



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

October 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

FROM: James Lieberman, Director
and Chief Counsel
Regional Operations and Enforcement Division
Office of the Executive Legal Director

SUBJECT: 10 CFR 2.206 REQUEST REGARDING CALLAWAY UNIT 1

Enclosed for your action is a letter dated September 28, 1984, which was filed by the Government Accountability Project on behalf of the Citizens Concerned About Callaway and others. The letter requests that the Commission suspend the low-power license for Callaway Unit 1 pending an investigation of the allegations stated in the letter and the performance of any appropriate reinspections to determine the extent of problems raised by the allegations. The Commission has referred the letter to the staff for appropriate action in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. Although the issues raised in the petition could be handled appropriately by IE, I suggest that NRR take the lead on this petition in view of the near-term full power licensing of the Callaway plant.

It is my understanding that your staff and Region III have already reviewed the petition and have determined that immediate action to suspend the low-power license or to refuse the granting of a full-power license is not warranted. I also understand the petition was briefly discussed at last Thursday's Commission meeting on the full-power license for Callaway Unit 1. Accordingly, we have drafted for your use an acknowledgement letter with a Federal Register notice, to the petitioners indicating that their request for immediate relief has been denied. Further information describing the basis for this interim denial should be inserted by your staff or Region III as appropriate.

You should also note that the acknowledgement letter asks the petitioners to come forward with the affidavits from which the allegations in the letter are said to derive. We discussed the approaches to obtaining the affidavits with Darrell Eisenhut, Bert Davis and other members of the Region III staff and agreed initially to seek the affidavits informally through the acknowledgement letter and a meeting with GAP, but to leave open the possibility

Contact: Stephen G. Burns, OELD
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of issuing a subpoena if GAP will not promptly submit the affidavits. We are assisting Region III in developing a memo to obtain subpoena approval from the Commission in the event that the "informal" method does not work.

We will assist your staff in developing a final response to the petition. If you need further information from the licensee in taking final action, we can assist your staff in drafting an appropriate request to the licensee for such information under 10 CFR 50.54(f). Please ensure that I am provided copies of all correspondence related to the petition and that I am asked to concur on all staff correspondence.

12/

James Lieberman, Director
and Chief Counsel
Regional Operations and Enforcement
Division
Office of the Executive Legal Director

Enclosures: (1) Petition
(2) Draft Letter
and Notice

cc: R. DeYoung, IE
J. Keppler, RIII
D. Eisenhut, NRR
J. Holonich, NRR
E. Christenbury, OELD

Distribution

B. Berson, RIII
R. Perlis, OELD
J. Axelrad, IE
EDO # 000004
ROED Sub (P-84-20)
ROED Rdg
Lieberman chron
Burns info
Cuoco info
Cunningham/Murray
NRC Central
ELD rdg
2.206 Chron

DFC :OELD	<i>Sto</i>	:OELD	:	:	:	:	:
NAME :Burns/cb		:Lieberman	:	:	:	:	:
DATE :10/12/84		:10/12/84	:	:	:	:	:

Docket No. STN 50-483
(10 CFR 2.206)

Louis Clark, Executive Director
Government Accountability Project
1555 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Suite 202
Washington, D.C. 20036

Dear Mr. Clark:

On September 28, 1984, Ms. Varricchio and Ms. Garde of the Government Accountability Project submitted a letter on behalf of the Concerned Citizens About Callaway which requested "immediate action" by the Commission to suspend the low-power operating license for Callaway Unit 1. In accordance with the Commission's usual practice, the request was referred to the staff for appropriate action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

The letter requested suspension of the low-power license pending an investigation of the allegations in the letter and the completion of any necessary reinspections to determine the scope of identified problems. As a basis for this action, the letter points to, among other things, various alleged construction deficiencies related to welding, electrical cabling, and concrete placement, poor construction drawing, undue pressure on quality control inspectors and drug and alcohol abuse at the site. The NRC received the letter only a few days before the Commission's scheduled meeting on authorization of a full-power license for Callaway Unit 1. In preparing for that meeting, the staff reviewed the information contained in the letter, and the staff informed the Commission that the matter raised by the letter did not warrant immediate action by the Commission to suspend the low-power license or stay issuance of a full-power license.

[NRR/Region III: Add other information regarding our position on immediate action; e.g., have we been aware of such allegations and taken appropriate action already].

I would also note with respect to the request that quality assurance including the adequacy of welding and concrete placement was a primary issue in the operating license proceeding for Callaway Unit 1. Both the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board concluded from the evidence on the record that there was no general breakdown in quality assurance procedures and that there was reasonable assurance that the Callaway plant could be operated safely. See LBP-82-109, 16 NRC 1826 (1982), aff'd, ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343 (1983).

Although no immediate action is warranted, the staff will continue to review the request and reach a final determination on it within a reasonable time in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. In that regard, the letter states that the allegations forming the basis for the request have been compiled from affidavits of former plant workers; however, these affidavits were not included with the letter to the Commission. I ask that you would provide me or NRC Region III with the affidavits. As I am sure you will agree, it is difficult for the staff to adequately assess the need for further action in the absence of the information which forms the basis for the request.

The NRC Region III staff has made several attempts to obtain the affidavits from Ms. Garde and Ms. Varicchio of your staff. Despite their efforts, and Mr. Keppler's letter to Ms. Garde of September 27, 1984, your staff has not as yet provided us with the affidavits. The staff is prepared to meet with you, to protect where possible the identity of the alleged ; and to meet with the alleged to obtain factual information concerning the allegations. I suggest that I and other senior NRC staff officials meet with you in the next week to discuss prompt submission of the affidavits to the NRC. I will contact you regarding such a meeting.

A copy of a notice is being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication is enclosed for your information.

Sincerely,

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure: as stated

cc: Union Electric Co.
Missouri Public Service
Commission
B. Garde

[7590-01]

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket No. STN 50-483]

UNION ELECTRIC CO.

(Callaway Plant, Unit 1)

Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that the letter dated September 28 1984, the Government Accountability Project, on behalf of Concerned Citizens About Callaway and others, has requested that the Commission suspend the low-power license for Callaway Unit 1 pending an investigation of the allegations set forth in the letter and the completion of any necessary reinspections of the plant as a result of problems identified during the investigation. The allegations concern chiefly improper construction practices and other improper conduct by plant workers such as a drug or alcohol abuse on the site. The letter is being treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206 and, accordingly, the staff will take appropriate action on the request within a reasonable time.

A copy of the petitioner's letter is available for public inspection in the Commission's public document room at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555 and in the local public document room at _____.

Dated in Bethesda, Maryland, this ___ day of October 1984.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

No. EO-483 (2.206)

Logging Date 10/2/84

NRC SECRETARIAT

TO: Commissioner _____ Date _____

Exec. Dir./Oper. _____ Gen. Counsel _____

Cong. Liaison _____ Solicitor _____

Public Affairs _____ Secretary _____

Incoming: Billie Garde, Director

From: Government Accountability Project

To: Commissioners Date 9/28/84

Subject: requesting immediate action on allegations;
requesting low power license be suspended

- Prepare reply for signature of:
- Chairman _____
 - Commissioner _____
 - EDO, GC, CL, SOL, PA, SECY _____
 - Signature block omitted _____
 - _____
 - Return original of incoming with response _____

Rec'd Off. EDO
 Date... 10-2-84
 Time... 1:30p

- For direct reply*
- For appropriate action Suspend: 10/17/84
- For information
- For recommendation

Remarks: Cys Commissioners, OGC, OPE, EDO, oCA, OPA,
Chilk, Bates, Records, OELD

For the Commission: Eugenia

*Send three (3) copies of reply to Secy Mail Facility

ACTION SLIP

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come forward with the affidavits from which the allegations in the letter are said to derive. We discussed the approaches to obtaining the affidavits with Darrell Eisenhut, Bert Davis and other members of the Region III staff and agreed initially to seek the affidavits informally through the acknowledgement letter and a meeting with GAP, but to leave open the possibility

Contact: Stephen G. Burns, OELD
X27268

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Division
 Director

CALLAWAY UNIT 1

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GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT

1555 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 202
Washington, D.C. 20036

Terry Polke

PRINCIPAL STAFF	
RA	DRP
EA	ERS
NRC	ESS
PAO	WL
SGA	OL
ETC	

Eisenhut - Action

(202) 232-8550

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Harold Denton, Director
Nuclear Reactor Regulation
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

October 17, 1984

Re: Callaway Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1
Authorized by NRC Operating License No. NFP-25

Dear Mr. Denton:

It is our understanding that on October 16, 1984 the NRC Regional Administrator for Region III made a final recommendation to your office that the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant be granted its full power operating license. This recommendation was made after his insufficient consideration of the 2.206 petition filed by GAP on October 2, 1984 which contained 48 safety related and cost overrun allegations. Mr. Keppler has evidently concluded from the allegations as generally stated in the petition that there was nothing which would preclude the full operation of the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant. This conclusion was based on the petition alone and not on other available substantiating evidence.

This hasty action on the part of the Regional Administrator clearly reflects an indifferent attitude towards the concerns of those workers who have made allegations of safety significance. In addition, this action falls far short of a good faith effort to execute an effective quality assurance program within the NRC.

If and when the full power operating license for the Callaway Nuclear Power Plant is granted, please give us 14 days notice to consider and pursue our other legal remedies.

Sincerely,

Billie P. Garde

Billie P. Garde
Citizens Clinic Director

Michele Varricchio
Michele Varricchio
Staff Associate

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FROM:

DJE: 11/08/84

EDO CONTROL: 000060
DOC DT: 10/17/84
FINAL REPLY:

BILLIE P. GARDE
MICHELE VARRICCHIO, GAP

TO:

DENTON

FOR SIGNATURE OF:

** GREEN **

SECY NO:

DENTON

DESC:

CALLAWAY PLANT FULL POWER OPERATING LICENSE

ASSIGNED TO: NRR
CONTACT: DENTON

DATE: 10/23/84

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

ROUTING:

DIRCKS
ROE
REHM
STELLO
KEPLER
DEYOUNG
GCLINNINGHAM



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Wainick

OCT 10 1984

Docket No. 50-483
License No. NPF-25
EA 84-97

Union Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Donald F. Schnell
Vice President - Nuclear
Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400
St. Louis, MO 63166

Gentlemen:

This refers to a routine safety inspection conducted by Mr. P. R. Pelke of this office during the period of July 30 through August 3 and August 13 through 17, 1984, of activities authorized by NRC Operating License No. NPF-25 at the Callaway Plant, Unit 1. The results of the inspection were discussed on August 20, 1984, during an enforcement conference held in the NRC Region III office between you and other members of your staff and myself and other members of the NRC Region III staff. During this inspection, the NRC reviewed the circumstances associated with a violation of a technical specification limiting condition for operation.

From August 10 to August 14, 1984, the Callaway Plant operated in Mode 4 with both Containment Spray Systems inoperable in violation of the technical specifications. It is recognized that your staff identified and promptly reported this violation to the NRC. Although the safety significance of the violation is less than it would have been had it occurred at power operation after the plant had achieved initial criticality, I am concerned about your operating the facility in violation of a Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation. To emphasize the importance the NRC places on:

- (1) conducting licensed activities in accordance with established procedures,
- (2) providing adequate attention to detail to minimize personnel errors, and
- (3) being cognizant of abnormal conditions that may exist during facility operations,

we propose to impose a civil penalty for the violation identified in Item I as set forth in the Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty enclosed with this letter.

This violation, as well as the other violations described in the enclosed Notice, have been categorized at severity levels in accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, as revised, 49 FR 8583 (March 8, 1984). The base civil penalty amount for a Severity Level III violation of this type is \$50,000. However, since the violation (1) was identified by your staff and promptly reported, (2) corrective actions were

CERTIFIED MAIL
RETURN RECEIPT REQUESTED

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prompt and extensive, and (3) your administrative control systems provided an opportunity for discovery prior to initial criticality, I am decreasing the amount of the civil penalty by 50%. After consultation with the Director of the Office of Inspection and Enforcement, I have been authorized to issue the enclosed Notice of Violation and Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount of \$25,000.


You are required to respond in writing to the Notice attached to this letter. In preparing your response, you should follow the instructions specified in the Notice. Your response should specifically address corrective actions you have taken or plan to take to improve the management effectiveness for ensuring that technical specification requirements are met and abnormal facility conditions are identified. Your written reply to this letter and the results of future inspections will be considered in determining whether further enforcement action is appropriate.

With respect to Item II.B as set forth in the Notice of Violation, the inspection showed that action had been taken to correct the identified violation and to prevent recurrence. Consequently, no reply to this violation is required and we have no further questions regarding this matter at this time.

In accordance with Section 2.790 of the NRC's "Rules of Practice," Part 2, Title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room.

The responses directed by this letter and the enclosed Notice are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

Sincerely,

for 
James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator

Enclosure: Notice of Violation
and Proposed Imposition of
Civil Penalty

cc w/encl:

W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear
Construction
S. E. Miltenberger, Plant Manager
R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager QA
K. Drey
Chris R. Rogers, P.E.
Utility Division, Missouri
Public Service Commission
SNUPPS

Distribution

PDR
 LPDR
 NSIC
 SECY
 ACRS
 CA
 RCDeYoung, IE
 JTaylor, IE
 JKeppler, RIII
 JAAxelrad, IE
 ABBeach, IE
 JLieberman, ELD
 VStello, DED/ROGR
 FIngram, PA
 Resident Inspector, Callaway
 Enforcement Coordinators
 RI, RII, RIII, RIV, RV
 SConnelly, OIA
 BHayes, OI
 HDenton, NRR
 MWilliams, NRR
 JCrooks, AEOD
 NGrace, IE
 State Attorney General
 IE:ES File
 IE:EA File
 EDO Rdg File
 DCS

IE:ES *ABBeach*
 ABBeach
 10/5/84

ELD *JLieberman*
 JLieberman
 10/5/84

JAAxelrad
 JAAxelrad
 10/9/84

IE:DT *JTaylor*
 JTaylor
 10/10/84

IE:RC *RCDeYoung*
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 Warnick/sv
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RIII *CNP*
 Norelius
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 WWS
 Schultz
 10-19-84

RIII *CD*
 Davis
 10/19

RIII *JKeppler*
 Keppler
 10/19

NOTICE OF VIOLATION

AND

PROPOSED IMPOSITION OF CIVIL PENALTY

Union Electric Company
Callaway Plant
Unit 1

Docket No. 50-483
License No. NPF-25
EA 84-97

During a routine inspection at the Callaway Plant site during the period of July 30 through August 3 and August 13 through 17, 1984, the NRC reviewed the circumstances associated with a violation of a technical specification limiting condition for operation. The violation involved operation in Mode 4 with both Containment Spray Systems inoperable. This violation was identified and promptly reported to the NRC by the licensee.

To emphasize the importance the NRC places on: (1) conducting licensed activities in accordance with established procedures, (2) providing adequate attention to detail to minimize personnel errors, and (3) being cognizant of abnormal conditions that may exist during facility operations, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to impose a civil penalty in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Dollars (\$25,000) for this matter. This penalty reflects a reduction of 50% from the base penalty of \$50,000 for a Severity Level III violation in recognition of the licensee's prompt reporting and extensive corrective actions. In accordance with the NRC Enforcement Policy, 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C, as revised, 49 FR 8583 (March 8, 1984) and pursuant to Section 234 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended ("Act"), 42 U.S.C. 2282, PL 96-295 and 10 CFR 2.205, the particular violation and the associated civil penalty is set forth in Section I below:

I. Civil Penalty Violation

Technical Specification 3.6.2.1 states, "Two independent Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE with each Containment Spray System capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump." This requirement is applicable for operational Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Technical Specification 3.0.3 states, "When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour ACTION shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

- a. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
- b. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
- c. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

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Contrary to the above, at 6:30 a.m.(CDT) on August 10, 1984, the licensee entered operational Mode 4 (hot shutdown) with Containment Spray manual isolation valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 closed and, therefore, with both Containment Spray Systems inoperable. The plant remained in Mode 4 with both valves closed until the closed valves were subsequently identified by the licensee and opened at 10:50 a.m.(CDT) on August 14, 1984.

This is a Severity Level III violation (Supplement I).
(Civil Penalty - \$25,000)

II. Violations Not Assessed A Civil Penalty

- A. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformances are promptly identified and corrected..."

The Callaway Plant FSAR, Section 17.2.16, states in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified, reported, and corrected..."

Contrary to the above, adequate measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected in that a deficient Bechtel design drawing resulted in a card associated with bistable 456B being installed incorrectly. Although this condition existed since November 1983, it was not detected during preoperational testing and the licensee did not become aware of it until this condition caused an inadvertent safety injection which occurred on August 13, 1984 when bistable 456B was tripped during a loop calibration surveillance procedure. Additionally, the trip status of 456B was unknown because the indicator light for it on the Partial Trip Status Panel located in the Control Room was burned out. Work Request No. 30748 to relamp the Partial Trip Status Panel was authorized on July 28, 1984, with a requested completion date of August 1, 1984, although the work was not accomplished until August 13, 1984, after the inadvertent safety injection occurred.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

- B. 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion V, states in part, "Activities affecting quality shall be prescribed by documented instructions, procedures, or drawings, of a type appropriate to the circumstances and shall be accomplished in accordance with these instructions, procedures or drawings."

Contrary to the above:

1. On August 3, 1984, during the removal of the No. 1 seal for Reactor Coolant Pump "C", Steps 5.8.4 and 5.8.5 of Procedure MPM-BB-QP001 were not accomplished. The seal was removed by

- hand rather than by the required extension tray mounted to the articulated arm.
2. Work Request No. 31368, dated August 12, 1984, was written to repair the drive mechanism for the exterior door to the containment personnel air lock. Block (009) of the Work Request incorrectly stated that outage of this equipment would not affect a Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO). Procedure APA-ZZ-00320, Revision 3, "Initiating and Processing Work Requests," states, "The approval authority should check the appropriate box if this component could cause an LCO, whether or not the specific work request requires that the component be OSS (Out of Service)." With the exterior door out of service, the plant was subject to the action statement of the LCO in Technical Specification 3.6.1.3.
 3. Procedure ODP-ZZ-00002, Revision 1, "Equipment Status Control," states in part, "When a...component, or device which is safety-related or is otherwise required to be operable to satisfy technical specifications...is determined to be out of service the shift supervisor shall initiate Attachment 1, Equipment Out of Service Log Sheet..." While the exterior door to the containment personnel air lock was inoperable during repairs on August 13, 1984, the shift supervisor did not make an entry in the Equipment Out of Service log to indicate the door was inoperable.

This is a Severity Level IV violation (Supplement I).

The inspection showed that action has been taken to correct the items of noncompliance identified in II.B. and to prevent recurrence. Consequently, no reply to these items of noncompliance is required and we have no further questions regarding this item.


Pursuant to the provisions of 10 CFR 2.201, Union Electric Company is hereby required to submit to the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C., 20555, with a copy to the Regional Administrator, U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region III, 799 Roosevelt Road, Glen Ellyn, IL 60137, within 30 days of the date of this Notice a written statement or explanation, including for each alleged violation except II.B: (1) admission or denial of the alleged violation; (2) the reasons for the violation, if admitted; (3) the corrective steps which have been taken and the results achieved; (4) the corrective steps which will be taken to avoid further violations; and (5) the date when full compliance will be achieved. Consideration may be given to extending the response time for good cause shown. Under the authority of Section 182 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2232, this response shall be submitted under oath or affirmation.

OCT 10 1984

Within the same time as provided for the response required above under 10 CFR 2.201, Union Electric Company may pay the civil penalty in the amount of \$25,000 or may protest imposition of the civil penalty, in whole or in part, by a written answer. Should Union Electric Company fail to answer within the time specified, the Director, Office of Inspection and Enforcement, will issue an order imposing the civil penalty proposed above. Should Union Electric Company elect to file an answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 protesting the civil penalty such answer may: (1) deny the violation listed in this Notice in whole or in part; (2) demonstrate extenuating circumstances; (3) show error in this Notice; or (4) show other reasons why the penalty should not be imposed. In addition to protesting the civil penalty in whole or in part, such answer may request remission or mitigation of the penalty. In requesting mitigation of the proposed penalty, the five factors contained in Section V(B) of 10 CFR Part 2, Appendix C should be addressed. Any written answer in accordance with 10 CFR 2.205 should be set forth separately from the statement or explanation in reply pursuant to 10 CFR 2.201, but may incorporate statements or explanations by specific reference (e.g., giving page and paragraph numbers) to avoid repetition. The Union Electric Company's attention is directed to the other provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, regarding the procedures for imposing a civil penalty.

Upon failure to pay any civil penalty due, which has been subsequently determined in accordance with the applicable provisions of 10 CFR 2.205, this matter may be referred to the Attorney General, and the penalty, unless compromised, remitted, or mitigated, may be collected by civil action pursuant to Section 234c of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 2282.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



for James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator

Dated at Glen Ellyn, Illinois
this 10/19 of October 1984

Pelke



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

OCT 19 1984

Docket No. 50-483

Union Electric Company
ATTN: Mr. Donald F. Schnell
Vice President - Nuclear
Post Office Box 149 - Mail Code 400
St. Louis, MO 63166

Gentlemen:

This refers to the routine safety inspection conducted during the period July 30 through August 3 and August 13 through 17, 1984, of activities at the Callaway Plant, Unit 1, authorized by NRC Operating License No. NPF-25. The results of the inspection were discussed during an enforcement conference conducted in the NRC Region III office on August 20, 1984. The report setting forth the results of the inspection and enforcement conference is enclosed.

In accordance with 10 CFR 2.790(a), a copy of this letter and the enclosure will be placed in the NRC Public Document Room unless you notify this office, by telephone, within ten days of the date of this letter and submit written application to withhold information contained therein within thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent with the requirements of 2.790(b)(1). If we do not hear from you in this regard within the specified periods noted above, a copy of this letter and the enclosed inspection report will be placed in the Public Document Room.

A separate letter is enclosed that sets forth certain matters of concern and the item of noncompliance found during this inspection. The responses directed by this letter are not subject to the clearance procedures of the Office of Management and Budget as required by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, PL 96-511.

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Union Electric Company

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OCT 18 1984

We will gladly discuss any questions you have concerning this inspection.

Sincerely,

for Carl J. Paperillo
James G. Keppler
Regional Administrator

Enclosure: Inspection Report
No. 50-483/84-36(DRP)

cc w/encl:

W. H. Weber, Manager, Nuclear
Construction
S. E. Miltenberger, Plant Manager
R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager
Quality Assurance
DMB/Document Control Desk (RIDS)
Resident Inspector, RIII
Region IV
K. Drey
Chris R. Rogers, P.E.
Utility Division, Missouri
Public Service Commission
SNUPPS

RFID for
Formy
10/18
RIII
WWS
Schultz/sv
10/18/84

RFW
Warrick
10/18

RIII
CJP
Davis
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RIII
CJP
Keppler
10/19

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-483/84-36(DRP)

Docket No. 50-483

License No. NPF-25

Licensee: Union Electric Company
Post Office Box 149
St. Louis, MO 63166

Facility Name: Callaway Plant, Unit 1

Inspection At: Callaway Site, Callaway Co., MO

Inspection Conducted: July 30 - August 3 and
August 13 - 17, 1984

Enforcement Conference: August 20, 1984

Inspector: *P. R. Pelke*
P. R. Pelke

10/19/84
Date

Approved By: *RFWarnick for*
W. L. Forney, Chief
Projects Section 1A

10-19-84
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on July 30 - August 3 and August 13 - 17, 1984 (Report No. 50-483/84-36(DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced safety inspection of an event in which both Containment Spray Systems were inoperable while the plant was in operational Mode 4, review of an inadvertent safety injection on August 13, 1984, observation of Reactor Coolant Pump "C" seal removal, review of containment personnel air lock repair activities, verification of Technical Specification requirements, and review of licensee event reports. This inspection involved a total of 67 inspector-hours onsite by one inspector.

Results: Of the six areas inspected, no items of noncompliance or deviations were identified in two areas, three items of noncompliance were identified in the remaining areas (failure to have two independent Containment Spray Systems operable during Mode 4 - Paragraph 2; failure to take timely corrective actions - Paragraph 4; and failure to follow procedures - Paragraphs 5 and 6).

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DETAILS

1. Persons Contacted

Union Electric Company

- °*D. F. Schnell, Vice President - Nuclear
- °*S. E. Miltenberger, Manager, Callaway Plant
- °D. C. Poole, Advisor to Manager, Callaway
- °*R. L. Powers, Assistant Manager, QA
- *A. C. Passwater, Superintendent, Licensing
- G. A. Patrissi, Fire Protection Consultant
- C. H. Fuhlage, Assistant Engineer, Compliance
- B. Dampf, Acting Assistant Safety Supervisor
- **S. Petzel, QA Engineer
- **R. H. Leuther, Superintendent, Maintenance
- **J. D. Blosser, Assistant Superintendent, Maintenance
- **J. W. Knaup, Assistant Engineer
- **C. D. Naslund, Superintendent, I&C
- **W. A. Norton, QA Engineer
- **J. T. Patterson, Assistant Superintendent, Operations
- °T. A. Baxter, Shaw, Pittman, Potts - Trowbridge

Burns

- B. L. Scott, Site Security Supervisor

USNRC

- °*James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator
- °A. B. Davis, Deputy Regional Administrator
- *J. A. Hind, Director, DRSS
- °*R. F. Warnick, Chief, Projects Branch 1
- °*W. F. Forney, Chief, Projects Section 1A
- *J. R. Creed, Chief, Safeguards Section
- *G. L. Pirtle, Physical Protection Specialist
- °*B. Berson, Regional Counsel
- *D. S. Morisseau, Training and Assessment Specialist, NRR
- *J. Holonich, Project Manager, NRR

* Denotes those attending the management meeting on August 8, 1984.

**Denotes those attending the exit interview on August 17, 1984.

° Denotes those attending the enforcement conference on August 20, 1984.

The inspector also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.

2. Isolation of Both Trains of the Containment Spray System

On August 14, 1984, at 2:43 p.m. (CDT), the NRC was notified by the licensee that both Containment Spray Systems were manually isolated during operational Mode 4. A chronology of events follows:

May 7, 1984 Containment Spray manual isolation valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 were closed, locked and tagged on Workmans Protection Assurance (WPA) Form 84-3252 to prevent inadvertent discharge into containment. A Senior Reactor Operator failed to enter the valves in the Equipment Out-of-Service Log per ODP-ZZ-00002.

May 9, 1984 A Senior Reactor Operator completed the Containment Spray Valve Lineup Procedure OTN-EN-00001 with exceptions annotated for valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 (WPA 84-3252) and valve EN-V097 (WPA 84-3014). All three valves were in the closed position. The Senior Reactor Operator failed to enter the three valves in the Equipment Out-of-Service Log as required by Standing Order 84-24.

August 3, 1984 A Senior Reactor Operator performed a review of the Workman's Protection Assurance log in preparation for entering Mode 4 as required by ODP-ZZ-00014. This review identified containment spray additive tank valve EN-V097 as being closed per WPA 84-3014, which was subsequently released and restored to normal operational lineup and appropriately noted on the valve lineup procedure OTN-EN-00001. The Senior Reactor Operator failed to identify valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 on WPA 84-3252 which were required for Mode 4.

August 5, 1984 A Senior Reactor Operator reviewed the WPA log prior to starting plant heatup. This did not include a review of the WPA's for Mode 4 but only for those required to be cleared prior to heating up the plant to 170°F.

August 5, 1984 A Senior Reactor Operator, while reviewing the status of system lineups for OTG-ZZ-00001, Attachment 1, initially approved the operational condition of the Containment Spray System as required by Step 3.22 of OTG-ZZ-00001. However, after discussion with another Senior Reactor Operator, he decided that due to outstanding WPA's he would withdraw his approval. This was shown as a line-out on OTG-ZZ-00001, Step 3.22.

August 6, 1984 The Operations Supervisor verified that WPA 84-3085 had been cleared and documented this verification on OTN-EN-00001, Checklist 3.

- August 7, 1984 A Senior Reactor Operator reviewed OTG-ZZ-00001, Step 3.22 and OTN-EN-00001 checklists. Based upon properly executed checklists and the verification of the WPA that was done on August 6, 1984, he signed off that step.
- August 8, 1984 Two Senior Reactor Operators executed a Temporary Change (TCN) to ODP-ZZ-00014 which, in part, deleted the sign-off requirement for the review of the Equipment Out-of-Service Log, the WPA Log review, and the Temporary Modifications Log review. The intent was to take credit for other sign-offs in the OTG procedures. The TCN was performed in such a manner that it negated the requirement to perform a separate review prior to making the mode change. Technical Specification 6.5.3.1.a requires that for changes to procedures which may involve a change in intent of the approved procedure, the person authorized to approve the procedure shall approve the change prior to implementation. The use of the TCN to ODP-ZZ-00014 circumvented the review by the required authority.
- August 10, 1984 A Senior Reactor Operator completed Attachment 54 of ODP-ZZ-00014, Operational Mode Change Requirements, and approved changing modes. At 6:30 a.m. on August 10, 1984, the plant entered Mode 4.
- August 14, 1984 A Reactor Operator found WPA sheet 84-3252 showing valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 closed while looking for another WPA. The valves were subsequently opened, locked open, and independently verified.

Failure to have two independent Containment Spray Systems operable during Mode 4 is a violation of Technical Specification LCO 3.6.2.1 (483/84-36-01).

On August 14, 1984, the Plant Manager immediately initiated a review of the WPA log, Equipment Out-of-Service Log, valve lineups, and outstanding Temporary Modifications. Valve lineups were re-verified for the Residual Heat Removal, Safety Injection, Centrifugal Charging Pump, Containment Spray and Auxiliary Feedwater Systems. This review was completed on August 15, 1984. The licensee identified several causes and took corrective actions to prevent recurrence as follows:

- a. Equipment Out-of-Service Log (EOSL) was not current. The licensee reviewed the EOSL against the Surveillance Master Tracking log, outstanding work requests, outstanding Workman's Protection Assurance, and outstanding temporary modifications. This review was completed on August 20, 1984.

- b. Improper application of procedures. Licensee management met with reactor personnel and discussed the necessity for adherence to procedures. This was completed on August 19, 1984.
- c. Personnel errors.
 - (1) Review of the WPA log did not identify the problem. The licensee reviewed the events with operations personnel and re-emphasized the necessity for accuracy in performance of activities. This was completed on August 22, 1984.
 - (2) Personnel did not follow Standing Order 84-24. The licensee reinstructed personnel on the requirement for compliance with procedures and orders. This was completed on August 22, 1984. The applicable portions of Standing Order 84-24 were incorporated into Procedures ODP-ZZ-00002 and APA-ZZ-00310 by August 20, 1984. This was accomplished by issuing TCNs 84-1013 and 84-1014 which require that when any Technical Specification related equipment is out of service as a result of WPAs, the equipment shall be entered in the Equipment Out-of-Service Log.
 - (3) Temporary Change 84-945 to Procedure ODP-ZZ-00014 inadvertently removed the requirement for review of WPAs, EOSL, and temporary modifications prior to mode change. Procedure ODP-ZZ-00014 was revised by August 15, 1984 to remove the changes made by TCN 84-945. The individuals involved were counseled on August 17 and 19, 1984. The individuals were aware of the limitations on the use of temporary changes. They had not intended for TCN 84-945 to delete the reviews, but only to delete what they believed to be redundant documentation of the reviews. A letter was issued to operations personnel and contractors on August 18, 1984, re-emphasizing the limitations on the use of temporary changes.

Although the closed valves were identified on August 14, 1984, by an operator while looking through the WPA log for another WPA, the licensee believes the monthly status survey of WPAs per APA-ZZ-00310 would have detected the closed prior to initial criticality. The monthly survey which was started on August 15, 1984, consists of a review of all outstanding WPAs that have been in effect longer than one month. WPA 84-3252 (showing valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 closed) was issued on May 7, 1984, and would have been included in the review.

3. Enforcement Conference

An Enforcement Conference was held in the Region III office on August 20, 1984 as a result of the Callaway Plant being in operational Mode 4 with both Containment Spray Systems inoperable. The purpose of the conference was to (1) discuss the violations, their significance and causes, and the licensee's corrective actions, (2) determine whether there were any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, and (3) obtain other information which would help determine the appropriate enforcement action.

The licensee was informed that the generic concerns raised by the violation needed to be addressed prior to the plant achieving initial criticality. The licensee was requested to have each shift demonstrate its proficiency in operating the plant at low power before Region III recommends operation above 5 percent power. The licensee agreed to develop a program which will give them and Region III confidence that the operating crews are ready to commence power ascension and operate the plant at full power.

4. Inadvertent Safety Injection

At 12:35 p.m. (CDT), August 13, 1984, while the plant was in Mode 4 (hot shutdown), an I&C technician performing a technical specification instrument calibration for Mode 3 inadvertently initiated a safety injection. Approximately 1200 gallons of water from the RWST were injected into the primary system via the Boron Injection Tank. The primary system was not solid at the time and the safety injection was terminated by an operator after two minutes. The licensee declared an Unusual Event at 12:37 p.m. and terminated the Unusual Event at 1:12 p.m. All systems functioned as designed. The licensee held a press conference at 4:30 p.m. to brief the news media on the event.

The I&C technician was performing loop calibration surveillance procedure ISL-BB-OP455 when the event occurred. The procedure required the trip of bistable 455B. Bistable 456B was also tripped due to an incorrect installation per a Bechtel design drawing. The trip status of 456B was unknown because the indicator light for this bistable was burned out on the Partial Trip Status Panel (SB069) located in the control room. Both channels in the tripped condition made up the required logic for permissive P-11 (2 out of 3). P-11 arms the logic for safety injection on low pressurizer pressure. Since a low pressure condition actually existed in the plant, a safety injection was initiated.

The inspector identified the following items that contributed to the inadvertent safety injection:

- a. The Bechtel design drawing, which was deficient, allowed the card associated with bistable 456B to be installed incorrectly. This nonconforming condition existed since November 1983 and was not detected during preoperational testing.
- b. Procedure ISL-BB-OP455 required that Loops BB-OP456, BB-OP457, and BB-OP458 must be operable (not in test) as an initial condition to prevent an inadvertent safety injection. The procedure limited the definition of operable by the phrase "(not in test)" and made no reference to the Partial Trip Status Panel. The licensee is revising Procedure ISL-BB-OP455 and associated procedures. This will remain an open item pending the inspector's review of the revised procedures (483/84-36-02).
- c. The I&C technician relied on the indication of the Partial Trip Status Panel without consideration of a work request sticker attached to the panel.

- d. The Shift Supervisor authorized the surveillance activity without reliable indication of the partial trip status.
- e. Work Request No. 30748 to relamp the Partial Trip Status Panel was authorized on July 28, 1984, with a requested completion date of August 1, 1984. The work was not accomplished until August 12, 1984, after the safety injection.

Failure to promptly identify and correct nonconforming conditions, as described in paragraphs (a) and (e), is an item of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI (483/84-36-03).

5. Observation of Reactor Coolant Pump "C" Seal Removal

On August 3, 1984, the inspector observed the removal of the No. 1 seal for RCP "C". The current revision of Procedure MPM-BB-QP001 was being used at the work area. Documentation indicated that required QC hold-points had been witnessed by the QC inspector. During the removal of the seal runner, it was discovered that the extension tray (A-11) was not mounted to the articulated arm assembly. The articulated arm assembly is used to swing the seal runner from the motor stand to the area outside for further removal. The Maintenance Foreman stopped the crew and told them to wait until the extension tray was found and installed. The extension tray could not be located at the work area. A discussion took place between the Westinghouse Pump Representative and the Maintenance Advisor. As a result of the discussion, the Maintenance Advisor directed the Maintenance Foreman to have the seal runner removed from the pump area by hand.

Subsequent review of the controlling procedure by the inspector after leaving the work area, revealed that Steps 5.8.4 and 5.8.5 required the runner to be removed by the extension tray mounted on the articulated arm. The Westinghouse Representative and the Maintenance Advisor did not realize at the time that use of the extension tray was a procedural requirement. Although the Maintenance Foreman had been following the procedural steps and was aware of the requirement to use the extension tray, he did not recognize that removing the seal runner by hand constituted a procedural violation because he felt that the action met the intent of the procedure. Removing the runner by hand is not significant from a safety standpoint (no damage occurred). However, violation of a procedural step which was possibly influenced by a vendor representative is a concern. Failure to follow procedures is an example of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (483/84-36-04(a)).

The licensee provided the inspector with written results of its investigation into this incident, including corrective action and actions taken to prevent recurrence. The Maintenance Advisor and Maintenance Foreman have been verbally reprimanded for failure to assure verbatim procedure compliance. A meeting was held with QA, QC, the System Engineer, the Maintenance Foreman, the Maintenance Advisor and the Maintenance Superintendent to discuss the incident and identify the cause. During this meeting the necessity to adhere to procedure requirements was reemphasized to all

supervision and staff personnel involved with the activity. Additional training is scheduled for all Maintenance Foremen on procedure requirements. A post-job review of the procedure for seal replacement is scheduled and the procedure will be revised based on the experience learned during the job.

6. Containment Personnel Air Lock Repair Activities

During a plant tour on August 14, the inspector learned from an employee that the drive mechanism for the exterior door to the containment personnel air lock (door 1507A) had been repaired. Through additional discussions with the employee, the inspector became concerned that the work may not have been adequately controlled. The inspector requested the licensee's QA staff to investigate this activity and provide documentation that it was adequately controlled. On August 17, the licensee provided the following information:

- a. WR No. 31386 was written on August 12 to swap the cam follower from the personnel air lock with one from the emergency hatch drive box to allow operation until spare parts arrived. Technical Specification 3.6.1.3(a) requires that "Each containment air lock shall be OPERABLE with both doors closed except when the air lock is being used for normal transit entry and exits..." Procedure APA-ZZ-00320, Revision 3, "Initiating and Processing Work Requests," states, "The approval authority should check the appropriate box if this component could cause an LCO, whether or not the specific work request requires that the component be OOS." Contrary to the above, WR No. 31386, Block (009), "Will outage on this equipment result in an LCO?" was checked "no".
- b. Procedure ODP-ZZ-00002, Revision 1, "Equipment Status Control," paragraph 4.1.1, states in part, "When a...component, or device which is safety related or is otherwise required to be operable to satisfy Technical Specifications...is determined to be out of service the Shift Supervisor shall initiate Attachment 1, Equipment Out-of-Service Log Sheet..." Contrary to above, work was performed on door 1507A which rendered the door inoperable for a period of time on August 13 which placed the plant under the Action Statement of Technical Specification 3.6.1.3. The door was not declared "out-of-service" and the plant was not declared to be under an Action Statement. The requirements of the Action Statement were met in that the door was back in service within 24 hours.

Failure to follow procedures is an example of noncompliance with 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, Criterion V (483/84-36-04(b)). The licensee initiated a Request for Corrective Action (RCA P8408-296) on August 16 to document the noncompliance.

7. Verification of Technical Specification Requirements

During Mode 5 the inspector observed that the following Technical Specification requirements were satisfied:

- . TS 3.5.4: The inspector observed that both safety injection pumps were inoperable in that their motor circuit breakers were secured in the open position.
- . TS 3.7.10.1(a) and (b): The inspector observed that the levels of the fire suppression water supply tanks were greater than 31 feet and the fuel oil day tanks were greater than 3/4 full. Surveillance records documented that the fire pumps had been tested in accordance with Procedure OSP-KC-00001, and the diesel fire pump batteries had been checked for electrolyte level and voltage once per 7 days in accordance with Procedure MSE-KC-FB001, Diesel Battery Check.

8. Licensee Event Report Followup

Through direct observations, discussions with licensee personnel, and review of records, the following event report was reviewed to determine that reportability requirements were fulfilled, immediate corrective action was accomplished, and corrective action to prevent recurrence had been accomplished in accordance with Technical Specifications.

(Closed) LER 84-01: Missed Hourly Fire Watch. On June 12, 1984, from 1600 to 1700, hourly fire watch patrols for four rooms in the Control Building were missed in violation of Technical Specification Action Statement 3.7.11.a. Door locks had been changed and new keys were not promptly made available to the fire watch personnel, causing the missed patrols. Licensee action to prevent recurrence included instructing the locksmith to coordinate future lock changes with fire watch supervision and key room personnel, and instructing key room and fire watch personnel to utilize the building master key for any further instances of this type.

The inspector interviewed a fire watch supervisor, fire watchmen, and key room personnel and identified a concern that verbal instruction may not be sufficient to prevent recurrence. Subsequently, the Site Security Supervisor issued a memorandum to the Lock and Key Control Supervisor and revised fire watch post orders to address the inspector's concern.

The inspector reviewed Procedure ODP-ZZ-06200, Requirements for and Duties of Tech Spec Fire Watches, reviewed fire watch records for July 22 through July 26, 1984, and observed the continuous fire watch in Auxiliary Building Room 1328. No instances of missed fire watches were identified.

9. Management Meeting

On August 8, 1984, Region III representatives met with licensee representatives (as denoted in Paragraph 1) to discuss Region III's concerns regarding the problems being experienced at Callaway. The following items were discussed:

- a. The licensee presented an overview of all licensee events which had occurred. The frequency of events caused by personnel errors appears to be excessive. The licensee described a number of actions being taken to correct weaknesses in this area.

- b. On August 5, 1984, the licensee implemented an interim work schedule for operations personnel utilizing four crews instead of six. Two 12 hour shifts are used instead of the previous 8 hour shifts. The licensee was requested to submit a letter to NRR describing the new work schedule. The licensee presented the following four crew schedule advantages:
- (1) Increased supervision per shift (6 crew manning distributed over 4 crews).
 - (2) Increased participation in startup activities.
 - (3) Two shift changes per day, improved communications between shifts.
 - (4) Increased personnel on duty to support plant activities.
 - (5) Reduced number of 16 hour shifts.
 - (6) More firmly established days off.
- c. The licensee discussed overtime in general and also the overtime history of the personnel involved in three LERs. The data did not show any obvious correlation between overtime and personnel errors.

10. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the licensee, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or licensee or both. An open item disclosed during the inspection is discussed in Paragraph 4.b.

11. Exit Interview

The inspector met with licensee representatives denoted in Paragraph 1 on August 17, 1984, to discuss the scope and results of the inspection.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

FROM:

BILLIE GARDE
MICHELE VARRICCHIO, GAP

DUE: 10/24/84

EDC CONTROL: 000004
DOC DT: 09/28/84
FINAL REPLY:

TO:

COMMISSIONERS

FOR SIGNATURE OF:

** GREEN **

SECY NO:

DENTON

DESC:

2.206 - CALLAWAY NUCLEAR PLANT - REQUEST SUSPEND
LOW POWER LICENSE

ROUTING:

DENTON
KEPPLER

ASSIGNED TO: ELD

DATE: 10/02/84

CONTACT: CUNNINGHAM

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS OR REMARKS:

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UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Docket No. STN 50-483

Ms. Billie Garde
Director of Citizens Clinic
Government Accountability Project
1555 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Suite 202
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Ms. Garde:

Subject: Acknowledgement of GAP Letter dated September 28, 1984, Requesting Suspension of Low-Power License and Denial of Full-Power License for Callaway Plant, Unit No. 1

On September 28, 1984, Ms. Michele Varricchio and yourself submitted a letter on behalf of the Concerned Citizens About Callaway which requested "immediate action" by the Commission to suspend the low-power operating license for Callaway Unit 1. In accordance with the Commission's usual practice, the request was referred to the staff for appropriate action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

The letter requested suspension of the low-power license pending an investigation of the allegations contained in the letter and completion of any necessary reinspections to determine the scope of identified problems. As a basis for this action, the letter points to, among other things, various alleged construction deficiencies related to welding, electrical cabling, concrete placement, poor construction drawings, undue pressure on quality control inspectors, and drug and alcohol abuse at the site. The NRC received the letter only a few days before the Commission's scheduled meeting on authorization of a full-power license for Callaway Unit 1. In preparing for that meeting, the staff reviewed the information contained in the letter and informed the Commission that the concerns raised by the letter did not warrant immediate action by the Commission to suspend the low-power license or stay issuance of a full-power license.

Several members of my staff along with personnel from the NRC Region III office and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement have reviewed the allegations. As a result of its evaluation, the staff has determined that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the low-power license should not be suspended and that the full-power license should be issued. (License NPF-30 granting full-power operation of the Callaway Plant, Unit 1 was issued to Union Electric Company on October 18, 1984.) The basis for the staff determination is:

- (1) several allegations were previously reviewed by the staff and closed; these are documented in reports;

- (2) many of the allegations identified areas where the allegor believed there was a concern; however, in all such instances, the necessary requirements were met; and
- (3) several allegations were too broad and, based on previous NRC and licensee inspections, evaluations, and reviews, no problems had been identified.

I would also note that with respect to quality assurance, including the adequacy of welding and concrete placement, this subject was a primary issue in the operating license proceeding for Callaway Unit 1. Both the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board concluded from the evidence on the record that there was no general breakdown in quality assurance procedures and that there was reasonable assurance that the Callaway plant could be operated safely. See LBP-82-109, 16 NRC 1826 (1982), aff'd, ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343 (1983).

Although no immediate action is warranted, the staff will continue to review the request and reach a final determination on it within a reasonable time in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. In that regard, your letter states that the allegations forming the basis for the request have been compiled from affidavits of former plant workers. These affidavits have been received by the staff and based on its review, the staff has determined that the affidavits, in general, do not provide any additional details concerning the allegations.

However, in the absence of more specific information supporting the petition, it is difficult to assess the need for further action. The NRC staff is prepared to meet with you and the allegers, whose identity will be protected where possible, to obtain factual information concerning the allegations.

With respect to the letter dated October 17, 1984, also from Ms. Varricchio and yourself, GAP stated that the actions on the part of the staff in reviewing the allegations in the September 28, 1984 letter were hastily done and did not consider other available evidence. Additionally, GAP requested that it be given 14 days notice prior to issuance of the full-power operating license.

At no time did the NRC treat the concerns in a hasty or haphazard manner. The staff decision to issue the full-power license was based on a review of available information. The information you submitted was not of sufficient specificity to cause the staff to change its position.

The staff was unable to give GAP the 14 days notice it requested since the full-power license was scheduled for issuance on October 18, 1984. The licensee had satisfied all of the restrictions prohibiting operation above 5% of rated power and had satisfactorily completed its low-power test program; therefore, a 14 day delay in issuing the license was not justified.

Ms. Billie Garde

- 3 -

As noted above, the staff is prepared to meet with the allegers to ensure that all avenues of information are explored. By permitting the NRC to discuss the concerns directly with the allegers, GAP will be assured that a thorough review of the allegations has been performed. Otherwise, the staff has no basis to change the conclusions drawn above. I suggest that a meeting be held with the NRC and GAP within the next week to discuss this proposal. The staff will contact you regarding such a meeting.

A copy of a notice being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication is enclosed for your information.

Sincerely,

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure: As stated

cc: See next page

Ms. Billie Garde

- 3 -

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Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure: As stated

cc: See next page

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See attached page

*SEE PREVIOUS PAGE FOR CONCLUSIONS

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JHolonich:kab	*BJYoungblood	JLieberman	TNovak	DEisenhut	*JKeppler
10/25/84	10/26/84	10/ /84	10/ /84	10/ /84	10/25/84

WITS ITEMS 000004 [acknowledgement letter (1st part)]
000060 (closes this item)

DISTRIBUTION: CALLAWAY 2.206 Dated: _____

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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. STN 50-483

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1

Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that by letter dated September 28, 1984, the Government Accountability Project, on behalf of Concerned Citizens About Callaway and others, has requested that the Commission suspend the low-power license for Callaway Unit 1 pending an investigation of the allegations set forth in the letter and the completion of any necessary reinspections of the plant as a result of problems identified during the investigation. The allegations concern primarily improper construction practices and other improper conduct by plant workers such as a drug or alcohol abuse on the site. The letter is being treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206 and, accordingly, the staff will take appropriate action on the request within a reasonable time.

A copy of the petitioner's letter is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555 and in the local public document room at Fulton City Library, 709 Market Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251 and at the Olin Library of Washington University, Skinker and Lindell Boulevards, St. Louis, Missouri 63130.

Dated in Bethesda, Maryland, this _____ day of _____ 1984.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. STN 50-483

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1

Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206

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Dated in Bethesda, Maryland, this _____ day of _____ 1984.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

DD:NRR
ECase
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D:NRR
HDenton
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JHolonich:kab
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Document Name:
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Requestor's ID:
SECURITY

Author's Name:
J. Holonich ✓

Document Comments:
(CALLAWAY 2.206) ACKNOWLEDGEMENT LTR (WITS 000004 & 000060)

~~first copy received~~ (RFW)

"Release" sp 0: JGK
NRR ABD
2/14/85 CEN
BB
WLF

This 10/25/84 draft of the letter to
GAP acknowledges 22A :06 request. Main
difference between 4 (sp) draft and the last one
is that this one is addressed to Billie Garde. The
last draft was addressed to Lewis Clark. Another
difference is that this draft says the "NRC
staff" is prepared to meet with Billie and the
allegers. The last draft said "Region III", etc. Also
some minor rearranging of sentences. I
suggest we concur in this draft. Let me
know if you have comments.

RFW

A33
A30
31
20A
4

FOIA-B4-901
A33

Document Name:
LTR CLARK/c

Requestor's ID:
NANCY

Author's Name:
J. Holonich

Document Comments:
TO BOB WARNICK - - (CALLAWAY 2.206)

Destination Name:
LEADOP

Notes:

Distribution Name:
NRC DL_KATHY_0005

Addressee:
Nancy Prescott

To - JGK
ABD
CEN
BB
WLF

RFW

RFW comments
were incorporated
into this final copy
of NRC's acknowledge-
ment of GAP's 2.206
Request. I told
NRR we (JGK)
concurred.

Warnick

"Release" NRR
2/14/85 (7p)

RFW
10/25/84

22B
~~5~~ 10/25/84 (7p)

A34
A3T
32
~~22B~~
~~5~~

FOIA-84-901
A34



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION III
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Docket No. STN 50-483

Mr. Louis Clark, Executive Director
Government Accountability Project
1555 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Suite 202
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Mr. Clark:

Subject: Acknowledgement of GAP Letter dated September 28, 1984, Requesting
Suspension of Low-Power License and Denial of Full-Power License
for Callaway Plant, Unit No. 1

On September 28, 1984, Ms. Michele Varricchio and Ms. Billie Garde of the Government Accountability Project (GAP) submitted a letter on behalf of the Concerned Citizens About Callaway which requested "immediate action" by the Commission to suspend the low-power operating license for Callaway Unit 1. In accordance with the Commission's usual practice, the request was referred to the staff for appropriate action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

The letter requested suspension of the low-power license pending an investigation of the allegations contained in the letter and completion of any necessary reinspections to determine the scope of identified problems. As a basis for this action, the letter points to, among other things, various alleged construction deficiencies related to welding, electrical cabling, concrete placement, poor construction drawings, undue pressure on quality control inspectors, and drug and alcohol abuse at the site. The NRC received the letter only a few days before the Commission's scheduled meeting on authorization of a full-power license for Callaway Unit 1. In preparing for that meeting, the staff reviewed the information contained in the letter and informed the Commission that the concerns raised by the letter did not warrant immediate action by the Commission to suspend the low-power license or stay issuance of a full-power license.

Several members of my staff along with personnel from the NRC Region III office and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement have reviewed the allegations. As a result of its evaluation, the staff has determined that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the low-power license should not be suspended and that the full-power license should be issued. (License NPF-30 granting full-power operation of the Callaway Plant, Unit 1 was issued to Union Electric Company on October 18, 1984.) The basis for the staff determination is:

- (1) several allegations were previously reviewed by the staff and closed, these are documented in reports;

- (2) many of the allegations identified areas where the allegor believed there was a concern; however, in all instances, the necessary requirements were met; and
- (3) allegations were too broad and, based on previous NRC and licensee inspections, evaluations, and reviews, no problems had been identified.

I would also note that with respect to quality assurance, including the adequacy of welding and concrete placement, this subject was a primary issue in the operating license proceeding for Callaway Unit 1. Both the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board concluded from the evidence on the record that there was no general breakdown in quality assurance procedures and that there was reasonable assurance that the Callaway plant could be operated safely. See LBP-82-109, 16 NRC 1826 (1982), aff'd, ASLB-740, 18 NRC 343 (1983).

Although no immediate action is warranted, the staff will continue to review the request and reach a final determination on it within a reasonable time in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. In that regard, your letter states that the allegations forming the basis for the request have been compiled from affidavits of former plant workers. These affidavits have been received by the staff and based on its review, the staff has determined that the affidavits, in general, do not provide any additional details concerning the allegations.

As I am sure you will agree, it is difficult for the staff to adequately assess the need for further action in the absence of the information which forms the basis for the request. Region III is prepared to meet with you and the allegors, whose identity will be protected where possible, to obtain factual information concerning the allegations. I suggest that a meeting be held with the NRC and GAP within the next week to discuss this proposal. The staff will contact you regarding such a meeting.

With respect to the letter dated October 17, 1984, also from Ms. Garde and Ms. Varricchio, GAP stated that the actions on the part of the staff in reviewing the allegations in the September 28, 1984 letter were hastily done and did not consider other available evidence. Additionally, GAP requested that it be given 14 days notice prior to issuance of the full-power operating license.

The staff decision to issue the full-power license was based on a review of the available information. At no time did the NRC treat the concerns in a hasty or haphazard manner; however, because of the lack of specifics in the allegations and affidavits, it is not possible for the staff to identify any areas where the allegations represent a valid safety concern. This conclusion is based on the reasons previously discussed.

Mr. Louis Clark

- 3 -

As noted earlier, the staff is prepared to meet with the allegers to ensure that all avenues of information are explored. By permitting the NRC to discuss the concerns directly with the allegers, GAP will be assured that a thorough review of the allegations has been performed. Otherwise, the staff has no basis to change the conclusions drawn above.

Finally, the staff was unable to give GAP the 14 days notice it requested since the full-power license was scheduled for issuance on October 18, 1984. Because the licensee had satisfied all of the restrictions prohibiting operating above 5% of rated power and had satisfactorily completed its low-power test program, a 14 day delay in issuing the license would not have been justified.

A copy of a notice being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication is enclosed for your information.

Sincerely,

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure: As stated

cc: See next page

DISTRIBUTION: (WITS ITEM 000004) CALLAWAY 2.206 Dated: _____

- Docket File
- NRC PDR
- L PDR
- NSIC
- EDO Reading
- WDircks
- JHolonich
- PO'Connor
- MRushbrook
- LB#1 R/F
- TNovak/Peggy
- MJambor/Marie
- OELD
- KBowman, #000004
- CMiles
- VYanez
- ASLP
- ASLAP
- ACRS (16)
- JKeppler

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. STN 50-483

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1

Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that by letter dated September 28, 1984, the Government Accountability Project, on behalf of Concerned Citizens About Callaway and others, has requested that the Commission suspend the low-power license for Callaway Unit 1 pending an investigation of the allegations set forth in the letter and the completion of any necessary reinspections of the plant as a result of problems identified during the investigation. The allegations concern primarily improper construction practices and other improper conduct by plant workers such as a drug or alcohol abuse on the site. The letter is being treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206 and, accordingly, the staff will take appropriate action on the request within a reasonable time.

A copy of the petitioner's letter is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555 and in the local public document room at Fulton City Library, 709 Market Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251 and at the Olin Library of Washington University, Skinker and Lindell Boulevards, St. Louis, Missouri 63130.

Dated in Bethesda, Maryland, this _____ day of _____ 1984.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. STN 50-483

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1

Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206

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Dated in Bethesda, Maryland, this _____ day of _____ 1984.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

DD:NRR
ECase
10/ /84

D:NRR
HDenton
10/ /84

LB#1:DL
JHolonich:kab
10/ /84

LB#1:DL
BJYoungblood
10/ /84

OELD
JLiberman
10/ /84

AD:L:DL
TNovak
10/ /84

D:DL
DEisenhut
10/ /84

RIII
JKeppler
10/ /84

October 26, 1984

Joe Holovich

John Niesler

- 1 84-45 Re-Inspection and re review.
No basis
- 2 84-45 Reinspected - Acceptable per
ASW code - No overgrinding
- 3 84-45 Inspected - bought as plate not
liner. Cut to fit not unusual
- 4 84-45 1984 version of code (ASME-318)
Do not paint or coat. Free of
oil, paint, etc. Rust desirable
- 5 84-45 Reinspection on welds in lower
part of 1 react building. Did
not substantiated allegation.
- 6 84-45 Inspected welds on unistruts.
spot inspections - adequate well
Condenser do not SR - not
inspected
- 7, 8 and training program
Procedures meet Section II
ASME and ASW⁰¹⁻¹ codes. Old
inspection report.

FOIA-84-90139
A35

Reviewed Failure rates -
1/3 welds rejected (some cases)

9A35
A34
A48

October 26, 1984

Not welding supervisor does not ^{certify} supervise. QC ~~is~~ certify

10

Same

11

Inspected welds in control building. Welding on hangers / supports acceptable. Temporary hangers during installation.

12

Codes permit rework. If heat treating procedures done properly. Procedures limited to only two reworks.

13

Same status. Reinspected welds. Found no problem.

14

Interviews - (Now & then) did not surface. Too strict.

15

One case of harassment. First aid records - no hand smashed by vibrator.

16

Site procedures permit work be done on item while waiting for A/E decision not affect part of component under A/E review.

17

No shortage Ratio (NRC report EDC report 6/21/82) Calloway among top ten. During CAT inspection area covered # of QC

October 20, 1984 inspectors 30+ in'tors / 2000-3000 workers
7.5%.

18 Reviewed records - Six types of cables I/E into notice. Three of six qualified. Remaining three in two year program. Location documented. If tests not passed will be replaced.

19 Closed in 84-30 (Status Same)

20 Some Status

21 ~~Re~~ Lockets removed inside cabinet. IEEE ^{I/E} reviewed method and is fine. Do not connect bleeder wires at both ends ⇒ circulating path.

22, 23 Status Same

24, 25 Hearings

26 Previous ~~CA~~ ^{and} allegation closed
Reviewed as a result
Inspection performed diesel
dux, containment.

27 Same

28 Same

October 26, 1984

29 Spill caused 6" depth of water.
No SR pipes or clamps at that elevation (a 10"-12" starts SR)

30 Need additional info

32 5005 show markings & errors.
Design specs do not be in center.
In only center 1/3.

31 No record of this happening.
No concrete columns except turbine pedestal.

33 Recent discussion Two boilmakers (Craft Union) say this was there was no undocumented work.

34 Test for ~~phosphates~~ (Holens not integrity of blankets via lab records.

35 Not complete

36 Reported to NRC and was ^{security incident / report (LER)} investigated and closed.

37, 38 MMP standard test in industry.
~~Not~~ Require screening but not psychological test 10 CFR 73.

October 26, 1984

- 39 Same
- 40, 41 End of 1993 Fewer electricians than at beginning. Not safety-related concern.
- 42 Interviews do not substantiate this.
- 43, 44 Not of safety concern
- 45 Same
- 46 Not safety concern
- 47 Pipes flushed ^{prior to start-up} clean. Interior of all components (where possible) were inspected. Flushing is documented. Pipe inspected prior to fitup by utility ^{NRC} per procedures
- 48 20% routine
As many as possible unannounced.
- Drug Terminations Do have ^{not} info and would result in violation of privacy act.



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555

K7-11
Taylor
File

November 7, 1984

Docket No. STN 50-483

PRINCIPAL STAFF	
RA	<i>DRS</i>
D/RA	DRS
RC	DRSS
PAO	ML
SGA	CL
EIC	OI
DRMA	FILE <i>File</i>

Ms. Billie Garde
Director of Citizens Clinic
Government Accountability Project
1555 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Suite 202
Washington, D. C. 20036

Dear Ms. Garde:

Subject: Acknowledgement of GAP Letter dated September 28, 1984, Requesting Suspension of Low-Power License and Denial of Full-Power License for Callaway Plant, Unit No. 1

On September 28, 1984, Ms. Michele Varricchio and yourself submitted a letter on behalf of the Concerned Citizens About Callaway which requested "immediate action" by the Commission to suspend the low-power operating license for Callaway Unit 1. In accordance with the Commission's usual practice, the request was referred to the staff for appropriate action pursuant to 10 CFR 2.206.

The letter requested suspension of the low-power license pending an investigation of the allegations contained in the letter and completion of any necessary reinspections to determine the scope of identified problems. As a basis for this action, the letter points to, among other things, various alleged construction deficiencies related to welding, electrical cabling, concrete placement, poor construction drawings, undue pressure on quality control inspectors, and drug and alcohol abuse at the site. The NRC received the letter only a few days before the Commission's scheduled meeting on authorization of a full-power license for Callaway Unit 1. In preparing for that meeting, the staff reviewed the information contained in the letter and informed the Commission that the concerns raised by the letter did not warrant immediate action by the Commission to suspend the low-power license or stay issuance of a full-power license.

Several members of my staff along with personnel from the NRC Region III office and the Office of Inspection and Enforcement have reviewed the allegations. As a result of its evaluation, the staff has determined that there is sufficient evidence to conclude that the low-power license should not be suspended and that the full-power license should be issued. (License NPF-30 granting full-power operation of the Callaway Plant, Unit 1 was issued to Union Electric Company on October 18, 1984.) The basis for the staff determination is:

- (1) several allegations were previously reviewed by the staff and closed; these are documented in reports;

A36
A32
27
6

84H160329
PDR/ARODL/SD 483 P

FOIA-BA-901
A36
NOV 15 1984

- (2) many of the allegations identified areas where the allegor believed there was a concern; however, in all such instances, the necessary requirements were met; and
- (3) several allegations were too broad and, based on previous NRC and licensee inspections, evaluations, and reviews, no problems had been identified.

I would also note that with respect to quality assurance, including the adequacy of welding and concrete placement, this subject was a primary issue in the operating license proceeding for Callaway Unit 1. Both the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board concluded from the evidence on the record that there was no general breakdown in quality assurance procedures and that there was reasonable assurance that the Callaway plant could be operated safely. See LBP-82-109, 16 NRC 1826 (1982), aff'd, ALAB-740, 18 NRC 343 (1983).

Although no immediate action is warranted, the staff will continue to review the request and reach a final determination on it within a reasonable time in accordance with 10 CFR 2.206. In that regard, your letter states that the allegations forming the basis for the request have been compiled from affidavits of former plant workers. These affidavits have been received by the staff and based on its review, the staff has determined that the affidavits, in general, do not provide any additional details concerning the allegations.

However, in the absence of more specific information supporting the petition, it is difficult to assess the need for further action. The NRC staff is prepared to meet with you and the allegors, whose identity will be protected where possible, to obtain factual information concerning the allegations.

With respect to the letter dated October 17, 1984, also from Ms. Varricchio and yourself, GAP stated that the actions on the part of the staff in reviewing the allegations in the September 28, 1984 letter were hastily done and did not consider other available evidence. Additionally, GAP requested that it be given 14 days notice prior to issuance of the full-power operating license.

At no time did the NRC treat the concerns in a hasty or haphazard manner. The staff decision to issue the full-power license was based on a review of available information. The information you submitted was not of sufficient specificity to cause the staff to change its position.

The staff was unable to give GAP the 14 days notice it requested since the full-power license was scheduled for issuance on October 18, 1984. The licensee had satisfied all of the restrictions prohibiting operation above 5% of rated power and had satisfactorily completed its low-power test program; therefore, a 14 day delay in issuing the license was not justified.

Ms. Billie Garde


- 3 -

November 7, 1984

As noted above, the staff is prepared to meet with the allegers to ensure that all avenues of information are explored. By permitting the NRC to discuss the concerns directly with the allegers, GAP will be assured that a thorough review of the allegations has been performed. Otherwise, the staff has no basis to change the conclusions drawn above. I suggest that a meeting be held with the NRC and GAP within the next week to discuss this proposal. The staff will contact you regarding such a meeting.

A copy of a notice being filed with the Office of the Federal Register for publication is enclosed for your information.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Harold R. Denton".

Harold R. Denton, Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Enclosure: As stated

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. STN 50-483

UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

CALLAWAY PLANT, UNIT 1


Request for Action Under 10 CFR 2.206

Notice is hereby given that by letter dated September 28, 1984, the Government Accountability Project, on behalf of Concerned Citizens About Callaway and others, has requested that the Commission suspend the low-power license for Callaway Unit 1 pending an investigation of the allegations set forth in the letter and the completion of any necessary reinspections of the plant as a result of problems identified during the investigation. The allegations concern primarily improper construction practices and other improper conduct by plant workers such as a drug or alcohol abuse on the site. The letter is being treated as a request for action under 10 CFR 2.206 and, accordingly, the staff will take appropriate action on the request within a reasonable time.

A copy of the petitioner's letter is available for public inspection in the Commission's Public Document Room at 1717 H Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. 20555 and in the local public document room at Fulton City Library, 709 Market Street, Fulton, Missouri 65251 and at the Olin Library of Washington University, Skinker and Lindell Boulevards, St. Louis, Missouri 63130.

Dated in Bethesda, Maryland, this 7th day of November 1984.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



Edson G. Case, Acting Director
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

841160341 Zpp


WITS ITEMS 000004 [acknowledgement letter (1st part)]
000060 (closes this item)

RLW - III

DISTRIBUTION: CALLAWAY 2.206 Dated: November 7, 1984
Docket File* (w/incoming)

NRC FDR*
L PDR* PRC System*
NSIC*
EDO Reading
WDircks
JHolonich
PO'Connor
MRushbrook
LB#1 R/F
TNovak/Peggy
MJambor/Marie
S. Burns, OELD
KBowman, #000004
CMiles
VYanez
ASLP
ASLAP
ACPS (16)
JKeppler
JRoe
TRehm 1/
VStello
RDeYoung
GCunningham

1/ note for T. Rehm from E. Case. -- This copy is being forwarded without prior discussion with you due to your absence.



UNION ELECTRIC COMPANY

1901 Gratiot Street, St. Louis

November 15, 1984

Donald F. Schnell
Vice President

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung, Director
Office of Inspection and Enforcement
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Dear Mr. DeYoung:

ULNRC- 976

INSPECTION REPORT NO. 50-483/84-36

This reply is in response to your letter of October 19, 1984 which transmitted the report of the inspection conducted at Callaway Plant, Unit 1 during the period of July 30 through August 3 and August 13-17, 1984. Our responses to the items of noncompliance are presented below in the order listed within the body of inspection report number 50-483/84-36.

None of the material in the inspection report or in this response is considered proprietary by Union Electric Company.

(50-483/84-36-01) SEVERITY LEVEL III VIOLATION (Civil Penalty)

Technical Specification 3.6.2.1 states, "Two independent Containment Spray Systems shall be OPERABLE with each Containment Spray System capable of taking suction from the RWST and transferring suction to the containment sump." This requirement is applicable for operational Modes 1, 2, 3, and 4.

Technical Specification 3.0.3 states, "When a Limiting Condition for Operation is not met, except as provided in the associated ACTION requirements, within 1 hour ACTION shall be initiated to place the unit in a MODE in which the specification does not apply by placing it, as applicable, in:

- a. At least HOT STANDBY within the next 6 hours,
- b. At least HOT SHUTDOWN within the following 6 hours, and
- c. At least COLD SHUTDOWN within the subsequent 24 hours.

FOIA-84-901
A37
NOV 19 1984

A37
A33

~~2411200320~~ 9 pp.

November 15, 1984

Contrary to the above, at 6:30 a.m. (CDT) on August 10, 1984, the licensee entered operational Mode 4 (hot shutdown) with Containment Spray manual isolation valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 closed and, therefore, with both Containment Spray Systems inoperable. The plant remained in Mode 4 with both valves closed until the closed valves were subsequently identified by the licensee and opened at 10:50 a.m. (CDT) on August 14, 1984.

Response

Admission or Denial of the Alleged Violation

As previously noted in Licensee Event Report 84-029-00 transmitted to the NRC September 10, 1984, Union Electric acknowledges the cited violations.

Reasons for the Violation If Admitted

The reasons for the violation were failure to follow procedures and orders and failure to recognize the interrelationships among administrative controls as listed below:

- o On May 7, 1984 Containment Spray manual isolation valves (EN-V014 and EN-V018) were closed, locked and tagged on Workman's Protection Assurance (WPA) 84-3252 to prevent inadvertent discharge into containment. At this time, the valves were not entered on the Equipment Out of Service Log (EOSL).
- o On May 9, 1984 valves EN-V014, EN-V018 and EN-V097 were noted as exceptions upon completion of OTN-EN-00001, but their status was not entered in the EOSL as required by Standing Order 84-24.
- o On August 3, 1984 in preparation for entering Mode 4 a review was made of WPA. WPA 84-3252 for valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 was not identified as being required for Mode 4.
- o On August 8, 1984 Temporary Change Notice (TCN) 84-945 to ODP-ZZ-00014 was executed to delete the sign-off requirement for the review of the EOSL, the WPA log review, and the Temporary Modification log review.
- o On August 10, 1984 Mode 4 was entered.
- o On August 14, 1984 WPA 84-3252 showing valves EN-V014 and EN-V018 closed was found. These valves were subsequently opened, locked and independently verified.

Corrective Actions Taken And The Results Achieved

On August 14, 1984 upon discovery of the Containment Spray Manual Isolation valves being locked closed, the valves were immediately opened, locked, and independently verified. Also when the EOSL was found to be out of date, immediate reviews of the Surveillance Master Tracking log, outstanding Work Requests, outstanding WPA, and outstanding Temporary Modifications were initiated against the EOSL to bring it up to date. These reviews were completed and the EOSL brought up to date on August 20, 1984. The individuals responsible for not entering EN-V014 and EN-V018 in the EOSL were counseled by August 30, 1984.

The Plant Manager and/or the Assistant Plant Managers held a series of meetings with plant staff and support personnel. The purpose of these meetings was to re-emphasize management's determination to ensure compliance with Callaway operating procedures and Technical Specifications to all levels of the work force, highlight the recent Callaway events, and stress the necessity for improving individual performance, group performance, and communication. These meetings were completed September 7, 1984.

In addition, on August 20, 1984 the content of Standing Order 84-24 was incorporated into ODP-ZZ-00002, Equipment Status Control, and APA-ZZ-00310, Workman's Protection Assurance.

And finally, on August 15, 1984 TCN 84-945, which removed the requirement for review of EOSL, WPA, and Temporary Modifications, was eliminated by a revision to procedure ODP-ZZ-00014, Operational Mode Change Requirements. This revision also included the requirement to do the same reviews for all mode ascensions. It previously applied to the change from Mode 5 to Mode 4 only. The individuals who initiated TCN 84-945 were counseled on August 17, 1984 and August 19, 1984. They had been aware of the limitations imposed on temporary changes and had not intended the TCN to delete the reviews of the EOSL, WPA, and Temporary Modifications. They had intended only to delete what they believed to be redundant documentation of the reviews. As an added precaution, a letter was issued on August 18, 1984 to Nuclear Operations personnel and contractors emphasizing the limitations on the use of temporary changes.

Corrective Actions To Be Taken To Avoid Further Violations

No further corrective action is considered necessary.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

Union Electric achieved full compliance September 7, 1984.

Proposed Civil Penalty

Union Electric acknowledges the cited violation and appreciates the reduction in the amount of civil penalty from the base amount. However, we feel there are additional circumstances which may not have been considered and should result in complete mitigation of the penalty.

The subject Severity Level III Violation is the only Severity Level III Violation Union Electric has received. This incident regarding the containment spray valves is the first and only incident of that nature to have occurred at Callaway.

The Commission's General Policy and Procedures for Enforcement Actions provide that civil penalties "are considered for Severity Level III Violations." In contrast, the Policy is to impose civil penalties for Severity Level I Violations and to impose civil penalties "absent mitigating circumstances" for Severity Level II Violations (10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.B.). More specifically, the Commission's Policy indicates that a civil penalty may be considered appropriate for the second and subsequent Severity Level III Violations of a "similar" nature (10 C.F.R. Part 2, Appendix C, Section V.D., Table 2). In making the most recent change to Table 2, the Commission stated: "Table 2 has been changed to indicate that a civil penalty might not be imposed for the first Severity Level III Violation in an area of concern" 49 Fed. Reg. 8586 (March 8, 1984).

In addition, 10CFR2, Appendix C, V.B.1., 2. and 3. provide reductions of civil penalties of 50%, 50% and 100% respectively for prompt identification and reporting, corrective action to prevent recurrence, and good prior performance. We feel that the Callaway Plant staff took timely action regarding identification, reporting and corrective action and has demonstrated good prior performance.

For these reasons, Union Electric Company believes that the proposed penalty should be reduced by 100% rather than only 50% and we request your reconsideration of these factors. Nevertheless, if your position is that these factors do not justify a further reduction in the penalty, the proposed penalty of \$25,000 will be paid and we will not further contest it. Please advise us of your decision.

50-483/84-36-03) SEVERITY LEVEL IV VIOLATION

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix B, Criterion XVI, Corrective Action, states in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality, such as failures, malfunctions, deficiencies, deviations, defective material and equipment, and nonconformance are promptly identified and corrected..."

November 15, 1984

The Callaway Plant FSAR, Section 17.2.16, states in part, "Measures shall be established to assure that conditions adverse to quality are promptly identified, reported, and corrected..."

Contrary to the above, adequate measures were not established to assure that conditions adverse to quality were promptly identified and corrected in that a deficient Bechtel design drawing resulted in a card associated with bistable 456B being installed incorrectly. Although this condition existed since November 1983, it was not detected during preoperational testing and the licensee did not become aware of it until this condition caused an inadvertent safety injection which occurred on August 13, 1984 when bistable 456B was tripped during a loop calibration surveillance procedure. Additionally, the trip status of 456B was unknown because the indicator light for it on the Partial Trip Status Panel located in the Control Room was burned out. Work Request No. 30748 to relamp the Partial Trip Status Panel was authorized on July 28, 1984, with a requested completion date of August 1, 1984, although the work was not accomplished until August 13, 1984, after the inadvertent safety injection occurred.

Response

Corrective Action Taken And The Results Achieved

The circumstances regarding this item were reported to the NRC by Licensee Event Report (LER) 50-483/84-028-00 transmitted to the NRC September 11, 1984.

As stated in the LER, three of the four instrument channels that monitor RCS pressure feed a permissive circuit (P-11) which permits blocking of the Pressurizer Low Pressure/Steamline Low Pressure Safety Injection (SI) signals at low RCS pressures. Prior to this event, P-11 was in the "BLOCK" mode as the plant was in Mode 4 and at low RCS pressure. Also, one of the three pressure loops (Loop 456) that make up the 2 out of 3 coincidence logic for P-11 was failed in the tripped state due to incorrect strapping on the associated bistable. This design error caused the bistable to provide a tripped output when plant conditions did not require it. This trip went undetected due to failed lamps on the associated window of the Partial Trip Status Panel. Also, the initial surveillance tests had not yet been performed on any of these pressure loops prior to this event. Thus, when the pressure loop (Loop 455) being calibrated was placed in test, the required 2 out of 3 coincidence for P-11 was satisfied, the block of the SI signal was automatically reset and the Pressurizer Low Pressure SI signal initiated.

Mr. Richard C. DeYoung

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The failed lamps in the Partial Trip Status Panel have been replaced and the bistable that resets P-11 on Loop 456 has been corrected to prevent the false output. A step was added to procedure ISL-BB-0P455 on August 21, 1984 to require a lamp test on the Partial Trip Status Panel prior to putting an instrument channel in the test mode.

Corrective Action To Be Taken To Avoid Further Noncompliance


A step similar to the one added to ISL-BB-0P455 is being added to other applicable Instrumentation and Control procedures.

Date When Full Compliance Will Be Achieved

Procedure revisions are expected to be completed by December 7, 1984.

If you have any questions regarding this response or if additional information is required, please let us know.

Very truly yours,



Donald F. Schnell

SEM/JRV/bjk

cc: James G. Keppler, Regional Administrator, NRC Region III
W. L. Forney, NRC Region III
NRC Resident Inspectors, Callaway Plant (2)
Missouri Public Service Commission

STATE OF MISSOURI)
) S S
CITY OF ST. LOUIS)

Donald F. Schnell, of lawful age, being first duly sworn upon oath says that he is Vice President-Nuclear and an officer of Union Electric Company; that he has read the foregoing document and knows the content thereof; that he has executed the same for and on behalf of said company with full power and authority to do so; and that the facts therein stated are true and correct to the best of his knowledge, information and belief.

By Donald F. Schnell
Donald F. Schnell
Vice President
Nuclear

SUBSCRIBED and sworn to before me this 15th day of November, 1984.

Barbara J. Pfaff
BARBARA J. PFAFF
NOTARY PUBLIC, STATE OF MISSOURI
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES APRIL 22, 1985
ST. LOUIS COUNTY

Bill Forney
 Frank Moraglio
 Jim Fishman
 Tom Stevens
 GAP
 Albi-Garcia
 Michelle Desnick

NRR - RIII - GAP

11/30/84
 1030

CALLAWAY GAP Allegations Mtg

Purpose: Try to elicit additional information of a specific nature.

Didn't like the last inspection report
 Feels we did an inadequate job. (84-30)
 "A Bunch of CRAP"

"HOSTILE TO THE WHOLE IDEA"

STILL THINK WE NEED TO LEARN INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
 NEED TO HAVE MORE PPT-TO-BACK MTGS WITH AUSEBA
 NEED TO DO BETTER JOB OF CHARACTERIZING ALLEGATIONS
 FEELS WE SHOULD HAVE FOLLOW-UP MTG WITH AUSEBA
 ON FINDINGS BEFORE REPORT ISSUED.

E&F Which ones have safety significance

Grounds Rules for Meeting with AUSEBA

1. Would like us to identify which ones we think are safety sig (including the ones in the report)
2. All but 2 will meet with NRC/GAP if we have specifics (Want AUSEBA)
3. Want prior notice of questions/Time/Place (2 weeks)
4. Would like us to re-look @ Home E&F FOIA-84-901
5. Characterization of allegation as it will be written in the I.R. **A38 25**
6. In-Process feedback (Goal is to have NRC direct contact)

A38
 A34

NRR - RIII - CAP (cont) 11/30

- 7. Desires findings with the Allegor before issuing the IR.
 - 8. Confidentiality
 - 9. Colombia / Court Records / Guy to get a copy of Transcript
- Note: Guy's copy was not stamped "Confidential"

Drug Issue - what have we done ???

IR 34-30 told Billie-Ganda to write us a letter about what they don't like / or have the guys interview with us.