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February 9, 1998

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant, Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
Calvert Cliffs Independent Spent Fuel storage Installation; Docket No. 72-8
Fitness for Duty; Program Performance Data (July 1 -- December 31, 1997)

The Semi-Annual Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data (Attachment 1) and Lessons Learned (Attachment 2) are submitted for the period of July 1 through December 31, 1997 in accordance with 10 CFR 26.71(d).

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

SRG/TER/bjd

Attachments: (1) Fitness for Duty Program Performance Data Personnel Subject to 10 CFR 26
(2) Lessons Learned Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant July 1 - December 31, 1997

cc: (Without Attachments)
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**Fitness for Duty Program
Performance Data
Personnel Subject to 10 CFR 26**

BALTIMORE GAS & ELECTRIC COMPANY		12/31/1997	
Company		6 Months Ending	
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT			
F. BRUCE MARTENIS, PROGRAM MANAGER		(410)234-6162	
Contact Name		Phone (area code)	

CUTOFFS: Screen/Confirmation (ng/ml)		[X] Appendix A to 10 CFR 26
Marijuana 50/ng/ml	Amphetamines /	_____
Cocaine /	Phencyclidine /	_____
Opiates /	Alcohol (% BAC)	_____

RANDOM TESTING RATE FOR EMPLOYEES & CONTRACTORS = 50%

Testing Results	Licensee Employees		Long-Term Contractor Personnel		Short-Term Contractor Personnel	
Average Number with Unescorted Access	1777		37		339	
Categories	# Tested	# Positive	# Tested	# Positive	# Tested	# Positive
Pre-Access	20	0	8	0	75	0
For Cause						
Post-accident	0	0	0	0	0	0
Observed Behavior	3	1	0	0	1	0
Random	488	0	13	0	118	0
Follow-up	4	0	0	0	0	0
Other	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTAL	515	1	21	0	194	0

**FI FITNESS FOR DUTY PROGRAM
PERFORMANCE DATA
PERSONNEL SUBJECT TO 10 CFR 26**

**Baltimore Gas & Electric Company
Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Reporting Period: 07/01/97-12/31/97**

The following list is a breakdown of **Management Actions** taken as a result of confirmed positive drug/alcohol screenings performed under the Calvert Cliffs Fitness For Duty Program:

TEST TYPE

ACTION TAKEN

Employee (1)

Access Terminated

BREAKDOWN OF CONFIRM POSITIVE TESTS FOR SPECIFIC SUBSTANCES

	Marijuana	Cocaine	Opiates	Amphe- tamines	Phency- lidine	Alcohol	Refusal to Test	1	2	3	4
Licensee Employees			1								
Long-Term Contractors											
Short-Term Contractors											
TOTAL	0	0	1	0	0	0	0				1

LESSONS LEARNED
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1997

Errors were found in the programming that extracted data from the Security Screening Data System (SSDS) and transferred the data into HEIDI, the drug and alcohol testing data base and random selector.

- * One error, discovered September 12, 1997, resulted in the omission of two individuals from the random testing pool. This error was found during a verification that all individuals who reported to the Emergency Operations Facility were in the random testing pool. Neither of these individuals had unescorted access to the protected area. The two individuals were unaware they were omitted from the pool. They were under behavioral observation. They were given drug and alcohol tests upon discovery of the error and had negative test results. The coding problem that omitted individuals who reported to the Emergency Operations Facility from the random testing pool, but never had unescorted access authorization, was corrected. No other individuals had this coding configuration in SSDS.
- * On October 20, 1997, during a verification of data as the FOCUS SSDS was being replaced with an Oracle-based system, it was discovered that 128 individuals on loan from other utilities had been omitted from the random pool due to a programming design flaw that omitted the logic for this category of workers. This programming change occurred September 1, 1995 when HEIDI was implemented. All of these individuals had unescorted access authorization for less than 60 days. They were under behavioral observation while on site. As none of these individuals had current unescorted access at the time of discovery of the error, drug and alcohol testing was not performed.
- * The other errors were discovered October 22, 1997 during this SSDS upgrade and the verification of data extraction for importing into HEIDI. Thirteen long-term contractors who currently had unescorted access authorization had been omitted from the random testing pool since November 17, 1995. A telephone report (Event No. 33138) was made to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on October 23, 1997. Again, the individuals were unaware they were omitted from the pool and were under behavioral observation. They were hardcoded into the FOCUS extract. Drug and alcohol tests were performed on the thirteen individuals on discovery of the error. Testing was completed on twelve of the thirteen individuals by October 30, 1997, with negative test results. As the thirteenth individual was unavailable for testing, his unescorted access was suspended until he returned December 1, 1997, and was tested. His results were also negative. This error was a different coding problem than the one above. The individuals had been in the random testing pool since implementation of the Fitness for Duty Rule in January 1990. They were deleted from the pool on November 17, 1995 when a change made by Security Screening was added to the FOCUS program that extracted the data from SSDS into HEIDI.

The extraction of data from the upgraded SSDS and the importing of data into HEIDI, was extensively tested and verified for accuracy. A daily report to determine if there were other individuals who were omitted from HEIDI through the FOCUS extraction from SSDS was run from October 23, 1997 (day after discovery of error) until November 17, 1997 when the Oracle SSDS application was operational. No other individuals were found to have been omitted. A weekly audit report to ensure that individuals required to be in the random pool are extracted from SSDS and imported into HEIDI correctly has been implemented. Other planned corrective actions are: (1) creation of a software configuration management plan for SSDS and HEIDI scheduled for completion March 1, 1998; (2) creation of a unit procedure to modify SSDS

LESSONS LEARNED
CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT
JULY 1 - DECEMBER 31, 1997

application transaction codes scheduled for completion June 1, 1998; (3) development of an audit program to evaluate the integrity of SSDS Fitness for Duty and Emergency Response Plan identified workers scheduled for completion May 1, 1998; and (4) review of HEIDI program to ensure compliance with site information management procedures scheduled for completion June 1, 1998.

The Information System individual who made the changes to SSDS was not the Information System individual who made the changes to the importation of data into HEIDI. The impact of changes in SSDS upon HEIDI was not fully understood nor was data verification conducted. Both of the Information System individuals involved in the November 1995 changes had background investigations as required in 10 CFR Part 26, Appendix A, Subpart B.2.3 for personnel who administer the testing program, were under behavioral observation, and were not omitted from the random testing pool.