



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
REGION II
101 MARIETTA STREET, N.W., SUITE 2900
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30323-0199

July 27, 1995

MEMORANDUM FOR: Ellis W. Merschoff, Director
Division of Reactor Projects

FROM: Curtis W. Rapp
Reactor Inspector
Division of Reactor Safety

SUBJECT: CRYSTAL RIVER 3 APPARENT VIOLATIONS RESULTING FROM PERFORMANCE OF
UNAPPROVED TEST

Having been excluded from the discussions for the above subject, I now am aware that several violations are under consideration. Since I accompanied OI to provide technical support, I reviewed the procedures referenced in support of these proposed violations. Based on my review of the procedures and understanding of commercial nuclear power plant operations, I believe that three of the proposed violations have no merit.

The violation for failure to follow procedure OP-402, Makeup and Purification System, does not apply because the operators did comply with OP-402. I reach this conclusion based on the following.

When increasing MUT overpressure, OP-402 specifically states the maximum allowable overpressure is given by OP-103B Curve 8. The operators complied with that guidance and did not exceed the maximum allowable overpressure when initially increasing MUT overpressure.

When changing MUT level, OP-402 does not give any guidance to maintain MUT overpressure within the limits given by OP-103B Curve 8.

There is no precaution or limitation that directs the operators to maintain MUT overpressure within the limits given by OP-103B Curve 8.

I concluded that OP-402 is weak in operator direction or guidance; however, it is not appropriate to cite the violation in a manner that holds the operators accountable for procedural weaknesses.

The violation for failure to comply with procedure AR-403 PSA H, Annunciator Response, does not apply because the operators did not need to comply with AR-403. I reached this conclusion based on the following.

When conducting an evolution it is not necessary or desirable to respond to alarms generated as a consequence of the evolution. The necessary

actions to bring any parameter back within the allowable limits would be taken when the evolution was completed. This evolution was completed when operators had restored MUT level. MUT overpressure was within the limits of OP-103B Curve 8 when MUT level was restored. I explained this concept during the conference call on this matter.

These alarms are to warn operators when a parameter is outside of the expected steady-state limits and are not valid when in a transient condition.

Considering the fact the operators did not know that OP-103B Curve 8 was a design basis limit, it is unreasonable to have expected the operators to respond to this alarm. The reason for the operators failure to respond being highlighted in the OI report is to emphasize the overt willfulness of the operators actions.

The violation for exceeding OP-103B Curve 8 is not a violation in and of itself. OP-103B is not a procedure but contains the administrative limits for the operation of Crystal River 3. Therefore, OP-103 Curve 8 must be referenced within the context of a procedural requirement.

Based on my review and understanding of commercial nuclear power plant operational practices, I concluded the only valid violation was AI-500, Conduct of Operations, for failing to operate the plant within administrative limits.

It is regrettable that my observations and conclusions were not sought during the preparation of the proposed enforcement action. If you have any questions or comments, I am available to discuss them.

cc:

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