

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
SPECIAL PROGRAM

REPORT NUMBER: WP-08-SQN

REPORT TYPE: Welding Project

REVISION NUMBER: 3

TITLE: Painting Requirements Related To Welds

REASON FOR REVISION:

Revised Corrective Action Plan - Attachment 6

SWEC SUMMARY STATEMENT: N/A

PREPARATION

PREPARED BY:

Original Signed By J. E. Rose
SIGNATURE

8-25-86
DATE

REVIEWS

PEER:

Original Signed By R. M. Bateman
SIGNATURE

8-25-86
DATE

TAS *[Signature]* 1/22/87
TECHNICAL REVIEW ONLY

[Signature] 1/22/87
SIGNATURE

1-23-87
DATE

CONCURRENCES

SIGNATURE

DATE

Original Signed By
CEG-H: L. E. Martin
SRP: *[Signature]*

SIGNATURE*

9-03-86
1-23-87
DATE

APPROVED BY:

[Signature]
ECSP MANAGER

1-23-87
DATE

N/A
MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER
CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

DATE

*SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

2242T

8702040283 870127
PDR ADOCK 05000327
P PDR

WELDING PROJECT
GENERIC EMPLOYEE CONCERN
EVALUATION REPORT

REPORT NUMBER: WP-08-SQN, R1

DATE 08-26-86

SUBJECT: PAINTING REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO WELDS

CONCERNS CONSIDERED: IN-85-273-001
IN-85-192-002
EX-85-059-001
IN-85-451-001

PREPARED BY J.E. Roe 8/25/86, OC, WP

REVIEWED BY R.H. Bateman 8/25/86, OC, WP

REVIEWED BY R.P. Lynskey 8/25/86, QA, WP

REVIEWED BY J.E. Minton 9/3/86, CEG-H, WELDING

APPROVED BY W.R. Brown 9/3/86, PROGRAM MANAGER

Revision 1 incorporates comments made by the Senior Review Panel on 8/19/86.

GENERIC EMPLOYEE CONCERN

SUMMARY SHEET

Report Number: WP-08-SQN, R1

Report Title: PAINTING REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO WELDS

I. CONCERNS CONSIDERED: IN-85-273-001
IN-85-192-002
EX-85-059-001
IN-85-451-001

II. ISSUES INVOLVED

1. Welds over six feet off the floor have not been painted in the Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings.
2. Unpainted welds are in evidence on conduit and pipe supports in the Reactor Building.
3. Hanger welds should be painted as soon as they are finalized by QC.
4. Rust causes welds to be weakened.
5. Sandblasting removes metal from welds.

III. STATEMENT OF CONCERN/ISSUE VALIDITY

Validity: Y X, N _____, Substantiated: Y X, N _____

IV. EFFECT ON HARDWARE AND/OR PROGRAM

None

V. JUSTIFICATION

Features are painted in accordance with engineering drawings and specifications.

VI. RECOMMENDATION AND/OR CORRECTIVE ACTION NEEDED

*Completion of the protective coating reinspection and resultant corrective action under SQN-CAR-86-01-001 for Issues 1, 2, and 4.

VII. REINSPECTION NEEDED: Y _____, N *X.

VIII. ISSUE CLOSURE

By this report.

IX. ATTACHMENT

1. Text of Employee Concerns
2. SQN-CAR-86-01-001.
3. Memo from P. R. Wallace to C. R. Brimer dated 2/18/86
(S01860218833).
4. Memo from B. M. Patterson to P. R. Wallace dated 4/7/86
(S01860403923).
5. Memo from P. R. Wallace to H. B. Rankin dated 4/8/86
(S53860407930).

GENERIC EMPLOYEE CONCERN

Report Number: WP-08-SQN, R1

Report Title: PAINTING REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO WELDS

I. SCOPE OF EVALUATION

This engineering analysis covers the following WBN concerns determined to have possible generic implications at SQN:

IN-85-273-001
IN-85-192-002
EX-85-059-001
IN-85-451-001

II. ISSUES ADDRESSED BY CONCERN(S)

Each concern was analyzed to determine the issues voiced by the concerned individuals. These issues are as follows:

1. Welds over six feet off the floor have not been painted in the Reactor and Auxiliary buildings.
2. Unpainted welds are in evidence on conduit and piping supports in the Reactor Building.
3. Hanger welds should be painted as soon as they are finalized by QC.
4. Rust causes welds to be weakened.
5. Sandblasting removes metal from welds.

III. CONCERN VALIDITY OR SUBSTANTIATION

The prime consideration for application of protective coatings in nuclear facilities is one of effective prevention of build-up of radioactive contamination on the building, structures, components, and systems of the facility. A secondary consideration is to provide a smooth, impervious surface (via a paint system) which will permit subsequent decontamination activities. These two considerations are effectively met by using nuclear grade coating systems. Using these basic considerations and additional environmental conditions, protective coating requirements are established by the Office of Engineering (OE) for every feature in the powerhouse. These requirements are transmitted to the Office of Construction (OC) or Nuclear Operations (NO) via drawings and specifications. The implementing organizations (OC or NO) coat the features based upon environmental conditions which that particular area will experience in plant operations. Not all areas are required to be coated.

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| R1
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The general nature and large scope of issues 1 and 2 prevents a direct physical inspection of the Reactor and Auxiliary Buildings by Welding Project Evaluators. A correspondence search and discussions with the Division of Nuclear Quality Assurance revealed that a comprehensive reinspection of protective coatings has been initiated as the result of a QA survey. The results of this survey are documented on SQN-CAR-86-01-001. An integral part of this reinspection program will include a 100 percent baseline coating inspection of the Level 1 and 2 coating areas at SQN. SQN-CAR-86-01-001 describes the details of the deficiencies in the Protective Coating Program. Coating deficiencies are being identified and appropriate corrective actions are being established which address both program deficiencies and repairs to coated features.

R1

There are no requirements which mandate a particular sequence of construction or modifications activities. The schedule is determined using prudent engineering judgement. OC or NO accomplishes coating operations based on a schedule intended to maximize efficiency in construction or modification activities.

All metallic materials oxidize (rust) to varying degrees. The engineering analysis of the need for coatings takes this characteristic into account. When a surface requires coating, the rust is removed.

Removal is primarily by sandblasting which has been and continues to be an industry-wide acceptable method of preparation of metallic features for painting. The metal removed in this process is minimal.

In summary, the resolution of each issue is as follows:

Issues 1, 2, and 4 are closed pending completion of protective coating reinspection and resultant corrective action under SQN-CAR-86-01-001.

Issue 3 is closed because it is an observation of prudent construction practices.

Issue 5 is closed because the practice of sandblasting is an accepted practice in preparation of metals for painting.

04/03/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

09:40:27

LOC	STATUS	RESP	-QTC-	PPP	CFR	INSP	TC	-----CONCERN-----	PROBLEM ID
	413	NSRS	20				SR	IN-85-273-001	WCMHS

KEYWORDS: MISCELLANEOUS WELD RUSTING

X: W Y: C Z: N

IN UNIT 1 REACTOR AND AUX BLDGS., WELDS ON PIPE SUPPORTS, SPECIFICALLY PIPE SUPPORTS INSTALLED OVER 6 FEET OFF THE FLOOR, HAVE NOT BEEN PAINTED AFTER SUPPORTS WERE COMPLETED AND QC ACCEPTED. CI IS CONCERNED THAT RUST/CORROSION WILL OCCUR TO THESE UNPAINTED WELDS AND WEAKEN THE PIPE SUPPORTS THUS PREVENTING THESE PIPE SUPPORTS FROM PERFORMING INTENDED FUNCTIONS THEY WERE DESIGNED FOR. CI DID NOT SPECIFY ANY PARTICULAR AREAS IN REACTOR BUILDING BUT STATED THAT PIPE SUPPORTS FOR FIRE PROTECTION SYSTEM IN AUX BLDG SHOULD BE LOOKED AT. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. (NOTE: ERT IS ACTIVELY INVESTIGATING THIS GENERIC CONCERN UNDER DIFFERENT FILE NUMBERS.)

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE CONSIDERED: UNPAINTED WELDS ARE RUSTING.

LOC	STATUS	RESP	-QTC-	PPP	CFR	INSP	TC	-----CONCERN-----	PROBLEM ID
	182	NSRS					SR	IN-85-192-002	WCOPS

KEYWORDS: MISCELLANEOUS WELD RUSTING

X: W Y: C Z: N

NUMEROUS UNPAINTED WELDS ON CONDUIT AND PIPING SUPPORTS THROUGHOUT PLANT ARE RUSTED. POSSIBLE LACK OF PROTECTIVE COATING. EXAMPLE: REACTOR BLDG UNIT 1 AZ. 1 DEGREES, EL 720'.

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE CONSIDERED: UNPAINTED WELDS ARE RUSTED.

LOC	STATUS	RESP	-QTC-	PPP	CFR	INSP	TC	-----CONCERN-----	PROBLEM ID
							SR	EX-85-059-001	WCPTI

KEYWORDS: MISCELLANEOUS WELD RUSTING

X: W Y: C Z: N

WHY AREN'T HANGER WELDS AND PIPE WELDS PAINTED AS SOON AS THEY ARE FINALIZED BY THE QC INSPECTOR AS COMPLETE AND ACCEPTABLE. THE DELAY CAUSES WELDS TO RUST, AND THE PASSAGE OF TIME OR THE PROCESS OF CLEANING THE WELDS MIGHT BREAK THE "PINK" PAINT ON BOLTS. RUSTING WEAKENS THE WELDS AND SANDBLASTING WILL REMOVE METAL, AND IS AN UNNECESSARY STEP (COST) IF WELDS WERE PAINTED IMMEDIATELY. (CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN). C/I HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUES CONSIDERED: 1. UNPAINTED WELDS ARE RUSTED. (REPORT WP-08-SQN)
2. TORQUE PUTTY COULD BE DAMAGED. (

04/03/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

09:40:27

LOC	STATUS	RESP	-QIC-	PPP	CFR	INSP	TC	-----CONCERN-----	PROBLEM ID
		ERT	20				SR	IN-85-451-001	WCMHY

KEYWORDS: MISCELLANEOUS WELD RUSTING

X: W Y: C Z: N

CI STATED IN 1984 THEY (PAINTERS) WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO PAINT ANYTHING ABOVE 6 FT. IN RBI, PRESENTLY, THERE ARE RUSTY WELDS THROUGHOUT.

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE CONSIDERED: UNPAINTED WELDS ARE RUSTED.

Page 14 of 16 Rev. 20

REPORT NO.

SO	CAR	86	01	00
PLT.	CAR	YR	MO	NO

INITIATED BY Clifford A. Crownover DATE 1/24/86SIGNIFICANT
(CIRCLE ONE)

YES

NO

REQUESTED BY (IF APPLICABLE) D. C. CravenASSIGNED TO P. R. Wallace

ADVERSE CONDITION: The Protective Coating Program as described in MI-10.14 (Rev. 17) does not adequately implement the requirements contained in Section 6.2 of the FSAR, Construction Specifications G-55 (dated 9/17/84), G-14 (dated 8/29/84), and Architectural Design Standard DS-A.9.8.1 (dated 2/4/85). (See Attachment for details.) Reference Survey 21-86-S-002.

ROOT
CAUSE (CAUSE ANALYSIS REQUIRED ☒ NOT REQUIRED ☐):

CORRECTIVE ACTION (1) REMEDIAL CORRECTIVE ACTIONS(S)

SEE ATTACHED

ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE April 14, 1986

(2) ACTION(S) TO PREVENT RECURRENCE

SEE ATTACHED

ESTIMATED COMPLETION DATE July 14, 1986

PROPOSED P.R. Wallace 2/16/86 RESP SUPV
CONCURRED D.C. Craven 3/16/86 QA SUPV

APPROVAL: THE RESOLUTION OF THE ABOVE DESCRIBED ADVERSE CONDITION IS ACCEPTABLE.

RECOMMENDED BY

N/A

PORC CHAIRMAN

(FOR SIGNIFICANT PLANT CARS ONLY)

DATE

APPROVED BY

P.R. Wallace
PLANT MGR/SITE DIRECTOR

DATE

DATE

COMPLETION - CORRECTIVE ACTION WAS COMPLETED ON _____ AND IS READY FOR VERIFICATION BY QA.

RESPONSIBLE SUPERVISOR

DATE

VERIFICATION - CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN AS DESCRIBED ABOVE OR WITH THE FOLLOWING DEVIATIONS

VERIFIED BY

QA REP

DATE

CLOSED BY

QA

SUPERVISOR

DATE

GENERAL NOTES:

Attachment 2
Page 2 of 4

1. The responsibility for these deficiencies involves various groups and organizations. Since these deficiencies all relate to the site Protective Coating Program, it was determined that resulting corrective action would be more effective if tracked and handled under one corrective action report.
2. Presently, there are no Nuclear Power upper tier documents describing a Protective Coating Program. The references to G-Specifications and Architectural Design Standards within this CAR are applicable because the notes on "As-Constructed" Drawing 46W466-1 refer to Construction Specifications G-41, G-42, and G-45 which were canceled. The index for Construction Specifications states that G-41, G-42, and G-45 were replaced by G-55. G-55 refers to G-14 for selecting, specifying, applying, and inspecting architectural paints and coatings. G-14 refers to Endes Architectural Design Guide DG-A9.8.1 regarding Nuclear Service Level I applications.

1. Contrary to the FSAR Section 6.2.1.6, no program has been established or implemented at Sequoyah to account for unidentified/uncontrolled coatings which have been applied to components installed in Level I coating areas. (e.g., Coatings on vendor supplied equipment such as motors or junction boxes. Specifically, some instrument panel mounting plates -- to be installed in a Level I coating area were coated using unapproved coatings (on MR A-564799) as specified on TVA drawing 46W600-23 without consideration for their impact on the percentage of unapproved coatings within containment.)

- a. MI-10.14 does not require the use of specific types of protective coatings for application on certain equipment as delineated in Section 6.2.1.6 of the FSAR. (e.g., RCP motors, accumulators, steam generators, etc.)

NOTE: Corrective action must include: (1) an evaluation (USQD, NCR, etc.) of any installation of unidentified coatings which may not have been accounted for and (2) correction of drawings (i.e., 46W600-23) which specifies use of an unapproved coating on equipment to be installed in a Level I coating area.

2. MI-10.14 does not adequately implement the requirements of G-55, G-14, FSAR Section 6.2, and Architectural Design Standard DS-A.9.8.1.

Examples:

- a. No definitions are contained in MI-10.14 to identify Level I and Level II coating areas as specified in Architectural Design Standard DS-A.9.8.1. Additionally, MI-10.14 does not list those Level I coating surfaces which are located outside containment. (For example, reactor coolant makeup water tank, essential air system tank interiors, emergency diesel fuel storage tank interiors, condensate storage tanks, and chemical and volume control system/RCS makeup system tank interiors).
- b. Periodic surveillance inspections of Level II coating system maintenance are not specified in MI-10.14 or performed as required per Section 8.1.1 of G-55.
- c. MI-10.14 does not ensure that coatings which have been stored at low temperatures are brought up to 70°F minimum before application as required in Section 4.3 of G-55.
- d. MI-10.14 does not implement the requirements for adhesion testing that are specified in Section 5.4 of G-55.
- e. MI-10.14 does not require the use of the "Tooke" gauge for verifying adequate dry film thickness for substrates which are not carbon steel as required per Section 4.5 of G-55.

NOTE: Carbon steel substrates are checked using a magnetic gauge.

- f. MI-10.14 references Construction Specifications G-41, G-42, and G-45 which have been canceled. Additionally, the SQN Protective Coatings Maintenance and Repair Manual is referenced in MI-10.14 but has not been approved (by PORC, etc.).
3. Notes on Drawing 46W466-1 have not been kept current to incorporate changes to Construction Specifications. (For example, drawing notes contain references to G-41, G-42, and G-45 which have been canceled. Attachment Cs to AI-25 were submitted during the performance of Survey 21-85-S-015 to correct this specific problem.)

Corrective actions should address not only those actions taken to correct these specific deficiencies, but also actions taken to further identify and correct other deficiencies within the Protective Coatings Program.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

801 860218 832

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : P. E. Wallace, Plant Manager, ONP, POB-2, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

FROM : C. E. Brimer, Manager, Site Services, ONP, SB-2, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

DATE : FEB 18 1986

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT (CAR) NO.
SQ-CAR-86-01-001 - NATE NO. 8461 - PROTECTIVE COATING PROGRAM

The following analysis and corrective action is being done in order to correct all deficiencies identified in CAR No. SQ-CAR-86-01-001.

Root Cause Analysis

The coating problems identified by this report were caused by the lack of a controlling upper-tier document for coating repairs and maintenance. Construction specifications and procedures were adequate for the new application phase of the plant, but they did not address all the aspects associated with repairing and maintaining the critical coatings during years of service. Additional FSAR requirements were not incorporated into the plant program.

Corrective Action

1. A new SQN is being prepared to provide control of all procedures, methods, responsibilities, and documentation of all aspects of surface preparation, coating application, and maintenance of all critically coated areas at SQN. This upper-tier document will incorporate the requirements of all applicable G-specifications, design guides and standards, and as-constructed drawings and will establish procedures for documenting compliance with section 6.2 of the FSAR.
2. In addition to the implementation of a new SQN, which will provide overall program control for nuclear protective coatings, other existing NIs will be revised as required to comply with and support the new SQN. Included in these revisions will be a major revision to NI-10.14, which will correct all of the deficiencies addressed by the CAR. New procedures will be issued as required to provide mandatory periodic surveillance inspections of all critically coated areas and to control a documentation log of all uncontrolled coatings inside primary containment.

Actions to Prevent Recurrence


The implementation of the program described above should correct all deficiencies noted by the CAR and should provide complete control and consistent program guidance to correct other deficiencies that may exist and prevent recurrence of problems of this nature.



P. R. Wallace

SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - CORRECTIVE ACTION REPORT (CAR) NO.
SQ-CAR-86-01-001 - NATE NO. 8461 - PROTECTIVE COATING PROGRAM

Attached is an outline for a revised nuclear program at SQN that will include all concerns addressed by the Nuclear Safety Review Staff and the Quality Assurance Staff on CAR No. SQ-CAR-86-01-001.


C. R. Brimer

SW:DPG:LRE:HC

Attachment

cc (Attachment):

RIMS, MR 4N 72A-C

This was prepared principally by L. E. Rogers.

100038 4142

100033 4143

NUCLEAR PROTECTIVE COATING PROGRAM

<u>DOCUMENT</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>PRIORITY</u>	<u>DEFICIENCY ADDRESSED</u>	<u>ACTION ITEM</u>	<u>ASSIGNED TO</u>	<u>EST COMP</u>
(New) SQM —	Nuclear Protective Coating Program	(1)	Coating program description including definition of Level I & II Areas; clarification of inconsistencies in G-SPECS, FSAR, etc.; establish training; certification of painters, inspectors, and engineers & uncontrolled coatings exempt log	1 A-F	Rogers/Brewton	4/25
(REV) SQM-45	Quality Control of Materials, Parts, & Services	(3)	Procurement problems	Added	Stutz/(Rogers & Hays Review)	3/14
(REV) AI-11	Receipt, Inspection, Non-conforming Items QA Level/Description Changes & Substitutions	(3)	Material testing and certification	2B	Stutz/Staley Rogers/Hays G-44 Incorporation (Hays)	3/14
(REV) AI-36	Storage, Handling, and Shipping of QA Material	(1)	Storage problems	2A	Staley/Stutz Brewton (Rogers)	2/14
(REV) PMs	Mandatory Surveillance and Maintenance	(3)	Regular inspection	3B	Brewton/Rogers	3/14
(REV) PMs	Baseline Inspection Criteria	(1)	Existing problems	3A	Brewton/Rogers	2/28

0 0 0 3 8 4 1 4 4

	Perform Baseline Evaluation		Determine present status	3A	Rogers/OE	4/14
	Identify Priority Items		Determine present status	3A	Rogers/OE	5/14
(REV) MI 10.14 of Protective Coating in the Reactor and Auxiliary Bld'g	Application Repair	(2)	Future repairs	2E	Brewton/Rogers	3/14
(REV) Drawings	All DWG's Relating to Coatings	(3)	Existing discrepancies	---	Rankin	7/14
IQT (Materials)	Paint & Equipment	(2)	Contingency for emergency	4A	Brewton/Rogers	7/1
IQT (Services)	Contractor Repairs	(2)	Contingency for emergency	4B	Brewton/Rogers	7/1
Emergency Contract	Coating Inspection/	(1)	Baseline inspection	4B	Brewton/Rogers	2/14
	NSRS Comments/ Employee Concerns	(1)	Resolve open NSRS/Employee Concern issues		Rogers/Goetcheus	2/14

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

86 04 10 00276

801 860403 923

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

TO : (2) P. E. Wallace, Plant Manager, ONP, POB-2, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

FROM : B. H. Patterson, Superintendent, Maintenance, ONP, POB-2, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

DATE : 4/7/86

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - UNPAINTED HANGERS AND STRUCTURAL STEEL OVER SIX FEET ABOVE THE FLOOR - EMPLOYEE CONCERN NO. IN-85-243-002-SNP

Reference: Memorandum to you from H. L. Abercrombie dated February 13, 1986, "Recommendations Generated From the Generic Concerns Task Force That Require Action by Your Organization" (500 860207 800)

Employee Concern No. IN-85-243-002-SNP refers to a complete lack of coating on steel over 6 feet from the floor at Watts Bar Nuclear Plant. This condition does not exist at SQN although some isolated areas are uncoated or damaged.

As part of the response to SQ-CAR-85-01-001, a comprehensive protective coatings program was established. An integral part of the program is to perform a 100 percent baseline coating inspection of the levels 1 and 2 coating areas at SQN. This inspection will initiate repairs of areas with degraded coating by means of the coatings preventative maintenance program.

It is my position that our inspection and maintenance program is sufficient to address the concerns and recommendations of this generic concern.

B. H. Patterson

CB [signature]
CRB:WSW:DFG:MC
cc: RIMS, MR 4M 72A-C

This was prepared principally by M. E. Koss.

COORDINATION: Chuck E. Brewton/Electrical Maintenance, Sequoyah
Lanson R. Rogers/Nuclear Services Welding and Metallurgy
Section, LP 5S 111D-C

4/7/86 - bc: H. L. Abercrombie, ONP, O&PS-4, Sequoyah
w/45D (attached)

0000312455



FROM	H. L. Abercrombie	DATE	4/7/95
TITLE	Site Director, O&PS-4, SQN	STATUS	<input type="checkbox"/> Draft <input type="checkbox"/> Final
TO	P. R. Wallace	ASST	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No
SUBJECT	Sequoiah Nuclear Plant	DATE	<input type="checkbox"/> 3/95 <input type="checkbox"/> 4/95
TBL CALL		REMARKS	<input type="checkbox"/> Returned <input type="checkbox"/> Forwarded

Re: SQN - UNPAINTED HANGERS AND STRUCTURAL
STEEL OVER SIX FEET ABOVE THE FLOOR -
EMPLOYEE CONCERN NO. IN-85-243-002-SNP

Please find attached our response to the
subject employee concern.
Attachment

PV

cc: Reg. Engineering Section - SQN

<input type="checkbox"/> For Your Review	<input type="checkbox"/> Comments	<input type="checkbox"/> Note and Report	<input type="checkbox"/> Approved	<input type="checkbox"/> Call No.
<input type="checkbox"/> Information	<input type="checkbox"/> Needs	<input type="checkbox"/> Shortfalls	<input type="checkbox"/> Signature	<input type="checkbox"/> See No.
<input type="checkbox"/> No Comment	<input type="checkbox"/> Progress Report	<input type="checkbox"/> Closure	<input type="checkbox"/> Review	<input type="checkbox"/> File

FOR 45 455 1 888 INTEROFFICE MAILING SLIP - ALL PAGES CALL 210

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RIMS, MR 4N 72A-C

553 860407 980

TVA 66-100-000

86 04 10 0263

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY

(2)

TO : H. B. Rankin, Manager, Design Services, ONP, DSC-E, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

FROM : P. R. Wallace, Plant Manager, ONP, POB-2, Sequoyah Nuclear Plant

DATE : APR - 8 1986

SUBJECT: SEQUOYAH NUCLEAR PLANT (SQN) - ADDITION OF SPECIAL COATING SYSTEMS FOR PROJECT CONSTRUCTION SPECIFICATION N2A931

Due to the implementation of a revised coating program at SQN, reference CAR #SQ-86-01-001, we are requesting the services of ADB for a revision of Construction Specification N2A931, to incorporate various products that are available for Level I and II coating applications. Plant personnel have determined coating products that could be possibly used for Level I and II applications and have compiled the attached list. New coating systems that are acceptable should be incorporated into N2A931. Compatibility of new systems with existing systems should be incorporated into N2A931 also. The items with asterisks should be addressed on a priority basis.

P. R. Wallace

BMP:MAS:TAK:DF

Attachment

cc: RIMS, MR 4N 72A-C
D. F. Goetcheus, ONP, SB-2, Sequoyah

This was prepared principally by C. L. Brevton.

5/045



Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

ATTACHMENT A

New Coating Systems

Level I - Steel

- 1) K&L #4500
- 2) K&L #4500 and CZ118G
- 3) Amercoat #90 and CZ118G
- 4) Nutec #1201 and CZ118G
- 5) Carboxinc 118G and Tnemec 90-93
- 6) Tnemec 90-93

Level II - Steel

- *1) K&L #3500 and CZ11
- 2) Amerlock 400 and CZ11
- 3) K&L #3500
- *4) Amerlock 400
- *5) Tnemec 90-93

Level II - Concrete

- 1) K&L #4129, K&L #3400, and K&L #3500
- 2) K&L #3500 and Mobil 44x16
- *3) K&L #3500
- *4) Amerlock 400

New Coating System Compatibility

Level I - Steel

- 1) K&L #4500 used w/Phenoline 305
- 2) Nutec 1201 used w/Phenoline 305
- 3) Amercoat 90 used w/Phenoline 305

Level II - Steel

- 1) K&L #3500 used w/Phenoline 305
- *2) Carboxinc 11 used w/Tnemec 90-93
- 3) Amerlock 400 used w/Phenoline 305

CLB:DF
3/27/86
5/046

000001 2334

CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN

1. Problem Description

No program has been established or implemented at Sequoyah Nuclear Plant (SQN) to account for unidentified/uncontrolled coating which have been applied to components installed in level 1 coating areas. Also coating has not been applied to some components within the level 1 areas as required.

Corrective action report number SQ-CAR-86-01-001 has been initiated to correct the deficiencies noted. Corrective action will be tracked on CATD number WP-08-SQN-001.

2. Corrective Action Plan

A comprehensive protective coatings preventative maintenance program was established at SQN. An integral part of the program is to perform a 100 percent baseline coating inspection of the levels 1 and 2 coating areas. This inspection will initiate repairs of areas with degraded coatings.

A new SQM is being prepared to provide control of all procedures, methods, responsibilities and documentation of all aspects of surface, coating application and maintenance of all critically coated areas at SQN. This upper-tier document will incorporate the requirements of all applicable specifications, design guides and standards, and as-constructed drawings and will establish procedure for documenting compliance with the FSAR.

In addition to the implementation of the new SQM, which will provide overall program control for nuclear protective coatings, other existing maintenance instruction procedures will be revised as required to comply with and support the new SQM. New procedures will be issued as required to provide mandatory periodic surveillance inspections of all critically coated areas and to control a documentation log of all uncontrolled coatings inside primary containment.

3. Action to Prevent Recurrence

The implementation of the program described above should correct all deficiencies noted by the CAR and should provide complete control and consistent program guidance to correct other deficiencies that may exist and prevent reoccurrence of problems of this nature.

4. Rusting conditions were found on the following Preventative Maintenance (PM) packages: RM-1474-364, PM-1434-364, PM-1435-364, PM-1439-364, PM-1438-364, PM-1519-364, PM-1520-364, PM-1521-364, PM-1436-364, PM-1437-364, PM-1473-364, and PM-1518-364. These PM packages are being evaluated by ONE. All rusting conditions have been given a repair priority of 2. Priority 2 items are not required for restart. MR's and WR's will be generated on these items after ONE completes their review. The implementation of the PM program will ensure that all areas of the containment will be inspected on a periodic basis. This will improve the basic condition of coatings inside the containment building, including welds.

2893T

TVA EMPLOYEE CONCERNS
SPECIAL PROGRAM

REPORT NUMBER: WP-19-SQN

REPORT TYPE: Welding Project

REVISION NUMBER: 1

TITLE: WBN Concerns With No Generic Application to SQN

REASON FOR REVISION: N/A

SUMMARY STATEMENT:

ADD ATTACHMENT 3 . Note of clarification on why WTG did not treat the concern in WP-19 as being generic to Sequoyah.

PREPARATION

PREPARED BY:

Original Signed By R. D. Briggs
SIGNATURE

07-31-86
DATE

REVIEWS

PEER:

Original Signed By J. F. Lewis
SIGNATURE

07-31-86
DATE

TAS: TECHNICAL REVIEW ONLY

ROY D. Hume
SIGNATURE

1-22-87
DATE

CONCURRENCES

Original Signed By

CEG-H: L. E. Martin

08-18-86

SRP:

James R. Russell
SIGNATURE*

1-23-87
DATE

APPROVED BY:

M. V. Ruto
ECSP MANAGER

1-23-87
DATE

N/A

MANAGER OF NUCLEAR POWER
CONCURRENCE (FINAL REPORT ONLY)

DATE

*SRP Secretary's signature denotes SRP concurrences are in files.

2242T

861112780
Wpp.

WELDING PROJECT
GENERIC EMPLOYEE CONCERN
EVALUATION REPORT

REPORT NUMBER: WP-19-SQN, R1

DATE 07/13/86

SUBJECT: WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN


CONCERNS CONSIDERED: SEE ATTACHMENT 1

PREPARED BY Original Signed by Robert D. Briggs 7/31/86, OC, WP

REVIEWED BY Original Signed by James F. Lewis 7/31/86, OC, WP

REVIEWED BY Original Signed by R. P. Lynskey 8/13/86, QA, WP

REVIEWED BY Original Signed by L. E. Martin 8/18/86, CEG-H, WELDING

APPROVED BY  9/15/86 PROGRAM MANAGER

Revision 1 to this report is being issued to add employee concerns which have been evaluated and determined not to be generically applicable to SQN.

GENERIC EMPLOYEE CONCERN

SUMMARY SHEET

Report Number: WP-19-SQN, R1

Report Title: WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

I. CONCERNS CONSIDERED: See Attachment 1.

II. ISSUES INVOLVED

Various.

III. STATEMENT OF CONCERN/ISSUE VALIDITY

Validity: Y_____, N___X___, Substantiated: Y_____, N___X___

IV. EFFECT ON HARDWARE AND/OR PROGRAM

None

V. JUSTIFICATION

Detailed review of the subject concerns indicates that they are WBN specific and have no implication to SQN. This was determined by review of ERT reports and analysis of concern wording for direct identification of WBN locations, procedures, and other identifying statements.

VI. RECOMMENDATION AND/OR CORRECTIVE ACTION NEEDED

None

VII. REINSPECTION NEEDED: Y_____, N___X___.

VIII. ISSUE CLOSURE

By this report.

IX. ATTACHMENTS

1. List of WBN Concerns With No Generic Applicability to SQN
2. Text of Employee Concerns

|
|R1
|

GENERIC EMPLOYEE CONCERN

Report Number: WP-19-SQN, R1

Report Title: WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

The subject WBN specific Employee Concerns were evaluated to determine if they have generic applicability to SQN.

The text of the concern was reviewed to determine if any direct references were made to SQN or WBN.

The criteria for classifying the WBN concerns as WBN-specific is as follows:

1. Investigation of the specific concern by ERT or NSRS as a WBN issue.
2. Text references to WBN procedures, locations, or features.

The attached Employee Concerns have been determined to be WBN-specific. They are to be investigated as part of the WBN program and are closed as they relate to SQN by this report.

GENERIC EMPLOYEE CONCERN

Report Number: WP-19-SQN, R1

Report Title: WBN CONCERNS WITH NO GENERIC APPLICABILITY TO SQN

IN-85-021-003
IN-85-965-001
WI-85-003-001
IN-85-612-006
IN-85-725-X15
IN-85-725-X14
IN-85-540-001
IN-86-143-002
IN-85-503-001
WI-85-084-001
IN-85-501-001
WI-85-030-008
IN-85-532-006
IN-85-021-X05
IN-85-335-002
IN-85-424-X13
IN-85-612-X07
IN-85-770-003
IN-85-770-X07
IN-85-778-X07
IN-86-167-005
IN-86-167-X06
WI-85-003-X02
IN-85-543-002
IN-85-299-003
WI-85-055-001
WI-85-056-001

|
| R1
|

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

08:13:33

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
		W	1	ERT	A2			SR				IN-85-021-003

.YWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE

PROB: WCPQW

STEAMFITTER'S WELDER CERTIFICATION CARDS HAVE BEEN BACK DATED 1 OR 2 WEEKS TO COVER WELDERS WHOSE CERTIFICATION CARDS WERE NOT RE-STAMPED AFTER THE 90 DAY CERTIFICATION PERIOD HAD EXPIRED. THIS OCCURRED WITH SEVERAL S/F WELDERS WHO WELDED DURING THE 90 DAY PERIOD. IN NOVEMBER 1984 CI WAS GIVEN 2 WEEKS OFF BY GENERAL FOREMAN FORLETTING CI'S 90 DAY CERTIFICATION CARD EXPIRE. CI STATED HE HAD MADE 96 ASME CODE CLASS 2 WELDS DURING THE 90 DAY TIME PERIOD (AUG.-OCT. 1984). AFTER RETURNING TO WORK IN DECEMBER 1984, CI'S CERTIFICATION CARD WAS BACK DATED TO OCTOBER 31, 1984. STEAMFITTER SHOP STEWARD (NAME GIVEN) HAS NAMES

IR: IN-85-113-003

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
		W	1		A2			SR				IN-85-965-001

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPIF

A WELDERS CERTIFICATION (NAME KNOWN) EXPIRED ON A WEDNESDAY. THIS WELDER WAS RE-CERTIFIED THE NEXT MONDAY, BUT THE CERTIFICATION WAS BACK-DATED TO PREVENT THE WORK PERFORMED BY THIS WELDER FROM BEING REJECTED. THIS WAS DONE ABOUT -16-80. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
		W	1		A2			NR				WI-85-003-001

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE NONSPEC

PROB: WCPIF

WELDERS CERTIFICATION CARD WAS FALSIFIED. CMA RESPONSIBLE FOR BACKDATING. CONCERN OCCURRED DURING MAY 27-JUNE 3, 1985. WELDER PERFORMING DUTIES IN TURBINE BLDG. (UNIT 2). THIS CONCERN WAS ORIGINATED IN THE WELDING UPDATING OFFICE.

IR: IN-85-770-002

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1		A2			SR				IN-85-612-006

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION PROGRAM SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPIF

WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE IS INADEQUATE AND NOT ENFORCED PER AN ESTABLISHED SET OF CRITERIA. WELDERS GIVEN TIME OFF WITHOUT PAY FOR FAILURE TO UPDATE CERTIFICATIONS. (NAMES/DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-352-001

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1		A4			SR				IN-85-725-X15

KEYWORDS: RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM SPECIFIC TES PL

PROB: WCPIF

THE CONTROL OF WELDER RECERTIFICATION TEST PLATES WAS INADEQUATE: TEST PLATES BEGUN BY ONE WELDER COULD HAVE BEEN COMPLETED BY ANOTHER WELDER. DETAIL KNOWN TO QTC- WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY.

IR: IN-85-725-X14

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1		A4			NR				IN-85-725-X14

KEYWORDS: RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM ADMINISTRATIVE

PROB: WCPTI

WELDER RECERTIFICATION: PROGRAM HAD INADEQUATE SUPERVISORY OVERSIGHT: IT COULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE FOR A GOOD WELDER TO WELD THE TEST PLATES FOR AN INCAPABLE WELDER. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY.

IR: IN-85-725-X14

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

08:13:33

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
		W	1	ERT	A2			SR				IN-85-540-001

.YWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION UPDATE

PROB: WCPIF

INADEQUATE WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE. WELDER IS "PUNISHED" IF HE/SHE FORGETS TO UPDATE ON TIME YET THE UPDATE IS A FORMALITY. THERE IS NO VERIFICATION THE PROCESS WAS USED DURING THE 90 DAY PERIOD. EMPLOYEES ARE KEPT UPDATED EVEN THOUGH THEY DO NOT WELD FOR YEARS AT AT TIME.

IR: IN-85-352-001

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
		W	1		A2			SR				IN-86-143-002

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPIF

WELDER'S CERTIFICATION CARD WAS BACK-DATED AROUND 30 DAYS AFTER WELDER FAILED TO HAVE HIS CARD UP-DATED. CONSTRUCTION CONCERN. (NAMES/DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC AND RELEASE OF THIS INFORMATION COULD JEOPARDIZE CI'S CONFIDENTIALITY). CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002

STAT: RC:

.CHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE CONSIDERED: WPO CONTINUITY RECORDS HAVE BEEN FALSIFIED.

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
		W	1	ERT	A2							IN-85-503-001

KEYWORDS: NOT WELD RELATED

PROB: XXXXX

INDIVIDUAL (NAME KNOWN) IN CONCERNED INDIVIDUAL'S (HEREAFTER CI) CREW WAS GIVEN 2 WEEKS OFF FOR FAILING TO HAVE WELDING CARD UPDATED BY WELD ENGINEERING. INDIVIDUAL HAD PERFORMED REQUIRED WELDS BUT WAS OUT SICK ON THE DAY UPDATE WAS REQUIRED. OTHER INDIVIDUALS IN CI'S CREW WHO HAD FAILED TO GET THEIR CARDS UPDATED RECEIVED NO DISCIPLINARY ACTION OR HAD RECEIVED ONLY AN ORAL WARNING. (ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE)

IR:

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1					SR				WI-85-084-001

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION PROGRAM UPDATE

PROB: WCDPW

CI REPORTED THAT A WELDER, WHOSE CERTIFICATIONS HAD EXPIRED, WAS ALLOWED TO CHECK OUT ROD FROM THE ROD SHACK. CI EXPRESSED THAT THIS INDICATES THAT THE "NEW" WELDER RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM STILL DOES NOT WORK. NAMES KNOWN. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION. INCIDENT OCCURRED 10/85.

IR: WI-85-084-001

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1	ERT	L2			SR				IN-85-501-001

KEYWORDS: ELECTRODE IMPLEMENTATION CONTROL

PROB: WCPME

UNUSED BUNDLES OF WELD ROD FREQUENTLY FOUND IN TRASH CANS I.E. TURBINE BLDG., 708', 729', AND 755' ELEVATIONS, UNIT #2 (15-20 RODS FOUND 6-7-85)

IR: IN-85-052-008

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE CONSIDERED: ELECTRODE ACCOUNTABILITY.

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1		P6			SR				WI-85-030-008

KEYWORDS: REINSPECTION PROGRAM PAINT

PROB: WCDPW

THERE MAY HAVE BEEN THOUSANDS OF WELDS INSPECTED THROUGH CARBO-ZINC PRIMER. HOWEVER, TVA REPORTS INDICATE THAT ONLY 100-150 WELDS WERE INSPECTED IN THIS MANNER EVEN THOUGH THERE IS NO DOCUMENTATION IDENTIFYING WHICH WELDS WERE INSPECTED THROUGH CARBO-ZINC PRIMER. NUC. POWER DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.

IR:

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE CONSIDERED: INSPECTION OF WELDS THROUGH PAINT.

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1	NSRS	P3			SR				IN-85-532-006

KEYWORDS: INSPECTION PROGRAM CRITERIA

PROB: WCDPW

QCP 4.13 VTC STATES THAT HANGER FILLET WELDS ARE TO BE 1/8-3/16" MAX. DWG. 47A050, SHEET IN, NOTE 50 STATES THAT WELDS MAY BE 100% OVERSIZE. THE QC HANGER CARDS STATE THAT THE INSTALLATION WAS INSPECTED PER QCP 4.13 VTC. PROCEDURE DWG NOW CONFLICTS WITH OVERSIZE WELDS THAT HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED. (NO SPECIFIC CASES GIVEN)

IR: 1-85-234-WBN

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1	ERT	A3			SR				IN-85-021-X05

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPQW

WELDERS CERTIFICATION CARDS WERE FALSIFIED. (DETAILS OF SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY) CONSTRUCTION CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1	ERT				SR				IN-85-335-002

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPQW

WELDERS ON "RESTRICTIONS" (NOT ALLOWED TO WELD) ARE TOLD TO KEEP THEIR CERTIFICATIONS UPDATED EVEN WITHOUT USING THE PROCESS OR TIME IN THE TEST SHOP. (NAMES ARE KNOWN)

IR: IN-85-335-002

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

08:13:33

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
		W	1	ERT	A3			SR				IN-85-424-X13

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE SPECIFIC PROB: WCPIF

MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL FALSIFIED WELDER'S CERTIFICATION CARD. (DETAILS OF SPECIFIC CASE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002 STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
		W	1		A3			SR				IN-85-612-X07

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE SPECIFIC PROB: WCPIF

WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002 STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

IT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----	-----
		W	1					SR				IN-85-770-003

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFIC PROB: WCPIF

INDIVIDUALS POSSESSING INVALID WELDER CERTIFICATIONS. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY REQUIREMENTS. CONSTRUCTION DEPARTMENT CONCERN.

IR: IN-85-352-001 STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

08:13:33

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
		W	1		A3			SR				IN-85-770-X07

_YWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPQW

WELDERS (8) CERTIFICATION CARDS WERE FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION. CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN.

IR: IN-85-770-002

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
		W	1	A3				SR				IN-85-778-X07

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPQW

WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD FALSIFIED, (DETAILS TO SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

.T	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
		W	1		A4			SR				IN-86-167-005

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION SPECIFIC

PROB: WCPQW

CI IS CONCERNED THAT WELDER RE-QUALS (UPDATES) HAVE BEEN BACK DATED. (DETAILS ARE KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY.) CONSTR. DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002

STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

08/23/86

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

Attachment 2

08:13:33

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CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1					SR				IN-86-167-X06

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE SPECIFIC PROB: WCP1F

WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD HAS BEEN FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002 STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT	ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
		W	1		A3			SR				WI-85-003-X02

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION IMPLEMENTATION FALSE SPECIFIC PROB: WCP1F

WELDER CERTIFICATION CARD FALSIFIED. (DETAILS TO THE SPECIFIC CASE ARE KNOWN TO QTC AND WITHHELD TO MAINTAIN CONFIDENTIALITY). CONSTRUCTION DEPT. CONCERN. CI HAS NO MORE INFORMATION.

IR: IN-85-770-002 STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE	PLANT	PRIORITY	ORG	QTC	EGG	INSP	SD	RD	GD	IO	-----CONCERN-----
---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	W	1	ERT	A4			SR				IN-85-543-002

KEYWORDS: CERTIFICATION PROGRAM UPDATE PROB: WCDPW

WELDER CERTIFICATION UPDATE PROCEDURE IS INADEQUATE. WELDERS CAN BE OFF WORK OVER 90 DAYS AND NOT BE REQUIRED TO RE-TEST UPON RETURNING TO WORK.

IR: IN-85-352-001 STAT: RC:

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

ISSUE CONSIDERED: WELDER PERFORMANCE QUALIFICATION UPDATE.

07/25/86
03:11:22

(EMPLOYEE CONCERNS)

CAT ISSUE PLANT PRIORITY ORG QTC EGG INSP SD RD GD IO -----CONCERN-----

WE W 1 EGG S3 593 Y SR IN-85-299-003

KEYWORDS: WELDMENT QUALITY NONSPECIFIC

PROB: WCMCU

SS WELDS SEEM TO HAVE EXCESS METAL REMOVED AT BUTT WELD JOINTS, ALSO THE WELDS EXHIBIT EXCESSIVE SHRINKAGE AT JOINTS. THIS CONCERN IS GENERIC BUT HAVE EXAMPLES. THIS HAS BEEN NOTICED FOR THE PAST 6 YEARS IN BOTH UNITS. DETAILS KNOWN TO QTC, WITHHELD DUE TO CONFIDENTIALITY. CONSTRUCTION DEPT CONCERN..

IR:

STAT: RC: EC-SP-6 WP-19-SQN

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT ISSUE PLANT PRIORITY ORG QTC EGG INSP SD RD GD IO -----CONCERN-----

WE W 1 EGG A4 511 Y SR WI-85-055-001

KEYWORDS: RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM NONSPECIFIC

PROB: WCDPW

THE WELDER CERTIFICATION TEST PRESENTLY BEING ADMINISTERED TO WELDERS AT WATTS BAR, IN THE RECERTIFICATION EFFORTS FOLLOWING A RECENT STOP WORK ORDER (NO. 25), IS NOT IN COMPLIANCE WITH CODE (ASME SECTION IX). CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

IR: WI-85-055-001

V STAT: RC: WP-19-SQN

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

CAT ISSUE PLANT PRIORITY ORG QTC EGG INSP SD RD GD IO -----CONCERN-----

WE W 1 EGG A4 511 SR WI-85-056-001

KEYWORDS: RECERTIFICATION PROGRAM SPECIFIC

PROB: WCDPW

CI WAS TOLD (BY WELDERS WHO ARE IN THE PROCESS OF RETESTING) THAT THEY ARE BEING TESTED ON FLAT PLATE, IN THE FLAT POSITION, FOR WELDING PIPE USING THE T.I.G. AND S.M.A.W. PROCESSES. THIS IS NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH ASME CODE REQUIREMENTS. CI HAS NO FURTHER INFORMATION.

IR: WI-85-055-001

V STAT: RC: WP-19-SQN

TECHNICAL COMMENTARY:

Note of clarification on why WTG did not treat the concerns in WP-19 as being generic to Sequoyah.

The Weld Project took issue with the ECTG's methodology and/or process of making concerns generic to Sequoyah and opted to perform it's own independent evaluation. The weld project's evaluation consisted of a detail analysis of the concerns and their associated NSRS/ERT investigation reports. In addition the weld project used some of TVA's senior level welding engineers to determine if the specific issues in question had any generic relevance to Sequoyah.

The result of the weld project review is included in subject report which primarily identifies the concerns and the method used by senior level welding engineers to evaluate the concerns. Although the weld project did not document the logic used in evaluating each concern the accuracy of the evaluation is supported by the findings and conclusions contained in the other Weld Project Reports.

It is the opinion of the Weld Project that the differences in the evaluation of the concern is related to the use of the additional information found in the reports as opposed to only using the text of the concern. The evaluation of the concern on the report level under the ECTG Program will resolve any remaining differences between ECTG and WTG on what should be considered generic to Sequoyah.