

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

APPROVED OMB NO. 3160-0104
EXPIRES 8/31/86

FACILITY NAME (1) Palo Verde Unit 1		DOCKET NUMBER (2) 050000528	PAGE (3) 1 OF 03
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TITLE (4)
Inoperable Class 1E Batteries Due to Inadequate Surveillance Testing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)		
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES		DOCKET NUMBER(S)
03	21	86	86	026	00	04	18	86			050000

OPERATING MODE (9) 1	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)																						
POWER LEVEL (10) 000	20.402(b)	20.405(a)(1)(i)	20.405(a)(1)(ii)	20.405(a)(1)(iii)	20.405(a)(1)(iv)	20.405(a)(1)(v)	20.405(a)(1)(vi)	20.406(c)	50.36(a)(1)	50.36(a)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(vi)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	50.73(a)(2)(ix)	73.71(b)	73.71(c)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)		TELEPHONE NUMBER
NAME William F. Quinn, Manager - Nuclear Licensing (Extension 4087)	AREA CODE 602	943-7200

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS	CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPROS

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (if yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces; i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 21, 1986, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 at 0 percent power (COLD SHUTDOWN). A Technical Specification Interpretation was being evaluated. During the course of the evaluation, it was determined that the intercell resistance measurement data recorded during Pre-operational testing was invalid, and therefore was assumed to exceed the limit of Technical Specification 4.8.2.1.c.3. This data had been misinterpreted by personnel as being acceptable, surveillance test credit was taken, and the Unit 1 class 1E batteries had been declared OPERABLE for initial Mode 4 entry.

The root cause of this event was cognitive personnel error, since personnel (contractor and utility) submitted a request for Pre-operational test credit for the 18 month surveillance test based on the start-up testing, and credit was subsequently granted by a plant review committee.

As an immediate corrective action, the 18 month surveillance test of the 125 V batteries was completed and verified to be within the Technical Specification criteria on March 21, 1986, for Unit 1.

As an additional corrective action, appropriate personnel were counseled and a sample review of other surveillance test credit taken based on Pre-operational testing is being performed. There were no component, system, or safety train failures that contributed to the event.

A similar event is being reported in Unit 2 LER 86-012-00.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 21, 1986, Unit 1 was in Mode 5 at 0 percent power (COLD SHUTDOWN). A Technical Specification Interpretation was being evaluated. The evaluation involved a concern of high readings on the 18 month surveillance test of the 125 V batteries (BTRY)(EJ).

During this evaluation, it was determined that the intercell resistance measurement data, recorded during Pre-operational testing, had exceeded the Technical Specification 4.8.2.1.c.3. limit of 1.5 E-4 Ohms. The data was misinterpreted by personnel (utility and contractor) as being acceptable; subsequently, surveillance test credit was taken and the Unit 1 Class 1E batteries were declared OPERABLE for initial Mode 4 entry. Based on this review, it was determined that the 18 month surveillance requirement for the 125 V battery bank was not performed adequately for Unit 1.

The Pre-operational test was to establish baseline data, and a test instrument was used which was not capable of measurements below 1.0 E-3 Ohms. Although the test instrument was satisfactory for measuring baseline data, it was not capable of measuring the required Technical Specification criteria, which was established after the Pre-operational test had been completed.

The root cause of the event was cognitive personnel error, since personnel (contractor and utility) submitted a request for Pre-operational test credit for this 18 month surveillance test based on the start-up testing, and credit was subsequently granted by a plant review committee without noting the oversight. The submittal and approval of the request was accomplished per procedure and there were no errors in the procedure that contributed to the event.

There were no unusual characteristics of the work location that directly contributed to the personnel error discussed in this LER. There were no component, system, or safety train failures that contributed to the event.

As an immediate corrective action, the 18 month surveillance test of the 125 V battery bank was completed and verified to be within the Technical Specification criteria on March 21, 1986.

As an additional corrective action, appropriate personnel were counseled. Also, a sample review of other surveillance test credit taken based on Pre-operational testing is being performed, in accordance with MIL Standard 105D.

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TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

Since no maintenance has been required to be performed to clean the intercell connection during the time period in question, and since the intercell connection resistance can only increase due to corrosion, oxidation or detorquing during any period of time with no corrective maintenance, the terminal resistance could only have been less than or equal to those values recorded on March 21, 1986.

Additionally, two actual Loss of Offsite Power events occurred in October, 1985 (see LER's 85-058 and 85-076). In each case, the diesel generators started and provided power to the Emergency Buses as required. A spurious Engineered Safety Feature Actuation occurred on December 16, 1985 (see LER 85-083). A Reactor Trip caused by a failure of Non-Essential loads to transfer during testing occurred on January 9, 1986 (see LER 86-006). Although surveillance credit is not being assumed for these occurrences, these are positive indications that the 125 V batteries performed their design safety function during the time period since Unit 1 had initially entered Mode 4. Therefore, there are no significant safety consequences or implications associated with these events.

A similar event is being reported in Unit 2 LER 86-012-00.



Arizona Nuclear Power Project

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April 18, 1986
ANPP-36297-EEVB/PGN/98.05

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Unit 1
Docket No. STN 50-528 (License NPF-41)
Licensee Event Report - 86-026-00
File: 86-020-404

Dear Sirs:

Attached please find Licensee Event Report (LER) No. 86-026-00 prepared and submitted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73. In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(d), we are herewith forwarding a copy of the LER to the Regional Administrator of the Region V Office.

If you have any questions, please contact me.

Very truly yours,

E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
Executive Vice President
Project Director

EEVB/PGN/rw
Attachment

cc: J. B. Martin (all w/a)
R. P. Zimmerman
A. L. Hon
E. A. Licitra
A. C. Gehr
INPO Records Center

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