



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

March 28, 1996

MEMORANDUM TO: Philip F. McKee, Project Director
Project Directorate II-3
Division of Reactor Projects - East

FROM: Carl H. Berlinger, Chief
Containment Systems and Severe Accident Branch
Division of Systems Safety and Analysis *Carl H. Berlinger*

SUBJECT: MILLSTONE 2, SAFETY EVALUATION - ENCLOSURE BUILDING SINGLE
FAILURE VULNERABILITIES (TAC M93652)

Millstone Unit 2 Inspection Report 50-336/95-25 identifies as an OPEN ITEM:

The determination as to whether the EBFS was originally required to meet single failure criteria remains unresolved pending NRC review of the LER supplement (LRI 336/95-25-03)."

By Work Request dated September 20, 1995, Guy Vissing requested an SCSB review. The Work Request stated:


Please review enclosed (LER 94-040-02) as it relates to the potential design deficiency in the Enclosure Building Purge System wherein in the event of a single facility or component failure, a release path from the Enclosure Building would allow for a direct discharge to the atmosphere without charcoal filtration following a LOCA if Enclosure building Purging operations were being performed. The licensee has presented its position and action. Please review the licensee's position and action for acceptability and provide an SE that supports your determination. This is an open issue in the inspection status and your determination will support the closure of this inspection issue. Please note that the review does not include the issue related to the hydrogen analyzer cabinet and sample hood exhaust fan that was found to take suction on the Enclosure building and discharge out the Unit 2 Main Exhaust Stack without charcoal filtration.

By memorandum dated February 12, 1996, we provided a Safety Evaluation which concluded that the remaining single failure deficiency should be corrected. We have since reconsidered that recommendation in terms of backfit benefits. It is our revised position that the potential safety benefits do not warrant a design fix. This reconsideration is based on credit given for proper implementation of plant procedures to ensure manual termination of vent exhaust flow in the event of a high radiation signal in the vent exhaust, and the low probability of multiple coincidental events in the accident scenario.

An evaluation is attached. If you need further information, please contact W. Long (415-3026).

Docket No. 50-336

Attachment: As stated



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