APPENDIX

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION REGION IV

NRC Inspection Report: 50-267/86-13

License: DPR-34

Docket: 50-267

Licensee: Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC)

Facility Name: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station

Inspection At: Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station, Platteville, Colorado

Inspection Conducted: May 1 through June 6, 1986

all

Inspector:

arre Resident Inspector (SRI) Senior

7/1/86 Date

Approved:

Jaudon, Chief, Project Section A Reactor Projects Branch

Inspection Summary

Inspection Conducted May 1 through June 6, 1986 (Report 50-267/86-13)

Areas Inspected: Routine, unannounced inspection of operational safety verification, surveillances, engineered safety features, maintenance, and security.

Results: Within the five areas inspected, no violations or deviations were identified.

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DETAILS

Persons Contacted 1.

Principal Licensee Employees

- D. Alps, Security Supervisor
- T. Borst, Support Services Manager/Radiation Protection Manager
- *R. Craun, Site Engineering Manager
- M. Deniston, Shift Supervisor
- J. Eggebroten, Superintendent, Technical Services Engineering
- D. Evans, Superintendent, Operations
- M. Ferris, QA Operations Manager
- *C. Fuller, Station Manager
- S. Hofstetter, Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- *J. Gahm, Manager, Nuclear Production
- J. Gramling, Site Licensing Supervisor
- *P. Moore, Supervisor, Quality Assurance Technical Support
- *F. Novachek, Technical/Administrative Services Manager
- *T. Prenger, QA Services Manager
- *K. Purnell, Nuclear Licensing Engineer
- J. Sills, Supervisor, Technical Services
- *L. Singleton, Manager, QA
- *D. Warembourg, Manager, Nuclear Engineering R. Walker, President, Chief Executive Officer

The SRI also contacted other licensee and contractor personnel during the inspection.

*Denotes those attending the exit interview conducted June 6, 1986.

2. Operational Safety Verification

The SRI reviewed licensee activities to ascertain that the facility is being operated safely and in conformance with regulatory requirements and that the licensee's management control system is effectively discharging its responsibilities for continued safe operation.

The review was conducted by direct observation of activities, tours of the facility, interviews and discussions with licensee personnel, independent verification of safety system status and limiting conditions for operation, and review of facility records.

Logs and records reviewed included:

Shift supervisor logs Reactor operator logs

- Equipment operator logs
- Auxiliary operator logs
- Technical specification compliance logs
- Operations order book
- Operations deviation reports
- Clearance log
- . Temporary configuation reports
- Station service requests (SSR)

During tours of accessible areas, particular attention was directed to the following:

- Monitoring instrumentation
- . Radiation controls
- . Housekeeping
- . Fluid leaks
- . Piping vibrations
- . Hanger/seismic restraints
- . Clearance tags
- . Fire hazards
- . Control room manning
- . Annunciators

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Surveillances

During the inspection period, the NRC SRI verified that the Technical Specification surveillances were current. Particular surveillance records examined included:

- . thermal coefficient of reactivity
- . regional peaking factor
- . control rod worth

On June 3, 1986, at 4:55 a.m. (MDT), Surveillance SR 5.6.1b-SA1, "Loss of outside power with the main turbine generator tripped (Part 1)," was performed. The NRC SRI was in the control room and observed preparation for, conduct of, and recovery from this surveillance test. The procedure used was current and had been reviewed by the plant operations review committee. Quality control witness hold points had been established, and a quality control inspector was present throughout conduct of the test. Shift staffing was augmented for conduct of the test, and an extra shift supervisor was on duty serving as the test conductor.

The plant was secured from the test at 6:50 a.m. (MDT). All systems performed as designed.

No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.

4. Engineered Safety Features

During the inspection period, the NRC SRI verified the auto-start configuation of the emergency diesel generators and the motor driven fire water pump, which provides an engineered safety feature function. At the close of the inspection period, the plant was shut down for equipment qualification modifications in accordance with 10CFR 50.49 and one of the diesel generator sets was taken out of service for routine maintenance.

No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.

5. Maintenance

During the inspection period, the NRC SRI followed up an item identified during the maintenance team inspection (NRC Inspection Report 50-267/86-09).

This item concerned drawings and is described below:

The drawings used by the licensee to calibrate pressure differential indicating switch PDIS-21-393 did not agree. The instrument setpoints listed on the master setpoint list and the piping and instrumentation drawing included one set of values that were instrument setpoints. The schematic drawings included a different set of values. The schematic drawings were incorrect. The licensee has indicated the intention to remove the instrument setpoint values from the schematic drawings as the master setpoint list is the document referred to for these values. Since the schematic drawings are controlled drawings, this was identified as a violation. However, since it was also identified as a violation in the maintenance inspection report (NRC Inspection Report 50-267/86-09), it is not cited in this report.

Additional maintenance items, which had been questioned during the maintenance team inspection, were reviewed:

Maintenance records indicated the calibration of differential pressure switch PDIS-21-393 had not been conducted annually as required by Technical Specification. This switch is on a 12-month caloration cycle, and the maintenance records indicated two different periods when the calibration was not performed for 2 years. The maintenance records are not the official surveillance records for the instrument. A check of the records for Technical Specification Surveillance SR 5.2.8c-A indicated that the instrument had been calibrated on schedule and that no calibrations were missed.

Procedure RP-89A for calibrating a differential pressure transmitter included a step which potentially exposed the technician to an electrical shock hazard. The licensee has generated new procedures, one for differential pressure transmitters without environmental qualification considerations and one for differential pressure transmitters with environmental qualification requirements. These new procedures eliminate the potential shock hazard to the technician.

Station Service Request (SSR) 85511583, concerning corrective maintenance on valve SV-21-05, circulator 1A steam control valve, was reviewed. The inspection revealed that during performance of the work on this SSR, the problem with the valve was diagnosed as a wrong part in a solenoid valve in the hydraulic actuator. The part (an orifice) was replaced with a plug, and the valve was reassembled. Post-maintenance testing demonstrated that the excessive bleed rate had been corrected. Quality assurance management and the quality control inspector both signed the SSR after completion of the work, and neither generated a nonconformance report.

Inspection by the NRC SRI identified that the SSR was generated to correct valve performance. Valve performance was successfully corrected during the maintenance activity and a nonconformance report was required only if the nonconforming condition was not rectified during the maintenance activity.

No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.

6. Security

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During the inspection period, the NRC SRI monitored security force manning and alertness on the plant perimeter, in the central alarm station, and in the secondary alarm station, as well as in the primary access point. The security force was monitored on backshifts and weekends as well as during normal working hours.

No violations or deviations were identified in this inspection area.

7. Exit Meeting

An exit meeting was conducted on June 6, 1986, at which time the NRC SRI reviewed the scope and findings of this inspection. The meeting was attended by those indicated in paragraph 1.