

NORTHEAST UTILITIES



THE CONNECTICUT LIGHT AND POWER COMPANY
WESTERN MASSACHUSETTS ELECTRIC COMPANY
MILFORD WATER POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST UTILITIES SERVICE COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY

General Offices • Selden Street, Berlin, Connecticut

P.O. BOX 270
HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT 06141-0270
(203) 665-5000

July 3, 1986

Docket Nos. 50-213

50-245

50-336

50-423

A05836

Office of Inspection and Enforcement
Attn: Mr. Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555

Gentlemen:

Haddam Neck Plant
Millstone Nuclear Power Station, Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3
IE Information Notice No. 86-47: Erratic Behavior of
Static "O" Ring Differential Pressure Switches

IE Information Notice No. 86-47, "Erratic Behavior of Static "O" Ring Differential Pressure Switches," advised licensees of erratic behavior of certain differential pressure switches which caused the failure of the LaSalle 2 reactor to scram when it underwent a transient with water level below the low-level scram setpoint. Licensees with differential pressure switches similar to those supplied by SOR, Incorporated, the vendor of the switches that caused the incident at LaSalle 2, were requested to conduct a review to determine the applicability to their facilities and to consider appropriate actions to preclude similar problems. In addition, affected utilities were invited to attend a meeting on June 12, 1986 with the NRC, General Electric Company and SOR, Incorporated to discuss experiences with the switches. The purpose of this letter is to inform the Staff of the actions Northeast Utilities (NU) took in relation to this incident.

SOR, Incorporated informed the Staff that they had provided some of their differential pressure switches to Northeast Nuclear Energy Company (NNECO). Hence, the Millstone Resident Inspector and NNECO personnel promptly began investigating to determine the extent of concern. Concurrently, Northeast Utilities Service Company (NUSCO) began investigating the applicability of the problem switches for the Haddam Neck Plant and Millstone Unit Nos. 1, 2 and 3.

The investigations concluded that the static "O" ring differential pressure switch issue did not apply to any of NU's four nuclear units. The differential pressure switches are not used in the specific application nor any integrated safety application. Additionally, it was found that Model 102 and 103 pressure switches

8607150106 860703
PDR ADOCK 05000213
Q PDR

A001
110

were in the warehouse for Millstone Unit No. 1. The original intent of these switches was for use for safety relief valve position indication but these switches could not be fully qualified and were not installed. Until the reliability issues with these switches are resolved, they will not be used in any safety-related application.


NUSCO was represented at the June 12, 1986 meeting in Bethesda, Md. to provide information regarding the non-applicability of the problem. A data base consisting of all SOR switches, model numbers and applications was presented to Gary Halahan of your Staff. Additionally, our procedures for checking the reactor water level switches were provided. It was noted that we have not experienced abnormal drift on SOR pressure switches in a similar fashion as Commonwealth Edison's pressure relief valve low-low setpoint instrument drift.

We have concluded that this issue does not represent a safety concern for any of our four (4) nuclear power plants. Although a response to IE Information Notice No. 86-47 was not requested, we have chosen to submit the above information since Millstone is specifically referenced in the subject Information Notice.


Should you have any questions on this subject, please feel free to contact us.

Very truly yours,

CONNECTICUT YANKEE ATOMIC POWER COMPANY
NORTHEAST NUCLEAR ENERGY COMPANY



J. F. Opeka
Senior Vice President



By: C. F. Sears
Vice President

cc: C. I. Grimes
V. S. Noonan
A. C. Thadani