NRC Form 366 (9-83)  LICENSEE EVENT REPO	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104  EXPIRES: 8/31/85
FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3)
D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1	0  5  0  0  0  3  1  5  1 OF 0  3
Operation With Inoperable Intermediate Detector, Caused by Instrument Drift	e Range Neutron Flux
EVENT DATE (5) LER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7)	OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8)
MONTH DAY YEAR YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAY YEAR	FACILITY NAMES DOCKET NUMBER(S)
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OPERATING MODE (9)  1 20.402(b) 20.408(c)  POWER LEVEL (10) 2 9 20.406(a)(1)(ii) 50.38(c)(2)  20.405(a)(1)(iii) X 50.73(a)(2)(ii)  20.405(a)(1)(iv) 50.73(a)(2)(ii)  20.405(a)(1)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(iii)	50.73(a)(2)(iv)   73.71(b)     50.73(a)(2)(v)   73.71(c)
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LE	A (12)
NAME	TELEPHONE NUMBER
A. A. Blind - Assistant Plant Manager	6 1 16 4 16 15 1- 15 19 10 11
COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DI	
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFACTURER TO NPROS CAUSE S	YSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE TO NPROS
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SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14)	EXPECTED MONTH DAY YEAR SUBMISSION
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO	DATE (15)
On November 17, 1985, at 0043 hours, Intermed Instrument N-35 (EIIS/IG) was determined to setpoint for N-35 was discovered to be above than or equal to 30 percent Reactor Thermal was made while RTP was at 29 percent. With power above 5 percent RTP, power escalation Specifications. It was not evident from the RTP that the setpoint was above allowable 1s attributed to instrument drift which is presidetector tube (EIIS/DET).  The N-35 detector has been replaced and the effort to identify any future drift.	diate Range (IR) Neutron Flux be inoperable. The reactor trip the allowable limit of less Power (RTP). The determination 1 inoperable IR instrument and continued as allowed by Technical data available below 5 percent mits. The cause has been sumed to be the result of a faulty
8607150209 860707 PDR ADDCK 05000315 PDR	IE35

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 DOCKET NUMBER (2) PAGE (3) FACILITY NAME (1) LER NUMBER (6) SEQUENTIAL YEAR 0,1 0,2 of 0,3 D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 10 15 10 10 10 13 1 1 5 8 5 0 16 19

TEXT (If more space is required, use additional NRC Form 395A's) (17)

#### Conditions Prior to Event

Unit 1 was operating at 29 percent reactor thermal power (RTP) during the initial power escalation for Fuel Cycle 9.

### Description of Event

On November 17, 1985, at 0043 hours, intermediate range (IR) nuclear instrument N-35 (EIIS/IG) was discovered to be inoperable. The reactor trip setpoint was in excess of Technical Specification 2.2.1 Table 2.1-1 which requires the setpoint to be less than or equal to 30 percent RTP. The reactor trip setpoint for N-35 was determined to be above the allowable limit while plotting detector current versus reactor thermal power (while at approximately 29 percent RTP) during startup. Technical Specification 3.3.1.1 Table 3.3-1, Item 5, Action 3, allowed the unit to continue power escalation with one inoperable IR nuclear instrument as RTP was above 5 percent. It was not evident from the data available below 5 percent power that the setpoint was above allowable limits.

The reactor trip setpoint for N-35 was lowered to less than 25 percent RIP at 1051 hours on November 17, 1985, fulfilling Technical Specification requirements. The detector (EIIS/DET) current output for N-35 continued to be trended and was later found to be decreasing. On February 13, 1986, the setpoint was found to have drifted above 30 percent RTP. The Unit during this time period was operating at 90 percent RTP. The IR detector high voltage and compensating voltage were checked and found to be set correctly. Based on vendor recommendations, voltage was increased to 1200 volts to place the detector tube at what appeared to be its saturation point. The detector output current was trended with the indication of continued instrument drift evident.

Following an unrelated Unit 1 reactor trip on May 28, 1986, the unit was placed in cold shutdown to replace the N-35 detector. There were no other components or systems related to this event that were inoperable at the start of the event.

#### Cause of Event

The intermediate cause for IR instrument N-35 reactor trip setpoint being in excess of Technical Specifications was instrument drift. The root cause is not known, but it is, presumed to be the result of a faulty detector tube.

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION NRC Form 366A LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/88 DOCK ET NUMBER (2) FACILITY NAME (1) PAGE (3) LER NUMBER (6) SEQUENTIAL YEAR D. C. Cook Nuclear Plant, Unit 1 0 |5 |0 |0 |3 |1 |5 |8 |5 OFO 0 6 9

### Analysis of Event

This supplemental report is submitted to report on actions taken since the original LER. The additional actions taken, including replacement of the N-35 detector, were based on trending of the instrument output. The original LER reported that the setpoint was erroneous based on reduced neutron leakage from the core, it has since been determined that the instrument setpoint had drifted.

The IR instrument (N-35) provides redundant protection for high startup rates (SUR). This trip is blocked above 10 percent RTP. The second of two IR instruments (N-36) remained operable and would have tripped the reactor if required as the coincidence is one out of two instruments. In addition, the four power range instruments provided high positive rate trip (5 percent RTP per 2 seconds) and high flux low setpoint trip (25 percent RTP) protection with a two out of four coincidence. Based on the redundant IR instrument (N-36) and the four power range instruments it is concluded that adequate core protection existed and that this condition did not constitute an unreviewed safety question nor did it create a substantial hazard to the health and safety of the public.

## Corrective Actions

The immediate corrective action was to reduce the setpoint below 25 percent RTP. This action did not correct the problem because the instrument continued to drift.

The instrument (N-35) detector has been replaced and the Plant will base its future setpoint predictions on detector current data and average power distribution from the end of the previous fuel cycle. This will give a more conservative prediction as it will account for any instrument drift. Previous predictions were based on data from the beginning of the last fuel cycle. In addition, the detector currents will be trended in order to identify any further instrument drift that may occur during a fuel cycle.

# Failed Component Identification

Westinghouse intermediate range nuclear instrument detector model number WL-23707, EIIS:DET.

# Previous Similar Events

None

July 7, 1986

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Document Control Desk Washington, D.C. 20555

Operating License DPR-58 Docket No. 50-315

Document Control Manager:

In accordance with the criteria established by 10CFR50.73 entitled <u>Licensee Event Reporting System</u>, the following report/s are being submitted:

85-069-01

Sincerely,

W.G. Smith,

Plant Manager

/cbm

Attachment

cc: John E. Dolan

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