


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February 5, 1999

Docket Nos. 50-321
50-366



HL-5591

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Request to Revise Technical Specifications to
Implement Previously Approved Generic Changes

Ladies and Gentlemen:

In accordance with the provisions of 10 CFR 50.90, as required by 10 CFR 50.59(c)(1), Southern Nuclear Operating Company hereby proposes changes to the Plant Hatch Units 1 and 2 Technical Specifications, Appendix A to operating licenses DPR-57 and NPF-5, respectively. The proposed changes implement some of the generic changes to the Improved Technical Specifications previously approved by the NRC. Additionally, a specification to test the Unit 1 automatic scram relay on a periodic basis is being added.

Enclosure 1 provides a description of the proposed changes and a justification for each change. Enclosure 2 details the basis for SNC's determination the proposed changes do not involve a significant hazards consideration. Enclosure 3 provides page change instructions for incorporating the proposed changes. Following Enclosure 3 are the revised Technical Specifications pages. Enclosure 4 provides the associated Bases pages for your information. Enclosure 5 provides the corresponding mark-ups of the Technical Specifications and Bases pages.

In accordance with the requirements of 10 CFR 50.91, the designated State official will be sent a copy of this letter and all applicable enclosures.

Mr. H. L. Sumner, Jr. states he is Vice President of Southern Nuclear Operating Company and is authorized to execute this oath on behalf of Southern Nuclear Operating Company, and to the best of his knowledge and belief, the facts set forth in this letter are true.

Respectfully submitted,

H. L. Sumner, Jr.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 5th day of February 1999.

Notary Public

MY COMMISSION EXPIRES SEPTEMBER 17, 2000

Commission Expiration Date: 12004

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U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Page 2

February 5, 1999

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Enclosures:

1. Basis for Change Request
2. 10 CFR 50.92 Evaluation
3. Page Change Instructions
4. Bases Changes
5. Hand-Marked Pages

cc: Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Mr. P. H. Wells, Nuclear Plant General Manager
NORMS

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C.
Mr. L. N. Olshan, Project Manager - Hatch

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Region II
Mr. L. A. Reyes, Regional Administrator
Mr. J. T. Munday, Senior Resident Inspector - Hatch

State of Georgia
Mr. L. C. Barrett, Commissioner - Department of Natural Resources

Enclosure 1

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant Request to Revise Technical Specifications to Implement Previously Approved Generic Changes

Basis for Change Request

Introduction

Southern Nuclear Operating Company (SNC) proposes to revise the Plant Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 Technical Specifications to implement some of the NRC-approved generic changes for the standard Improved Technical Specifications (ITS). This proposed amendment consists of nine generic changes applicable to both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Additionally, a change is being made to ensure the Unit 1 automatic scram relay is tested periodically; this is not a generic change.

In July 1995, Plant Hatch Unit 1 and Unit 2 implemented the ITS, and since that time, have operated under the ITS. SNC is represented in the Boiling Water Reactor Owners' Group Technical Specifications Committee and is cognizant of the overall generic change process, as well as individual generic changes.

Proposed Change One (Approved TSTF No. 45, WOG-39)

Proposed Change One revises Surveillance Requirements (SR) 3.6.1.3.2 and SR 3.6.1.3.3 to specify that the primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) that are already locked, sealed, or otherwise secured do not need to have their positions verified via these SRs.

SRs 3.6.1.3.2 and 3.6.1.3.3 require verification that the PCIVs required to be closed during accident conditions are indeed closed. The proposed wording clarifies that the intent of the SR is to provide verification for those valves not somehow secured in the closed position. The proposed change is consistent with the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) Specifications; e.g., SR 3.5.2.4, which do not require verification of valves that are "locked, sealed, or otherwise secured in position." This is acceptable, because the subject valves were verified to be in the correct position prior to locking, sealing, or securing, and are periodically checked via the locked valve procedure once every 18 months and as deemed necessary by Operations Department management.

Proposed Change Two (Approved TSTF No. 33, BWROG-4)

Proposed Change Two revises Technical Specification 3.1.3, Required Action A.2, to relocate the Note currently in the Required Action to the Completion Time column. This change precludes not meeting the Completion Time if Thermal Power is increased above the low power setpoint (LPSP) of the rod worth minimizer (RWM) greater than 24 hours after discovery of the stuck withdrawn rod.

Enclosure 1
Basis for Change Request

The Note in Required Action A.2 states that the Required Action does not have to be performed if power is less than or equal to the LPSP of the RWM. Thus, if Condition A (stuck withdrawn rod) is entered during a startup while below the LPSP, the Required Action does not have to be performed. However, according to Technical Specification 1.3, Completion Times, the 24 hour clock of Required Action A.2 does start. If power is subsequently increased to above the LPSP, the Required Action must be performed, and if more than 24 hours have expired since the discovery of the stuck rod, the Required Action must be considered not met. This means that Required Action E, which requires a unit shutdown, must be entered. The intent of Required Action A.2 is to provide a 24 hour period in which to perform SRs 3.1.3.2 and 3.1.3.3 after the capability to perform the SRs exists; i.e., from discovery of the stuck withdrawn control rod concurrent with thermal power greater than the LPSP of the RWM. Relocating the text of the Required Action A.2 Note into the Completion Time column correctly incorporates this requirement, consistent with other similar requirements in the ITS.

Proposed Change Three (Approved TSTF No. 34, BWROG-5)

Proposed Change Three revises Technical Specification 3.1.3 by deleting Required Action B.1.

Required Action A.1 of Technical Specification 3.1.3, Control Rod Operability, requires that, in the event one withdrawn control rod is stuck, the associated control rod drive (CRD) be disarmed within 2 hours. Required Action B.1 of Specification 3.1.3 requires that, in the event of two or more stuck control rods, the associated CRDs be disarmed within 2 hours. In accordance with Technical Specification 1.3, Completion Times, if two or more withdrawn control rods are stuck, Condition A is entered separately for each withdrawn stuck control rod. Specification 1.3 also requires Condition B to be entered concurrently for this situation and the Required Actions of Condition B to be taken. As a result, Required Actions A.1 and B.1 (which provide the same requirements) must both be applied within the same time period for each withdrawn stuck control rod. Therefore, Required Action B.1 is deleted, since the requirement to disarm the associated CRD when in Condition B is adequately addressed by Required Action A.1 and Specification 1.3.

Proposed Change Four (Approved TSTF No. 38, BWROG-11)

Proposed Change Four revises SR 3.8.4.3 to clarify that the inspection performed per this SR is for physical damage or abnormal deterioration that could affect battery performance.

The Technical Specifications Bases for SR 3.8.4.3 states: "Visual inspection of the battery cells, cell plates, and battery racks provides an indication of physical damage or abnormal degradation that could potentially degrade battery performance." This statement is interpreted to mean that the presence of physical damage or deterioration does not necessarily represent a failure of SR 3.8.4.3, provided an evaluation determines that the damage or deterioration does not affect the operability of the battery. Therefore, for consistency with the Bases, the proposed words "that could degrade battery performance" are added to SR 3.8.4.3.

Proposed Change Five (Approved TSTF No. 17, WOG-33)

Proposed Change Five extends the Frequency of SR 3.6.1.2.2 from 184 days to 24 months and deletes the associated Note.

Typically, the primary containment air lock door interlock is installed after each refueling outage, verified operable with this surveillance, and not disturbed until the next outage. Also, when an airlock door is opened during times the interlock is required, plant procedures require the operator to first verify that one door is completely closed before attempting to open the other door. Therefore, the interlock is not challenged except during actual testing of the interlock. Consequently, it should be sufficient to ensure proper operation of the interlock by testing it on a 24-month interval.

Testing of the airlock interlock mechanism is accomplished through having one door not completely engaged in the closed position, while attempting to open the second door. Failure of this Surveillance could result in a loss of containment integrity. Procedures and training do not allow this interlock to be challenged for ingress and egress. One door is opened, all personnel and equipment are placed into the airlock, as necessary, and the door is completely closed prior to attempting to open the second door. This Surveillance is contrary to processes and training of conservative operation when the interlock function is required.

Historically, this interlock verification has had its Frequency chosen to coincide with the Frequency of the overall airlock leakage test. According to 10 CFR 50, Appendix J, Option A, the maximum frequency is 30 months.

For the above reasons, SNC proposes to change the required Frequency for SR 3.6.1.2.2 from 184 days to 24 months. In this fashion, the interlock can always be tested in a mode where the interlock is not required. With this Frequency change, the Note is not needed, because testing will be conducted during a plant shutdown and will not be required until the following plant shutdown for refueling.

Proposed Change Six (Approved TSTF No. 166, WOG-78)

Proposed Change Six revises limiting condition for operation (LCO) 3.0.6 to correct an inconsistency between the LCO and Technical Specification 5.510, Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP), regarding the performance of an evaluation.

Currently, there is an inconsistency among LCO 3.0.6, the SFDP, and the Bases for LCO 3.0.6. As currently written, LCO 3.0.6 does not explicitly require an evaluation in accordance with the SFDP. LCO 3.0.6 states that further evaluation may be required. However, both the SFDP and the Bases for LCO 3.0.6 state that upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, an evaluation shall be made to determine if a loss of safety function exists. In addition, because LCO 3.0.6 states that the evaluation be performed in accordance with the SFDP and the SFDP states that other appropriate actions may be taken, the statement "additional...limitations may be required" is not needed in LCO 3.0.6.

Proposed Change Seven (Approved TSTF No. 76, R.1, CEOG-30)

Proposed Change Seven revises Technical Specification 5.5.1 to remove a reference to the onsite review committee relative to the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM).

Revision 1 of the ITS NUREG eliminated the description and requirements for onsite review functions. However, the BWR/4 and BWR/6 ODCM program descriptions still contain a reference for ODCM changes to be reviewed and approved by the onsite review function. (This is the Plant Review Board for Plant Hatch.) Therefore, Specification 5.5.1.b is being revised to state that ODCM changes will be effective upon the approval of the Plant Manager. This is consistent with the ITS NUREG. The review functions for ODCM changes, prior to Plant Manager approval, will be relocated to licensee controlled documents.

Proposed Change Eight (Approved TSTF No. 5; WOG-2)

Proposed Change Eight deletes some of the safety limit violation notification requirements in Technical Specification 2.2. Also, this proposed revision removes references to the "corporate executive responsible for overall plant safety."

These requirements are redundant to other requirements and regulations. For example, the requirement to notify the NRC Operations Center is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii). Similarly, the requirement to submit a Licensee Event Report is already provided in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii).

Proposed Change Nine (This change is specific to Hatch)

Proposed Change Nine adds a footnote to the Unit 1 Technical Specifications (Table 3.3.1.1-1) to test the auto scram relays (K14s) on a weekly basis. Presently, the manual scram relays (K15s) are tested on a weekly basis. These relays are direct input to the de-energization logic for the scram pilot solenoids. As a result, the Unit 1 manual scram logic alone is capable of initiating a rapid control rod insertion of all control rods. On Unit 2, the manual scram logic inputs into the automatic scram logic and, as a result, both manual scram and automatic scram relays are tested weekly as part of the manual scram functional test. It is desirable to test the Unit 1 auto scram relays (K14s) on the same frequency as the manual relays (K15s). In fact, this was done on Unit 1 prior to implementation of the new power range neutron monitoring system, which increased the Surveillance interval on the average power range monitor (APRM) High scram to every 184 days. Previously, the APRM High Functional Test was required to be performed weekly; thus, the auto scram relay (K14s) Functional Test was required on the same Frequency as the manual scram relays (K15s). The K14s are presently being tested on a weekly basis via procedural controls.

To ensure the K14s are tested weekly, it is necessary to impose a new SR on the K14s. This will be accomplished by adding a footnote to the manual scram SRs indicating the K14s should also be tested as a part of the manual scram channel Functional Test.

Enclosure 2

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Request to Revise Technical Specifications to
Implement Previously Approved Generic Changes

10 CFR 50.92 Significant Hazards Evaluation

In 10 CFR 50.92(c), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission provides the following standards to be used in determining the existence of a significant hazards consideration:

...a proposed amendment to an operating facility licensed under 50.21(b) or 50.22 for a testing facility involves no significant hazards consideration if operation of the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not: (1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of an accident of a new or different kind from any previously evaluated; or (3) involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

Southern Nuclear has reviewed the proposed license amendment request and determined its adoption does not involve a significant hazards consideration based on the following discussion:

Justification for Proposed Changes

1. *The proposed changes do not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of a previously evaluated event for the following reasons:*

Proposed Change One

The majority of primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) should be in the closed position following an accident to prevent the release of radiation to the environment. Locked PCIVs are verified to be in the closed position prior to being locked. Therefore, it is unnecessary for these valves to be verified closed under the provisions of Surveillance Requirements (SRs) 3.6.1.3.2 and 3.6.1.3.3. The fact that the valves are secured closed assures they will be in the safe position following an accident. Furthermore, per Plant Hatch procedure, locked valves are periodically verified to be in their correct position. This provides additional assurance the valves will remain in the correct position. For these reasons, the proposed change does not involve a significant increase in the probability or the consequences of a previously evaluated event.

Proposed Change Two

This proposed change does not affect the function of the control rods, the control rod drive (CRD) system, or the control rod housing. Thus, the probability of the control rod drop accident (CRDA) is not increased. Also, this change does not affect the function of the rod worth minimizer (RWM). As with the present Technical Specification, no control rods will be moved (via SRs 3.1.3.2 and 3.1.3.3) when below the low power setpoint (LPSP) to limit

interference with respect to the RWM's function in limiting the consequences of a CRDA. Additionally, no other systems designed to prevent or mitigate the consequences of any other transient or accident are affected.

Proposed Change Three

This proposed change merely deletes a redundant specification in the control rod operability section. The requirement to electrically disarm an inoperable withdrawn control rod ensures the validity of banked position withdrawal sequence (BPWS) is maintained, thus ensuring the mitigation of the consequences of the CRDA. This proposed change in no way affects the BPWS, the RWM, or the structures of the control rods and control rod drive. Thus, the probability, or the consequences, of a previously evaluated event are not increased by this proposed change.

Proposed Change Four

Any physical deterioration of a station service battery that can cause degradation of battery performance will result in failure of the SR, with the ensuing inoperable declaration of the battery. A determination that battery performance is not degraded, or will not degrade, will result from evaluation of the particular abnormality found while performing the Surveillance. This is the intent of the Technical Specification as clarified in the Bases.

Accordingly, the safety function of the station service batteries is not compromised as a result of this proposed change. Thus, the consequences of a previously evaluated event are not affected by this proposed revision. The proposed revision does not affect any system needed to prevent the occurrence of previously analyzed events; therefore, the probability of occurrence of a previously evaluated event is not increased.

Proposed Change Five

The purpose of the primary containment air interlock is to provide access to the primary containment while maintaining containment integrity. Extending the Surveillance Frequency on the airlock to once per 24 months will not increase the likelihood of occurrence of any previously evaluated event, since no change in the operation or testing of any system designed for the prevention of accidents and transients is being made.

Extending the Frequency of the airlock interlock Surveillance does not increase the consequences of any accident or transient, since the proposed change does not affect any system designed to mitigate the consequences of a previously analyzed event. In fact, the extended Frequency will challenge the airlock interlock less; thus, the likelihood of a loss of primary containment integrity will decrease.

Proposed Change Six

This proposed change to the Safety Function Determination Program (SFDP) description in LCO 3.0.6 is more restrictive than the existing version. Requiring an SFDP evaluation upon entry into LCO 3.0.6, as stated in the Bases, will not increase the probability of occurrence

or the consequences of a previously evaluated event, since this is purely an administrative change to clarify the intent of LCO 3.0.6 and provide consistency with the Bases.

Proposed Change Seven

This proposed administrative change merely relocates the review requirements for the Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) to licensee controlled documents. This change does not affect any system designed for the prevention or mitigation of previously analyzed events or any assumptions regarding transient and accident analyses.

Proposed Change Eight

This proposed administrative change eliminates some of the redundant reporting requirements for safety limit violations listed in the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect any systems designed for the prevention or mitigation of any previously evaluated accident or transient. Additionally, the change does not affect any assumptions of previously evaluated accidents or transient analyses.

Proposed Change Nine

This change adds a footnote to Unit 1 Technical Specifications Table 3.3.1.1-1 to ensure the auto scram relays (K14s) are tested as part of the manual scram Functional Test. This change does not adversely affect the ability of the reactor protection system (RPS) to perform its safety function. In fact, the added testing requirement enhances the ability to detect and correct problems with the RPS. Successful testing of the K14s on a weekly basis for many years has demonstrated that the additional testing requirements do not impose an undue burden on the system. No other systems designed for the prevention or mitigation of accidents are affected by this change. Therefore, the probability, or the consequences, of a previously evaluated event are not increased.

2. *The proposed changes do not create the possibility of an accident of a new or different kind from any previously evaluated.*

Proposed Change One

Removing the SR to verify locked valves are in their "safe" position does not increase the likelihood of occurrence or consequences of a new type of event, since no new modes of operation are introduced. All plant systems will continue to be operated within their design basis. Since the valves are verified to be in their safe position prior to locking, and are periodically verified to be in that position per the locked valve procedure, the valves will be in the position assumed by accident analyses should an event occur.

Proposed Change Two

This proposed change does not affect the function of either the CRD system or the RWM. These systems, as well as all other systems designed for the prevention or mitigation of accidents, will continue to function per their design basis. Also, the BPWS will continue to

be used for control rod withdrawal. Thus, no new modes of operation that would cause a type of failure different from any previously analyzed are introduced.

Proposed Change Three

Deleting Required Action B.1 of Technical Specification 3.1.3 does not eliminate any Required Actions, since the subject Required Action is redundant. Deleting the redundant specification does not prevent any of the control rod control systems from performing their functions per their design bases. Therefore, no new modes of operation are introduced, and the probability of a new type event is also not introduced by this proposed change.

Proposed Change Four

No changes to the operation, maintenance, or testing of the batteries are proposed. The batteries will continue to operate within their design basis. As a result, no new modes of operation are introduced, and thus, the probability of occurrence of a new type event is not created.

Proposed Change Five

This change is administrative in the sense that it does not result in the airlock being operated or tested outside of its design. The proposed revision only includes a change to the Frequency of SR 3.6.1.2.2, which tests the interlock's ability to prevent the two primary containment airlock doors from opening at the same time. This change does not affect how the test is to be performed or how the doors are operated. Therefore, the probability of occurrence of a new type event is not increased by the proposed change.

Proposed Change Six

This proposed administrative change to the SFDP description does not involve the operation of any safety-related system. Furthermore, this change does not involve accident or transient analyses; thus, no changes to the assumptions for the analyses are made. As a result, the probability of occurrence of a new type event is not increased.

Proposed Change Seven

This administrative change merely relocates the review requirements for the ODCM to licensee controlled documents. This change does not affect any system designed for the prevention or mitigation of previously analyzed events or any assumptions regarding transient and accident analysis. Accordingly, the possibility of a new type event is not created.

Proposed Change Eight

This administrative change eliminates some of the redundant reporting requirements for safety limit violations listed in the Technical Specifications. This change does not affect any systems designed for the prevention or mitigation of any previously evaluated accident or

transient. Additionally, the change does not affect any assumptions of previously evaluated accident or transient analyses. Accordingly, the possibility of a new type event is not created.

Proposed Change Nine

Adding a requirement to test the auto scram relays (K14s) on a weekly basis does not create a new mode of operation for the RPS. Also, no other safety-related systems are affected by this change, and as a result, the possibility of occurrence of a new type accident is not created.

3. *The changes do not significantly reduce the margin of safety.*

Proposed Change One

Not requiring position surveillance on PCIVs locked in position does not reduce the margin of safety, because the valves are verified to be in their "safe" position prior to locking. This ensures the valve will remain in the "safe" position until it is unlocked again. The position of these locked valves is verified periodically by the Operations Department. Furthermore, a "malicious" unlocking of the valves is unlikely to take place, since the keys to the valves are controlled by the shift supervisor (SS). Anyone wanting to check out a key must obtain SS approval. Also, the locked valves are periodically verified to be in their proper position whenever Operations Management deems it necessary. For these reasons, the margin of safety is not significantly reduced.

Proposed Change Two

Moving the Technical Specification 3.1.3 Note from the Required Action column to the Completion Time column will not affect the safety function of the RWM system. The RWM will continue to function through the power ranges where the control rod drop accident is of concern. The change does not affect the safety function of the RWM in any way. Thus, the margin of safety is not reduced.

Proposed Change Three

This proposed change only eliminates a redundant Specification. Adherence to the requirements of the BPWS will still be maintained during plant startups. Also, the operation of the RWM system remains unaffected by this proposed change. For these reasons, the margin of safety for the CRDA is not reduced.

Proposed Change Four

This proposed change clarifies that the purpose of SR 3.8.4.3 is to determine whether a physical deterioration that could affect battery performance exists. This is already stated in the Plant Hatch Technical Specifications Bases; thus, the proposed revision is merely a clarification of the Specification. Adding this clarification does not reduce the margin of safety with respect to battery performance, because an engineering evaluation must be

performed to document that the particular deficiency will not prevent the battery from performing its safety function.

Proposed Change Five

This proposed change to extend the Frequency of SR 3.6.1.2.2 reduces the number of challenges to primary containment integrity. The nature of the Surveillance is such that the primary containment (drywell) interlock is challenged. With that challenge, the likelihood of a primary containment breach is increased. Therefore, reducing the Frequency of this SR actually increases the safety of margin, since normal entry and exit procedures do not permit challenging the interlock.

Proposed Change Six

This purely administrative change clarifies the definition of the SFDP in LCO 3.0.6. The Technical Specifications margin of safety is enhanced, since the new wording, together with the existing wording in the Bases, makes it clear that the SFDP must be performed any time LCO 3.0.6 is entered.

Proposed Change Seven

This proposed change merely allows relocation of the review and approval functions for the ODCM revisions from the Technical Specifications to owner-controlled documents. The purely administrative change does not affect any Technical Specifications required system, test, or function. Changes to the ODCM will continue to receive the level of review necessary to ensure any proposed changes are accurate and complete. Therefore, the margin of safety is not reduced.

Proposed Change Eight

This purely administrative change eliminates redundant reporting requirements with respect to a safety limit violation. The change has no effect on any Technical Specifications required system, test, or function, or on any other safety-related system. Accordingly, the margin of safety is not reduced.

Proposed Change Nine

This proposed change ensures the Unit 1 auto scram relays (K14s) are tested on a weekly basis. General Electric recognizes this as an optimum test frequency for these scram contactors. In this respect, the margin of safety is increased, since this change ensures the relays will be tested at the optimum recommended Frequency. Also, at Plant Hatch, the K14 relays and contacts have been tested at this Frequency for many years. As a result, placing this requirement on the relays will not pose an undue burden on the RPS. No other safety-related systems are affected by this proposed change. For the above reasons, this proposed change does not reduce the margin of safety.

Enclosure 3

Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant
Request to Revise Technical Specifications to
Implement Previously Approved Generic Changes

Technical Specifications Page Change Instructions

Unit 1

<u>Page</u>	<u>Instruction</u>
2.0-1	Replace
3.0-2	Replace
3.1-8	Replace
3.3-8	Replace
3.6-7	Replace
3.6-12	Replace
3.6-13	Replace
3.8-30	Replace
5.0-7	Replace

Unit 2

<u>Page</u>	<u>Instruction</u>
2.0-1	Replace
3.0-2	Replace
3.1-8	Replace
3.6-7	Replace
3.6-12	Replace
3.6-13	Replace
3.8-30	Replace
5.0-7	Replace