

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Hope Creek Generating Station DOCKET NUMBER (2) 05000354 PAGE (3) 1 OF 013

TITLE (4) Missed Response Time Surveillance Due to Procedure Inadequacy

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
08	01	86	86	049	000	08	29	86			050000
											050000

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 2	20.402(b)	20.406(e)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0102	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.38(a)(1)	* 50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.38(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
	20.406(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
	20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
	20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Karen M. Head, Technical Staff Engineer TELEPHONE NUMBER 6109 31319-15121319

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15) MONTH DAY YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On August 1, 1986, inadequacies in the I&C and Technical isolation instrumentation response time procedures were discovered as the I&C procedure was reviewed and revised. The procedures neglected to include the automatic isolation relays for Reactor Recirculation Water System valves BB-SV-4310 and 4311 as is required by the Technical Specifications. These valves were not addressed in a previous revision or in the Operations procedure. As a result the surveillance requirements were not current. The procedures were immediately revised to include the missing logic and the surveillance was reperformed. The limiting conditions for operation were not exceeded since the response times after the retest were 0.22 and 0.42 seconds for the isolation instrumentation including BB-SV-4310 and 4311 respectively. Since the Technical Specifications state that the times are to be less than thirteen seconds, the response was within the requirements.

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TEXT (if more space is required, use additional NRC Form 388A's) (17)

PLANT AND SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION

General Electric - Boiling Water Reactor
Containment Isolation Control System (EIS Designation: JM)

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

Technical Specification Surveillance Procedures Inadequacies Prohibit Surveillance Requirements From Being Current
Discovery Date: 08/01/86
Date of Non Compliance: 06/28/86
This LER is initiated by Incident Report 86-156.

BACKGROUND

Technical Specification 4.3.2.3 requires that the ISOLATION SYSTEM RESPONSE TIME of the isolation trip function for the Main Steam Line Radiation - High High be demonstrated to be within its limits at least once per eighteen months. This requirement is imposed for Operational Conditions 1,2 and 3 and therefore the surveillances are required to be current in these conditions. If the surveillances are not completed, the channel is to be declared inoperable and the appropriate action statements entered. In addition, the Technical Specifications specify the valve actuation groups in which the tests are to be performed. For all main steam line isolation trip functions, Group 1 primary containment isolation valves are to be included in the response time testing. For the Main Steam Line Radiation - High High trip function, however, Group 2 valves are also required. Group 2 consists of valves BB-SV-4310 and BB-SV-4311.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

On August 1, 1986, an inadequacy in an I&C procedure was discovered as it was reviewed and revised. The procedure neglected to include the automatic isolation relays for Reactor Recirculation Water Sample System valves BB-SV-4310 and BB-SV-4311. These relays had not been included in previous revisions nor were they addressed in the Operations Department procedure or the Technical Department procedure. The I&C procedure, Operations procedure are combined by the Technical procedure to satisfy the response time test requirement. Since this surveillance is required in Operational Conditions 1,2 and 3 and the plant had operated in these conditions this incident is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i)(B).

APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The root cause of this incident is procedural inadequacy in neglecting the Group 2 valves.

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 365A's) (17)

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE

I&C and Operations test procedures measure the response time of different parts of the circuit. The Technical procedure is then a summing of those parts to determine the total system response time. The I&C procedure and the Technical procedure should have contained the relays pertaining to the Group 2 valves as was realized during the I&C revision review. Since this testing was missed in the procedure, the system response time was incomplete and the channels were technically inoperable.


After revising the procedures, surveillance testing was performed to satisfy the Technical Specification requirements. The valve stroke time and the instrumentation response time were measured. The instrumentation response time including BB-SV-4310 and 4311 was 0.22 and 0.42 seconds respectively. The Technical Specifications require the response times to be less than thirteen seconds and therefore it can be concluded that the times did not exceed the requirements.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

The corrective actions required to resolve this incident involved I&C, Operations and Technical. I&C procedures were revised to incorporate a portion of the missed logic, while the Operations procedure was changed to include the remaining part of the logic. The Technical procedure was then revised to combine the "pieces" of the missed logic. The surveillance test was performed successfully.

This incident posed no threat to the public health and safety.

Sincerely,



R. S. Salvesen
General Manager -
Hope Creek Operations

KMH:tlb

SORC Mtg. 86- 217



PSEG

Public Service Electric and Gas Company P. O. Box A Hancocks Bridge, New Jersey 08038

Hope Creek Generating Station

August 29, 1986

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

HOPE CREEK GENERATING STATION
DOCKET NO. 50-354
UNIT NO. 1
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT 86-049-00

This Licensee Event Report is being submitted pursuant to the requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(i).

Sincerely yours,

R. S. Salvesen
General Manager
Hope Creek Operations

KMH:tlb

SORC Mtg. 86-217
Attachment

C Distribution

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