

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)

Turkey Point Unit 4

DOCKET NUMBER (2)

05000251

PAGE 13

1 OF 02

TITLE (4)

Inadvertent Relay Actuation During Inspection Causes Phase A Containment Isolation Actuation

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)			
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)		
0	9	0	8	8	6	8	6	0	2	2	N/A	050000
0	9	0	8	8	6	8	6	0	2	2	N/A	050000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 5. (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9)	1	20.402(b)	20.408(a)	90.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10)	0, 2, 9	20.408(a)(1)(i)	90.38(a)(1)	90.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(a)
		20.408(a)(1)(ii)	90.38(a)(2)	90.73(a)(2)(vi)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.408(a)(1)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(i)	90.73(a)(2)(vii)(A)	
		20.408(a)(1)(iv)	90.73(a)(2)(ii)	90.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)	
		20.408(a)(1)(v)	90.73(a)(2)(iii)	90.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
G. Salamon, Compliance Engineer	AREA CODE 305 246-1300

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

Event:

On September 8, 1986, at 1020, with Unit 4 at 29% power, Phase A Containment Isolation (CI) of train B was actuated. At the time of the actuation, operations personnel were checking the status of the train B lights in safeguards rack 44. At the conclusion of the light check, in order to facilitate closing the safeguards rack door, a wire bundle was moved. While it was being moved, it inadvertently came in contact with relay SIA2. The jarring, due to the inadvertent contact, actuated train B Phase A CI. Upon actuation, the valves required to close did close, or were either already closed or de-energized per plant status. After determining that containment conditions did not warrant Phase A isolation, train B of Phase A CI was reset.

Cause of event:

The cause of the Phase A CI was personnel error and wire bundle/relay interference. The location and length of the wire bundle, along with the location of relay SIA2, requires more than the usual amount of caution to be exercised upon closing of the door. The inadvertent contact of the wire bundle with relay SIA2 resulted from not recognizing the need for extra care when the door was being closed.

Corrective action:

- 1) Upon confirming that containment conditions did not warrant Phase A CI, the Phase A CI actuation signal was reset, and the valves which had closed were reopened.
- 2) A Request for Technical Assistance was written in order to resolve the wire bundle/relay interference using engineering direction.
- 3) The technicians on the job were rebriefed on the proper precautions to be taken to prevent inadvertent actuation of the relays.

JE22
11

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (8)			PAGE (3)	
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
Turkey Point Unit 4	05000251	86	022	00	02	OF 02

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

Event:

On September 8, 1986, at 1020, with Unit 4 at 29% power, Phase A Containment Isolation (CI) of train B was actuated. At the time of the actuation, operations personnel were checking the status of the train B lights in safeguards rack 44. At the conclusion of the light check, in order to facilitate closing the safeguards rack door, a wire bundle was moved. While it was being moved, it inadvertently came in contact with relay SIA2. The jarring, due to the inadvertent contact, actuated train B Phase A CI. Upon actuation, the valves required to close did close, or were either already closed or de-energized per plant status. After determining that containment conditions did not warrant Phase A isolation, train B of Phase A CI was reset.

Cause of event:

The cause of the Phase A CI was personnel error and wire bundle/relay interference. The location and length of the wire bundle, along with the location of relay SIA2, requires more than the usual amount of caution to be exercised upon closing of the door. The inadvertent contact of the wire bundle with relay SIA2 resulted from not recognizing the need for extra care when the door was being closed.

Analysis of event:

At the time of the Phase A CI's the unit was at 29% power. The Phase A CI actuation signals were generated by the making up of relay SIA2. Certain valves were already closed prior to the CI actuation, and others were de-energized, per plant status. The remaining valves closed, as designed. Based on the above, the health and safety of the public were not affected.

Corrective action:

- 1) Upon confirming that containment conditions did not warrant Phase A CI, the Phase A CI actuation signal was reset, and the valves which had closed were reopened.
- 2) A Request for Technical Assistance was written in order to resolve the wire bundle/relay interference using engineering direction.
- 3) The technicians on the job were rebriefed on the proper precautions to be taken to prevent inadvertent actuation of the relays.

Additional Details: Similar Occurrences: LER 251-86-004, 251-86-005, 251-86-013.



OCTOBER 08 1986

L-86-414


U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Re: Reportable Event 86-22
Turkey Point Unit 4
Date of Event: September 8, 1986
Inadvertent Relay Actuation During Inspection
Causes Phase A Containment Isolation Actuation

The attached Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirement of 10 CFR to provide notification of the subject event.

Very truly yours,


C. O. Woody
Group Vice President
Nuclear Energy

CGW/RG/gp

Attachment

cc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Region II, USNRC
Harold F. Reis, Esquire

IE22
1/1