

SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT  
DOCKET NO. 50-483  
CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1  
GENERIC LETTER 83-28, ITEM 2.2 (PART 2)  
VENDOR INTERFACE  
(PROGRAMS FOR ALL SAFETY RELATED COMPONENTS)

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

Generic Letter 83-28 was issued by the NRC on July 8, 1983, indicating actions to be taken by applicants and licensees based on the generic implications of the Salem ATWS events. Item 2.2 (Part 2) states a staff position which requires licensees and applicants to establish, implement and maintain a continuing program to ensure that vendor information for safety-related components is complete, current and controlled throughout the life of the plant, and appropriately referenced or incorporated in plant instructions and procedures.

The licensee for the Callaway Plant, Unit 1, submitted responses to Item 2.2 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28 by letters dated November 18, 1983; March 12, 1984; May 21, 1984; December 27, 1984; and May 17, 1985. Our evaluation of these responses find them to be acceptable.

EVALUATION

The licensee's program has been evaluated for three sub-items: (1) for equipment where vendor interfaces can be established, (2) for equipment where vendor interface cannot be practicably established, and (3) division of responsibilities between the licensee and vendor for servicing safety-related equipment.

The NRC Staff has developed guidelines for evaluating the licensee's responses for each sub-item.

1. Program Where Vendor Interface Can Be Established

Guideline - The licensee or applicant response should describe their program for establishing and maintaining interfaces with vendors of safety-related components which ensures that vendors are contacted on a periodic basis and that receipt of vendor equipment technical information (ETI) is acknowledged or otherwise verified.

The licensee describes an interface program with Westinghouse, the NSSS supplier. It consists of controlled distribution of Westinghouse technical bulletins, acknowledgement of receipt and implementation as appropriate by the licensee.

The licensee also states that they have implemented the Nuclear Utility Task Action Committee (NUTAC) Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program (VETIP)<sup>1</sup>.

One of the VETIP implementation responsibilities is to seek assistance and equipment technical information from safety-related equipment vendors other than the NSSS vendor when the utility's evaluation of an equipment or equipment technical information problem concludes that such interaction is necessary or would be beneficial.

The licensee has not indicated that any formal interface program has been established with vendors other than their NSSS vendor. The licensee

should establish a program to periodically contact vendors of key components (such as auxiliary feed pumps, safety-related batteries, ECCS pumps and safety-related valve operators) to facilitate the exchange of current technical information. In the case of the diesel generator and safety-related switchgear vendors, a formal interface such as that with the NSSS vendor should be established if practicable.

2. Program Where Vendor Interface Cannot Be Practicably Established

Guideline - The licensee/applicant should describe their program for compensating for the lack of a formal vendor interface where such an interface cannot be practicably established. This program may reference the NUTAC/VETIP program, as described in INPO 84-010, issued in March 1984. If the NUTAC/VETIP program is referenced, the response should describe how procedures were revised to properly control and implement this program and to incorporate the program enhancements described in Section 3.2 of the NUTAC/VETIP report.

Through participation in the NPRDS program, electric utilities submit engineering information, failure reports and operating histories for review under the SEE-IN program. Through the SEE-IN program, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations (INPO) reviews nuclear plant events that have been reported through the NPRDS programs, the Nuclear Network

and NRC reports. Based on the significance of the event, as determined by the screening review, INPO issues a report to all utilities outlining the cause of the event, related problems and recommends practical corrective actions. These reports are issued in Significant Event Reports, and Significant Operating Experience Reports and as Operations and Maintenance Reminders. Upon receipt of these documents, electric utilities evaluate the information to determine applicability to the facility. This evaluation is documented and corrective actions are taken as determined necessary.

The licensee references the NUTAC/VETIP program and states that plant instructions and procedures are now in place to review and evaluate incoming equipment technical information, to incorporate it into existing procedures, and to assure that the VETIP program is properly controlled and implemented.

We find that the licensee's response to this concern is adequate and acceptable, with the understanding that the licensee's commitment to implement the VETIP program includes the implementation of the enhancements described in Section 3.2 of the NUTAC/VETIP program to the extent that the licensee can control or influence the implementation of these recommendations.

Also, the lack of either a formal interface with each vendor of safety-related equipment or a program to periodically contact each vendor of

safety-related equipment does not relieve the licensee of their responsibility to obtain appropriate vendor instructions and information where necessary to provide adequate confidence that a structure, system, or component will perform satisfactorily in service and to ensure adequate quality assurance in accordance with Appendix B to 10 CFR Part 50.

3. Division of Responsibilities Between The Licensee and Vendor For Servicing Safety-Related Equipment

Guideline - The licensee/applicant should verify that the responsibilities of the licensee or applicant and vendors that provide service on safety-related equipment are defined such that control of applicable instructions for maintenance work on safety-related equipment are provided.

The licensee committed to implement the NUTAC/VETIP program. They further state that their present and planned future practices and activities adequately implement this program. The VETIP program includes implementation procedures for the internal handling of vendor services.

We find the licensee's commitment to implement the VETIP program to be acceptable, with the understanding that the licensee's commitment includes the objective for "Internal Handling of Vendor Services" described on page 23 of the March 1984 NUTAC Report.

CONCLUSION

Our review of the licensee's responses to Item 2.2 (Part 2) of Generic Letter 83-28 for the Callaway Plant, Unit 1, finds that the licensee's interface program with its NSSS supplier, plus the licensee's commitment to implement the NUTAC/VETIP program is acceptable, with the understanding that the licensee's commitment to implement the NUTAC/VETIP program includes the objective for "Internal Handling of Vendor Services," described on page 23 of the March 1984 NUTAC report, and includes the enhancements described in Section 3.2 of the report to the extent, that the licensee can control or influence such enhancements. In addition, the licensee should establish a program to periodically contact vendors of key components (such as auxiliary feed pumps, safety-related batteries, ECCS pumps and safety-related valve operators) to facilitate the exchange of current technical information. In the case of the diesel generator and safety-related switchgear vendors, a formal interface such as that with the NSSS vendor should be established if practicable.

REFERENCE

1. NUTAC, On Generic Letter 83-28, Section 2.2.2, Vendor Equipment Technical Information Program, March 1984, INPO 84-010 (NUTAC).