NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/85

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	PAGE (3)
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4	1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4)
Inoperable Relay Room Fire Suppression System

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)					REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR		SEQUENTIAL NUMBER		REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	1 1	8 6	8 6	—	0 0 3	—	0 0	0 4	1 0	8 6		0 5 0 0 0
												0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9)	N	THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)			
POWER LEVEL (10)	0 0 0	20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
		20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
		20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)	X 50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)	50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
		20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
J. C. Bodine, Nuclear Assurance Manager	AREA CODE 3 1 5 — 5 2 4 - 4 4 4 6

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
A	K Q	P S F	G 2 5 6	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)	MONTH	DAY	YEAR
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)	X NO				

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On March 13, 1986, at approximately 0630 hours, with the unit in conditions for crevice cleaning operation, the secondary side auxiliary operator was making a routine round and noticed the cutter actuating hose for Halon bottle #1 of Fire Suppression Zone S-08 for the Relay Room was found to be broken off at the cutter assembly. Immediate corrective action was to post a firewatch within 1 hour in accordance with Technical Specification 3.14.4.1. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that this condition was reported to a Control Room Foreman on March 11, 1986, at approximately 2023 hours by a security officer making a routine round with no immediate action being taken. The apparent cause of the broken off hose to the cutter assembly was personnel error.

IE22
1/1

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
R. E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant	0 5 0 0 0 2 4 4	8 6	— 0 0 3	— 0 0	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On March 13, 1986, at approximately 0630 hours, the unit was in conditions for crevice cleaning operation. The secondary side auxiliary operator, while making a routine round, noticed the cutter actuating hose for Halon Bottle #1 on the Fire Suppression Zone S-08, Relay Room Halon System was broken off at the cutter assembly. Specifically, a carbon steel 1/4" street ell was broken off leaving the male portion of the fitting in the cutter assembly. This made the Relay Room Halon System inoperable because if automatic or manual actuation of the system S-08 were initiated, the nitrogen supply to the cutter assemblies of the nine Halon bottles would have leaked out the broken hose at a rate such that there would not have been adequate pressure to actuate the cutter assemblies of the remaining 8 Halon bottles whose actuating hoses were still intact. This event was reported to the Shift Supervisor and a firewatch was posted in the Relay Room at 0712 hours in accordance with Technical Specification 3.14.4.1. The apparent cause of this event was a personnel error in that it appears as though a worker moving a large piece of material, hit the fitting and broke it off without noticing the fitting was broken.

While this condition, operating with the Relay Room Halon System S-08 out of service and a firewatch posted, is allowed by Technical Specification 3.14.4.1, further investigation into this event identified that according to a security memorandum, on March 11, 1986 at approximately 2023 hours, following a tour performed by a security officer a report was given to the Control Room Foreman simultaneously reporting problems with both the Hydrogen Monitoring System and the Halon System. Due to the plant operating condition (crevice cleaning) and the lack of specific information in the report the foreman failed to realize the significance of the Halon System concern. This allowed the plant to be in a condition where the Relay Room Halon System, S-08, was inoperable without a firewatch posted for a period of 34 hours and 49 minutes.

During this time period, all work ongoing in the Relay Room which could have increased the potential for a fire, such as open flame, welding and grinding operations, were performed with the required firewatches posted. Also the water supplied spray/sprinkler systems S-09, S-10, and S-11 and the fire detection system Z-18 located in the Relay Room remained operable during this time period.

Corrective action to return the Relay Room Halon System to operable status and prevent recurrence was that on March 13, 1986, the broken street ell was replaced and an Engineering Work Request (EWR) has been initiated to investigate a supervisory method for the nitrogen actuation system on the Relay Room Halon System.

ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION • 89 EAST AVENUE, ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001

ROGER W. KOBER
VICE PRESIDENT
ELECTRIC & STEAM PRODUCTION

TELEPHONE
AREA CODE 716 546-2700

April 10, 1986

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

Subject: LER 86-003, Inoperable Relay Room Fire Suppression System
R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant
Docket No. 50-244

In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, Licensee Event Report System, item (a)(2)(i) which requests a report of, "any operation or condition prohibited by the Plant Technical Specifications." The attached Licensee Event Report LER 86-003 is hereby submitted.

Very truly yours,

Roger W. Kober

Roger W. Kober

xc: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region I
631 Park Avenue
King of Prussia, PA 19406

IE22
1/1