NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
Perry Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1	0 5 0 0 0 4 4 0	1 OF 0 3

TITLE (4)

Personnel Error Results In Loss Of Primary Containment Integrity

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	1 4	8 7	8 7	0 1 7	0 0	0 4	1 0	8 7		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)					
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 1 7	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)		
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	X 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)		
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)			
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)			
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)			

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE
Gregory A. Dunn, Compliance Engineer ext. 6484	2 1 6 2 5 9 - 3 7 3 7

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 14, 1987 at 2100 and 2121 primary containment integrity was compromised in that the containment upper airlock inner door equalizing valve was leaking and an individual was allowed to access containment through the upper airlock. This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 which requires in part, with one primary containment airlock door inoperable maintain the operable air lock door closed.

The equalizing valve had been placed in an overtravel position allowing the leakage. When the leaking valve was discovered the Supervising Operator instructed the security officer posted at the upper airlock to not allow access through the upper airlock. The security officer failed to pass on the information to a relieving security officer. Access was then permitted. At the time of the event preparations to tag the containment upper airlock outer door closed were in progress.

The linkage for operation of the equalizing valve has been adjusted to prevent operating beyond the close position. All security officers have been informed of the need for complete and proper turnovers and directed to ensure all instructions are written down.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 14, 1987 at 2100 and 2121 primary containment [NH] integrity was compromised in that the containment upper airlock inner door [DR] equalizing valve [V] was leaking and an individual was permitted to access containment through the upper airlock. This is a violation of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3 which requires in part, with one primary containment airlock door inoperable maintain the operable air lock door closed. At the time of the event the plant was in Operational Condition 1 (Power Operation), with reactor thermal power approximately 17 percent of rated. Reactor vessel [RPV] pressure was approximately 933 psig and reactor coolant temperature was approximately 513 degrees.

At 2000 an operator making rounds noticed a "hissing" sound in the containment upper airlock. The operator informed the Unit Supervisor. A Supervising Operator contacted the security officer posted at the containment upper airlock, instructing him not to allow anyone access through the upper airlock. At this time an individual was sent to determine the cause of the "hissing" sound. At 2045 the security officer was relieved but failed to inform the relieving security officer of the restriction to access through the upper airlock. At 2050 the leaking equalizing valve was verified and the airlock inner door was declared inoperable. A chemistry technician was permitted access to containment through the upper airlock at 2100 and at 2121 the technician exited containment through the upper airlock. At the time of the event preparations were in progress to tag the containment upper airlock outer door closed and locked.

On March 16 a leak rate test was performed on the containment upper airlock. It was discovered that the inner door equalizing valve (a ball valve) had been placed in an overtravel position. The leak rate was greater than 20000 standard cubic centimeters per minute (SCCM). The allowable value is 1180 SCCM. The valve was repositioned to the closed range and leakage was 10 SCCM. On March 17 at 0900 the leakage was verified greater than the limit and the NRC was notified at 1130.

The cause of this event was an improper turnover by a security officer. The relieving officer, unaware of access restrictions, allowed the unauthorized access. Additionally the containment upper airlock was being operated in the manual mode. In the manual mode the operator can move the handwheel past the "Close" position, thus allowing the equalizing valve to leak.

The containment, in combination with other accident mitigation systems, limits fission product leakage during and following the postulated design basis accident to values less than leakage rates that would result in offsite doses greater than those stated in 10 CFR 100. The containment airlocks are designed with two doors to allow access while maintaining containment integrity. Each door has a valve to equalize pressure to allow opening. With

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TEXT *(If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's)* (17)

the equalizing valve on the inner door open, there is a direct penetration to containment whenever the outer door is open. Perry Plant Technical Specifications require both airlock doors closed except for normal transit entry and exit, then one door shall be closed. Airlock leakage rate shall be less than 2.5 standard cubic feet per hour (1180 SCCM) at 11.31 psig. Even though leakage from the inner door equalizing valve was in excess of the limit, the containment upper airlock outer door remained closed except for the two passages by the technician. There was no airborne radioactivity in containment. Containment pressure at the time of the event was approximately 0.25 psig, well below design pressure. Therefore, containment leakage was minimized and had no safety significance. No previous similar events were identified.

The upper containment airlock was declared inoperable, locked and danger tagged to preclude use of the airlock. On March 26, 1987 the airlock inner door equalization valve operating mechanism was adjusted by installing additional washers on the operating linkage to prevent overtravel during manual operation. The other airlock doors have been inspected and verified to operate properly. All security officers have been given verbal instructions to ensure that any directions received are written and properly addressed to the relieving officers. A memorandum from the security supervisor to all security shift supervisors was issued directing that any future instructions received by security officers shall be communicated to the security shift supervisor who shall verify them with the originator.

Energy Industry Identification System Codes are identified in the text as [XX].

THE CLEVELAND ELECTRIC ILLUMINATING COMPANY

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SR. VICE PRESIDENT
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April 10, 1987
PY-CEI/NRR-0634 L

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Perry Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-440
LER 87-017-00

Dear Sir:

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 87-017-00 for the Perry Nuclear Power Plant.

Very truly yours,

A. Kaplan for

Murray R. Edelman
Senior Vice President
Nuclear Group

MRE:njc

Enclosure: LER 87-017-00

cc: Paul Leech
K. Connaughton

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
799 Roosevelt Road
Glen Ellyn, IL. 60137

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