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Energy to Serve Your World™

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Docket Nos. 50-321
50-366

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Annual Operating Report for 1997

Gentlemen:

Enclosed is the 1997 Annual Operating Report for Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Unit 1, Docket No. 50-321, and Unit 2, Docket No. 50-366. This report is submitted in accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59(b)(2) and Regulatory Guide 1.16.

Sincerely,

H. L. Sumner, Jr.

IFL/eb

Enclosure: 1997 Annual Operating Report for Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2

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ENCLOSURE

EDWIN I. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT - UNITS 1 AND 2
NRC Docket Nos. 50-321 and 50-366
Operating Licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5

ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT
1997

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GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ABN	as-built notice
AC	air conditioning
ADS	automatic depressurization system
AHU	air handling unit
ALARA	as low as reasonably achievable
APLHGR	average power linear heat generation rate
APRM	average power range monitor
ARI	alternate rod insertion
ARTS	average power range monitor, rod block monitor, and Technical Specifications
ASME	American Society of Mechanical Engineers
ATWS	anticipated transient without scram
ATWS-RPT	anticipated transient without scram-recirculation pump trip
BHD	bottom head drain
BOP	balance of plant
BWR	boiling water reactor
BWROG	Boiling Water Reactor Owners Group
CFR	Code of Federal Regulations
COLR	Core Operating Limits Report
CRD	control rod drive
CS	core spray
CST	condensate storage tank
DAS	data acquisition system
DBA	design basis accident
DBE	design basis earthquake
DCB	double cantilever beam
DCR	design change request
DHR	decay heat removal
dP	differential pressure
DoCR	Document Change Request
ECCS	emergency core cooling system
ECP	electrochemical potential
EDG	emergency diesel generator
EFCV	excess flow check valve
EFPD	effective full power days
EFPH	effective full power hours
EHC	electrohydraulic control
ELI	Equipment Location Index
EMI/RFI	electromagnetic interference/radiofrequency interference
EOC-RPT	end-of-cycle-recirculation pump trip

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
FHA	Fire Hazards Analysis
FPC	fuel pool cooling
FSAR	Final Safety Analysis Report
GE	General Electric
GL	Generic Letter
GPC	Georgia Power Company
HCU	hydraulic control unit
HNP	Hatch Nuclear Plant
HPCI	high pressure coolant injection
HVAC	heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning
HWC	hydrogen water chemistry
I&C	instrumentation and control
IE	inspection and enforcement
IGSCC	intergranular stress corrosion cracking
ILRT	integrated leak rate test
IRM	intermediate range monitor
ISI	inservice inspection
IST	inservice testing
LCO	limiting condition for operation
LDS	leak detection system
LLRT	local leak rate test
LLS	low-low set
LOCA	loss of coolant accident
LOSP	loss of offsite power
LPAP	low power alarm point
LPCI	low pressure coolant injection
LPM	loose-parts monitor
LPRM	local power range monitor
LPSP	low power setpoint
MCC	motor control center
MCPR	minimum critical power ratio
MCR	main control room
MCRECS	main control room environmental control system
MDC	minor design change
MOV	motor-operated valve

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

MPL	master parts list
MSIV	main steam isolation valve
MSL	main steam line
MSLRM	main steam line radiation monitor
MSR	moisture separator reheater
NMA	noble metals addition
NPSH	net positive suction head
NRC	Nuclear Regulatory Commission
NSSS	nuclear steam supply system
ODCM	Offsite Dose Calculation Manual
OPDRV	operations with the potential to drain the reactor vessel
OPRM	oscillation power range monitor
PAM	post accident monitoring
PASS	post accident sampling system
PCIS	primary containment isolation system
PCIV	primary containment isolation valve
P&ID	pipng and instrumentation diagram
PRB	Plant Review Board
PRNM	power range neutron monitor
PSW	plant service water
P/T	pressure/temperature
QA	quality assurance
RBM	rod block monitor
RCIC	reactor core isolation cooling
RCPB	reactor coolant pressure boundary
RCS	reactor coolant system
REA	Request For Engineering Assistance
RES	Request For Engineering Services
RFP	reactor feed pump
RFPT	reactor feed pump turbine
RG	Regulatory Guide
RHR	residual heat removal
RHRSW	residual heat removal service water
RMCS	reactor manual control system
RPS	reactor protection system
RPT	recirculation pump trip
RPV	reactor pressure vessel
RRS	reactor recirculation system

GLOSSARY

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

RSCS	rod sequence control system
RWCU or RWC	reactor water cleanup
RWCS	reactor water cleanup system
RWE	rod withdrawal error
RWM	rod worth minimizer
SAER	Safety Audit and Engineering Review
SAT	station auxiliary transformer
SBGT or SGTS or SGT	standby gas treatment
SCM	stress corrosion monitor
SDC	setpoint design change
SED	System Evaluation Document
SJAE	steam jet air ejector
SLMCPR	safety limit minimum critical power ratio
SNC	Southern Nuclear Operating Company
SRB	Safety Review Board
SR	Surveillance Requirement
SRM	source range monitor
SRV	safety relief valve
SSC	system, structure, or component
TBWD	thrust bearing wear detector
TCV	turbine control valve
THV	torus hardened vent
TIL	Technical Information Letter
TIP	traversing incore probe
TLD	thermoluminescent dosimeter
TRM	Technical Requirements Manual
TSV	turbine stop valve

INTRODUCTION

The Edwin I Hatch Nuclear Plant is a two-unit facility located approximately 11 miles north of Baxley, Georgia, on U.S. Highway 1. The plant consists of two light water reactors. Unit 1 and Unit 2 are each currently licensed to operate at 2558 MWt. The maximum dependable capacity for 1997 on Unit 1 was 800 net MWe. The maximum dependable capacity for 1997 on Unit 2 was 818 net MWe. General Electric furnished the boiling water reactor, the nuclear steam supply system, the turbine, and the generator for both units. The plant was designed by Southern Company Services, Inc., with assistance provided by Bechtel Power Corporation. The condenser cooling method employs induced-draft cooling towers and recirculating water systems with normal makeup supplies drawn from the Altamaha River.

The plant is a co-owned facility with ownership delegated as follows:

Georgia Power Company	50.1%
Oglethorpe Electric Membership Cooperative	30.0%
Municipal Electrical Authority of Georgia	17.7%
City of Dalton, Georgia	2.2%

Licensing information for the units is as follows:

	<u>Unit 1</u>	<u>Unit 2</u>
Docket Number	50-321	50-366
License Issued	08/06/74 (DPR-57)	06/13/78 (NPF-5)
Initial Criticality	09/12/74	07/04/78
Initial Synchronization	11/11/74	09/22/78
Commercial Operation	12/31/75	09/05/79

Southern Nuclear Operating Company has sole responsibility for overall planning, design, construction, operation, maintenance, and disposal of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant.

10 CFR 50.59 SUMMARIES FOR 1997

UNIT 1/COMMON AS-BUILT NOTICES

96-0064, Rev. 0

This change revises sheet 4 of the service water piping P&ID (H-11611) to eliminate an inadequate reference flag and replace it with the actual depiction of the piping running directly from the hydrogen coolers to the Alterex cooler. This change is for clarification purposes only and does not modify the function or operation of this system.

The hydrogen coolers (1N43B003A & B) and the associated service water piping (P41) located in the turbine building are not safety related. This change to the P&ID does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the service water system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0073, Rev. 0

This change replaces the MCR emergency cooling isolation valve 1P41-F110 to eliminate leakage. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system.

The 1P41-F110 valve is safety related. The replacement of this valve has no adverse effect on the MCR emergency cooling system. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0110, Rev. 0

This change adds existing valve 1P41-F3054 to the reactor building service water system P&ID to correct an oversight and bring the P&ID into conformance with actual plant design as depicted on piping drawing H-16094 and on isometric drawings S-00581 and S-03226. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system since it is an editorial change to a design document.

The 1P41-F3054 valve is a safety-related valve since the reactor building PSW system is a safety-related system. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the reactor building PSW system or any other safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 1/COMMON AS-BUILT NOTICES

96-0133, Rev. 0, and 96-0130

ABN 96-0133 revised the CRD system P&ID (H-16065), and ABN 96-130 revised the isometric drawings H-16938 and S-01121 to depict existing flanges for valve 1C11-F012 to bring these drawings into conformance with the as-found condition and ISI boundary diagram HB-16065. This is not a change to the CRD system since the flanges are installed to meet applicable design codes. This change does not modify the function or the operation of this system since it is an editorial change to existing design documents.

The CRD system SRV 1C11-F012 is safety related; however, the flanges have no impact on its operation. This editorial change to depict the flanges on the abovementioned design documents does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the CRD system or any other safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0135, Rev. 0

This change modifies the main auxiliary steam system P&ID, H-11602, to correctly depict the wiring arrangement of the following MSR thermocouples and associated temperature indicators with respect to the cold reheat to moisture separator lines as noted in Deficiency Card 9601338: 1) Point 6 - MSR line A, thermocouple 1N38-N011, and temperature indicator 1N21-R811; 2) Point 7 - MSR line B, thermocouple 1N38-N012, and temperature indicator 1N21-R782; 3) Point 8 - MSR line C, thermocouple 1N38-N013, and temperature indicator 1N21-R782; and 4) Point 5 - MSR line D, thermocouple 1N38-N014, and temperature indicator 1N21-R811. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system as the actual wiring arrangement was not changed. Only the aforementioned P&ID was revised to depict the correct as-found wiring arrangement.

The above thermocouples and temperature indicators are not safety related. Revising the P&ID to correctly depict the wiring arrangement as described above does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the main auxiliary steam system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0140, Rev. 0

This change modifies sheet 2 of the nuclear boiler system P&ID, H16063, to show the excess flow check valves 1B21-F065A and -F065B and their respective isolation valves 1B21-F064A and -F064B. These valves are existing valves utilized in sampling lines as part of the nuclear boiler system and are shown on piping drawing S-17151 and isometric drawings S-05832 and S-05841. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system since it is an editorial change to a design document to correct an inadvertent omission.

UNIT 1/COMMON AS-BUILT NOTICES

Excess flow check valves 1B21-F065A and -F065B and their respective isolation valves 1B21-F064A and -F064B are safety related. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the nuclear boiler system or any other safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0184, Rev. 0

This change makes numerous editorial changes to reflect as found conditions pertaining to the Load Lists and P&IDs associated with the nuclear boiler system, the PASS, and the hydrogen and oxygen analyzer system to correct errors and omissions in these design documents to bring them in conformance with other related design documents. These changes do not modify the function or operation of these systems as these are only editorial changes to these design documents.

The nuclear boiler system and the hydrogen and oxygen analyzer system are safety-related, Seismic Category Class I systems. The PASS is a nonsafety-related, Seismic Category Class II system. This ABN does not reflect any physical changes to the plant, only editorial changes to design documents. These editorial changes do not challenge nor do they have any adverse effect on their respective system or any other safety-related system or component. These changes do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0192, Rev. 0

This change modifies the nuclear boiler system P&ID, H-16063, to show transmitter 1B21-N036 associated with the 1B21-D004B condensing chamber instead of the 1B21-D004A condensing chamber to reflect as-found conditions and supporting design documents. Also, for clarification purposes, panel locations for 1B21-N070, 1C31-N110, and 1C32-R655 are added to the P&ID. These changes do not modify the function or operation of the nuclear boiler system as these changes are editorial in nature only.

The nuclear boiler system condensing chamber level indicator transmitter switch 1B21-N036 is safety related. However, no physical change is made to the design of the nuclear boiler system. These changes do not challenge nor do they have any adverse effect on the nuclear boiler system or any other safety-related system or component. These editorial changes do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 1/COMMON AS-BUILT NOTICES

96-0243, Rev. 0

This change makes an editorial correction to the following documents to correctly depict the 1E11-F3007 valve symbol as a globe valve in lieu of a gate valve: Sheet 1 of the RHR system P&ID, drawing H-16329; the ELI; and the SED. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system since it is an editorial change to design documents.

The RHRSW heat exchanger inlet drain globe valve, 1E11-F3007, is a safety-related, Seismic Category I valve. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the RHR system or any other safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0252, Rev. 0

This change adds the turbine building chillers 1A and 1B condenser vent valves, MPL Nos. 1P63-F828A and 1P63-F828B, respectively, to the turbine building chilled water system P&ID, drawing H 16326. These valves have always been installed in the system, but erroneously omitted from the P&ID. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system since it is an editorial change to a design document.

The turbine building chilled water system is not safety related and the piping is Seismic Category Class II. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the turbine building chilled water system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0256, Rev. 0

This change makes an editorial correction to the reactor building instrument air system P&ID, drawing H-16329, to correctly depict the 1P52-F2408 drain valve symbol as a globe valve in lieu of a ball valve, and also add the MPL No. for this valve to the P&ID. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system since it is an editorial change to a design document.

The 1P52-F2408 drain valve is not safety related. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the reactor building instrument air system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 1/COMMON AS-BUILT NOTICES

97-0044, Rev. 0

This change makes an editorial correction to sheet 2 of the moisture separator and heater drain system P&ID, drawing H-11606, to correct an MPL No. assigned to a valve located on the vent drain line to clean radwaste from the 1st stage moisture separator reheater A & B shell drains to the 5th stage heater A. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system since it is an editorial change to a design document.

The Unit 1 moisture separator and heater drain system (N22) is a non-safety-related system. The affected valve (correct MPL No. 1N22-F863) and associated piping were purchased to ANSI B31.1, Seismic II requirements. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on this system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 2 AS-BUILT NOTICES

95-0233, Rev. 0

This change adds fire resistive barriers to plant raceways (R90) to meet divisional separation requirements. This change does not modify the function of this system.

The R90 fire protection system is safety related; however, this change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0116, Rev. 0

This change adds fire resistive barriers to plant raceways (R90) to meet divisional separation requirements. This change does not modify the function of this system.

The R90 fire protection system is safety related; however, this change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0120, Rev. 0

This change adds fire resistive barriers to plant raceways (R90) to meet divisional separation requirements. This change does not modify the function of this system.

The R90 fire protection system is safety related; however, this change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0215, Rev. 0

This change modifies the FPC system P&ID to change the depiction of pressure indicators 2G41-PI-N020 and -N021 to pressure test connections 2G41-PX-N020 and -N021, and to show the respective root valves as normally closed instead of normally open. These gauges were originally installed to determine the differential pressure across the fuel pool cooling pump, 2G41-C001, suction strainer. The strainer has since been removed and there is no need for the pressure gauges. Since these gauges no longer served any purpose and were a continuing maintenance problem due to excessive vibration caused by the pumps, they were replaced with caps to eliminate the need for frequent replacement of unneeded gauges. This change does not modify the function or operation of the fuel pool cooling system nor does it have any effect on the pressure boundary.

UNIT 2 AS-BUILT NOTICES

The portion of piping on which the pressure test connections are installed is not safety related and is not seismic. This change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the fuel pool cooling system or any other safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0222, Rev. 0

This change modifies P&IDs H-26053 (Hot Machine Shop Support System), H-26398 PASS room), H-2813⁵ (PASS), and tubing arrangement drawing H-26408 (Tubing Arrangement Inside PASS Room) to change all references indicating valve "-F308" and "2P33-F308" to "2P21-F308." Valve 2P33-F308 does not exist. This change does not modify the function or the operation of these systems since it is an editorial change to the affected design documents.

The 2P21-F308 demineralized water inlet isolation valve to the PASS room is not safety related. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the PASS or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0245, Rev. 0

This change revises the RCIC system P&ID, H-26023, and the primary containment purge & inerting system P&ID, H-26084, to reflect as built conditions. This change does not modify the function or operation of these systems.

The RCIC and primary containment purge and inerting systems are safety related. This change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0262, Rev. 0

This change documents on P&ID H-21074 the reorientation of the air start compressors 2R43-C005A/C and -C006A/C SRVs and discharge isolation valves to prevent the possibility of isolating the relief valves from the compressors. This change does not modify the function or operation of the DGs 2A and 2C air start systems.

The DG air start systems are not safety related. Moving the air start compressor SRVs from downstream to upstream of the discharge isolation valves to comply with the vendor's original design does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the DGs, DG air start system, or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 2 AS-BUILT NOTICES

96-0266, Rev. 0

This change revises condensate and feedwater system P&ID H-21037 to make editorial corrections to resolve errors found during a walkdown of the system. This change does not modify the function or operation of this system since it is an editorial change to a design document.

The condensate and feedwater system is not safety related. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on this system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-0295, Rev. 0

This change makes editorial changes to the following documents to more accurately depict references and provide additional clarification: Nuclear boiler system P&ID, H-26000; HPCI system P&ID, H-26020; and RCIC system P&ID, H-26053; and the associated boundary drawings. These changes do not modify the function or operation of these systems as they are only editorial changes to design documents.

The nuclear boiler system, the HPCI system, and the RCIC system are safety-related systems. However, these editorial changes do not challenge nor do they have an adverse effect on these systems or any other safety-related systems or components. These changes do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-0049, Rev. 0

This ABN makes an editorial change to the fission products/post-LOCA monitoring systems P&ID, H-26017, to remove indication of 1/2 in. x 1/4 in. reducers prior to valve 2D11-F161 and either side of valve 2D11-F172 to bring the P&ID into conformance with the as-found condition. The size of the tubing to these valves is 1/2 in. and there are no reducers as the P&ID depicted. This change does not modify the function or the operation of this system since it is only an editorial change to an existing design document.

The process radiation monitoring system is a safety-related, Seismic Category I system. However, Panel 2D11-P010 and the affected tubing inside are nonsafety related and are installed to Seismic Category I criteria. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the process radiation monitoring system or any other safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 2 AS-BUILT NOTICES

97-0067, Rev. 0

This ABN makes an editorial change to the offgas system P&ID, H-26045, to add depiction of the existing 2N62-N144 flow switch installed on the 2N62-B004A refrigeration machine glycol discharge line to the glycol tank, 2N61-A002, to bring the P&ID into conformance with the as-found condition. This change does not modify the function or the operation of this system since it is only an editorial change to an existing design document.

The offgas system refrigeration machine and the glycol piping and associated components are nonsafety related. This editorial change does not challenge nor does it have any adverse effect on the offgas system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 1/COMMON DESIGN CHANGE REQUESTS

90-110, Rev. 0

This change modifies the radwaste system to allow more reliable monitoring of radwaste discharge flow. This change does not modify the operation of this system.

The system does not meet the criteria as being treated as safety related. This change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. The radwaste discharge instrumentation is being replaced with more reliable and more accurate instruments that will be used per the ODCM as our basis for meeting our commitment to RG 1.21. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

93-058, Rev. 0

This change modifies the 1P73 HWC DAS to allow ECP and DCB crack growth data to be taken from various reactor core regions, BHD and recirculation piping. Modifications include: hardware and software changes to the DAS panel (1P73-P002); installation of modified LPRMs; installation of BHD ECP assembly and recirculation assembly; install of associated cables and raceway. Additionally, this change will modify the HWC injection, control and sampling sub-systems to allow increased hydrogen and oxygen flow rates. This change allows increased hydrogen injection and provides improved sampling and monitoring capabilities. This change does not alter the methods in which the HWC (1P73), neutron monitoring (1D11), reactor recirculation (1B31), and RWCU (1G31) systems are operated nor does it change any system functions.

The 1P73 DAS is not safety related. This change has no adverse effect on the any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

93-067, Rev. 0

This design change replaces valve 1E51-F022, which is located in the RCIC test line to the CST, with a drag valve. This valve's technology will allow for improved flow control that is needed during system testing. The function of the 1E51-F022 valve to test the flow performance of Unit 1 RCIC pump 1E51-C001 will not change.

RCIC valve 1E51-F022, which is required for system testing, is treated as safety related. Replacement of this valve has no adverse effect on the RCIC system or any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 1/COMMON DESIGN CHANGE REQUESTS

94-031, Rev. 0

This DCR modifies the Unit 1 RHR system by eliminating the steam-condensing mode of RHR. The objective of this DCR is to stop the steam leakage across HPCI to RHR cross tie valves 1E11-F140A, F140B, F091A, F091B, F051A and F051B. The leakage in these valves has resulted in higher temperatures in the upper portions of the RHR heat exchanger. This has caused operations to run the system unnecessarily to reduce the temperature and eliminate concerns of local voiding in the heat exchanger. The function and operation of the RHR systems will otherwise remain unchanged. The steam condensing mode of RHR has not been used by operations as a means of removing decay heat from the reactor.

The use of this mode of RHR to remove reactor decay heat is not required to bring the reactor to a hot shutdown condition. The steam-condensing mode is one of several options available to the plant operator for decay heat removal. There will be no adverse impact on plant operation by eliminating the steam-condensing mode of RHR. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95-043, Rev. 0

The jockey pump system is provided to maintain the CS and RHR pump discharge lines full of water to eliminate the possibility of water hammer on system startup. The jockey pumps take suction from the torus via the CS and/or the RHR suction lines. An external seal cooler is provided to maintain the temperature of the pump seals. The cooling water to the seal cooler is provided by the PSW system. The PSW supply and return lines for the seal coolers are experiencing severe wall thickness reduction. To maintain the integrity of the PSW system and to comply with Generic Letter 89-13, these lines must be replaced, or cut and capped. These lines will be cut and capped with this design change. Jockey pump function and operation will not be impacted. CS, RHR, and PSW system function, operation, and availability will not be affected.

The jockey pumps, the CS system, the RHR system, and the PSW system are safety related. CS, RHR, and PSW system function, operation, and availability will not be affected. No operational requirements as defined in Technical Specifications are impacted by this change. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

95-065, Rev. 0

Due to concerns of potential cracking in the core shroud, a preemptive repair of the shroud horizontal welds was performed on Unit 1 in the Fall 1994 outage. This repair consisted of a set of four core shroud stabilizer assemblies that structurally replaced nine horizontal welds of the core. Each stabilizer assembly attaches to the top at the shroud flange and to the shroud gussets at the bottom. Subsequent to this repair, further analysis determined that potential of a shroud weld opening (assuming fully cracked) during normal operation existed under specific deteriorated conditions. To preclude this possibility, the mechanical preload is increased on each

UNIT 1/COMMON DESIGN CHANGE REQUESTS

of the four tie rod nuts. No additional hardware addition to the vessel internals is required. The function and operation of the reactor vessel and reactor internals are not altered by this design change.

The stabilizers are designed as safety-related components. The stabilizers assure that the shroud, even if cracked, will perform its safety functions. The operating limitations described in the Technical Specifications will not be affected, since this modification does not alter the function or availability of any safety-related system. No acceptance limits are increased, and no failure points are decreased by this change such that any margin of safety is reduced.

95-069, Rev. 0

This change temporarily modifies the FPC, the RRS, and the RWCU system to allow these systems to be decontaminated to reduce personnel radiation exposures. The change to the FPC system temporarily modifies the operation of the system by declaring it inoperable during decontamination. Cooling for the spent fuel pool will be performed by the DHR system. The changes to the RRS and the RWCU system temporarily modify the operation of these systems during decontamination. These affected systems will be restored such that there will be no residual negative effect on operation or reliability.

Portions of the FPC system at tie-ins to the RHR system and to the fuel pool itself are safety related and portions of the RWCU system, up to the outboard isolation valve, G31-F004, are safety related. The RRS is safety related. The decontamination process, which has been reviewed by GE, the original NSSS supplier, and an independent consulting company, Structural Integrity Associates, has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-024, Rev. 0

This change replaces six 600 VAC switchgear GE RMS-9 trip devices with three GE Micro Versa Trip Plus and three Westinghouse Digitrip 610 trip devices to eliminate the spurious trips previously experienced for these applications. This change does not modify the function of this system. Like the previous GE RMS-9 trip devices, the purpose of each replacement trip device is to monitor the load current through a 600 VAC switchgear circuit breaker and to trip the circuit breaker for abnormal or excessive currents.

The 600 VAC switchgear busses and the six applications using the replacement trip devices are not safety related. This change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 1/COMMON DESIGN CHANGE REQUESTS

96-052, Rev. 0

This change modifies the Unit 1 DG reverse power relays to eliminate the problem of nuisance trips attributed to high harmonics. This change does not modify the function of this system by relocating to a different phase and modifying the setpoints of the reverse power relay.

The reverse power relay is not safety related. This change has no adverse effect on the DG system, and the reverse power relay is not functional during an accident condition. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-055, Rev. 0

This change modifies diesel building MCC 1R24-S026 to eliminate possible breaker miscoordination between downstream feeder breakers and supply breakers for certain postulated faults. The protective trip function for the supply breakers is eliminated, and the protective function is furnished by the CO-9 protective relays in the upstream 4160 V buses. The largest feeder breaker on the MCC is changed from an HFB 150 thermal magnetic breaker to an HFD 125 thermal magnetic breaker, whose characteristic time current curve coordinates better with the protective relays. This change does not modify the function of this system.

The MCC 1R24-S026 is safety related. This change has no adverse effect on the MCC or any safety-related system or component fed from the MCC. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-018, Rev. 0

This change replaces 2G11-F003 & -F004 and 2G11-F019 & -F020 (4-in. gates) of the radwaste system with 3-in. globes to allow the operator to be placed in a vertical position. This change does not modify the function or operation of these systems.

The radwaste system is a non-safety-related system that is treated as a safety-related. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-063, Rev. 0

This change modifies the nuclear boiler system to eliminate a valve bonnet leak (1B21-F068C and 1B21-F069C). This change does not modify the operation of this system.

The nuclear boiler system is safety related. Cutting and capping the 1-in. line do not challenge any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 2 DESIGN CHANGE REQUESTS

92-042, Rev. 0

This change replaces the obsolete Edison Omniguard motor-bearing temperature monitors used in the 2E11, 2N21, 2N32, 2N34, and 2N71 systems with an upgraded version. This change does not modify the function of these systems.

The motor bearing temperature monitors used in the above systems are not safety related. The new monitors will have no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

94-013, Rev. 0

This change modifies the 2T52 system primary containment electrical penetration assemblies to allow SRM and IRM detectors to be fed from a new electrical penetration assembly, 2T52-X100I/J. This change does not modify the operation of this system.

The 2T52 system primary containment electrical penetration assemblies are safety related. This change has no adverse effect on the 2T52 system. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

94-043, Rev. 0

This change reroutes cables or repulls single conductor circuits for cables currently requiring protection per Appendix R and removes Thermo-Lag from raceways experiencing ampacity derating concerns. This change affects several Appendix R systems and prevents fire induced circuit faults from adversely affecting safe shutdown. This change does not modify the function or operation of the affected systems.

The Appendix R systems are safety related. This change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

94-047, Rev. 0

This change deletes the 11 carbon dioxide hose reels located in the radwaste building, control building, and both turbine buildings to eliminate the chance of an inadvertent CO₂ discharge. This change eliminates the operation of the hand-held hose stations. The gas purge system for the generators remains unchanged and available for operation.

The system and equipment are not safety related. This change has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 2 DESIGN CHANGE REQUESTS

97-006, Rev. 1

NRC GL 96-006 identified a safety issue for thermally induced pressurization of isolated and trapped water filled piping sections in the containment. The evaluation for GL 96-006 indicated that thermally induced pressure buildup would exceed design limits of the piping at penetrations 12, 18, and 19. This change adds bypass lines on the sections of pipe in primary containment penetrations 12, 18, and 19.

The proposed modifications will not have any impact on the overall original plant design, structure, system, and component performance.

UNIT 1/COMMON FSAR/FHA CHANGES

FCF 12C-004

This change to FHA appendix H documents that an exemption to NFPA 24:4-3.3 (1973) governing the installation, maintenance, and use of fire hydrants, as noted in FHA section 4.7, has been requested and is supported by field trials performed under AIT No. RC9600072.

Fire hydrants are solely a function of property loss minimization and do not contribute to the safe shutdown of the plant. This change does not affect hydrant performance, and fire hydrants do not contribute to or minimize the affect any accidents evaluated in the FSAR. The Technical Specifications do not address the applicability of NFPA 24.

FCF 15B-004

This change revises Unit 1 FSAR subsection N.5.4 and Unit 2 FSAR subsection 15A.5.4 relative to RCIC steam supply isolation valve closure time for 1/2E51-F007 and F006 (from 15 to 20 s; i.e., blowdown time duration increases from 28 to 33 s) to reflect the results of a P/T reanalysis and provide consistency with the TRMs. The Unit 2 RCIC corner room volume is revised to show the correct analytical input value, and the pressure results for the torus room and the reactor building 130-ft elevation is removed.

The revised P/T reanalysis does not alter the design or operation of any plant component that could be an initiator of an accident, and does not require any plant component to be operated outside its design capability. The temperature and pressure profiles based on the reanalysis are enveloped by the existing profiles used in the environmental qualification of safety-related components. The revised P/T analysis does not alter the means for detecting and initiating of isolation of the postulated line break. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis of any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15B-027

This administrative change to FSAR appendix H updates and clarifies information relative to the ISI Program; i.e., reference is made the ISI/IST Programs which accurately reflect 10 CFR 50.55a commitments.

This administrative change does not affect the overall performance, design, or operation of any plant system, structure, or component described in the FSAR. The accident analysis is not affected and, therefore, remains bounding. No new accident initiators or single failures are created. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

UNIT 1/COMMON FSAR/FHA CHANGES

FCF 15B-029

This administrative change to Unit 1 FSAR section 10.2 corrects a discrepancy between the actual plant configuration and the FSAR in that the FSAR states that removable grating is provided over each new fuel storage vault. This is true for Unit 1 but not for Unit 2 in that Unit 1 utilizes a removable concrete plug with no grating under it. Minor editorial changes are made to enhance clarity and readability.

This administrative change does not alter any system, structure, or component and does not affect the operation of any system designed to mitigate the consequences, or prevent the occurrence, of an accident or transient. No new failure modes are introduced. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15B-041

This administrative change to Unit 1 FSAR table 7.4-2 deletes all references to floor drain valves to make the FSAR consistent with the actual plant configuration. This change is the result of the FSAR verification program (REA 96-632).

This administrative change does not alter any system, structure, or component and does not affect the operation of any system designed to mitigate the consequences, or prevent the occurrence, of an accident or transient. No new failure modes are introduced. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15B-043

This change revises Unit 1 FSAR section 10.4 and Unit 2 FSAR section 9.1 to clarify the system description of the DHR system with respect to availability of the backup DG and its heat load capacity; i.e., state that the DHR system is a viable method of decay heat removal for either the reactor core or the spent fuel pool. Also, in Unit 2, the statement that the unit will be brought to cold shutdown subsequent to the loss of the FPCCs is deleted.

The DHR system will continue to operate as designed. This change does not affect the operation or testing of any system or equipment designed for the prevention or mitigation of design basis events. No new modes of operation are introduced, and no new failure modes are created. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

UNIT 1/COMMON FSAR/FHA CHANGES

FCF 15C-007

These administrative changes to FSAR section 13.11 provide consistency between the FSAR and actual operating practices; i.e., the Technical Specifications, the TRM, the Annual Radiological Environmental Report, and ANSI N18.7

These administrative changes do not affect/impact any systems, components, accident/transient parameters, design basis accidents or operational transients, failure modes, and the original structures, system, or component design basis. The accident analysis remains unaffected, and the changes are bounded by approved programs, processes, and procedures. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15C-023

This administrative change revises Unit 1 FSAR table 7.3-1 to accurately describe containment penetration physical condition and testing practices for penetrations X-206A-D.

This administrative change does not affect the design, method of operation, or modification of any plant system, structure, or component important to safety. The accident analysis is not affected and remains bounding. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15C-034

This documentation change modifies Unit 1 FSAR sections 7.4 and 8.4, and Unit 2 FSAR sections 7.3 and 8.3 regarding the design stroke times of key valves assumed in the LOCA analysis; i.e., the stroke times of key LOCA valves specified in the torque switch setting guide.

This documentation change does not introduce any changes in the way plant equipment is designed, operated, or maintained. The MOVs will continue to be designed and tested in the same manner. Safety analyses are not affected by this change. The margin of safety as defined in the Technical Specifications is, therefore, not reduced.

FCF 15C-042

This change revises Unit 1 FSAR section 10.5 to state that one RBCCW heat exchanger is capable of providing the required heat removal capability and maintain the RBCCW supply temperature below the design limit of 105°F, and that the RBCCW system is designed to allow for the optional use of both heat exchangers. Unit 2 FSAR subsection 9.2.2 is revised to state that each RBCCW heat exchanger is designed to remove the required heat during reactor blowdown mode of operation and the use of the second heat exchanger is optional.

This operational change does not alter the plant as described in the FSAR. The change adds additional information which has been obtained from years of operating service. The change

UNIT 1/COMMON FSAR/FHA CHANGES

makes no physical modifications to the plant and no fission product barriers are affected. The RBCCW system is not required for safe shutdown of the plant following an accident. The RBCCW system does not perform any safety-related function, except for maintaining the containment isolation boundary following an accident. No new accident scenarios or failure mechanisms are created. Therefore, the change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

FCF 15C-052

This change to FSAR figure 7.16-2 revises the peak pressure value for the first 20 s of the accident profile from 57 psig to 49.6 psig and revises the accident profile to show a post-accident period temperature of 135°F. The revision reflects the current accident profile used in the EQ analyses.

This change does not impact any system or component required to mitigate an accident. No new failure modes or accident mechanisms are introduced, and no safety limits or failure points are affected by the accident profile. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

UNIT 2 FSAR/FHA CHANGES

FCF 15B-025

This administrative change to FSAR section 13.1, table 13.1-1, and figures 13.1-2 and 13.1-7 reflects the license transfer from Georgia Power Company to Southern Nuclear Operating Company, as well as some personnel changes.

This administrative change does not involve any physical alteration of any plant system, structure, or component, or changes to setpoints or operating parameters. The physical operation, maintenance, or testing of the plant is not changed. The accident analysis remains unchanged. No new failure modes or new limiting single failures are introduced. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15B-035

This change revises paragraph 4.4.3.4.2 to allow the SLCS liquids to be routed to a chemical waste drain via temporary piping/hoses to eliminate the additional step of transporting SLCS liquids via 55-gal drums, consistent with plant procedures.

This change does not alter the function of the SLCS and the radwaste system. No new failure modes are introduced, and no radiological barriers are changed. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15B-044

These administrative changes to Unit 1 FSAR sections 12.2 and 12.6, and Unit 2 FSAR sections 3.7A, 3.7A.A, and 3.10 are the result of the FSAR verification program. These changes revise the FSARs to reflect actual plant design, as-built condition, and operating practices. These changes are the result of the FSAR verification program (REA 96-632).

These administrative changes do not alter any system, structure, or component and do not affect the operation of any system designed to mitigate the consequences, or prevent the occurrence, of an accident or transient. No new failure modes are introduced. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15C-008

These administrative changes to FSAR section 17.2 provide consistency between the FSAR and actual operating practices.

These administrative changes do not affect/impact any systems, components, accident/transient parameters, design basis accidents or operational transients, failure modes, and the original structure, system, or component design basis. The accident analysis remains unaffected, and the changes are bounded by approved programs, processes, and procedures. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

UNIT 2 FSAR/FHA CHANGES

FCF 15C-025

This administrative change to Unit 2 FSAR paragraph 9.2.6.4 deletes the statement "CST is visually inspected for leakage after filling" to reflect current plant procedures. The same paragraph states that routine visual inspections are adequate to verify system operability. This change is the result of the FSAR verification program (REA 96-632).

This administrative change does not impact any original design requirements for the CST and does not have any adverse effect on the integrity of the CST. No other systems or components are impacted by this revision. There is no impact on the overall original plant design. The CST is not safety related. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15C-028

This change revises FSAR paragraph 9.2.5.4 to delete the statement that the maximum recorded river temperature is 51.4°F. All analyses and evaluations involving river temperature are based upon the maximum allowable inlet water temperature of 95°F as stated in paragraph 9.2.5.4. This change is the result of the FSAR verification program (REA 96-631).

This change does not affect the ability of the ultimate heat sink to provide adequate cooling to allow safe shutdown of the plant following an accident. This change does not affect any safety system and does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

FCF 15C-032

This administrative change to Unit 2 FSAR section 11.4 reflects: 1.) the installed non-divisional power sourcing for the valves and detectors in the reactor vent stack radiation monitoring system; 2.) the correct calibration method; and 3.) the correct design parameters for the main stack configuration.

The reactor vent stack monitor is not safety related. The subject system is for monitoring only and is used to quantify radioactive releases. No new failure modes are added by the configuration changes. All RG 1.97 requirements are satisfied. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

UNIT 2 FSAR/FHA CHANGES

FCF 15C-040

This change revises FSAR table 9.1-1 to add the shipping fuel rods canister to the list of items that can be moved over the spent fuel pool racks.

All equipment is operated as described in procedures consistent with the FSAR. No new failure modes are introduced. All postulated accidents are conservatively bounded by the FSAR or reload licensing submittal. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15C-049

This administrative change revises tables 1.6-1 and 4.3-1 to add a reference to the Cycle 12 Supplemental Reload Licensing Report, Revision 2, and updates table 15.1-1 to reflect the correct reload licensing submittal applicable to Cycle 12.

This administrative change only provides references to Revision 2 of the Supplemental Reload Licensing Report for Cycle 12 and does not modify any system or equipment, or alter the operation of any system or equipment. No new failure modes are created. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

FCF 15C-053

This administrative change to FSAR paragraph 3.11.2.1 and figure 3.11-2 revises the peak pressure value for the first 20 s of the accident profile from 57 psig to 45.3 psig and revises the accident profile to show a post-accident period temperature of 135°F. This change reflects the current accident profile contained in the EQ analyses.

This change does not impact any system or component required to mitigate an accident. No new failure modes or accident mechanisms are introduced, and no safety limits or failure points are affected by the accident profile. Therefore, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

UNIT 1/COMMON MINOR DESIGN CHANGES

96-5043

This Unit 1 MDC removes RHR and CS pump suction relief valves. Removing the valves was deemed acceptable because they are passive to system performance, and the piping will not exceed design pressure without them. Since this is a change to the plant as described in the FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

This MDC does not alter the systems' ability to meet their Technical Specifications requirements. Thus, it cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

96-5056

This MDC replaces existing 250 Leeds and Northrup recorders with Speedomax recorders which are equivalent in form, fit, and function. Filtered power sources will be provided to prevent EMI/RFI. Since this is considered a change to the plant as described in the FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

These recorders are at least as reliable as the old ones and will continue to provide the same function. Thus, the MDC cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-5001

This Unit 1 MDC constructs a service platform below installed instrumentation to assist in performance of surveillance on the instrumentation. This is a personnel safety issue. Since this is considered a change to the plant as described in the FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The platform was designed to applicable seismic requirements and was designed to have no operational interface with safety-related equipment. Thus, the MDC cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-5021

This MDC adds a second redundant skin over the existing leak tight non-welded joints of the negative pressure sections of the MCRECS. A change to Unit 2 FSAR paragraph 6.4.1.5 is required to take exception to RG 1.52-1978 to allow use of silicone RTV on safety-related ducts. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The MDC provides a redundant sealing of the sections of the system to which it is being applied. Thus, the MDC cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

UNIT 2 MINOR DESIGN CHANGES

97-5002

This MDC installs a communications sound power station near the reactor vent stack panels to assist in performance of the surveillance. Since this is considered a change to the plant as described in the FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The station was designed to applicable seismic requirements and was designed to have no operational interface with safety-related equipment. Thus, the MDC cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-5004

This MDC deletes snubbers and/or changes snubbers to rigid struts. Since this requires a change to Unit 2 FSAR figures 3.6.16 and 3.6.17, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The deletion of snubbers and/or changing snubbers to rigid struts was done such that all affected piping stresses and support remained as required. Thus, the MDC cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-5005

This MDC applies to Unit 2 and deletes snubbers and/or changes snubbers to rigid struts. Since this requires a change to Unit 2 FSAR figure 3.9-32, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The deletion of snubbers and/or changing snubbers to rigid struts was done such that all affected piping stresses/support remained as required. Thus, the MDC cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-5006

This MDC removes pressure-regulating valves 2P41-F334A/B. Their original purpose was to limit the flow of cooling water to RHRSW and PSW motor copper cooling coils to a maximum value in order to protect them from erosion. The cooling coils have been replaced with stainless steel which can accommodate a higher flow without being affected by erosion. Thus, the valves are no longer needed. Since Unit 2 FSAR figure 9.2-6 requires revision, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The deletion of the valves has no impact on either RHRSW or PSW operability. Thus, the MDC cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS**1-96-044**

This temporary modification was performed to modify control building ventilation fan 1Z41-C008C suction duct to allow suction from the turbine building. This is part of an action plan to reduce noble gas concentrations in the turbine building by increasing the amount of air exhausted from the turbine building. Since this temporarily changes the Unit 1 Control Building ventilation as described in the Unit 1 FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The modification has no adverse impact on safety-related components. Additionally, the release of radioactive effluents defined in the Technical Specifications will not be exceeded, because existing monitoring equipment will be utilized to prevent exceeding any such limits. Thus, the temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

1-97-001

This temporary modification disables the rod drift alarm for control rod 10-31. This is being done to restore alarm capability for all other rods which are not disabled from providing input to the alarm. Since this disables an alarm described in Unit 1 FSAR paragraph 7.7.4.4, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The alarm is not required by the Technical Specifications, and CRD operation remains unchanged. Thus, the temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

1-97-013

This temporary modification is implemented to isolate two circuits that are routed through the wrong divisional raceways, thereby preventing damage to other circuits in the same raceways. The modification disables differential relay protection sensing and associated trip circuits for 600VAC transformer ICD, thereby affecting the plant as described in the FSAR. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

Although the Technical Specifications do not specifically address a margin of safety using transformer ICD as a backup power source, this modification will help to maintain the degree of reliability of the power supply system. Thus, the temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

1-97-014

This temporary modification provides an acceptable temporary power source for EDG 1B battery charger 1R42-S032D for a time duration adequate to depower and perform preventive maintenance on its normal source of power. Since this is different from the plant as described in the FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

Since the battery charger will continue to be powered with an acceptable power source, the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8 continue to be satisfied. Thus, the temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

1-97-015

This temporary modification removed a fuse to ensure that the out-of-service "B" main turbine pressure regulator did not interfere with the operation of the inservice "A" regulator. Since this makes the plant different from described in section 7.11 of the Unit 1 FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

To protect against the pressure regulator failure in the closed event with no backup regulator, compensatory actions in the form of more restrictive thermal limits were imposed. This ensures that the temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

1-97-022

This temporary modification is being initiated to disable the OPRM instability trip. During the time this temporary modification is in place, the OPRM will generate an alarm only. This system has not been added to the FSAR; however, this temporary modification was considered to be a change to the plant as described in the FSAR. Thus, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The OPRM has not been added to the Technical Specifications, and this temporary modification has no effect on any equipment in the Technical Specifications. Thus, this temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

1-97-027

This temporary modification installed temporary sump pumps for the Unit 1 turbine building floor drain sump and equipment drain sump (one temporary sump in each) to allow the increased volumes of water received during drain down for the refueling outage to be moved in parallel with the discharge from the existing sump pumps. Since this is a change to the plant as described in

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

sections 9.2 and 11.2 of the Unit 1 FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

None of the involved equipment or the pumping of the water from one point to another is addressed by the Technical Specifications. Additionally, there is no impact on offsite release limits in the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual. Thus, this temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

1-97-030

This temporary modification disables the automatic transfer logic associated with MCR AC unit 1Z41-B008B. Since this makes the plant different from what is described in subsection 10.7.6 of the Unit 1 FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The evaluation concluded / demonstrated that the auto transfer logic is not required in order for 1Z41-B008B to be considered operable. Additionally, it was shown to not be required to be operable to ensure the MCR temperature is maintained below the limits which form (implicitly) the margin of safety contained in the bases for Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications.

1-97-C33

This temporary modification defeats two refuel interlock limit switches to allow the refueling bridge to be used over the core as a work platform without causing a rod block. This is being performed to prevent interference with RPS and neutron monitoring system testing during concurrent work periods. Since this was identified as a change to the plant as described in the Unit 1 FSAR, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

As addressed in the bases for Technical Specification 3.9.1, the refueling interlocks prevent an inadvertent criticality by preventing the loading of fuel into the core with any control rod withdrawn. The use of a clearance in the refueling bridge hoists prevents loading fuel into the core, while the one rod out interlock, combined with the proven shutdown margin, prevents any inadvertent criticality due to control rod withdrawal. Thus, the margin of safety contained in the bases for the Technical Specifications is maintained.

1-97-035

This temporary modification disables the rod drift alarm for control rod 06-35 to restore alarm capability for all other rods which are not disabled from providing input to the alarm. Since this disables an alarm described in Unit 1 FSAR paragraph 7.7.4.4, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

The alarm is not required by the Technical Specifications, and CRD operation remains unchanged. Thus, the temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

2-97-004

This temporary modification removes existing tornado vent on roof of stairwell at Unit 2 refueling floor and replaces with a plywood panel that is configured to facilitate routing of power cable from 130 ft elevation of the reactor building to the refueling floor. This temporary modification is being generated to support activity on jet pump cleaning during outage. Since this changes the configuration of the tornado vents connecting the refueling floor to the reactor building, it is considered a change to the plant as described in the FSAR. Thus, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The temporary modification will be in place while the refueling floor and the Unit 2 reactor building are communicating. Thus, Technical Specifications requirements for secondary containment are satisfied. Consequently, the temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

2-97-011

This temporary modification is being initiated to disable the OPRM instability trip for a 6-month period. During the time this temporary modification is in place, the OPRM will generate an alarm only. This system has not been added to the FSAR; however, this temporary modification was considered to be a change to the plant as described in the FSAR. Thus, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The OPRM has not been added to the Technical Specifications, and this temporary modification has no effect on any equipment in the Technical Specifications. Thus, this temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

2-97-023

This temporary modification is being initiated to provide a means to monitor the 2A EDG stator temperature until the normal monitor and indicator can be replaced. Since an annunciator listed in Unit 2 FSAR table 8.3-8 is inoperable, this temporary modification is a change to the plant as described in the FSAR. Thus, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The monitoring provided by this temporary modification restores monitoring of the 2A DG, helping to ensure that it remains operable. Thus, this temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

TEMPORARY MODIFICATIONS

2-97-032

This temporary modification is being initiated to disable the OPRM instability trip. This temporary modification replaces temporary modification 2-97-11 and disables the trip for the complete operating cycle to agree with latest concurrence from the NRC. During the time this temporary modification is in place, the OPRM will generate an alarm only. This system has not been added to the FSAR; however, this temporary modification was considered to be a change to the plant as described in the FSAR. Thus, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The OPRM has not been added to the Technical Specifications, and this temporary modification has no effect on any equipment in the Technical Specifications. Thus, this temporary modification cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

SETPOINT DESIGN CHANGES

96-6007

The current setpoint for 2C11-N600 (CRD charging water header pressure) is too close to the normal system operating pressure. This SDC revises the setpoint to prevent unnecessary alarms. This was identified as being a change as a procedure listed in Unit 2 FSAR table 13.5-3; thus, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The change will still ensure that the minimum charging water pressure specified in the Technical Specifications bases for Technical Specification 3.10.8.5 is satisfied. Thus, the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification is not reduced.

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS

96-33

This change modifies the Unit 2 TRM to address the changes made by DCR 92-134 concerning the relocation of the drywell return air fan motor control and power cables to different compartments (these compartments are within the same MCC). The TRM change does not modify the operation of this system.

The TRM change concerning the relocation of the drywell return air fan motor control and power cables has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-02, TRM Change

TRM 3.9.3.1 is revised to change the loaded interlock on the refueling bridge auxiliary hoist from 485 +/- 30 lb to 400 +/- 30 lb. Additionally, the TRM is also being revised to change the slack cable cutoff for the refueling bridge main grapple from 100 lb to 50 +/- 25 lb.

These changes do not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a previously evaluated event for the following reasons: the auxiliary hoist loaded interlock will be engaged at 400 lb instead of 485 lb, a lighter weight. This interlock is intended to prevent a criticality event during refueling by inserting a control rod withdrawal block when any hoist is loaded. The change is, therefore, conservative since the interlock will now be engaged sooner.

The slack cable cutoff is intended to alert the operator when the main mast cable is not supporting the weight of the mast. This, for example, could occur when a loaded fuel bundle is resting on an object. The slack cable light also prevents excess cable from being dispensed. The slack cable is purely an operational consideration and has no safety basis.

The probability of occurrence of a new type event is not increased since no other safety-related systems are affected by this TRM change. All plant systems continue to be operated within their design basis.

The margin of safety is not reduced by this TRM change since these interlocks are not assumed to function to mitigate the consequences of a design basis event. The bases for the refueling Technical Specifications are not impacted by this TRM change. Additionally, the new values are within the vendor recommended values.

97-04, Bases Change

This Bases revision changed the minimum reactor pressure requirement for performance of the SRV manual actuation surveillances from 920 psig to 890 psig.

This change does not increase the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a previously evaluated event because the reactor pressure for manual actuation testing is not taken credit for in

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS

any analyzed transient or accident. The importance of reactor pressure during the test is to provide for dampening or cushioning of the pilot disc when it reseats. This prevents disc damage that could lead to disc to seat sticking or valve leakage. The requirement for the pressure is that it be sufficient to prevent such damage. On the other hand, an excessively high pressure could result or contribute to SRV leakage. Lowering the value to 890 psig is within the valve manufacturer recommendations to prevent disc damage, while lowering the risk of valve leakage. Lowering the pressure at which an SRV is manually tested will not affect the probability of occurrence or the consequences of a previously analyzed event.

The possibility of a new type event is not created since all plant systems continue to be operated per their design basis; no new modes of operation are introduced.

The margin of safety is not reduced since the reactor pressure at which the manual test is performed is not a part of any transient or accident analyses. Also, reducing this test pressure should minimize SRV leakage so the margin of safety to an inadvertent SRV actuation is reduced.

97-06

This change modifies Units 1 and 2 FHA. This is an administrative change that removes the requirement to prepare and submit special reports to the Safety Review Board for fire protection equipment or systems that remain inoperable for 14 consecutive days. This FHA change does not modify the operation of any system.

The FHA change concerning the removal of the requirement to submit a report to the Safety Review Board has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-14

This change modifies the Security Training and Qualification Plan to permit the use of the most recent revision of the ISO 389, "Standard Reference Zero for the Calibration of the Purtone Audiometer." This change to the Security Training and Qualification Plan does not decrease the effectiveness of the plan nor does it negatively impact the Physical Security Plan or the Security Program.

The Security Training and Qualification Plan change concerning the audiometer calibration standard is a 50.54 (p) change and does not reduce the effectiveness of the Plan.

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS

97-15, TRM Change

This TRM change is being made to add the following valves to the Unit 2 qualified post accident monitoring instrumentation list in table T10.3-1: 2P33-F005, 2P33-F013, 2T48-F209 and 2T48-F210. Additionally, unnecessary valves are being removed from the Units 1 and 2 list of qualified post accident monitoring instrumentation tables in their respective TRMs. The valves are being removed because they are not applicable as RG 1.97 valves. The change will also correct several typographical errors in the Units 1 and 2 tables.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of a previously analyzed event are not increased because these changes are being made to ensure that the required valves are listed in the post-accident instrumentation table. This will insure that the position indications for the correct valves are maintained operable as required by Technical Specifications LCO 3.3.1.1.

97-20

This change modifies the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications Bases to address the changes made by the proposed Operating Licensees and Technical Specifications changes for extended power uprate. The implementation of this change is contingent upon the NRC's approval of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications change for extended power uprate.

The Technical Specifications Bases change concerning extended power uprate has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the proposed Technical Specification.

97-22

This change modifies the Unit 2 FSAR and is an administrative change that removes the requirement to perform a separate independent trend analysis of SAER and NRC items.

The FSAR change concerning the removal of the requirement to separately trend SAER and NRC items has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the proposed Technical Specification.

97-24

This change modifies Units 1 and 2 TRM to address changes made by DCRs 94-007 and 94-008, and a proposed Technical Specifications change to Units 1 and 2 concerning the modifications to the PRNM and the installation of the OPRM. The TRM change does not modify the operation of this system. The implementation of this change is contingent upon NRC approval of the Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications change.

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS

The TRM change concerning the PRNM and OPRM has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the proposed Technical Specification.

97-25, Bases Change

This Bases change to Units 1 and 2 section B3.7.5 clarifies that Unit 2 PSW may be used to supply cooling water to the MCR AC system at any time. The Bases references Unit 2 PSW as a back-up source in modes other than 1, 2, and 3, but makes no mention of it as a possible source in mode 1, 2, or 3.

The probability of occurrence and the consequences of a previously evaluated event are not increased due to this Bases revision since no changes are being made to any system designed for the prevention of accidents. Also, the architect/engineer confirmed that Unit 2 PSW is a viable supply for AC system cooling water. As such, the AC system will continue to provide an acceptable post accident MCR environment.

The possibility of a new type event is not created since the PSW and MCR AC systems continue to be operated within their design bases. Additionally, no other system is operated outside its design basis as a result of this Bases revision.

The margin of safety is not reduced since the Unit 2 PSW system is capable of adequately supplying the MCR AC system with cooling water while simultaneously supplying its other safety-related loads. Therefore, the operability of the PSW safety-related loads is not affected. Additionally, the Unit 1 PSW has an interlock that will transfer cooling water to the "B" AC unit from Division I of PSW to Division II if flow is low following a LOCA. It is likely that supplying cooling water to the AC units from Unit 2 PSW would render that interlock inoperable. For added redundancy therefore, the applicable Technical Specifications condition for having the "B" AC unit out of service should be entered.

97-25, Rev. 1, Bases Change

Revision 0 to this DoCR modified the Technical Specification Bases for Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications LCO 3.7.5 to allow Unit 2 PSW to supply cooling to the MCR AC system. That change dictated that if the auto transfer logic for the "B" AC unit was not operable in the configuration with Unit 2 PSW providing the cooling, the "B" AC subsystem must be declared inoperable. This change revises the Bases to clearly state that the auto transfer logic is not required for operability of the MCR AC system regardless of which unit's PSW system is providing cooling.

The probability of a previously analyzed event is not increased as a result of this Bases change since no physical or operational changes are being made to any plant system designed for the prevention of transients or accidents. The consequences of a previously evaluated event are not increased since it is not necessary to postulate a PSW pipe break following a LOCA/LOSP.

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS

The probability of a new type event is not created since this change does not result in the PSW, the MCR AC system, or any other safety-related system being operated in a manner outside their design bases.

The margin of safety is not reduced because the auto swap feature is merely a design feature of the PSW and AC system. It is not necessary to postulate a PSW system pipe break together with a LOCA/LOSP. Furthermore, no other Technical Specifications are affected by this proposed Bases change.

97-26, TRM Change

This TRM revision changes the configuration of Type C secondary containment to require that the Hatch 2 equipment hatch be removed when Type C containment is in effect. It was determined during initial testing of Type C containment that the refueling floor could not be maintained at > 0.2 in. of water column vacuum with the hatch installed.

The TRM revision also clarifies what type of secondary containment testing is required to be performed during/following the expansion of secondary containment. The difference in testing arises in whether the expansion involves only a volume change or both a volume and a boundary change.

The probability of occurrence or the consequences of a previously evaluated event are not increased by this proposed change since the secondary containment is not an accident precursor. This change only clarifies when secondary containment testing is required for an expansion activity. The change ensures that secondary containment integrity is demonstrated when appropriate, which ensures that the radiological dose consequences remain within those evaluated in the FSAR.

The proposed change does not create the possibility of a new accident since the secondary containment is not an accident precursor. The secondary equipment will be operated as before and the change does not introduce any off-normal methods of equipment operation.

97-27

This change modifies the Unit 2 FSAR concerning radioactive waste management. This change modifies and updates the description of resin bed lifetime, off-gas system flow monitoring, solid radwaste system, dry active waste processing, waste oil handling methods, radwaste volumes, and clarifies the planning of radwaste processing.

The FSAR change concerning radioactive waste management has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for the proposed Technical Specification.

DOCUMENT CHANGE REQUESTS**97-28, TRM Change**

This was a change to the Unit 1 TRM to remove the operability requirements for the LPCI cross-connect valve open annunciator as contained in TLCO 3.3.12. The surveillance requirements on the cross connect valve were also removed from the TRM.

This change does not increase the probability or consequences of a previously evaluated event because the cross connect valve is locked closed and can only be opened under Plant Hatch administrative procedures. Furthermore, the annunciator serves no accident prevention function in the safety analysis. No other safety-related systems designed for the prevention of previously evaluated events, or their mitigation, are affected by this TRM change.

The change does not increase the probability of occurrence of a new type event, since no other systems are affected by this change. Plant systems will still be operated normally per their design basis after this change has been made.

The margin of safety is not reduced since the cross-connect valve is kept locked closed and may only be opened under Plant Hatch administrative procedures. Furthermore, the Technical Specifications contain a surveillance requirement to check that the valve is locked closed once every 31 days. This Technical Specifications surveillance is not being eliminated.

97-29

This change modifies the Unit 1 and Unit 2 FSAR and Unit 1 TRM to resolve inconsistencies between isolation valves for lines penetrating the primary containment and equipment variables listed in the FSARs. This change corrects valve identification nomenclature, adds missing valves, and deletes valves not required by RG 1.97. The change does not modify the operation of the system.

The FSAR and TRM change resolving inconsistencies has no adverse effect on any safety-related system or component. This change does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

97-32, TRM Change

This TRM change was made to align the TRM with a plant design change made under MDC 96-5043. This MDC removed the RHR suction piping relief valves from the Hatch Unit 1 RHR system. The TRM was in turn revised to remove these valves from PCIV tables T 7.0.1 and T 7.0.2.

The TRM change was made under the safety evaluation prepared for MDC 96-5043.

COMMITMENT CHANGES

ITS Program

This safety evaluation was performed to relocate the general description of the Solid Radwaste Process Control Program from the FSAR to the Solid Radwaste Process Control Program manual. This was conservatively classified as a change to the plant described in the FSAR. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The Technical Specifications do not address solid radwaste. Thus, this change cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

PLANT PROCEDURES

34GO-OPS-030-1S

Proposed revision 31 to the daily inside rounds procedure was made to allow personnel to remove a pipe cap downstream of the MCR HVAC strainer backwash isolation valve. The procedure revision further allowed the cap to be left off with a rubber hose routing water to a nearby drain. The change was made due to high frequency of backwashes and to minimize the need to connect/reconnect the rubber hose each time. Since this is different from what is shown in sheet 3 of Unit 1 FSAR figure 10.7-1, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The procedure has no impact on the ability of the PSW system to supply required loads. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

34SO-N62-001-1S

Proposed revision 14 to the offgas system procedure was made to provide steam to the standby offgas heater in order to increase the temperature in the standby recombine loop. This alignment will also improve the performance of the condensate return pumps by increasing the amount of process condensate. This is contrary to P&ID H-16532 in the Unit 1 FSAR. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The procedure has no impact on any system in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

34SO-N62-003-1S

Proposed revision 12 to the offgas auxiliary steam system procedure was made to provide steam to the standby offgas heater in order to increase the temperature in the standby recombiner loop. This alignment will also improve the performance of the condensate return pumps by increasing the amount of process condensate. This is contrary to P&ID H-16532 in the Unit 1 FSAR. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The procedure has no impact on any system in the Technical Specifications. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

PLANT PROCEDURES

34SO-R22-003-2S

This new procedure (de-energizing 4160 VAC bus 2C) was written to allow de-energizing and electrically isolating 4160 VAC bus 2C so that preventive maintenance can be performed on this bus. Since this procedure temporarily changes the plant as described in Unit 2 FSAR paragraph 8.3.1.1.2, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The affected portion of the onsite ac power system is nonsafety related. This is not addressed in Technical Specification 3.8. Additionally, this procedure has no impact on items addressed in Technical Specification 3.8. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

34SO-R43-001-2S

Proposed revision 21 (initiated as Temporary Procedure Changes 97-74 and 97-99) to the DG standby AC system was due to the changeout of a lube oil strainer pressure gauge isolation valve. The old three-way valve was replaced with two separate isolation valves. This resulted in a required change to the Instrument Valve lineup. Since a change to Unit 2 FSAR figure 9.5-1 is required, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

This change merely revises the procedure to match a change made in the plant. System operation is maintained as before. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

34SO-T48-002-1S

Proposed revision 17 (initiated as Temporary Procedure Change 97-192) to the containment atmospheric control and dilution systems procedure was made to preclude simultaneously venting the torus and/or purging the drywell. This revision was deemed different from that described in Unit 1 FSAR paragraph 5.2.3.8. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The procedure separates the purging and venting of the drywell into separate substeps. Otherwise, equipment operation and isolation features of the purge and vent valves are not affected. The procedure continues to ensure that Unit 1 Technical Specifications LCO 3.6.3.2 is satisfied. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

PLANT PROCEDURES

34SQ-T48-002-2S

Proposed revision 16 (initiated as Temporary Procedure Change 97-193) to the containment atmospheric control and dilution systems procedure was made to preclude simultaneously venting the torus and/or purging the drywell. This revision was deemed different from that described in Unit 2 FSAR paragraph 6.2.1.2.1.8. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The procedure separates the purging and venting of the drywell into separate substeps. Otherwise, equipment operation and isolation features of the purge and vent valves are not affected. The procedure continues to ensure that Unit 1 Technical Specifications LCO 3.6.3.2 is satisfied. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

34SV-SUV-008-1S

Proposed revision 14 to the primary containment isolation valve operability procedure was made to change the acceptance criteria for valves 1B21-F016 and 1B21-F019. These valves were modified by DCR 96-005, which changed their acceptance criteria. The safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

There is no required FSAR stroke or response time for either valve, and the containment isolation design function remains unchanged for both valves. Thus, there is no impact on Technical Specifications for PCIVs. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

34SV-T23-002-2S

Proposed revision 1 to the PCIV position indication status check procedure was made to remove reference to valves 2E11-F026A and F026B. These valves no longer serve a function since associated piping was cut and capped during removal of the steam-condensing mode of RHR by DCR 94-032. Since the valves remain on the PCIV tables in the Technical Requirements Manual, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

Since the valves are closed and de-energized, deleting them from the procedure satisfies the requirements of Technical Specifications for PCIVs. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

40AC-ENG-008-0S

Proposed revision 9 (initiated as Temporary Procedure Change 97-60) to the fire protection program procedure changes the way by which transient combustible permits are controlled. Previously, the effect of these permits was, partly, to control plant housekeeping. This change will use the controls for housekeeping, partly, to control transient combustibles. A plant licensing

PLANT PROCEDURES

document (i.e., the FHA) required revision. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The only part of the Technical Specifications that addresses fire protection is 5.4.1.d., which requires written procedures for specified activities including Fire Protection Program implementation. Maximum permissible fire loadings will not be exceeded as a result of this revision; the revision only makes changes to administrative controls for transient combustibles. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

42SP-040897-QF-1-0S

This new procedure (OPRM testing and tuning) provides a document to control testing and tuning of the OPRM of the PRNM. This procedure was classified as a test or experiment, and consequently required that the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation be completed.

The test is to be performed during normal plant operations and evolutions. This procedure does not establish test conditions outside these normal plant operations. Additionally, the OPRM interconnection to RPS is de-activated during this test. Therefore, the proposed procedure does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

42SP-100197-PM-1-1S

This new procedure (Temporary Modification to Unit 1 Division PSW Outage) provides a procedure to ensure required PSW is supplied to the MCR AC units, and that they are maintained in the required configuration. The procedure is considered a change to the plant as described in the FSAR because the FSAR states that PSW to the MCR AC units is supplied by Unit 1. Consequently the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The procedure maintains PSW to the MCR AC units as required and has no impact on analyzed accidents. Therefore, the proposed procedure does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

42SP-100797-OT-1-1S

The new procedure (RFPT main ac oil pump surveillance) provides a document to test the design of the two main ac oil pumps in the Unit 1 reactor feed pump turbines due to previous RFPT trips. The test is different from the test described in the FSAR (i.e., the standby RFPT main ac oil pump will be tested by tripping the running pump instead of the normal practice of starting the standby pump and then tripping the operating pump). Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

PLANT PROCEDURES

The test is to be performed while the plant is at reduced power and is within the capacity of one RFPT. If a trip of the RFPT being tested occurs as a result of this procedure, the plant will already be below the No. 2 speed limiter for the reactor recirculation system. Technical Specifications requirements will be satisfied during the performance of this procedure. Therefore, the proposed procedure does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

42SV-R42-006-0S

Proposed revision 14 to the battery load discharge test procedure was made to prevent nuisance tripping of the switchgear breaker feeding the service battery test bank. Adequate load and circuit protection is maintained by the procedure. Since removal of the main battery fuses is contrary to Unit 1 FSAR section 8.5 and Unit 2 FSAR subsection 8.3.2, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

During performance of this procedure, the loads normally being supplied by the battery being tested are not required to be in service. This in conjunction with maintaining adequate load and circuit protection ensures that the procedure has no impact on Technical Specifications for the specific battery being tested. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

42SV-R42-008-0S

Proposed revision 11 to the battery capacity test (performance test) procedure was made to prevent nuisance tripping of the switchgear breaker feeding the service battery test bank. Adequate load and circuit protection is maintained by the procedure. Since removal of the main battery fuses is contrary to Unit 1 FSAR section 8.5 and Unit 2 FSAR subsection 8.3.2, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

During performance of this procedure, the loads normally being supplied by the battery being tested are not required to be in service. This, in conjunction with maintaining adequate load and circuit protection, ensures that the procedure has no impact on Technical Specifications for the specific battery being tested. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

42SV-R42-009-0S

Proposed revision 2 to the combined service-performance and modified performance tests procedure was made to prevent nuisance tripping of the switchgear breaker feeding the service battery test bank. Adequate load and circuit protection is maintained by the procedure. Since removal of the main battery fuses is contrary to Unit 1 FSAR section 8.5 and Unit 2 FSAR subsection 8.3.2, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

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During performance of this procedure, the loads normally being supplied by the battery being tested are not required to be in service. This, in conjunction with maintaining adequate load and circuit protection, ensures that the procedure has no impact on Technical Specifications for the specific battery being tested. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

90AC-OAP-002-0S

Proposed revision 1 to the scheduling maintenance procedure was made to correct problem areas identified during the Maintenance Rule Inspection and to incorporate comments resulting from a full year of using the procedure. The screening portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation states that Unit 1 FSAR subsection G.5.3 and Unit 2 FSAR subsection 15C.5.3 discuss maintenance during power operation. Thus, since this procedure establishes controls over that process, it was noted that an FSAR procedure was being changed. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was required to be completed.

The revision merely adds additional administrative controls for existing approved maintenance activities. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

246-GP-01, R. 12; 246-GP-03, R. 5; 246-GP-37, R. 5; 246-GP-43, R.3; 246-GP-64, R. 1

This is a group of vendor procedures used for fuel inspection on Unit 2. As a conservative measure, these procedures were classified as a change to procedures described in the FSAR such that the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

All equipment under these activities will be operated as described in procedures which conform to the Technical Specifications, and all postulated accidents are conservatively analyzed by the FSAR or reload licensing submittal. Therefore, the proposed procedure revision does not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

**WP-1-Hatch-HPBH964801, RO; WP-2-Hatch-HPBH964801, RO; QCP-10-1-Hatch
HPBH964801, RO; QCP-10-2-Hatch-HPBH964801, RO**

This is a group of vendor procedures used for inspection and repair of the torus coating for Units 1 and 2. Unit 2 FSAR paragraph 3.8.2.7 requires revision as a result of these procedures. Thus, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation required completion.

Work will be done while the torus is not required to be operable. Any coating/repair will improve the overall reliability of the torus to perform its required function. Therefore, the proposed procedures do not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

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246-GP-03, R.7; 246-GP-37, R.5

These two vendor procedures were used for fuel inspection on Unit 1. As a conservative measure, these procedures were classified as a change to procedures described in the FSAR such that the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

All equipment under these activities will be operated as described in procedures which conform to the Technical Specifications, and all postulated accidents are conservatively bounded by the FSAR or reload licensing submittal. Therefore, the proposed procedure revisions do not reduce the margin.

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORTS

Hatch 2 Cycle 14 COLR, Rev. 0

The Hatch 2 Cycle 14 COLR contains all of the power distribution operating limits required for Cycle 14 operation. This includes: OLMCPRs, APLHGR limits, and ARTS modifiers. The COLR also contains RBM operability requirements and appropriate references.

The COLR is referenced in the Power Distribution Limits section of the Technical Specifications and is Appendix A of the TRM. The Cycle 14 COLR did not alter the physical configuration or operation of any system, structure or component. All values in the COLR were calculated using NRC-approved codes and methods.

Hatch 2 Cycle 14 Reload Safety Evaluation

The reload safety evaluation describes the Cycle 14 final core configuration along with the Cycle 14 reference loading pattern which was used as the basis for reload licensing analyses and SLMCPR calculation. Also noted in the reload safety evaluation is the use of SAFER/GESTR to demonstrate compliance of GE13 fuel with requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. Appropriate references are included.

The Cycle 14 final core loading pattern meets all of the criteria described in GE's NRC-approved licensing topical report, GESTAR-II, for using a reference loading pattern and end-of-previous-cycle exposure conditions as a basis for reload licensing analyses.

Hatch 1 Cycle 17 COLR, Rev. 2

Reduced unnecessary operating conservatisms by: 1) reducing MCPR Operating Limits for a fuel type based on a change in the limiting transient near end of cycle, and 2) increasing APLHGR limits on a sub-batch of fuel based on actual operating histories. Added new ARTS curves for operation with only one turbine pressure regulator in service.

The COLR is referenced in the Power Distribution Limits section of the Technical Specifications and is Appendix A of the TRM. These Cycle 17 COLR changes did not alter the physical configuration or operation of any system, structure or component. All values in the COLR were calculated using NRC-approved codes and methods.

Hatch 1 Cycle 17 COLR, Rev. 3

Reduced unnecessary operating conservatisms by increasing APLHGR limits on a sub-batch of fuel based on the inclusion of additional APLHGR limit values at high exposures.

The COLR is referenced in the Power Distribution Limits section of the Technical Specifications and is Appendix A of the TRM. These Cycle 17 COLR changes did not alter the physical configuration or operation of any system, structure or component. All values in the COLR were calculated using NRC-approved codes and methods.

UNIT 1 AND UNIT 2 CORE OPERATING LIMITS REPORTS

Hatch 1 Cycle 18 COLR, Rev. 0

The Hatch-1 Cycle 18 COLR contains all of the power distribution operating limits required for Cycle 18 operation. This includes: OLMCPRs, APLHGR limits, and ARTS modifiers. The COLR also contains appropriate references.

The COLR is referenced in the Power Distribution Limits section of the Technical Specifications and is Appendix A of the TRM. The Cycle 18 COLR did not alter the physical configuration or operation of any system, structure or component. All values in the COLR were calculated using NRC-approved codes and methods.

Hatch 1 Cycle 18 Reload Safety Evaluation

The reload safety evaluation describes the Cycle 18 final core configuration along with the Cycle 18 reference loading pattern which was used as the basis for reload licensing analyses and SLMCPR calculation. Also noted in the reload safety evaluation is the use of SAFER/GESTR to demonstrate compliance of GE13 fuel with requirements of 10 CFR 50.46. Appropriate references are included.

The Cycle 18 final core loading pattern meets all of the criteria described in GE's NRC-approved licensing topical report, GESTAR-II, for using a reference loading pattern and end-of-previous cycle exposure conditions as a basis for reload licensing analyses.

MAINTENANCE WORK ORDERS

1-97-2559

This safety evaluation was performed for a freeze seal to be applied for MWO 1-97-2559. Valve 1B21-F068C had a bonnet leak; it is located on an unisolable portion of the 12-in. feedwater line that injects into the reactor vessel. Freeze seal was necessary to allow repair to the valve. Placing a freeze seal in the 1-in. test line off of the 12 in. feedwater line was deemed to be a temporary change to the plant as described in the FSAR. Consequently, the safety evaluation portion of the 10 CFR 50.59 evaluation was completed.

The Technical Specifications do not address freeze seals; however, they addressed required systems and actions during OPDRV. The TRM defined OPDRV makes an exception for penetrations ≤ 1 in. in diameter and where barriers are used to isolated these penetrations from the RPV. Thus, it cannot reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any Technical Specification.

DATA TABULATIONS AND UNIQUE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

OCCUPATIONAL PERSONNEL RADIATION EXPOSURE FOR 1997

This section satisfies the requirement of the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specification 5.6.1 and assures compliance with the Code of Federal Regulations. Special attention was afforded to the methods prescribed by the Commission in RG 1.16 in order that the intent, as well as the letter of these laws, might be fulfilled with providing meaningful information as to the degree and circumstances of exposure of personnel at this facility. An indication of the effectiveness of the plant radiation program may be inferred from the large number of individuals with no measurable exposure or minimal dose.

The time period covered by this tabulation extended from January 1, 1997 through December 31, 1997. Individual exposures as indicated by electronic direct reading dosimeters (EDRDs) were recorded daily with the use of an ALARA computer system. These exposures were tabulated and printed in hard copy on a daily basis and when required, along with the difference between these readings and the most restrictive exposure limit. The corresponding EDRD results, as recorded on the disc dosimetry files, were supplanted by thermo-luminescent measurements made over a period of approximately one calendar quarter as the data became available from a vendor. It should be noted, however, that radiation exposure values presented herein were based on EDRA (estimated readings).

Each person listed in the dosimetry disc files was assigned an usual job category based on daily activities. The six job categories are identified in the following table. Running totals of dose acquired in each of these categories were maintained for each person in his/her dosimetry file. Each dosimeter reading was added for individual exposure records and to the total representing the cumulative dose in the appropriate job category.

The implicit assumption involved in this method of accounting for exposure in different tasks is that all exposure acquired in job categories other than the usual will be documented by a Radiation Work Permit. This circumstance should prevail in all significant cases.

Further delineation regarding the number of persons and amount of exposure to individuals in different job categories and by various personnel categories is indicated by the standard reporting format of RG 1.16. Each personnel dosimetry disc file contains the personnel category information required to accomplish the record keeping. The individual running dose totals for each job were used by ALARA Computer to compute the number of man-rem indicated in each group. Backup disc files were maintained for redundancy in the case of destruction of temporary inaccessibility suffered by the files. Hard copy records as printed by the ALARA Computer were also maintained.

By the use of the ALARA computer system, dosimetry information was compiled, retained, and tabulated in such a manner as to satisfy the pertinent Federal regulations and the Technical Specifications. The system has been organized to provide the information in the format specified by these requirements and the suggestions of the Regulatory Guides.

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.16 INFORMATION END-OF-YEAR REPORT - 1997

<u>Work and Job Function</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u> <u>> 100 mrem</u>			<u>Total man-rem*</u>		
	<u>Station</u>	<u>Utility</u>	<u>Contractor</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Utility</u>	<u>Contractor</u>
ROUTINE PLANT MAINTENANCE						
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION	194	14	347	102.267	3.833	173.569
OPERATIONS	24	0	0	7.110	0.004	0.004
HEALTH PHYSICS	18	0	18	6.396	0.053	7.899
SUPERVISORY	20	0	4	10.854	0.141	1.608
ENGINEERING	14	2	9	5.848	0.567	2.957
ROUTINE OPERATIONS AND SURVEILLANCE						
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION	0	0	4	0.037	0.039	2.145
OPERATION	77	0	0	43.441	0.013	0.002
HEALTH PHYSICS	57	5	59	27.986	1.484	26.405
SUPERVISORY	2	0	0	0.780	0.013	0.027
ENGINEERING	2	0	0	0.435	0.000	0.125
INSERVICE INSPECTION						
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION	8	1	30	3.479	0.225	15.486
OPERATIONS	0	0	0	0.108	0.000	0.000
HEALTH PHYSICS	4	0	1	2.080	0.006	0.403
SUPERVISORY	2	0	0	1.456	0.045	0.162
ENGINEERING	1	0	53	0.259	0.161	43.217
SPECIAL PLANT MAINTENANCE						
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION	136	8	282	56.585	2.460	120.953
OPERATIONS	7	0	0	2.682	0.007	0.000
HEALTH PHYSICS	1	1	7	0.800	0.219	1.994
SUPERVISORY	16	0	4	6.177	0.092	1.704
ENGINEERING	10	4	2	2.665	0.881	1.464

1997 ANNUAL OPERATING REPORT

EDWIN L. HATCH NUCLEAR PLANT

REGULATORY GUIDE 1.16 INFORMATION END-OF-YEAR REPORT - 1997

<u>Work and Job Function</u>	<u>Number of Personnel</u> <u>> 100 mrem</u>			<u>Total man-rem*</u>		
	<u>Station</u>	<u>Utility</u>	<u>Contractor</u>	<u>Station</u>	<u>Utility</u>	<u>Contractor</u>
WASTE PROCESSING						
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION	3	0	4	2.340	0.007	1.118
OPERATIONS	0	0	0	0.005	0.000	0.000
HEALTH PHYSICS	3	0	16	1.668	0.000	7.624
SUPERVISORY	0	0	0	0.079	0.000	0.006
ENGINEERING	0	0	0	0.007	0.000	0.003
REFUELING OPERATION						
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION	4	0	78	1.434	0.019	4.088
OPERATIONS	4	0	0	1.161	0.000	0.000
HEALTH PHYSICS	0	0	3	0.087	0.000	0.736
SUPERVISORY	2	0	0	0.587	0.101	0.059
ENGINEERING	0	0	6	0.218	0.003	2.312
Totals						
MAINTENANCE AND CONSTRUCTION	345	23	745	166.142	6.583	347.359
OPERATIONS	112	0	0	54.507	0.024	0.006
HEALTH PHYSICS	83	6	104	39.017	1.756	45.061
SUPERVISORY	42	0	8	19.933	0.392	3.566
ENGINEERING	27	6	70	9.432	1.612	50.078
Grand Totals	609	35	927	289.031	10.367	446.970
						GRAND TOTAL 745.468

*The total radiation exposure of the above personnel constitutes 100% of the site's exposure for the year.