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U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-315; 50-316
License Nos: DPR-58; DPR-74

Report Nos: 50-315/98024(DRS); 50-316/98024(DRS)

Licensee: American Electric Power Company

Facility: Donald C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2

Location: 1 Cook Place
Bridgman, MI 49106

Dates: Between November 12 and 19, 1998

Inspector: Terry J. Madedo, Physical Security Inspector

Approved by: James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1
Division of Reactor Safety

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2
NRC Inspection Reports 50-315/98024; 50-316/98024

This inspection reviewed plant support activities relating to the physical protection of the D. C. Cook facility. The report evaluated security activities related to the access authorization program, alarm stations, communications, control of personnel, packages and vehicles, compensatory measures, security event reports, security training and qualifications, security training records, and follow-up of previous inspection findings.

- Security related activities that involved the personnel and equipment performance of the control of packages and personnel, the alarm stations, and security communications were conducted effectively (Section S1.1). Security training activities were conducted and documented in an appropriate manner. (Section S5)
- The inspector identified an isolated violation regarding the inadequate search of one vehicle. The failure was caused when a security officer recognized, but failed to search an easily accessible storage compartment located under the passenger seat in the cab of a vehicle. Individual poor performance in the search conducted by the officer was determined to be the cause of the failure. Corrective action was implemented in a timely and effective manner. (Section S1.2)
- The inspector identified a violation involving the inadequate access control into each reactor containment caused by an ineffectively implemented compensatory measure. This failure had existed for approximately 12 months. The failure occurred because the licensee security staff had not recognized an easily exploitable pathway around posted security officers. When identified, licensee corrective action was implemented in a timely and effective manner. (Section S2.1)