

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 3		
TITLE (4) Fire Watch Not Established Due To Personnel Error																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 2	1 7	8 7	8 7	0 0 9	0 0	0 3	1 9	8 7	N/A				0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
1		20.402(b)				20.405(c)				50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.38(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
1 0 0		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.38(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 365A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				X 50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Roger W. Ouellette, Associate Engineer - Licensing										TELEPHONE NUMBER						
										AREA CODE 7 0 4 3 7 3 - 7 5 3 0						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS						
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)												EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR
X YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)												NO		0 4	3 0	8 7
ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)																

On February 17, 1987, at 0138 hours, personnel discovered two fire doors propped open near the Diesel Generator 1A room. No hourly fire watch had been established as required per Technical Specifications. The doors were closed at 0200 hours, which returned them to an operable status. Unit 1 was at approximately 100% power at the time of this incident.

This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error, because the doors were propped open by personnel. The responsible personnel could not be determined.

In addition to this incident, another fire door was found propped open on March 10, 1987, at approximately 1920 hours leading into Diesel Generator 1B room. No one was found in the area. A revision to this report will be forthcoming which will address this particular incident in more detail.

This incident is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.73, Section (a)(2)(i)(B).

8704070335 870319
PDR ADOCK 05000413
S PDR

IE22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 7	0 0 9	0 0	0 2	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

BACKGROUND

Technical Specification (Tech Spec) 3.7.11 states that all fire barrier penetrations (EIIS:PEN) and all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations shall be operable at all times. The action statement for this Tech Spec states: With one or more of the above fire barrier penetrations and/or sealing devices inoperable, within 1 hour either establish a continuous fire watch on at least one side of the affected penetration, or verify the operability of fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable penetration and establish an hourly fire watch patrol.

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On February 16, 1987, at 1917 hours, Security Officer A patrolled through the Switchgear Room adjacent to the Unit 1 Diesel Generator (D/G) (EIIS:DG) rooms. Security Officer A noticed that fire door (EIIS:DR) AX353B, leading into the D/G 1A room, was closed. Security Officer A exited the area at 1922 hours, and Security Officer B entered the area at 1923 hours. Security Officer B also noticed that fire door AX353B was closed. At 1925 hours, Security Officer B exited the area. At 2147 hours, a Nuclear Equipment Operator (NEO) entered the D/G room while performing his rounds. The NEO noticed that fire doors AX353B and AX302, leading into the D/G 1A room, were opened. The NEO exited the area at 2155 hours. The NEO re-entered the area at 2203 hours and exited at 2208 hours. Quality Assurance (QA) surveillance personnel entered the Switchgear Room at 0138 hours on February 17, 1987. The QA personnel noticed that each of the two doors leading into the D/G 1A room were propped open by a waste receptacle. QA personnel notified the Fire Protection Console Operator (FPCO) of the open fire doors. The need to establish an hourly fire watch had not been identified to the FPCO. The FPCO dispatched a Security Officer to close the doors. At 0200 hours, the doors were closed.

CONCLUSION

During the time of this incident, personnel in the area of the Unit 1 Switchgear and D/G 1A rooms noticed that the rooms were warm. The doors were probably opened to allow air circulation and cool down the area. A violation of Tech Spec 3.7.11 resulted when the fire doors were opened and a fire watch was not established.

This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error, because the doors were propped open by personnel. The responsible personnel could not be determined.

In addition to this incident another fire door (AX353C) was found propped open on March 10, 1987, at approximately 1920 hours leading into D/G 1B room. No one was found in the area. A revision to this report will be forthcoming which will address this particular incident in more detail.

There have been two previous incidents in which fire watches were not established for impaired fire barriers due to a lack of follow-up activity (see LERs 413/84-32 and 413/85-46).

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1) Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 4 1 3	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
		8 7	- 0 0 9	- 0 0	0 3	OF	0 3

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

CORRECTIVE ACTION

- (1) Security Officer closed both doors.
- (2) All Nuclear Production Station personnel will be reminded, in the monthly safety meeting, to keep fire doors closed.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

During the time that the fire doors were inoperable, the fire detectors in the area were operable and would have notified personnel if a fire had occurred.

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

P.O. BOX 33189
CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER
VICE PRESIDENT
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
(704) 373-4531

March 19, 1987


Document Control Desk
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D. C. 20555

Subject: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 1
Docket No. 50-413

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Section (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 413/87-09 concerning a fire watch not being established due to a personnel error. This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

RWO/37/sbn

Attachment

xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator
U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region II
101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900
Atlanta, Georgia 30323

American Nuclear Insurers
c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library
The Exchange, Suite 245
270 Farmington Avenue
Farmington, CT 06032

M&M Nuclear Consultants
1221 Avenue of the Americas
New York, New York 10020

INPO Records Center
Suite 1500
1100 Circle 75 Parkway
Atlanta, Georgia 30339

Mr. P. K. Van Doorn
NRC Resident Inspector
Catawba Nuclear Station

IK22
11