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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Docket Nos: 50-266; 50-301  
License Nos: DPR-24; DPR-27

Report Nos: 50-266/98002(DRS); 50-301/98002(DRS)

Licensee: Wisconsin Electric Power Company

Facility: Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2

Location: 6610 Nuclear Road  
Two Rivers, WI 54241

Dates: Between: January 5 and 20, 1998

Inspector: Terry J. Madeda, Physical Security Inspector

Approved by James R. Creed, Chief, Plant Support Branch 1  
Division of Reactor Safety

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Point Beach Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2  
NRC Inspection Report 50-286/98002; 50-301/98002

This inspection included a review of plant support activities relating to the physical protection of the facility. The inspector assessed and evaluated for compliance the following elements of the security program: alarm stations, communications, control of personnel and material, assessment aids, vehicle barriers, search equipment, event logs, response and staffing capabilities, management controls, and follow-up on previous inspection findings. The inspection was conducted between January 5-20, 1998.

- The inspector observed a violation when a vehicle was inadequately searched. The violation was caused when a security officer's attention-to-detail in searching a vehicle was inadequate. Previous corrective actions for two similar violations were not totally effective to prevent recurrence. Each failure, although slightly different, involved weak attention to detail by the search officer. It appeared that previous corrective action had not been effectively focused on addressing the issue of attention-to-detail. (Section S1.1)
- The licensee identified a violation regarding two failures to implement a specific compensatory measure. The events were caused when security supervisory personnel, because of a heavy workload in the alarm stations failed to implement on two occasions a specific compensatory measure. Contributing to this implementation failure was a lack of procedural guidance to address the specific compensatory measure required for the situation. Previous corrective actions for three similar events which included actions to improve alarm station effectiveness by reducing workload activities and improving procedural guidance were not totally effective. Although those actions have resulted in overall improved performance by alarm station personnel, they did not prevent the current events. (Section S2.1)
- The inspector observed a violation when an armed security response officer was posted to continuously monitor an outage of a protected area intrusion alarm zone. The significance of this finding was that licensee security management was aware of this routinely implemented practice, but did not recognize that this action was in violation of a security plan requirement which required the use of a non-response force security officer. (Section S6.1)

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