U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION II

Docket No.: License No.:	50-395 NPF-12
Report No.:	50-395/99-01
Licensee:	South Carolina Electric & Gas (SCE&G)
Facility:	Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station
Location:	P. O. Box 88 Jenkinsville, SC 29065
Dates:	January 3 - February 13, 1999
Inspectors:	M. Widmann, Senior Resident Inspector M. King, Resident Inspector (In-Training) W. Stansberry, Security Specialist, RII (Sections S2.5, S2.6, S3.1, S3.2, S3.3, S4.1, S4.2, S5.1, and S5.2)
Approved by:	R. C. Haag, Chief, Reactor Projects Branch 5, Division of Reactor Projects

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Virgil C. Summer Nuclear Station NRC Integrated Inspection Report No. 50-395/99-01

This integrated inspection included aspects of licensee operations, maintenance, engineering, and plant support. The report covers a six-week period of resident inspection; in addition, it includes the results of an announced inspection by a regional security specialist.

Operations

- Operators promptly responded to a moisture separator pressure switch failure by reducing load. The operators followed the appropriate annunciator response and operating procedures during the transient and prevented a potential loss of feedwater and reactor trip (Section O1.2).
- Onsite and offsite review meetings were appropriately focused on plant safety issues (Section 07.1).

Maintenance

- A particularly noteworthy example of a good questioning attitude by an electrical maintenance technician was noted. The technician questioned the validity of existing electrical schematics versus the installed plant wiring configuration of a component cooling water pump hand switch (Section M1.1).
- Based on a review of test data the inspectors verified that the moderator temperature coefficient met the limits specified in TS 4.1.1.3.b and the Core Operating Limits Report. The licensee performed the test in accordance with procedure requirements (Section M1.2).

Plant Support

- The observed tests effectively provided assurance of the operability and readiness of the security contraband detection system. Security maintenance personnel performing the tests demonstrated a good level of knowledge and familiarity with security equipment (Section S2.2).
- The vehicle barrier system was functional, well maintained, and effective in its intended purpose. The vehicle barrier system met the Physical Security Plan commitments and regulatory requirements (Section S2.5).
- The security compensatory measures program was effective and functional for failed or impaired security equipment and met Physical Security Plan commitments and regulatory requirements (Section S2.6).
- Security plan changes and security procedures were thorough, well documented, and consistent with the Physical Security Plan commitments and 10 CFR Part 50.54 (Sections S3.1 and S3.2).

- The licensee's safeguards events were logged according to the Physical Security Plan commitments. The licensee's process of tracking, trending, analyzing, and resolving these events was noteworthy (Section S3.3).
- Security force personnel possessed the requisite knowledge to cope with the designbasis threat described in 10 CFR 73.1(a) and the Physical Security Plan (Section S4.1).
- The inspector verified that responses by the security organization to security threats, contingencies, and routine response situations were consistent with the security procedures, the Physical Security Plan and Security Contingency Plan. Appropriate procedural guidance was developed in response to NRC Information Notice 98-35, "Threat Assessments and Consideration of Heightened Physical Protection Measures" (Section S4.2).
- The security force was effectively trained and requalified according to the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements. Training records were properly maintained and reflected current qualifications according to the training program commitments (Sections S5.1 and S5.2).

Report Cetails

Summary of Plant Status

On the first day of this inspection period, January 3, power was reduced to 62 percent due to a failure of a moisture separator pressure switch. On January 4, power was returned to 100 percent po ver and remained at full power for the remainder of the inspection period.

I. Operations

O1 Conduct of Operations

O1.1 General Comments (71707)

The inspectors conducted frequent reviews of ongoing plant operations. In general, the conduct of operations was professional and safety-conscious. Specific events and noteworthy observations are detailed in the sections below.

O1.2 Failed Moisture Separator Pressure Switch Response

a. Insp ion Scope (71707)

The inspectors reviewed the licensee's response to a failure of IPS05635, Second Stage Reheater and Control Valve Interlock Pressure Switch.

b. Observations and Findings

At 10:18 a.m. on January 3, a failure (internal leak) of IPS05635 occurred while the unit was operating at 100 percent power. This resulted in isolation of reheat steam to the moisture separator reheaters (MSRs) and closure of the number 2 feedwater heater outlet valves. This caused several feedwater heater annunciators in the control room to alarm. Control room operators responded to the resulting decrease in deaerator storage tank level and commenced a rapid load reduction at 10:21 a.m. in accordance with General Operating Procedure GOP-4 "Power Operation (Mode 1)," Revision 12C. Low deaerator storage tank level would result in an automatic trip of all feedwater booster pumps and feedwater pumps and a subsequent reactor trip. Operators promptly responded by starting the A Condensate Pump at 10:22 a.m. and reduced load to approximately 62 percent power in approximately 15 minutes. All primary systems responded as expected. At 11:10 a.m. the unit was stabilized. After the pressure switch was replaced the unit returned to 100 percent power on January 4. The inspectors review of the operators prompt response to the transient indicated they followed the appropriate annunciator response procedures and operating procedures during the transient and prevented a more significant challenge to plant operation.

The inspectors review of post transient data determined that power reduction averaged under three percent per minute for the duration of the transient. However, an indicated load reduction as high as 15 percent per minute exceeded the unit unloading rate of 5 percent per minute specified on GOP-4 Reference Page Item 3B, "Turbine Control." The licensee generated a Condition Evaluation Report (CER) 99-0047 to address this NRC identified condition. The CER indicated that the turbine control system did not

properly reduce turbine load at the operator selected rate of five percent per minute. Discussion with the crew indicated that the automatic decrease load rate was in service throughout the transient and no other abr.ormalities were noted during the event. Plant support engineering is reviewing the turbine load reduction data to determine the potential cause and any needed corrective or preventive maintenance to prevent recurrence. The licensee's post-event review of control rooms logs identified that due to the rapid transient, a control rod insertion limit low-low alarm was received at 10:26 a.m. Rods were restored above the insertion limit at 10:57 a.m., i.e., within the two hours allowed by Technical Specification (TS) 3.1.3.6.

c. Conclusions

Operators promptly responded to a moisture separator pressure switch failure by reducing load. The operators followed the appropriate annunciator response and operating procedures during the transient and prevented a potential loss of feedwater and reactor trip.

O3 Operations Procedures and Documentation

O3.1 Review of Control Room Supervisor Log Book

a. Inspection Scope (71707)

As part of routine control room observations the Control Room Supervisor (CRS) station log book, the Removal and Restoration (R&R) log book, and other operational log books were reviewed.

b. Observations and Findings

During the inspection period the inspectors identified omissions in the CRS station log book. On January 26, 1999, the plant entered the action statement of TS 3.7.9 due to duel racked in 480-volt breakers on essential chiller trains A and C, rendering train A inoperable, however a station log book entry was not made. On January 27, 1999, a similar TS entry was made for the B train of essential chilled water and an entry into the action statement of TS 3.5.2 was made due to the 7.2 KV breakers for charging pumps A and C being racked in at the same time which caused train A high head safety injection system to be inoperable. For these TS action statement entries the station log book did not reflect the conditions. The inspectors noted that the TS action statement entries on January 26 and 27 were typical, in that, the licensee routinely enters TS action statements as a result of various maintenance, surveillance, and system realignment activities. For many of these TS action statement entries the station log book did not indicate the applicable action statement entries. The licensee failed to fully recognize the station log book entry requirements of Station Administrative Procedure, SAP-204, "Operating Logs and Records," Revision 7. This requirement was established in the applicable station administrative procedure in order to provide a complete and accurate record of plant history. The documenting of TS action statements in the station log book also provides recorded information for the CRS, such that he is aware of all applicable TS action statements and can properly manage plant evolutions to ensure

compliance with the action statements. This is particularly important when multiple TS action statements are in effect and the CRS must recognize the most limiting action statement requirement.

SAP-204 provides the requirement for station log book entries. The procedure requires that station log book entries will be made for any LCO action statement not covered by an R&R. No existing R&Rs were evident or subsequent R&Rs initiated pertaining to the inoperable equipment during the inspectors' review. The inspectors verified that the station log book was not being maintained as prescribed in procedure SAP-204. This failure to document applicable TS action statements constitutes a violation of minor significance and is not subject to formal enforcement action.

As a result of this inspection, the licensee initiated CER 99-0142, to address SAP-204 deficiencies, specifically, clarification of the requirements for logging TS action statements for inoperable equipment. The licensee plans to revise SAP 204 to require that the most limiting TS action statements be documented in the log book.

c. Conclusions

A minor violation was identified for the station log book not being maintained in accordance with the applicable station procedure for making log entries.

07 Quality Assurance in Operations

07.1 Onsite/Offsite Review Meeting Observations

a. Inspection Scope (71707, 40500)

The inspectors attended portions of Plant Safety Review Committee (PSRC) and the Nuclear Safety Review Committee (NSRC) meetings conducted through the inspection period to verify compliance with TSs 6.5.1 and 6.5.2, respectively.

b. Observations and Findings

During the inspection period the inspectors observed portions of several PSRC meetings. The meetings observed were appropriately focused on safety, and achieved set agenda item goals. The agenda included reviews of procedure revisions, Final Safety Analysis Report changes, associated 10 CFR 50.59 screening reviews, TS change submittal for reactor coolant system heatup and cooldown curves, Engineering Change Requests and Nonconformance Notices. The inspectors verified that reviews specified in TS 6.5.1 were performed; however, the inspectors questioned the timeliness for some of the PSRC reviews. The January 12 PSRC meeting reviewed modification packages that were completed approximately ten years ago. Although TS 6.5.1 does not specify a time period in which to complete required reviews, the inspectors questioned the effectiveness or value added by the PSRC when reviewing packages this long after completion. In discussions with the PSRC Chairman, the inspectors were informed that the licensee recognized this issue earlier and have taken corrective action

to require pre-implementation reviews for future modification packages. The PSRC meeting observed by the inspectors were part of a cleanup review of those old items.

On January 13 and February 10, the inspectors attended scheduled NSRC meetings. These meetings were also appropriately focused on safety and accomplished set agenda item goals. The agenda included an overview of refueling outage 11; review of the third quarter trend report; a briefing on a root cause analysis addressing corrective action response CAR-91; review of quality assurance reports; and closure of numerous backlog and open items. The inspectors verified that sufficient personnel were available at the meeting to exceed the TS requirement for an NSRC quorum. The inspectors observed that the offsite representatives provided valued input that contributed to overall performance of the board.

c. Conclusions

Onsite and offsite review meetings were appropriately focused on plant safety issues. A minor issue regarding the review of old modification work packages was being adequately addressed.

II. Maintenance

M1 Conduct of Maintenance

M1.1 Observation of Work Activities (62707, 61726)

The inspectors observed all or portions of maintenance and surveillance testing activities listed below.

- PMTS 9816595 EMP-405.001 "7.2 KV Circuit Breaker Maintenance," Revision 13, Inspection and Cleaning of the A Component Cooling Water Pump Breaker, XPP0001A-CC.
 MWR 9901385 STP-302.31 "Steam Generator A Steam / Feedwater Flow Instrument IFT00475/IFT00476," Revision 6, bistable would not clear when the test switch is placed in normal position.
- STP-360.032 "Control Room Supply Air Atmospheric Radiation Monitor, RM-A1, Channel Operational Test," Revision 8
- STP-310.008 "NIS Power Range N44 Calibration," Revision 8
- MWR 990102 Adjust and Repair Door Latch DRCB-302 Turbine Building to Control Building 436' Door

The inspectors observations verified that work was performed with the work package present and actively referenced. All activities observed were conducted in accordance with written procedure instructions. Procedures provided sufficient detail and guidance for the intended activities. Technicians demonstrated that they were experienced and

knowledgeable of their assigned tasks. Quality control personnel were present whenever required by procedure. The inspectors noted that appropriate radiation control measures were in place. The inspectors concluded that routine maintenance and surveillance activities were satisfactorily performed.

A troubleshooting plan was reviewed by the inspectors during the period. During the maintenance activity to replace the hand switch for component cooling water pump C, an electrical maintenance technician displayed a questioning attitude. The technician questioned a discrepancy between the electrical schematics and the in-plant wiring configuration of the hand switch. The inspectors concluded that the original question of improperly wired circuit contacts internal to the hand switch was not substantiated, and operability of the pump was not impacted. The fact that the technician challenged the existing drawing and plant management's positive response to the concern was particularly noteworthy.

M1.2 Moderator Temperature Coefficient Determination

a. Inspection Scope (61726)

Inspectors reviewed the surveillance for at-power measurement of moderator temperature coefficient (MTC) which was conducted by reactor engineering personnel.

b. Observations and Findings

On January 8, the licensee performed STP-210.001, "Moderator Temperature Coefficient Determination," Revision 9, to determine the MTC in accordance with TS Surveillance 4.1.1.3.b. This surveillanch ensures that the MTC coefficient remains within the end of life (EOL) limit assumed in the Final Safety Analysis Report accident and transients analyses. The inspectors used the guidance provided in NRC Inspection Procedure IP-61708, "Isothermal and Moderator Temperature Coefficient Determinations," to verify the licensee's determination was technically consistent with the Core Operating Limits Report (COLR) predicted value and TS requirements. The inspectors reviewed the pre-test briefing guide, boron sampling log, data collection sheet and MTC calculations for the boration, dilution and the average MTC calculation and found them to be performed in accordance with STP-210.001 requirements. The MTC value met the acceptance criteria specified in the COLR for Cycle 11. The average MTC, negative 2.62 x 10E-4 delta k/k per degree Fahrenheit, was determined to be less negative than the EOL MTC Limit, negative 5.0 x 10E-4 delta k/k per degree Fahrenheit. Based on this data no further testing is required this fuel cycle.

c. Conclusions

Based on a review of test data the inspectors verified that the moderator temperature coefficient met the limits specified in TS 4.1.1.3.b and the Core Operating Limits Report. The licensee performed the test in accordance with procedure requirements.

III. Engineering

E8 Miscellaneous Engineering Issues (92903, 37551)

E8.1 (Open) Unresolved Item (URI) 50-395/98006-01: licensee controls of steam propagation barriers. NRC Inspection Report 50-395/98-09 which was issued on December 21, 1998, documented the staff's position on controlling steam propagation barriers (SPB) per TIA-98-004, "Lack of Allowed Outage Time Guidance for Inoperable Hazard Protection Equipment," which was an enclosure to the inspection report. During this inspection period the licensee revised Fire Protection Procedure FPP-025, "Fire Containment," Revision 3A, to incorporate additional guidance requirements related to a routine ingress/egress for hazard barrier docrs. Additionally, the licensee revised Civil Maintenance Procedure CMP-100.008, "Rework or Replacement of Plant Doors," Revision 5, to define what constitutes hazard barrier door minor maintenance. On February 11, the inspectors observed the adjustment of the door latch conducted under Work Request 990102 for high pressure door DRCB-302 which protects the relay room in the control building from the high energy hazards in the turbine building. This door latch had become difficult to operate. The licensee had stopped access through this door until they revised procedures FPP-025 and CMP-100.008 and completed the door repair. The work observed by the inspectors was performed in accordance with the new procedure requirements and was completed in a timely manner. The licensee was sensitive to the length of time the door would be opened to perform the maintenance. The entire maintenance activity took less than 5 minutes. Licensee controls of steam propagation barriers, including the changes to FPP-025 and CMP-100.008, remain an open URI pending further NRC review.

IV. Plant Support

R1 Radiological Protection and Chemistry (RP&C) Controls

R1.1 General Comments

The inspectors observed radiological controls during conduct of routine inspections and observation of operation and maintenance activities and found them to be acceptable.

S2 Status of Security Facilities and Equipment

S2.2 Observation of Security Equipment Operational Tests

a. Inspection Scope (71750)

The inspectors observed the operational and functional testing on the components of the Security Contraband Detection System.

b. Observations and Findings

On January 12, the inspectors observed performance testing of the security equipment conducted under Security Flan Procedure SPP-228, "Search Equipment Operational Test Procedure," Revision 4 and Security Maintenance Procedure SMP-002, "Explosive Detection Equipment," Revision 4. All testing observed was conducted in accordance with the approved procedures, met the acceptance criteria and was properly documented. These tests effectively provided assurance of the operability and readiness of the security contraband detection system. The inspectors verified functional checks of the distress alarm and lock down capability at the entrance point. The inspectors discussed various aspects of security equipment, corrective and preventive maintenance with the security maintenance personnel. Security maintenance personnel demonstrated a good level of knowledge and familiarity with security equipment.

c. Conclusions

The observed tests effectively provided assurance of the operability and readiness of the security contraband detection system. Security maintenance personnel performing the tests demonstrated a good level of knowledge and familiarity with security equipment.

S2.5 Vehicle Barrier System

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors evaluated and reviewed Chapters 12, 13, and 15 of the Physical Security Plan (PSP) to ensure that the licensee was complying with the Vehicle Barrier System (VBS) commitments and 10 CFR 73.55(c)(7).

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors verified by touring the site perimeter that the VBS was in place and functioning according to the PSP. The licensee continued to the accombination of surface mounted anchored jersey barriers, bollards, buildings, Caules and natural barriers as part of the barrier system. The licensee used both active and passive gate barriers. The inspectors reviewed quarterly and annual inspection records of the VBS and found that the licensee was complying with various testing and maintenance commitments.

c. Conclusions

The vehicle barrier system was functional, well maintained, and effective in its intended purpose. The vehicle barrier system met the Physical Security Plan commitments and regulatory requirements.

S2.6 Compensatory Measures

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors evaluated the licensee's actions for failed or impaired security equipment. Licensee actions were compared to the PSP commitments and regulatory requirements.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed randomly selected Security Event Logs (SELs) and previously completed maintenance work requests. These records indicated that the need for compensatory measures was minimal. Early in the inspection period, there was one compensatory measure in place. The inspectors verified hat previous compensatory measures employed for inoperable security equipment consisted of applications of specific procedures to assure that the measures did not reduce the effectiveness of the security system. Turnaround time of work requests by security maintenance personnel was minimal, resulting in the low number of compensatory measures. The one compensatory measure in place pertained to a safeguards issue from NRC Safeguards Information Inspection Report No. 50-395/96-03 and later discussed in NRC Inspection Report No. 50-395/98-02. By the end of the inspection period, the licensee completed the work required to terminate the compensatory measure. The inspectors reviewed the completion of the corrective actions for this issue and noted that the compensatory measure has been appropriately terminated.

c. <u>Conclusions</u>

The socurity compensatory measures program was effective and functional for failed or impaired security equipment and met Physical Security Plan commitments and regulatory requirements.

S3 Security and Safeguards Procedures and Documentation

S3.1 Security Program Plans

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors evaluated Amendment 42 to the V. C. Summer PSP and Amendment 16 to the Training and Qualification Plan (T&QP). This was to ensure that the changes were consistent with PSP commitments and in compliance with 10 CFR Part 50.54.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed Amendment 42 to the PSP. The changes involved enhancements to or clarification of existing commitments, revisions to commitments which reflect corresponding changes in regulatory requirements, and a major format change. The inspectors also reviewed Amendment 16 of the T&QP. The changes involved enhanced commitments to include hand held metal detector training.

The inspectors interviewed security force personnel and determined that they were familiar with their changes. The reviewed changes were consistent with plan commitments and 10 CFR Part 50.54.

c. Conclusions

Security plan changes were thorough, well documented, and consistent with the Physical Security Plan commitments and 10 CFR Part 50.54.

S3.2 Security Procedures

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors evaluated a sample of security implementing procedures to ensure that the procedures were consistent with PSP commitments and to determined the adequacy and compliance with 10 CFR Part 50.54.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed seven site security procedures and related supporting records and reports. The inspectors also interviewed security force personnel to determine their familiarity with these documents. The proceduros reviewed pertained to authorized personnel access control, vehicle/material access control, and search requirements. The security procedures were thorough, detailed, and consistent with the Physical Security Plan commitments and 10 CFR Part 50.54.

c. <u>Conclusions</u>

The security procedures were thorough, dutailed, and consistent with the Physical Security Plan commitments and 10 CFR Part 50.54.

S3.3 Security Event Logs

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors reviewed Security Event Logs (SEL) for 1998 to verify that the licensee appropriately analyzed, tracked, resolved, and documented safeguards events that the licensee had determined did not require reporting to the NRC.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the SELs for 1998. This review found that the licensee tracked, trended, analyzed, and had taken corrective actions to resolve the events described in the SELs. The highest number of logged events was in hardware events involving vital area doors and perimeter intrusion detection system alarms. Logged events that indicated a trend were further documented in the Primary Identification

Program (PIP). The PIP system analyzed and implemented necessary corrective actions. The inspectors found that the door problem was directly related to the aging of the hardware locking and control equipment. The perimeter intrusion detection system alarms were cause by adverse weather and aging equipment. The licensee was replacing the perimeter intrusion detection equipment as it became inoperable.

c. Conclusions

The licensee's safeguards events were logged according to the PSP commitments. The licensee's process of tracking, trending, analyzing, and resolving these events was noteworthy.

S4 Security and Safeguards Staff Knowledge and Performance

S4.1 Security Force Requisite Knowledge

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors interviewed security personnel to determine if they possessed adequate inowledge to carry out their assigned duties and responsibilities, including response procedures, use of deadly force, and armed response tactics as committed to in Chapter 8 of the PSP.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors interviewed approximately 16 security personnel, including supervisors, and witnessed approximately 12 others in the performance of their duties. Members of the security force were knowledgeable in their duties and responsibilities, response commitments and procedures, and armed response tactics. The inspectors found that armed response personnel had been instructed in the use of deadly force as required by 10 CFR Part 73.

c. Conclusions

Security force personnel possessed the requisite knowledge to cope with the designbasis threat described in 10 CFR 73.1(a) and the Physical Security Plan.

S4.2 Response Capabilities

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors assessed the security organization's ability to respond to security threats, contiligencies, and routine response situations. The inspectors also evaluated the licensee's action regarding NRC Information Notice (IN) 98-35, "Threat Assessments and Consideration of Heightened Physical Protection Measures," dated September 4, 1998.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors evaluated the tactical equipment and personnel prepositioned within the protective area to verify that tactical response commitments were implemented. Tactical response personnel were also interviewed to ascertain their familiarity with the tactical response equipment.

Response personnel were familiar with their duties and the locations of the response equipment, as well as, the t, pe and quantity of items at the locations. Response personnel were familiar with the event response conditions listed in the contingency plan. Response personnel knew the shift chain of command during a tactical response. The number of tactical responders available on each shift met the plan commitments. The inspectors observed an aggressive and challenging tactical response exercise conducted by security personnel involving nonsecurity personnel. The critique of the exercise was thorough and interactive with the participants. The licensee developed and implemented Nuclear Security Guideline No. 30, Revision 0, to meet the guidelines of IN 98-35. This was to ensure a consistent approach to future NRC response communications.

c. Conclusions

The inspector verified that responses by the security organization to security threats, contingencies, and routine response situations were consistent with the security procedures, the Physical Security Plan and Security Contingency Plan. Appropriate procedural guidance was developed in response to NRC Information Notice 98-35, "Threat Assessments and Consideration of Heightened Physical Protection Measures."

S5 Security Safeguards Staff Training and Qualification

S5.1 Security Training and Qualification

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors observed tactical training and reviewed training and qualification commitments to ensure that the training met the criteria in the T&QP.

b. Observations and Findings

Members of the security organization were requalified at least every 12 months in the performance of their assigned tasks, both normal and contingency. This included the conduct of physical exercise requirements and the completion of the firearm course. Through the observation of security personnel with hand guns, shotguns, and rifles during the tactical exercise mentioned in Section 4.2 and interviews with security force personnel, the inspectors found that the training complied with 10 CFR 73, Appendix B proficiency requirements.

c. Conclusions

The security force was effectively trained and requalified according to the Training and Qualification Plan and regulatory requirements.

S5.2 Training Records

a. Inspection Scope (81700)

The inspectors evaluated security force training records to verify that the records were properly maintained and reflected current qualifications.

b. Observations and Findings

The inspectors reviewed the training records of three supervisors, four armed response, and two armed security officers and compared the training records to the training commitments in the T&QP and PSP. Security personnel were interviewed by the inspectors to verify that the training documentation was correct. All records reviewed by the inspectors indicated that basic training, medical and fitness testing, firearms training and qualification, and task qualification were completed. Interviews of the security force verified that the training documentation was accurate and correct. The records reviewed were neat, orderly, and well maintained.

c. <u>Conclusions</u>

Security force training records were properly maintained and reflected current qualifications according to the training program commitments.

V. Management Meetings

X1 Exit Meeting Summary

The inspectors presented the inspection results to members of licensee management at the conclusion of a regional security inspection on January 29, 1999, and at the conclusion of the six-week inspection on February 22, 1999. The licensee acknowledged the findings presented.

The inspectors asked the licensee whether any materials examined during the inspection should be considered proprietary. No proprietary information was identified.

PARTIAL LIST OF PERSONS CONTACTED

Licensee

- F. Bacon, Manager, Chemistry Services
- L. Blue, Manager, Health Physics
- S. Byrne, General Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations
- R. Clary, Manager, Quality Systems
- M. Fowlkes, Manager, Operations
- S. Furstenberg, Manager, Maintenance Services
- L. Hipp, Manager, Nuclear Protection Services
- D. Lavigne, General Manager, Nuclear Support Services
- G. Moffatt, Manager, Design Engineering
- A. Rice, Manager, Nuclear Licensing and Operating Experience
- G. Taylor, Vice President, Nuclear Operations
- R. Waselus, Manager, Systems and Component Engineering
- R. White, Nuclear Coordinator, South Carolina Public Service Authority
- B. Williams, General Manager, Engineering Services
- G. Williams, Associate Manager, Operations

INSPECTION PR(`EDURES USED

- IP 37551: Onsite Engineering
- IP 40500: Effectiveness of Licensee Controls 1 Identifying, Resolving, and Preventing Problems
- IP 61726: Surveillance Observations
- IP 62707: Maintenance Observations
- IP 71707: Plant Operations
- IP 71750: Plant Support Activities
- IP 81700: Physical Security Program for Power Reactors

URI

IP 92903: Followup - Engineering

ITEMS DISCUSSED

50-395/98006-01

licensee controls of steam propagation barriers (Section E8.1)