

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) McGuire Nuclear Station - Unit 2	DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 3 7 0	PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 4
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TITLE (4)  
Fire Watch Patrols Were Not Performed Due To A Personnel Error

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0	2	13	8	6	00	0	0	4			0 5 0 0 0
											0 5 0 0 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)

OPERATING MODE (9) 6	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
POWER LEVEL (10) 0 0 0	20.406(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
	20.406(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.406(a)(1)(iii)	XX 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)		
20.406(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)(B)		
20.406(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)		

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME Julio G. Torre, Licensing	TELEPHONE NUMBER
	AREA CODE: 7 0 4 3 7 3 - 1 8 0 2 1 9

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NRPDS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

<input type="checkbox"/> YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 26, 1986, it was discovered that required fire barrier watch patrols in the Unit 2 cable room were not performed from February 13, 1986 through March 26, 1986. Hourly patrols had been instituted on February 6, 1986 in response to Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.7.11 when fire retardant material was removed from a penetration in the floor of the Unit 2 cable room. The fire retardant material was removed from the penetration to route cables through the floor to a new cabinet installed for the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor system.

Unit 2 was in Mode 6, Refueling, at the time of the discovery.

This incident is attributed to a Personnel Error due to the incorrect declaration of the penetration as operable by an unidentified individual.

Hourly fire barrier watch patrols for the subject penetration were resumed by Security personnel on March 26, 1986, at 1257, and were maintained until the fire penetration was declared operable on April 5, 1986, at 1930.

The fire zone detectors in the subject area were operable during the time the fire watch patrols were missed. No fires occurred in the subject area while the fire watch patrols were not performed.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER		
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 26, 1986, it was discovered that required fire barrier watch patrols in the Unit 2 cable room were not performed from February 13, 1986 through March 26, 1986. Hourly patrols had been instituted on February 6, 1986 in response to Technical Specification (T.S.) 3.7.11 when fire retardant material was removed from a penetration in the floor of the Unit 2 cable room. The fire retardant material was removed from the penetration to route cables through the floor to a new cabinet installed for the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitor system.

Unit 2 was in Mode 6, Refueling, at the time of the discovery.

This incident is attributed to a Personnel Error due to the incorrect declaration of the penetration as operable by an unidentified individual.

BACKGROUND:

McGuire Nuclear Station Technical Specification 3.7.11 requires all fire barrier penetrations (walls, floor/ceilings, cable tray enclosures, and other fire barriers) separating safety-related fire areas or separating portions of redundant systems important to safe shutdown within a fire area and all sealing devices in fire rated assembly penetrations (fire doors, fire windows, fire dampers, cable piping, and ventilation duct penetration seals) to be operable at all times. With one of the required fire barrier penetrations and/or sealing devices inoperable either: 1) a continuous fire watch must be established within 1 hour, or 2) the fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable assembly must be verified operable and an hourly fire watch patrol established.

The installation of the Inadequate Core Cooling Monitoring system is covered by a Nuclear Station Modification (NSM). The NSM required the installation of two cabinets in the Unit 2 cable room located in the auxiliary building on 750' elevation. Cables for these cabinets were routed through the bottom of the cabinet and through a penetration in the floor to their required destinations. The penetration through the floor is identified as no. 2-750-101-02.

Hourly Fire Barrier Patrol tags are used to log hourly inspections of inoperable fire barriers. The back of the tag contains blanks for the date and time of the inspection and initials of the individual performing the inspection. There are 48 entry blanks on each tag and another tag is used when the previous tag is full of entries.

DESCRIPTION OF EVENT:

During the planning of the installation of the subject NSM, discussions were made among the responsible personnel to determine who would provide the required fire watch during the job. Personnel representing the contracted security organization at McGuire (Southern Security) stated that a security post would be required for the job and therefore, Security personnel agreed to take responsibility for the fire watch. Implementation of the NSM began on February 6, 1986, and the fire retardant material was removed from a portion of the penetration at 0917. The penetration was declared inoperable, and continuous

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		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

fire watch was started at 0917 by Security personnel. The fire watch was changed to an hourly watch patrol after Security personnel determined a security post was not required. Work continued, and the fire penetration was left open (inoperable) to facilitate the required work.

Although the penetration was not yet closed because work was still in progress, penetration no. 2-750-101-02 was logged operable in the Technical Specification Action Item Logbook (TSAIL) on February 12, at 1205. The identity of the personnel who verified the penetration operable could not be determined by the initials in the TSAIL. Security personnel performing the fire watch were unaware of the entry in the logbook, and the fire watch patrol continued until the entry blanks on the fourth fire watch tag were completed. The Security personnel performing the fire watch patrol requested the issuance of a new tag, but the Station personnel responsible for the issuance of fire watch tags checked the TSAIL and notified the Security personnel that the fire penetration had been declared operable and that no additional fire watch patrols were necessary. Security personnel subsequently terminated the fire watch patrol at 2244 on February 13. Work to pull cable through the penetration continued while it remained inoperable.

On March 26, 1986, Station personnel checked the progress of work for the subject NSM by visually inspecting the job site. It was observed at this time that no fire watch was in progress and Security personnel were asked whether the fire watch was still being performed. After an investigation, Security personnel determined the fire watch had been terminated. The penetration was declared inoperable at 1256. The fire watch patrol for the penetration was resumed by Security personnel at this time.

Work requiring the open fire penetration continued until April 4, 1986. The penetration was then sealed in accordance with the appropriate procedure - Initial Penetration and Penetration Repairs. The penetration was declared operable on April 5, at 1930, and the fire watch patrol was terminated.

CONCLUSION:

The reason penetration no. 2-750-101-02 was declared operable in the TSAIL could not be determined. The Station personnel responsible for initiating the entry in the TSAIL beside the initials of the unidentified individual could not identify the individual by name, but recalled that the individual had the proper work request documentation in hand and stated the penetration was operable. The initials recorded in the TSAIL were not clearly legible and do not identify any personnel associated with the job.

The fire barrier watch tag showed hourly patrols were performed for about one day past the date and time the penetration was first declared operable in the TSAIL. Patrol times were recorded until the tag was full (all blanks completed). The time and date recorded on the front of the tags (time and date the fire watch ended) indicated the watch was terminated approximately 10 hours after the last tag entry.

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		8 6	0 0 5	0 0	0 4	OF	0 4

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 368A's) (17)

Due to the fact that the penetration was not closed until April 4, 1986, the entry in the TSAIL did not properly reflect the operability of the penetration. This incident is attributed to a Personnel Error due to the incorrect entry on the TSAIL which caused the fire watch patrol to be discontinued.

A review of past reports revealed no similar incidents. Therefore, this incident is considered an isolated occurrence.

There were no personnel injuries, radiation overexposures, or releases of radioactive materials as a result of this incident.

CORRECTIVE ACTION:

- Subsequent:
- 1) An hourly fire watch patrol was initiated and performed by Security personnel from March 26, 1986 through April 5, 1986.
  - 2) The penetration fire barrier was repaired in accordance with the Initial Penetration and Penetration Repair procedure.

SAFETY ANALYSIS:

During the time period the fire watch patrols were not performed in the cable room, other Security personnel performed fire door inspections in the area which required entry into the subject room. Additionally, station personnel were working 6 days per week and 8-10 hours per day in the room and would have been able to identify any fire in the area while on their job.

The fire zone detectors in the area were operable during the time the fire watch patrols were missed and would have been able to detect any fire in the area. No fires occurred in the subject area while the fire watch patrols were not performed.

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

DUKE POWER COMPANY

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HAL B. TUCKER

VICE PRESIDENT  
NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

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April 24, 1986

Document Control Desk


U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission  
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: McGuire Nuclear Station, Unit 2  
Docket No. 50-370  
LER 370-86-05

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Sections (a)(2)(i)(B), attached is Licensee Event Report 370-86-05 concerning Missed Fire Watch Patrols Due to a Personnel Error at McGuire Unit 2. This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,



Hal B. Tucker

JGT/jgm

Attachment

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