ACULTY NAME (1) DOCKET NUMBER Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 0 5 0 0 Wain Feedwater Isolation During Testing Due To Personnel Error OTHER FACULTIES INV WONTH DAY VEAN Use NUMBER (0) Report DATE (7) OTHER FACULTIES INV WONTH DAY VEAN Use NUMBER (0) Report DATE (7) OTHER FACULTY NAMES WONTH DAY VEAN Use NUMBER (0) Report DATE (7) OTHER FACULTY NAMES WONTH DAY VEAN Use NUMBER (0) Report DATE (7) OTHER FACULTY NAMES WONTH DAY VEAN Use NUMBER (0) DAY VEAN N/A O 6 0 3 8 6 0 2 3 0 0 0 1/2 0 3 0 0 0 738012100 OFFENENCE THIS REPORT IS EUBMITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENT OF 10 CFR §: (Deex on or more of the foluming) 0 0 738012100 0 0 738012100 OPENENCE OPENENCE 20 00000000 THIS REPORT IS EUBMITED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENT OF 10 CFR §: (Deex on or more of the foluming) OPENENCE 20 000000000 THIS REPORT IS EUBMITED PURSUANT OF 10 CFR §: (Deex on or more of the foluming) OPENENCE 20 00000000000000000000000000000000000	U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES: 8/31/86					
O 5 0 C Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 O 15 0 C TITLE 10 Main Feedwater Isolation During Testing Due To Personnel Error SUPPER TARE 10 APPENDIX FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 17 ONLY TEAM TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 17 ONLY TEAM TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 17 ONLY TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 17 ONLY TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 17 ONLY TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 17 ONLY TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 170 ONLY TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 170 ONLY TEAM FEED FUNCTION TO THE REPORT OATE 170 ONLY TEAM FEED FUNCTION	ER (2)	F	PAGE (3)		
THE HO Main Feedwater Isolation During Testing Due To Personnel Error OTHER FACILITIES INV NAME NAME NAME NAME OPER FACILITIES INV OPER FACILITIES INV NAME NAME OPER FACILITIES INV OPER FACILITIES INVERTED FURBLART TO THE REQUERTMENT OF 10 CFR & ICOMP or one of the FORMART OPER FACILITIES INVERTED FURBLART TO THE REQUERTMENT OF 10 CFR & ICOMP or one of the FORMART OPER FACILITIES INVERTED FURBLART TO THE REQUERTMENT OF 10 CFR & ICOMPORT OPER FACILITIES INVERTED FURBLART TO THE REQUERTMENT OF 10 CFR & ICOMPORT OPER FACILITIES FOR THE LEG INT THE REPORT INT OPER FACILITIES FOR THE LEG INT OPER FACILITIES FOR THE FOR FACE COMPORT FALL REPORT THE LEG INT OPER FACE FOR THE LEG INT THE REPORT INT OPER FACE COMPONENT <th< td=""><td>0 0 4</td><td>141</td><td>OF</td><td></td></th<>	0 0 4	141	OF			
Main Freedwater Isolation During Testing Due to Presonnel Error Other Acturty have Other Ac						
EVENT DATE (B) LEEN NUMBER (B) PACULTY NAMES VEAN VEAN <th colspan="2" td="" vea<=""><td>VOLVED (8)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></th>	<td>VOLVED (8)</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td>		VOLVED (8)			
OAVY OAV VEAR	DOCKET N	DOCKET NUMBER(S)				
0 6 0 3 8 6 9 2 3 0 0 7 0	0 5	01010	TIL	1		
0 0						
O TO JUNC OTHER APPORT IN SUBMITTED PURBUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR §: (Check one or move of the following) OPERATING MODE (a) 5 10 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 POWER 100 10 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 POWER 100 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 20 A0200 20 A0200 20 A0200 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 20 A0200 20 A0200 10 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 20 A0200 20 A0200 10 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 50 Jain(2000 NAME COMPONENT MANUFAC REFORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC NUMPLEMENTAL REFOR TABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REFORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC VES Iff yww. computer EXPECTED SUMMISSION CATE NO NO NO NO VES Iff yww. computer EXPECTED SUMMISSION CATE NO	0 151	101010	11	1		
Store Store <thstore< th=""> <thstore< th=""> <thst< td=""><td>(11)</td><td></td><td></td><td></td></thst<></thstore<></thstore<>	(11)					
POVER 01010 20.056601000 50.386120 50.386120 50.736012000 20.066601000 20.066601000 50.736012000 50.736012000 50.736012000 20.066601000 20.066601000 50.736012000 50.736012000 50.736012000 20.066601000 20.066601000 50.736012000 50.736012000 50.736012000 20.066601000 20.066601000 50.736012000 50.736012000 50.736012000 20.066601000 20.066601000 50.736012000 50.736012000 50.736012000 NAME 20.0666010100 50.736012000 50.736012000 50.736012000 50.736012000 NAME COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT 150. NANUFAC TO REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC State Protection 140	73.7	1.71(b)				
Ling: 01010 20.406(01) 90.34(012) 90.7	V OTH	THER (Specify	in Abstra	ct		
20.406(a)(10(a)) 20.406(a)(10(a)) 20.73(a)(21(a)) 20.73(a)(21(a)) 20.406(a)(10(a)) 20.73(a)(21(a)) 20.73(a)(21(a)) 20.73(a)(21(a)) NAME D.73(a)(21(a)) 20.73(a)(21(a)) 20.73(a)(21(a)) NAME NAME NAME NAME Roger W. Ouellette, Associate Engineer, Licensing 71.012 CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER TO NFROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TEXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUBMISSION CATE) SUBMUSSION CATE) VES (// yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION CATE) X NO VES (// yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION CATE) X NO ABETRACT (Limit to 1400 unces, 1.8. suproximately, fitteen single spece typermittee lines) (18) SUBMUSSION CATE) On June 3, 1986, at 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSFS). The Reactor 7 placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, rather than in the CONNECT required by procedure. When the Input Error Inhibit switch was pla NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. Personnel subsequently to Isolation and realigned the valves to the previous alignment. The 5, Cold Shutdown, at the time of this incident. This incident is assigned Cause Cod	be/0 366	iow and in Ta 6A)	AL, NAC F	orm		
Description Description 20.4006000000 50.7360(2000) 20.40060000000 50.7360(2000) NAME LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME Incense Component Failure for Each Component Failure Description CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE TURER TO NFRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER TURER TO NFRDS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM VES (// yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION CATE) X VES (// yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION CATE) X VES (// yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION CATE) X NO June 3, 1986, at 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Re	50.72	2(b)(2))(ii)			
LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12) NAME Roger W. Ouellette, Associate Engineer, Licensing COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REFORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT BUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) SUBMINDATE SUBMINDATE VES (// YMM, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO ABSTRACT (Linit to 1400 ROBER, (a. 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Reactor To placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, rather than in the CONNECT required by procedure. When the Input Error Inhibit switch was plac NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. Personnel subsequently To Isolation and realigned th						
NAME AREA COD Roger W. Ouellette, Associate Engineer, Licensing 7101 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUREE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TUREE COMPONENT TUREE TUREE TUREE COMPONENT TUREE COMPONENT TUREE TUREE COMPONENT TUREE TUREE TUREE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) MANUFAC SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (14) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (14) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (14) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TAKE OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (14) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT OSCIMUMENT FAILURE DESC						
Roger W. Ouellette, Associate Engineer, Licensing 71014 COMPLETE ONE LINE FOR EACH COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC COMPONENT MANUFAC SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT TABLE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (140 SUBMISSION DATE! YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE! <td< td=""><td>TELEPHON</td><td>ONE NUMBER</td><td></td><td></td></td<>	TELEPHON	ONE NUMBER				
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE CAUSE OWPONENT FAILURE DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT (13) CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT TURER TURER TO NUMBER CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	1 2171	12 1 12	7 15 1 1	210		
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC REPORTABLE CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC TURER TO NPROS I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I	4 3 7	121-14	DI.	211		
CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MANUFAC. TURER TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MURAC TURER TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MURAC TURER TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MURAC TURER TO NPROS CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MURAC CAUSE SYSTEM COMPONENT MURAC SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTANCE SUBMISSION DATE SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED (14) SU	C. REPORT	RTABLE				
Image: Superconductor of the superc	TO NF	NPRDS				
Image: Supplemental REPC if EXPECTED (14) Supplemental REPC if EXPECTED (14) Image: Supplemental REPC if Expects (14)						
supplemental REPCAT EXPECTED (14) Experimental REPCAT EXPECTED (14) ves (if yee, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces (14, spproximetally fifteen single-space typewritten lines) (16) X NO On June 3, 1986, at 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Reactor To placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, rather than in the CONNECT required by procedure. When the Input Error Inhibit switch was plas NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. Personnel subsequently resolution and realigned the valves to the previous alignment. The 5, Cold Shutdown, at the time of this incident. This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error. The Techn follow the procedure, and directed Operations personnel to place th TEST position rather than the CONNECT position.	1					
BUPPLEMENTAL REPCAT EXPECTED (14) EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE! YES (If yee, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 upcce, i.e. approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16) On June 3, 1986, at 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Reactor 7 placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, rather than in the CONNECT required by procedure. When the Input Error Inhibit switch was pla NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. Personnel subsequently r Isolation and realigned the valves to the previous alignment. The 5, Cold Shutdown, at the time of this incident. This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error. The Techn follow the procedure, and directed Operations personnel to place th TEST position rather than the CONNECT position.	1. 1.1					
SUPPLEMENTAL REPCITE CITE SUBMISSION DATE VES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spece, i.e., approximately fiftmen single-space typewritten lines) (16) On June 3, 1986, at 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Reactor 1 placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, rather than in the CONNECT required by procedure. When the Input Error Inhibit switch was pla NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. Personnel subsequently r Isolation and realigned the valves to the previous alignment. The 5, Cold Shutdown, at the time of this incident. This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error. The Techn follow the procedure, and directed Operations personnel to place th TEST position rather than the CONNECT position.	11	MONTH	DAY	YEA		
YES (If yes, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION DATE) X NO ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 updees, i.s., approximately fifteen single space typewritten lines) (16) On June 3, 1986, at 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Reactor 1 placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, rather than in the CONNECT required by procedure. When the Input Error Inhibit switch was pla NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. Personnel subsequently r Isolation and realigned the valves to the previous alignment. The 5, Cold Shutdown, at the time of this incident. This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error. The Techn follow the procedure, and directed Operations personnel to place th TEST position rather than the CONNECT position.	ECTED		UNI			
VES (If yee, complete EXPECTED SUBMISSION CATE) ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 upces, i.s. approximately fiftuen single-space typewritten lines) (16) On June 3, 1986, at 0613:07 hours, a Main Feedwater (CF) Isolation testing of the Solid State Protection System (SSPS). The Reactor 7 placed in the TEST position and CLOSED, rather than in the CONNECT required by procedure. When the Input Error Inhibit switch was pla NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. Personnel subsequently r Isolation and realigned the valves to the previous alignment. The 5, Cold Shutdown, at the time of this incident. This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error. The Techn follow the procedure, and directed Operations personnel to place th TEST position rather than the CONNECT position.	TE (15)	111		1		
This incident is reportable pursuant to 10CFR 50.73, Section (a)(2)	Trip Bri position aced in reset the unit was nicians the break	red dur reaker ion as n the the CF was in s did n aker in and 10C	Mode tot TFR			

+ U.S.GPO:1964-0-454-461/18750

IE 22

NRC Form 366 (9-83)

B607110234 B60703 PDR ADOCK 05000414 S PDR

LICENSEE EVEN	T REPORT	(LER) TEXT	CONTINUATION
		the first of the second s	

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)	PAGE (3)		
		YEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION NUMBER NUMBER			
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 4 1 4	8 6 - 0 2 3 - 0 0	d 2 OF 0 3		

BACKGROUND

NRC Form 366A

Procedure IP/0/A/3200/02A, Solid State Protection System (SSPS) (EIIS:JC) Train A Periodic Testing procedure is used monthly to verify the operability of the logic in the SSPS. The test may be performed without disturbing the operation of the plant. Two redundant trains provide protection functions for equipment in the plant. Testing of each train is accomplished by placing the Input Error Inhibit switch for that train in the INHIBIT position, and thus isolating the input signals to that train. Reactor Trips and Engineered Safeguards outputs of SSPS are blocked by disabling the operation of the slave relays in the Output Relay bay, for the train under test. At the completion of the test, the Reactor Trip Breakers are required to be closed and connected to the bus, and all Manual Blocks must be reinstated before SSPS is placed back into normal operation.

During the restoration section of the procedure, the Reactor Trip Breaker is required to be placed in the CONNECT position and CLOSED. The next step in the procedure states to place the Input Error Inhibit switch to the NORMAL position. If the Input Error Inhibit switch is placed in the NORMAL position, with the Reactor Trip Breaker not racked into the CONNECT position and CLOSED, a Main Feedwater (CF) (EIIS:SJ) Isolation will occur.

DESCRIPTION OF INCIDENT

On June 2, 1986, test personnel began the SSPS Train A Periodic Testing procedure. On June 3, 1986, at the completion of the test as the SSPS was being placed back in normal alignment, it was decided by Technician A that the Train A Reactor Trip Breaker should be racked to the TEST position and CLOSED rather than to the CONNECT position and CLOSED. Operations personnel were told by Technician A to place the Train A Reactor Trip Breaker in the TEST position and CLOSED. Continuing with the procedure, the technicians performed the next step which was to place the Input Error Inhibit switch in the NORMAL position. At 0613:07 hours, a CF Isolation occurred. The CF Isolation caused Steam Generator (S/G) CF Bypass to Auxiliary Feedwater (CA) (EIIS:BA) Nozzle valves to close automatically. At 0615 hours, the CF Isolation was reset and the S/G CF Bypass to CA Nozzle valves were opened, returning the plant to normal status. At 0616 hours, the affected valves were realigned and at 0619 hours, the Reactor Trip Breakers were opened.

CONCLUSION

This incident is assigned Cause Code A, Personnel Error, since Technician A deviated from the procedure and decided to place the Train A Reactor Trip Breaker in the TEST and CLOSED position rather than the CONNECT and CLOSED position. A procedure violation also occurred when Technician B and C both signed the procedure step to place the Reactor Trip Breaker in the CONNECT and CLOSED position. Upon placing the Input Error Inhibit switch to the NORMAL position, a CF Isolation occurred. The procedure has a warnin, stating that if the Reactor Trip Breaker is not in the CONNECT and CLOSED position, and there are 2 out of 4 Low Temperature

LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) TEXT CONTINUATION

U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

APPROVED OMB NO. 3150-0104 EXPIRES 8/31/85

FACILITY NAME (1)	DOCKET NUMBER (2)	LER NUMBER (6)				PAGE (3)		
		YEAR		NUMBER	REVISION NUMBER			
Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2	0 5 0 0 4 1 4	8 6	_	0 2 3	- 010	0 3	OF	0

Average lights illuminated, there will be a CF Isolation when the Input Error Inhibit switch is placed in the NORMAL position.

Technician A considered that due to the Unit being Shut Down that the Reactor Trip Breaker only needed to be closed to prevent a CF Isolation. The Technician was not aware that the breaker needed to be racked to the CONNECT position and CLOSED to prevent the CF Isolation though the procedure did state this. The Technician's Supervisor was not consulted in making this decision. Technicians B and C were being trained by Technician A during this incident.

Incidents caused by failure to follow procedure have occurred previously, but are not considered to be recurring problems.

During the investigation it was found that procedures IP/0/A/3200/08A, 08B, 10A, and 10B had a step stating that "the Reactor Trip Breaker was to be placed in the CONNECTED and CLOSED position, if required". The "if required" should be removed or clarified in this step to prevent a similar incident. IP/0/A/3200/08A, 08B, 10A, and 10B are not associated with this incident.

CORRECTIVE ACTION

AC Form 366A

- (1) The CF Isolation signal was reset and the affected valves were realigned to normal position.
- (2) Personnel involved were counseled by Supervision to stress the need to follow procedures.
- (3) Procedures IP/0/A/3200/08A, 08B, Train A and B Reactor Trip Breaker Trip Device Monthly Functional Test, and IP/0/A/3200/10A, and 10B, Train A and B Reactor Trip Breakers Trip Device Functional Test, will be modified to explicitly state that the Reactor Trip Breaker must be in the CONNECT and CLOSED position prior to returning the Input Error Inhibit switch to the NORMAL position.
- (4) Trips and transients related to this type of work will be discussed with all shifts.

SAFETY ANALYSIS

At the time of the incident all four S/G narrow range levels were at approximately 50%. After the CF Isolation, levels did not change in the S/Gs. The CA System was not required to start. Adequate heat removal capability was available at all times for the Reactor Coolant System (EIIS:AB).

The health and safety of the public were not affected by this incident.

DUKE POWER COMPANY P.O. BOX 33189 CHARLOTTE, N.C. 28242

HAL B. TUCKER VICE PRESIDENT NUCLEAR PRODUCTION

÷

4

TELEPHONE (704) 373-4531

July 3, 1986

Document Control Desk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555

Subject: Catawba Nuclear Station, Unit 2 Docket No. 50-414

Gentlemen:

Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73 Section (a) (1) and (d), attached is Licensee Event Report 414/86-23 concerning a Main Feedwater isolation during Solid State Protection System testing due to a personnel error. This event was considered to be of no significance with respect to the health and safety of the public.

Very truly yours,

Hal B. Tucker Jun

Hal B. Tucker

RWO/11/jgm

Attachment

xc: Dr. J. Nelson Grace, Regional Administrator U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Region II 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323

American Nuclear Insurers c/o Dottie Sherman, ANI Library The Exchange, Suite 245 270 Farmington Avenue Farmington, CT 06032

M&M Nuclear Consultants 1221 Avenue of the Americas New York, NY 10020 INPO Records Center Suite 1500 1100 Circle 75 Parkway Atlanta, Georgia 30339

NRC Resident Inspector Catawba Nuclear Station

IE22