

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME (1) Nine Mile Point Unit I										DOCKET NUMBER (2) 0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0				PAGE (3) 1 OF 0 2		
TITLE (4) HPCI Initiation Due To Turbine Trip																
EVENT DATE (5)			LER NUMBER (6)				REPORT DATE (7)			OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)						
MONTH	DAY	YEAR	YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER	MONTH	DAY	YEAR	FACILITY NAMES				DOCKET NUMBER(S)			
0 3	0 8	8 6	8 6	0 0 3	0 0 0	4	0 7	8 6					0 5 0 0 0			
OPERATING MODE (9)		THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR § (Check one or more of the following) (11)														
N		20.402(b)				20.406(c)				<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 50.73(a)(2)(iv)				73.71(b)		
POWER LEVEL (10)		20.405(a)(1)(i)				50.36(c)(1)				50.73(a)(2)(v)				73.71(c)		
0 1 1 8		20.405(a)(1)(ii)				50.36(c)(2)				50.73(a)(2)(vii)				OTHER (Specify in Abstract below and in Text, NRC Form 366A)		
		20.405(a)(1)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(i)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(A)						
		20.405(a)(1)(iv)				50.73(a)(2)(ii)				50.73(a)(2)(viii)(B)						
		20.405(a)(1)(v)				50.73(a)(2)(iii)				50.73(a)(2)(x)						
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12)																
NAME Robert G. Randall, Supervisor, Technical Support										TELEPHONE NUMBER AREA CODE 3 1 5 3 4 9 - 1 2 4 4 5						
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13)																
CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS		CAUSE	SYSTEM	COMPONENT	MANUFACTURER	REPORTABLE TO NPDOS						
X	J I J	0 1 0 3 1 3	G 1 0 1 8 1 0	N												
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)																
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE)										<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO		EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE (15)		MONTH	DAY	YEAR

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16)

ABSTRACT

On March 8, 1986, with the Nine Mile Point Unit I Nuclear Station at 18% power, the turbine was manually tripped in conjunction with the shutdown procedure to bring the plant to cold shutdown for the 1986 refueling outage. As a result an initiation signal for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) mode of Feedwater was received as anticipated at 0116 hours. There was an attempt to reset HPCI but the contacts for the Emergency Governor Limit Switch had not changed state as designed. Subsequently, when the generator lockout trip relays picked up, another HPCI initiation signal was received. The generator lockout trip relays were reset and the HPCI signal cleared.

Corrective actions taken involved the initiation of a work request to investigate the root cause of the problem and correct it during the 1986 refueling outage.

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LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104

EXPIRES: 8/31/88

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)			PAGE (3)		
		YEAR	SEQUENTIAL NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Nine Mile Point Unit I	0 5 0 0 0 2 2 0 8 6	—	0 0 3	—	0 0	0 2	OF 0 2

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 366A's) (17)

TEXT

The Nine Mile Point Unit I Nuclear Station turbine was manually tripped while at 18% power on March 8, 1986 at 0'16 hours. The station was being shutdown for the 1986 refueling outage. The High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) mode of Feedwater received an initiation signal, as anticipated, when the Unit Emergency Trip Button was pushed. HPCI was momentarily reset. However, the contacts for the Emergency Governor Limit Switch had not changed state as designed. This was caused by the plunger assembly associated with the Emergency Governor Unit becoming stuck and preventing the limit switch from changing position. When the Emergency Governor is tripped, the turbine stop valves close. As per the control logic a signal to trip the generator lockout trip relays would be initiated 3 seconds after the turbine stop valves close. However, when this occurred another HPCI signal was received because the contacts for the Emergency Governor Limit Switch remained in the untripped position. HPCI was subsequently cleared when the generator lock out trip relays were manually reset.

ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL SAFETY CONSEQUENCES

There is no significant safety consequence associated with this event because the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) mode of Feedwater would maintain water level in the normal control band. Additionally, the Limit Switch problem would not have prevented the actuation of HPCI had there been an actual valid start signal.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

A work request has been initiated to inspect the Emergency Governor Limit Switch assembly. Any necessary repairs will be performed during the 1986 refueling outage.

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION

NIAGARA  MOHAWK

300 ERIE BOULEVARD WEST
SYRACUSE, N. Y. 13202

THOMAS E. LEMPGES
VICE PRESIDENT—NUCLEAR GENERATION

April 7, 1986

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Document Control Desk
Washington, DC 20555

RE: Docket No. 50-220
LER 86-03

Gentlemen:


In accordance with 10 CFR 50.73, we hereby submit the following
Licensee Event Report:

LER 86-03 Which is being submitted in accordance with
10 CFR 50.73 (a) (2) (iv), "Any event or
condition that resulted in manual or automatic
actuation of any Engineered Safety Feature (ESF),
including the Reactor Protection System (RPS).
However, actuation of an ESF, including the RPS,
that resulted from and was part of the preplanned
sequence during testing or reactor operation need
not be reported."

A 10 CFR 50.72 report was made at 0208 on March 8, 1986.

This report was completed in the format designated in NUREG-1022,
dated September 1983.

Very truly yours,



Thomas E. Lempges
Vice President
Nuclear Generation

TEL/tg
Attachments
cc: Dr. Thomas E. Murley
Regional Administrator

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11