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Carolina Power and Light Company ATTN: Mr. E. E. Utley Senior Executive Vice President Power Supply and Engineering and Construction P. O. Box 1551 Raleigh, NC 27602

Gentlemen:

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SUBJECT: REPORT NOS. 50-325/88-14 AND 50-324/88-14

We have completed our evaluation of your June 3, 1988, response to our Notice of Violation issued on May 5, 1988, concerning activities at your Brunswick facility. After careful review of the basis for your denial of Violation 50-325/88-14-01 and consultation with the Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, we have concluded, for the reasons presented in the enclosure to this letter, the violation occurred as stated in the Notice of Violation. Therefore, pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, please submit to this office within 30 days of the date of this letter, a written statement describing the reasons for the violation, the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved, corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations, and the date when full compliance will be achieved.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and its enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

The response directed by this letter is not subject to the clearance procedures for the Office of Management and Budget issued under the Paperwork Reduction Action of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-511.

> Sincerely, Original Signed by Charles W. Hehl /for

Luis A. Reyes, Director Division of Reactor Projects

Enclosure: Evaluation of Violation Denial

cc w/encl: R. B. Starkey, Jr., Manager Brunswick Nuclear Project J. L. Harness, Plant General Manager State of North Carolina

bcc w/encl: (See page 2)

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bcc w/encl: NRC Resident Inspector DRS. Technical Assistant Document Control Desk

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ENCLOSURE

EVALUATION OF VIOLATION DENIAL

The cited violation (50-325/88-14-01) involved an inadvertent reactor coolant system (RCS) neatup of about 90 degrees (120°F to 210°F) over a 1.75 hour period in which the reactor vessel pressure and shell temperature were not determined as specified by Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.6. Your denial of the violation is based on two points: (1) you believe that the associated TS bases refers to RCS temperature changes during startup and shutdown, not while in cold shutdown; and (2) there is no technical concern, as the temperature/ pressure c rves do not apply when the reactor vessel is vented.

Although not recognized as part of the TSs in 10 CFR 50.36, the bases section does provide a general understanding/reason for TS requirements. The basis applicable to TS 3.4.6 indicates that the pressure/temperature limits set forth in the TS are to assure that stresses induced by heatup and rooldown operations are bounded to protect the reactor vessel and its associated components. In essence, the intent of the TS is to require monitoring plant conditions such that pressure/temperature limits meet the fracture toughness requirements in Appendix G, 10 CFR Part 50. Section 1 of Appendix G, 10 CFR Part 50, indicates that its requirements are necessary to provide adequate margins of safety during any condition of normal operation, including anticipated operational occurrences and system hydrostatic tests, to which the pressure boundary may be subjected over its service lifetime. Accordingly, this is not just a concern during startup and shutdown as you portray in your response; in fact, the specified TS applicability is "at all times".

As the affected init was in a condition recognized by the TS (i.e., recently shutdown, vented, and cooldown established to prevent RCS heatup from decay heat). TS surveillance requirement 4.4.6.1.1 requires that reactor vessel shell temperature and reactor vessel pressure be determined to be within the limits at least once per 30 minutes. We agree, in part, that the inadvertent heatup event resulted in no technical concern, in that the TS specified heatup rate was not exceeded and pressure/temperature limits were not reached because the plant remained depressurized. However, your operations staff had no confirmation that the reactor vent path remained established/effective and hence pressure/temperature limits maintained, since pressure and temperature were not being monitored.

Based on the above, it is the NRC's position that the pressure/temperature monitoring requirements associated with TS 3.4.6 are applicable during cold shutdown. We, therefore, find that your denial is not 'stified and the violation occurred as stated.