NRC Form 366
(9-83)

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104
EXPIRES: 8/31/88

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1): Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3

DOCKET NUMBER (2): 0 5 0 0 0 4 2 3

PAGE (3): 1 OF 0 2

TITLE (4): Failure of Safeguards Channel Due to Freezing

EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)			REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)	
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES	DOCKET NUMBER(S)
0 3	0 8	8 6	8 6	0 2 2	0 0	0 4	0 7	8 6		0 5 0 0 0
										0 5 0 0 0

OPERATING MODE (9): 1

POWER LEVEL (10): 0 3 0

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or more of the following) (11)

20.402(b)	20.405(c)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)	73.71(b)
20.405(a)(1)(i)	50.36(c)(1)	50.73(a)(2)(v)	73.71(c)
20.405(a)(1)(ii)	50.36(c)(2)	X 50.73(a)(2)(vii)	OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)
20.405(a)(1)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(i)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)	
20.405(a)(1)(iv)	X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)	50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)	
20.405(a)(1)(v)	50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(x)	

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)

NAME: Thomas Cleary, Associate Engineer

TELEPHONE NUMBER: AREA CODE 2 0 3 4 4 4 - 5 5 7 1

COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)

CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPRDS	
E	S B	P T	R 3 6 9	N							
E	S B	P T	R 3 6 9	N							

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)

☐ YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)

☒ NO

EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15): MONTH | DAY | YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

On 3/8/86, at 0058 hours, while operating at 30% power, two independent channels of steam generator "A" steam line pressure were found to be failed high due to the sensing lines on their pressure transmitters being frozen. This left only one of the three channels operable.

Plant operators responded in accordance with Plant Technical Specifications. The sensing lines were thawed out, verified operable, and placed back in service.

Temporary heat tracing had been placed on these lines in January after a similar event (LER 86-005-00). The heat tracing was to be checked by plant operators during rounds. This check was not formalized on the Plant Equipment Operator round sheet. The heat tracing was subsequently removed by contractor personnel during a construction cleanup.

As corrective action, the heat tracing has been reinstalled and the rounds checks have been formalized. This event has been reviewed with all department heads to emphasize timely implementation of procedure changes.

This event is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (ii) and 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (vii).

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FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	
Millstone Nuclear Power Station Unit 3	0 5 0 0 0 4 2 3	8 6	— 0 2 2	— 0 1	0 2 OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

On 3/8/86, at 0058 hours, while operating at 30% power, two independent channels of steam generator "A" steam line pressure were found to be failed high due to the sensing lines on their pressure transmitters being frozen. This left only one of the three channels operable. In addition to providing indication and annunciation, these channels will generate a steamline isolation, reactor trip, and safety injection if 2 of 3 channels sense a low steamline pressure condition. These circuits are also rate compensated to initiate an anticipatory steamline isolation, reactor trip, and safety injection on a high rate of pressure drop. With two of the three channels failed high, the logic needed to generate these signals could not be met for the "A" steam generator. The corresponding channels for the B, C, and D steam generators were operable.

Plant operators responded in accordance with Plant Technical Specifications. The sensing lines were thawed out, verified operable, and placed back in service. The plant secured from the limiting condition for operation at 0125 hours on 3/8/86.

The cause of the frozen lines was insufficient heat in the portion of the Main Steam Valve Building (MSVB) in which the pressure transmitters are located. There were three contributing factors: (1) The heating system is insufficient in overcoming cold air in-flow from the ventilation system during extreme cold conditions; (2) One of two inlet ventilation dampers was blanked causing additional cold air flow past the sensing lines; (3) Temporary heat tracing which had been installed previously had been removed.

A similar event had occurred on 1/25/86 and was reported on LER 86-005-00. The corrective action provided on LER 86-005-00 included installing the heat tracing. Plant operators were to have checked the sensing lines during rounds and to energize the heat tracing as necessary. The checks were not formalized on the operator round sheets. The heat tracing was removed by contractor personnel during a "roll back" in which all temporary installations are removed unless directed otherwise.

As corrective action, the heat tracing has been reinstalled, the operators' round sheet changed and the heating system design is being addressed by engineering. This event has been reviewed with all department heads to emphasize timely implementation of procedure changes.

The third channel of the "A" steam generator steamline pressure was still operable and able to annunciate at Main Board 2 and Main Board 5 had steamline pressure decreased. Operators would, therefore, have had indication of a problem in the "A" steam line, and could have actuated safeguards systems manually. In addition, had a fault occurred, a reactor trip and safety injection would have resulted from low pressurizer pressure.

This report is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (ii) and 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (vii).

NORTHEAST UTILITIES

THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
HOLYOKE WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

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MP-8905

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, D. C. 20555

Reference: Facility Operating License No. NPF-49
Docket No. 50-423
Licensee Event Report 50-423/86-022-00

Gentlemen:

This letter forwards Licensee Event Report 86-022-00 to be submitted within thirty days pursuant to 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (ii), any event that resulted in the condition of the plant being seriously degraded; and 10CFR50.73 (a) (2) (vii), any event where a single cause or condition caused at least two independent trains or channels to become inoperable in a single system.

Yours truly,

NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

Wayne D. Romberg
Station Superintendent
Millstone Nuclear Power Station

WDR/TC:se

Attachment: LER 86-022-00

cc: Dr. T. E. Murley, Region I

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