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COMBINED SUMMARY/MINUTES OF THE
JUNE 25, 1986 MEETING OF THE
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BABCOCK & WILCOX REACTOR PLANTS SUBCOMMITTEE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A meeting was held by the ACRS Subcommittee on Babcock & Wilcox Reactor Plants on June 25, 1986. The purpose of the meeting was two-fold. First, the Subcommittee heard the results of the NRC's Incident Investigation Team's review of the loss of integrated control system power and overcooling transient at Rancho Seco on December 26, 1985. Second, the Subcommittee was briefed by the NRC Staff and the B&W Owners Group on the Trip Reduction and Transient Response Improvement Program (STOP-TRIP Program for short) established as a result of NRC concerns regarding the frequency of reactor trips and complex transients on B&W plants. Notice of this meeting was published in the Federal Register on Monday, June 9, 1986 (Attachment A). Attachment B is a schedule of presentations and Attachment C is a list of slides and handouts on file in the ACRS office. The meeting was entirely open to the public. Richard Major was the cognizant ACRS Staff member for this meeting. The meeting began at 8:30 a.m.

Attendees

ACRS

C. Wylie, Chairman
D. Ward, Member
H. Lewis, Member
J. Ebersole, Member
W. Kerr, Member
G. Reed, Member
R. Major, Staff

NRC Staff

F. Hebdon, AEOD
D. Hinckley
J. Ramsey
R. Jones, NRR
G. Kalman, NRR
E. Branagun, NRR
G. Schwenk, NRR
D. Crutchfield, NRR
R. Hernan, NRR

DESIGNATED ORIGINAL

Certified By _____

BWOG

C. Tally, B&W
C. Doyel, FPC
W. Wilson B&W
J. Ritts, TVA
D. Welington, SMUD
R. Ganther, B&W
S. Mays, Toledo Edison
J. Taylor, B&W
W. Wilgus, FPC
L. Reed, DPC
J. Carlton, Duke Power Co.
R. Dorman, B&W
S. Rose, Duke
G. R. Skillman, GPU
J. Langenback, GPU
N. McCole, MPR

Others

S. Levy, SLI
T. DuPree, Group W
D. Conner, Group W
R. Boyd, KMC
W. Brawn, PG&E
N. Todreas, MIT
C. Brinkman, CE
B. Royster, Outlet Comm
E. Flandtai, Outlet Comm
F. Tayloe, ACE
N. Brodsky, BETA
M. Heiskican, Rep. Matsui
S. Grayman, Outlet, TV
M. Ferronte, ANI
D. Hanson, INEL
L. Connor, WA
J. Nurmi, QA Tel
S. Letouraceau, Bechtel
S. Savage, NUS

Loss of Integrated Control System Power and Overcooling Transient at Rancho Seco on December 1985 - Report of NRC's IIT - F. Hebdon

Mr. Hebdon reported on the findings of NRC's Incident Investigation Team (IIT) review of the 12/26/86 transient at Rancho Seco. He noted the goal of the IIT is fact finding, that judgments on the incident are left for others to make. It was noted that a member of the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) accompanied the team as an observer.

Rancho Seco nuclear power station is operated by the Sacramento Municipal Utility District. It is located 25 miles southeast of Sacramento, Calif. It is a Babcock and Wilcox-designed reactor that was licensed in 1974. The various systems involved in the event were described.

The description of the event from the ISI Report, NUREG-1195 follows:

"At 4:14 a.m. on December 26, 1985, the plant was operating at 76 percent power, when a loss of integrated control system (ICS) dc power occurred as a result of a single failure. The loss of dc power to the ICS (a nonsafety-related system) caused a number of feedwater and steam valves to reposition automatically and also caused the loss of remote control of the affected valves from the control room. In addition, the main feedwater (MFW) pump turbines slowed to minimum speed and the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) pumps started. The immediate result was a reactor coolant system (RCS) undercooling condition that resulted in the reactor tripping on high pressure. The reactor trip was followed by an overcooling condition that resulted in safety features actuation and excessive RCS cooldown.

The operators were not immediately able to restore dc power within the ICS. As a result, nonlicensed operators were sent to isolate the affected steam and feedwater valves locally with handwheels. During the first 7 minutes of the incident, the excessive steam and feedwater flows resulted in a rapid RCS cooldown of over 100 °F. The pressurizer emptied and a small bubble formed in the reactor vessel head. The RCS cooldown continued and the RCS depressurized to about 1064 psig and then began to repressurize. This repressurization resulted in the RCS entering the B&W-designated pressurized thermal shock (PTS) region. The atmospheric dump valves and turbine bypass valves were isolated within 9 minutes after the reactor trip. However, the operators experienced difficulty closing the ICS-controlled AFW flow control valves. One of the AFW flow control valves was finally shut; however, the second AFW flow control valve was damaged and failed open. The associated AFW manual isolation valve was found to be stuck open. Therefore, both AFW pumps continued to feed and overfill one steam generator. Since the plant has no main steam isolation valves, water began to overflow into the main steam lines.

About 26 minutes after the reactor trip, the operators restored power within the ICS by reclosing two switches in an ICS cabinet. The operators were then able to close the open AFW flow control valve from the control room, which stopped the RCS cooldown, and started stabilizing the plant. The RCS had cooled down a total of 180 °F in this 26-minute period.

While changing a valve lineup in the suction of the pump used to supply RCS makeup (makeup pump), the last suction valve to the makeup pump was inadvertently shut. This resulted in the overheating and destruction of the makeup pump. About 450 gallons of contaminated water were spilled on the floor. This failure did not directly affect the incident since a high pressure injection (HPI) pump was available to supply RCS makeup. In addition, the spilled water did not result in any significant onsite or offsite radioactivity release or personnel dose.

Operators later stabilized the plant and brought it to a cold shutdown without a significant release of radioactivity to the environment and without significant additional damage to plant equipment. Because of the potential significance of the event, an NRC Team was sent to the site on December 27 and started their investigation of the incident on December 28. The five-member Team was selected on the basis of their knowledge and experience in the fields of reactor systems, reactor operations, human factors, and instrumentation and control systems. The Team was directed to: (a) determine the facts of what happened; (b) identify the probable cause as to why it happened; and (c) make appropriate findings and conclusions which would form the basis for any necessary follow-on actions."

The principal findings and conclusions were reported. The IIT reported that the fundamental causes for this transient were design weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the ICS and in the equipment controlled by that system. These weaknesses and vulnerabilities were not adequately compensated by other design features, plant procedures or operator training. Rancho Seco Emergency Operating Procedures (EOPs) do not address the loss of ICS power; the lack of specific guidance seems to be a weakness in the plant-specific EOPs available to the operators on December 26, 1985. These weakness and vulnerabilities were largely known to SMUD and the NRC staff by virtue of a number of precursor events and through related analyses and studies. Yet, adequate plant modifications were not made so that this event would be improbable, or so that its course of consequences would be altered significantly. The information was available and known which could have prevented this overcooling transient; but in the absence of adequate plant modifications, the incident should have been expected.

NRC Reassessment of B&W Plant Designs - D. Crutchfield, NRR

Mr. Crutchfield noted the NRC encouraged the B&W Owners Group (BWOG) to take the leadership role in this matter. BWOG documented their program in a May 15, 1986 submittal, "Trip Reduction and Transient Response Improvement Program," BAW-1919. The Staff is continuing to have meetings with the Owners Group and to comment on the program. The Staff's initial assessment indicates the program is generally on target. Documentation of the results of the Staff review is planned for December 1986.

The Staff will perform certain actions themselves, including: reviewing the BWOG effort, rereviewing the disposition of previous Staff recommendations, and performing a comparison to other PWRs.

In response to questions, Mr. Crutchfield said that currently B&W reactors meet the regulations and can operate safely while the reassessment is performed. When asked if the reassessment was focused on hardware rather than people problems, the response was that both

issues are under consideration. The Staff is giving equal emphasis to hardware and people-related issues. However, it was noted that management activities are outside the current scope. It was felt other programs are addressing how the plants are managed and run. It was also stated that the Staff will use the PRA information to compare potential changes that the Staff believes may be necessary to see if there is an improvement in safety.

B&W Owners Group Stop Trip Program Presentation to the B&W Plant ACRS Subcommittee

Introduction - W. Wilgus and G. R. Skillman

It was noted that the purpose of the meeting was to describe the BWOG Trip Reduction and Transient Response Improvement Program and to receive ACRS comments on the program. The objective of the program will be to reduce the number of trips and reduce complex transient frequencies and to ensure acceptable plant response during those trips and transients which do occur.

The goals of the program are to by 1990 reduce the average per plant trip frequency to less than two per year. In addition, by the end of 1990 the number of transients as classified by measurable parameters (Category "C") will be reduced to 0.1 per plant per year based on a moving three-year average.

The transient categories are defined as:

Normal response classification -

Category A - plant response parameters remain within preferred, or expected range

Category B - plant response slightly exceeds the expected range in one or more parameters, but does not reach the category C limits and is not a significant concern. This category is used to better focus efforts on trip reduction and transient response improvements as these may be precursors to category C events

Abnormal response classification -

Category C - system conditions reach limits which require safety system and extensive operator response to mitigate the transient.

Information Gathering Process - BWOG

The information gathering process will perform a broad and comprehensive search for problems in both the NSSS and the balance of plant. Included in this effort will be a review of the transient assessment program (TAP) data (which will use the graded TAP reports to review operating data from 1980 to the present). Interviews with operations and maintenance personnel will be conducted to search for trouble spots. The project will also review any other pertinent data.

The BWOG will employ an outside consultant (MPR) to assess the relative B&W plant sensitivity compared to other PWR designs. It is also planned to interface with the NRC Staff on their concerns.

The sensitivity study will attempt to quantify the perception of sensitivity by defining measurable, quantitative indices of thermodynamic behavior during normal operations, anticipated occurrences, and design basis accidents (through analysis of FSAR information).

The sensitivity study will evaluate the relative differences among PWR designs in these indices and establish safety margins. The effort is to identify areas of potential improvements in the B&W design and operations based upon an anlysis of the observed differences and their significance. It is also planned to identify specific areas which would be appropriate for consideration in risk or other studies.

The detailed key actions to be taken during this effort are:

1. Review 1154 Task Force items (the June 9, 1985 Davis-Besse event response).

2. Review Rancho Seco events
3. Perform operating experience review
4. Perform operator and maintenance personnel interviews
5. Perform sensitivity study
6. Review ICS/NNI system design
7. Review MFW system designs
8. Perform risk assessment
9. Review EFW/AFW systems designs
10. Review secondary plant relief system designs
11. Review instrument air system designs
12. Review procedures

A root cause program is planned. This effort was undertaken out of recognition that more thorough and more consistent investigations are crucial to solving problems. The program will be utilized in future events to: ensure thorough investigations, determine root and contributing causes, identify effective corrective action.

Integration Phase Key Projects - BWOG

The BWOG provided details on three of the twelve key projects. These were the ICS/NNI system review, MFW system review, and the risk assessment effort. The ICS/NNI system review will study the relationship between these nonsafety systems and safety functions. The processing of control signals will be the focus. The original design as well as modifications will be studied. The main feedwater reliability improvement program has as its objectives: to identify root causes of main feedwater upsets, develop recommendations for the resolution of plant problems that will improve MFW reliability, and to provide a technical basis for each recommendation. The risk assessment effort is geared toward assessing the significance of category C events with respect to core damage frequency using Oconee and Crystal River-3 PRAs.

Schedules - BWOG

Currently the Owners Group is scheduled to meet with the Staff and review progress on the Stop Trip Program in August and October of this year. BWOG activities related to Davis-Besse and Rancho Seco transients are continuing and are being integrated into the overall program on transient performance.

Executive Session

The Chairman asked the members if they thought the program was meeting its stated goals and, if not, what are the deficiences or concerns. Second, if the programs do satisfy the objectives and goals outlined, will the results satisfy the NRC safety concerns? Third, what other concerns are there?

One member stated more emphasis was needed on methods to remove decay heat. Alternative principles for decay hear removal address a more fundamental safety concern than reducing the number of trips.

It was noted by another member that the "stop trip" program would improve operations of plants with B&W systems, but may not have as its prime focus safety. A concern was expressed over the fact that in a list of complex transients to be studied, a third of the B&W operating units did not contribute to these transients. The question was raised, what is the reason for such a situation not being pursued.

Another subcommittee comment centered on the fact that many of the B&W transients were initiated by failures in power supplies. It appeared that early stages of transients were not receiving enough attention. A concern was again expressed that safety may not be the central focus of this program.

It was noted that the B&W design has a unique geometry, well fitted to decay heat removal. This situation should be used to an advantage. Further study on the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater system seemed appropriate.

Two and one-half hours of full Committee time has been allotted on Friday, July 11, 1986 between 3:00 p.m. and 5:30 p.m. Thirty minutes will be used for a subcommittee report, and fifteen minutes will be used for a Staff presentation. The remainder of the time will be given to the BWOG for presentations.

The meeting was adjourned at 6:05 p.m.

NOTE: A transcript of the meeting is available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can be purchased from ACE-Federal Reporters, 444 N. Capitol St., Washington, DC 20011 [(202) 347-3700]

[Docket No. 50-251]

Florida Power and Light Co.; Environmental Assessment and nding of No Significant Impact

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is considering issuance of an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR 50.48(c)(4) to Florida Power and Light Company (the licensee), for the Turkey Point Plant, Unit No. 4, located at Dade County, Florida.

Environmental Assessment

Identification of Proposed Action

The exemption would grant schedular extensions for the completion of the following fire protection items for Unit 4 and common areas.

1. Cable reroute.
2. Penetration seals.
3. Raceway (conduit) protection by fire rate barriers.
4. Alternate Shutdown System, common procedures and areas (control room, cable spreading rooms and the Auxiliary Building north-south breezeway).

The scope of additional work needed in these areas was identified as the result of reverification effort by the licensee.

The Need for the Proposed Action

When the reverification program indicated the need for additional modifications, necessary engineering and procurement were required by the licensee. The magnitude of the work associated with the modifications is such that it does not allow the 10 CFR 50.48(c) schedule to be met. The exemptions are strictly schedular in that they allow the modification schedule to be extended, with interim compensatory measures in place, which will provide the necessary fire protection until the corresponding modifications are completed.

Environmental Impact of the Proposed Action

The proposed action only affects the length of time for the required modifications to be completed. The licensee has proposed interim compensatory measures to provide the necessary level of fire protection until the modifications are completed. Thus, fire-related radiological releases will not differ from those determined previously and the proposed exemption does not otherwise affect facility radiological effluent or occupational exposures. With regard to potential nonradiological impacts, the proposed exemption does not affect plant nonradiological effluents and has no other environmental impact. Therefore, the Commission concludes there are no measurable radiological or nonradiological environmental impacts associated with the proposed exemption.

Alternatives to the Proposed Action

Since the Commission has concluded there is no measurable environmental impact associated with the proposed exemption, any alternatives with equal or greater environmental impact need not be evaluated. The principal alternative to the exemption would be to require rigid compliance with the 50.48(c)(4) requirements. Such action would not enhance the protection of the environment and would result in unjustified costs for the licensee.

Alternative Use of Resources

This action does not involve the use of resources not considered previously in the Final Environmental Statement for Turkey Point Plant Units 3 and 4.

Agencies and Persons Consulted

The NRC staff reviewed the licensee's request and did not consult other agencies or persons.

Finding of No Significant Impact

The Commission has determined not to prepare an environmental impact statement for the proposed exemption. Based upon the environmental assessment, the NRC staff concludes that the proposed action will not have a significant effect on the quality of the human environment.

For further details with respect to this action, see the requests for exemption dated October 11, 1985 and April 4, 1986. These letters are available for public inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC, and at the Environmental and Urban Affairs Library, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199.

Dated at Bethesda, Maryland, this 3rd day of June 1986.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Daniel G. McDonald,

Acting Director, PWR Project Directorate No. 2, Division of PWR Licensing-A, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 86-12920 Filed 6-6-86; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Reactor Plants; Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on Babcock and Wilcox (B&W) Reactor Plants will hold a meeting on June 25, 1986, Room 1046, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

Wednesday, June 25, 1986—8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of business.

The Subcommittee will consider the B&W Owners Group plans to reassess the long-term safety of B&W reactors, including, the implications of operating experience on the adequacy of B&W plant designs. The focus of this section of the meeting will be the B&W Owners Group Trip Reduction and Transients Response Improvement Program. The Subcommittee will also be briefed on the NRC Staff's Incident Investigation Team's (IIT) findings related to the December 26, 1985 loss of integrated control sysem power and overcooling transient at the Rancho Seco nuclear power plant.

Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the concurence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the Committee. Recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the ACRS staff member named below as far in advance as is practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff, its consultants, and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizants ACRS staff member, Mr. Richard Major (telephone 202/634-1413) between 8:15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named individual one or two days before the scheduled meeting to be advised of any changes in schedule, etc., which may have occurred.

ATTACHMENT A

Dated: June 2, 1986.

Morton W. Libarkin,

Assistant Executive Director for Project Review.

[FR Doc. 86-12922 Filed 6-6-86; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards, Subcommittee on Davis-Besse; Meeting

The ACRS Subcommittee on Davis-Besse will hold a meeting on June 27, 1986, Room 1046, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

Friday, June 27, 1986—8:30 a.m. until the conclusion of business.

The Subcommittee will review start-up activities for Davis-Besse.

Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the concurrence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the Committee. Recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the ACRS staff member named below as far in advance as is practicable to that appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff, its consultants, and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr. Herman Alderman (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact one of the above named individuals one or two days before the scheduled meeting to be advised of any changes in schedule, etc., which may have occurred.

Dated: June 2, 1986.

Morton W. Libarkin,

Assistant Executive Director for Project Review.

[FR Doc. 86-12921 Filed 6-6-86; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Subcommittee on Gas Cooled Reactor Plants; Meeting

The ARCS Subcommittee on Gas Cooled Reactor Plants will hold a meeting on June 26, 1986, Room 1046, 1717 H Street, NW., Washington, DC.

The entire meeting will be open to public attendance.

The agenda for the subject meeting shall be as follows:

Thurdsay, June 26, 1986—1:00 P.M. until the conclusion business

The Subcommittee will review the applicability of NRC requirements for equipment qualification and cable testing and other topics related to Fort St. Vrain, an HTGR.

Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the concurrence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the Committee. Recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept, and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee, its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify the ACRS staff member named below as far in advance as is practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made.

During the intitial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be considered during the balance of the meeting.

The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff, its consultants, and other interested persons regarding this review.

Further information regarding topics to be discussed, whether the meeting has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant ACRS staff member, Mr. John C. McKinley (telephone 202/634-1414) between 8:15 A.M. and 5:00 P.M. Person planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact one of the above named individual one or two days before the scheduled meeting to be advised of any changes in schedule, etc., which may have occurred.

Dated: June 2, 1986.

Morton W. Libarkin,

Assistant Executive Director for Project Review.

[FR Doc. 86-12923 Filed 6-6-86; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M

Regulatory Guides; Issuance and Availability

The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has issued a new guide in its Regulatory Guide Series. This series has been developed to describe and make available to the public methods acceptable to the NRC staff of implementing specific parts of the Commission's regulations and, in some cases, to delineate techniques used by the staff in evaluating specific problems or postulated accidents and to provide guidance to applicants concerning certain of the information needed by the staff in its review of applications for permits and licenses.

Regulatory Guide 3.56, "General Guidance for Designing, Testing, Operating, and Maintaining Emission Control Devices at Uranium Mills," describes procedures acceptable to the NRC staff for designing, testing, operating, and maintaining these emission control devices to ensure the realiability of their performance.

Comments and suggestions in connection with (1) items for inclusion in guides currently being developed or (2) improvements in all published guides are encouraged at any time. Written comments may be submitted to the Rules and Procedures Branch, Division of Rules and Records, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555.

Regulatory guides are available for inspection at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Copies of issued guides may be purchased from the Government Printing Office at the current GPO price. Information on current GPO prices may be obtained by contacting the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Post Office Box 37082, Washington, DC 20013-7082, telephone (202) 275-2060 or (202) 275-2171. Issued guides may also be purchased from the National Technical Information Service on a standing order basis. Details on this service may be obtained by writing NTIS, 5285 Port Royal Road, Springfield, VA 22161.

(5 U.S.C. 552(a))

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B

REVISED JUNE 23, 1986

TENTATIVE SCHEDULE
JUNE 25, 1986 MEETING OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BABCOCK AND WILCOX REACTOR PLANTS
ROOM 1046, 1717 H ST., N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555

8:30 AM	1.	Opening Remarks - C. Wylie, Chairman	10 Min.
8:40 AM	2.	Loss of Integrated Control System Power and Overcooling Transient at Rancho Seco on Dec. 26, 1985 - Report by NRC's IIT - Fred Hebdon	2 Hrs.

a. Introduction
b. Description of Fact-Finding Effort
c. System Descriptions
d. Narrative of the Incident
e. Equipment and Personnel Performance
f. Event Precursors
g. Significance of the Incident to Additional Issues
h. Conclusions

10:40 AM ****** BREAK ****** [10 Min.]

10:50 AM 3. Introduction by NRC Staff D Crutchfield 10 Min.

11:00 AM 4. B&W Owners Group Trip Reduction and Transient Response Improvement Program (STOP-TRIP) 4 Hrs.

a. Introduction
   i. W. B. Wilgus
   ii. G. R. Skillman

b. Information Gathering

i. Transient Assessment Program	S. T. Rose
ii. Sensitivity Study	S. T. Rose
iii. Root Cause	S. T. Rose
iv. Interviews	S. E. Mays

12:30 PM ****** LUNCH ****** [1 Hr.]

1:30 PM c. Integration Phase

i. ICS/NNI	C. B. Doyel
ii. MFW	C. W. Tally
iii. Risk Assessment	S. E. Mays

3:00 PM ****** BREAK ****** [10 Min.]

d. Implementation Phase	L. A. Reed
e. Concluding Remarks	W. S. Wilgus

ATTACHMENT B

4:15 PM	5.	Open Executive Session	45 Min.
		a. Plans for Reporting to Full Committee b. Future Interactions with BWOG & Staff	
5:00 p.m.		ADJOURN	

ATTACHMENT C
LIST OF SLIDES AND HANDOUTS
JUNE 25, 1986 MEETING
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE ON B&W REACTOR PLANTS
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1. Slides, Loss of Integrated Control System Power and Overcooling Transient at Rancho Seco on December 26, 1986, F. Hebdon, AEOD, 41 slides

2. NRC Reassessment of B&W Plant Designs, D. Crutchfield, NRR, 2 slides

3. Slides, B&W Owners Group, Stop Trip Program Presentation to the B&W Reactor Plant ACRS Subcommittee, June 25, 1986, 79 slides

ATTACHMENT C