STATUS BRIEF is designed to be responsive to the information needs of the news media by providing information on the Arizona Nuclear Power Project as it becomes available. A great deal of the information in it is preliminary in nature. Thus, some information which initially appears significant may later prove to be of less importance, while other material, which at first seems insignificant, may subsequently prove to be significant.

## PROJECT STATUS

Unit 1 -- Scheduled work on the inspection and maintenance outage was completed on May 14, 1986, with the successful conclusion of the Integrated Safeguards test and completion of minor modifications to the Balance-of-Plant Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (BOPESEFAS). In Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) since March 7, 1986, the unit entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown) at 5:12 a.m. on May 18, 1986, as operators prepared to return it to service. Mode 3 (Hot Standby) operation was achieved the same day at 7:01 p.m., when the temperature of the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) exceeded 350 degrees F. At 1:59 p.m. on May 23, 1986, Unit 1 went into Mode 2 (Startup) and into Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 4:49 p.m. that afternoon.

Unit 2 -- At 4:42 p.m. on April 30, 1986, the unit was placed in Mode 5 (Cold Shutdown) to conserve fuel while surveillance testing on the Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) and minor modifications to the Balance-of-Plant Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (BOPESEFAS) were completed. At 3:33 a.m. on May 14, 1986, Unit 2 entered Mode 4 (Hot Shutdown), followed by Mode 3 (Hot Standby) operation at 1:26 p.m. that same day. At approximately 9:00 p.m. that evening, major vandalism to three 500 Kilovolt transmission lines leading to PVNGS caused plans to restart Unit 2 to be placed on hold. Following repair of the damaged lines and their return to

-more-

May 27, 1986  
Page 2

service, the unit entered Mode 2 (Startup) at 6:25 p.m. on May 16, 1986, and Mode 1 (Power Operation) at 9:57 p.m. on May 18, 1986. After warming and rolling the turbine-generator, Unit 2 was syn-chronized to the grid and produced its first electricity, 65 Megawatts, at 5:41 p.m. on May 20, 1986.

Unit 3 -- Prerequisite and preoperational testing of the various systems and subsystems turned over to ANPP Startup and Operations continues, as construction is 99.6 percent complete.

#### NRC INSPECTIONS

Reported April 25, 1986. NRC inspection of PVNGS Units 1, 2 and 3 from March 24 through March 28, 1986, and April 7 through 11, 1986. Routine, unannounced inspection by regionally based inspector of licensee action on previously identified construction deficiencies and on other inspector-identified items. No violations of NRC requirements were identified within the scope of this inspection.

Reported May 6, 1986. NRC proposed imposition of a civil penalty of \$100,000 based on the results of a routine, unannounced security inspection from February 11, 1986 through March 13, 1986. ANPP has thirty days from the date of the notice to respond.

#### MISCELLANEOUS

On May 19, 1986, ANPP announced that it is offering a reward of \$25,000 for information leading to the arrest and conviction of the person or persons responsible for vandalizing three of four 500 kilovolt transmission lines tied to PVNGS on May 14, 1986. The three damaged lines experienced separate faults within a period of 25 minutes beginning at approximately 9:00 p.m., at points ranging from 10 to 32 miles from the plant. Repair crews from Arizona Public Service and Salt River Project restored the lines to service the following afternoon. The Federal Bureau of Investigation is investigating the case. The reward will be paid by ANPP participants in proportion to their share of ownership. Anyone with information concerning the incident is asked to call the Phoenix office of the F.B.I. at 279-5511.

# # #

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

FACSIMILE TRANSMITTAL  
 REQUEST

REQUESTER'S MAILING ADDRESS

STREET

1450 MARIA LANE, SUITE 210

CITY

WALNUT CREEK

STATE

CA

DATE

11/5/86

RETURN ORIGINAL TO  
 SENDER

☒ YES ☐ NO

MESSAGE TO

NAME AND ORGANIZATION

HENRY BAILEY

FACSIMILE PHONE NUMBER

VERIFICATION PHONE NUMBER

CITY

STATE

MINNE 3302

AUTOMATIC

NUMBER OF PAGES (INCLUDING  
 TRANSMISSION INSTRUCTIONS)

☒ YES ☐ NO

4

MESSAGE FROM

NAME

TELEPHONE NO.

FACSIMILE PHONE NUMBER

VERIFICATION TELEPHONE NUMBER

LEFEL COOK

HIGH-SPEED (UP TO 1 MIN.)

LOW-SPEED (2-5 MIN.)

463-3804

463-3806

463-3721

BUILDING

MAIL STOP

AUTOMATIC

AUTOMATIC

REGION V

☒ YES  
☐ NO

☒ YES  
☐ NO

PRECEDENCE

OVERNIGHT

FOUR HOURS

TWO HOURS

ONE HOUR

IMMEDIATE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS

TIME/DATE (Stamp)

RECEIVED

TRANSMITTED

A-5



~~SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION~~  
UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION V

1450 MARIA LANE, SUITE 210  
WALNUT CREEK, CALIFORNIA 94596

AUG 21 1986

Docket Nos. 50-528 and 50-529

Arizona Nuclear Power Project  
P.O. Box 52034  
Phoenix, Arizona 85072-2034

Attention: Mr. E.E. Van Brunt, Jr.  
Executive Vice President

Gentlemen:

Subject: NRC Security Inspection, Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station,  
Units 1 and 2

This letter refers to the routine Safeguards inspection of your activity at Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS), Units 1 and 2 authorized under NRC License Nos. NPF-41 and NPF-51, respectively. The inspection was conducted by Mr. D. Schaefer of this office on July 28 through August 1, 1986. It also refers to the discussion of our inspection findings held by the inspector with Mr. E. Van Brunt Jr., Executive Vice President of the Arizona Nuclear Power Project (ANPP), and members of his staff on August 1, 1986. Further, this letter refers to a telephone discussion between Messrs. J. Pollard, ANPP and D. Schaefer of this office on August 13, 1986.

Areas examined during this inspection are described in the enclosed inspection report. Within these areas, the inspection consisted of selective examinations of procedures and representative records, interviews with facility and contract personnel and observations by the inspectors.

Within the scope of this inspection, no violations were observed.

In accordance with Section 2.790(d) of NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, documentation of the findings of your safeguards and security procedures are exempt from public disclosure; therefore, the enclosed inspection report will not be placed in the Public Document Room and will receive limited distribution.

We have determined that the enclosure to this letter contains Safeguards Information and must be protected against unauthorized disclosure in accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 73.21.

9608260396 9pp

ENCLOSURE CONTAINS  
SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION.  
UPON SEPARATION THIS  
PAGE IS DECONTROLLED.


~~SAFEGUARDS INFORMATION~~

A6

AUG 21 1986

Should you have any questions concerning this letter, we will be glad to discuss them with you.

Sincerely,

  
James L. Montgomery, Chief  
Nuclear Materials Safety and  
Safeguards Branch

Enclosure:

Inspection Report Nos. 50-528/86-26  
50-529/86-25 (IE-V-764)

cc w/enclosure:

J. Bynum, ANPP  
W. F. Quinn, ANPP  
T. D. Shriver, ANPP  
W. E. Ide, ANPP  
C. N. Russo, ANPP

~~SAFETY INFORMATION~~

(Closed) Follow-up Item (05-14-86). Suspected sabotage of off-site equipment. The licensee reported that on May 14, 1986, between 8:58 p.m. and 9:23 p.m., May 14, 1986, three of the four licensee offsite high voltage transmission lines tripped off-line. The licensee did not identify any problems in their switchyard, nor at their towers within the owner controlled area. Throughout the evening of May 14/15, 1986 all attempts to try and locate the cause of the power outage met with negative results. On May 15, 1986, cable slings were discovered tied to towers of the high voltage transmission lines, each located between 25-35 miles from the site. On May 15, 1986, the FBI arrived at the site of the first transmission line and assumed charge of the investigation. The FBI is continuing their investigative efforts with assistance from NRC Office of Investigation (OI). All relevant information, as it becomes available, is being forwarded to the FBI. Due to OI's direct involvement in this case, this event is administratively closed in this inspection report. No inspection efforts are required in support of this event.

# INSPECTION REPORT

50-528/86-16

86 66300297 33 pgs 6/12/86  
4

change notices and will be included in the next revision. Item (b) is covered in procedure 41AO-1ZZ10 "Functional Recovery Procedure" Revision 1. This item is closed.

I. (Closed) Followup Item 50-528/85-06-07: "Minimum Shift Crew for Fire Brigade."

The licensee committed to revise 40AC-9ZZ02, "Control of Shift Operations", to specify the minimum shift crew complement required to implement 41AO-1ZZ44 "Shutdown Outside the Control Room" while simultaneously manning the fire brigade.

The inspector reviewed procedure 40AC-9ZZ02 which was modified by a procedure change notice (PCN) to increase minimum shift manning by two auxiliary operators. In addition, to the above, in November 1985, a full time professional fire department was established. This department replaced the fire brigade requirements of the operating staff. This item is closed.

Unit 2

(Closed) Followup Item 529/86-04-02: "Review of Procedures Dealing With Preventing Operation With Dry Reference Legs."

This item related to the operational checks which should assure the reference legs associated with the pressurizer, steam generators and safety injection tanks level instrumentation were filled.

A review of operating procedures and the Control Room daily data log sheet revealed that the procedures had been modified to include instructions and cautions to confirm that there was a proper correlation between the multiple level instrumentation associated with these components. These changes included both Units 1 and 2. This item is closed.

3. Review of Plant Activities

A. Unit 1

During the report period Unit 1 remained in a scheduled maintenance outage until May 23, 1986. The outage was extended beyond the scheduled duration when problems were identified during testing of the "A" Diesel Generator (D/G). Water and fuel oil leaks prevented the D/G from completing a required 24 hour operational test for the integrated safeguard surveillance test. Following repair to the D/G, identification of a broken wire in the balance of plant emergency safety features actuation system (BOP ESFAS) in Unit 2 led to the discovery that module connectors in the BOP ESFAS in all three units were not mating correctly. The connectors were subsequently modified in the BOP ESFAS cabinets to provide adequate mating (see paragraph 11). On May 14, 1986, at approximately 8:59 PM the offsite power line from the North Gila substation tripped, at 9:02 PM, the Kyrene line tripped, and at 9:23 PM, the

A-7

Westwing line tripped. Licensee investigation the following morning revealed that all three lines had been intentionally grounded by unknown persons. The locations of the groundings were all 30-40 miles from the plant site. The grounds were cleared and the lines were returned to service. The licensee performed surveillance testing of the D/Gs at Units 1 and 2 and performed walkdowns of onsite electrical distribution equipment, as well as portions of selected mechanical, safety related systems. No discrepancies were identified during the check of the above equipment. In addition, the licensee increased security surveillance both onsite and offsite of the transmission network.

On May 16, plant heat up was started and Mode 4 was entered. Mode 3 was attained May 17, and on May 23 the reactor was taken critical. Power was raised to 100% on May 26 and remained at 100% through the remainder of the report period.

B. Unit 2

Unit 2 initial criticality was achieved on April 18. This was followed by the performance of low power physics testing which was completed on April 21. A short period of operation followed at approximately 3% of rated power until April 22, for the purpose of performing nuclear instrumentation calibrations, core protection calculator and core operating limit supervisory system tests. The plant was then taken to Mode 3 on April 22 in order to complete testing of the post accident sampling system. The full power license was issued on April 24.

On April 23, Unit 2 experienced an inadvertent main steam isolation actuation due to a personnel error during the conduct of a surveillance test on the system. The plant was in Mode 3 at the time.

On April 28, during the inspection of wire connections in the train "A" balance of plant engineered safety features actuation system (BOP ESFAS) cabinet a loss of power signal was actuated when wires were moved to facilitate the inspection. The plant was in Mode 3 at the time. Following the determination that the actuation was caused because the BOP ESFAS connectors had limited engagement (paragraph 11) the plant was taken to Mode 5 on April 30. Both trains of engineered safety features were declared inoperable at the time.

Following replacement of the connectors, the plant was again made critical on May 6, and 20% power was reached on May 21. On May 25, 1986, while reducing power from 20% to 12% for a turbine over speed trip test, operator error in controlling feedwater flow caused a reactor trip due to a low steam generator level condition. After the reactor trip, excessive auxiliary steam loads and overfeeding the steam generators caused main steam isolation, containment isolation and safety injection actuations. All required systems functioned

# CONVERSATION RECORD

TIME  
7:05A

DATE  
5/15/86

A-1

☐ VISIT

☐ CONFERENCE

☒ TELEPHONE

☐ INCOMING

☐ OUTGOING

## ROUTING

NAME/SYMBOL	INT
Burnett	
Ten Eyck	
Karun	
Daudron	

Location of Visit/Conference:

NAME OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU

Falkenberg

ORGANIZATION (Office, dept., bureau, etc.)

RV

TELEPHONE NO.

SUBJECT

Palo Verde Incoming Transmission Lines

## SUMMARY

Event: 3 out 4 Power lines to site  
5/14 knocked out.  
one was climbed and a conductor  
thrown over the lines  
Others - were taken out with risk shots  
etc

Time 9:14 PM : 2 lines  
9:23 AM 1 Line

No Safety concern - both plants shutdown 1 hot 1 co  
One power line still in, another being restored  
Local law enforcement notified -

## ACTION REQUIRED

RV will talk to Licensee to get more detail and  
Notify FBI

NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION

C Gaskin

SIGNATURE

Charles E. Gaskin

DATE

5/15

ACTION TAKEN

None

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

50271-101

GPO : 1981 O - 361-526 (7227)

CONVERSATION RECORD

OPTIONAL FORM 271 (1)  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

A-8

# CONVERSATION RECORD

TIME 1145

DATE 5/16/82

TYPE

☐ VISIT

☐ CONFERENCE

☒ TELEPHONE

☐ INCOMING

☐ OUTGOING

ROUTING

NAME/SYMBOL INT

Location of Visit/Conference:

NAME OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU

Creed

ORGANIZATION (Office, dept., bureau, etc.)

R3

TELEPHONE NO:

SUBJECT

SUMMARY

Common Wealth talked to PV.

PV says 2,7,32 miles

Monson arrested in Cleveland? recently

ACTION REQUIRED

NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION

SIGNATURE

DATE

ACTION TAKEN

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

50271-101

GPO : 1981 O - 361-526 (7227)

CONVERSATION RECORD

OPTIONAL FORM 271 (12-76)  
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

# CONVERSATION RECORD

TIME  
1935

DATE  
5/19/86

☐ VISIT

☒ CONFERENCE  
GASKIN

☒ TELEPHONE

☐ INCOMING

☐ OUTGOING

## ROUTING

NAME/SYMBOL	INT

Location of Visit/Conference:

NAME OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT WITH YOU  
Doig Nelson  
Palo Verde Sec.

ORGANIZATION (Office, dept., bureau, etc.)

TELEPHONE NO.

SUBJECT

PV

## SUMMARY

Location 31, 7, 14 miles.

Labor

Not shot at.

Climbed tower, metal above lines, spring pulled, hit center line. Could've done something easier. Sophistication or stupidity.

Bits of info filtering in.

Could've been done by one person but <sup>highly</sup> doubtful

No obvious labor unrest.

South Cal Ed owns some of the lines. Lot of activity in the desert betwn P.V., Calif. border & Mexico.

## ACTION REQUIRED

NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION

SIGNATURE

D.

DATE

## ACTION TAKEN

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE

CONVERSATION RECORD

TIME  
1020 AM

DATE  
5/16

TYPE

☐ VISIT

☐ CONFERENCE

☒ TELEPHONE

☒ INCOMING

☐ OUTGOING

Location of Visit/Conference:

NAME OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED OR IN CONTACT  
WITH YOU

Bill Pollock

ORGANIZATION (Office, dept., bureau,  
etc.)

DOE

TELEPHONE NO.

SUBJECT

P.V. data dump → 252-1127

ROUTING

NAME/SYMBOL

INT

SUMMARY

Echo Defense <sup>Booth</sup> pub. in Arizona. "Field Guide to Monkey  
Wrenching." How to for various acts.  
<sup>st</sup>Earth First radical environmental journal ~~from~~ Tucson Az  
Chap Power Lines - how to down them. Remove  
bolts. #3 high powered rifle  
Not nuclear necessarily.  
Radical Environmentalist  
Big Against U.S. Forest Service

Hnatid 353-2478

ACTION REQUIRED

NAME OF PERSON DOCUMENTING CONVERSATION

SIGNATURE

Davidson

DATE

ACTION TAKEN

SIGNATURE

TITLE

DATE