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February 5, 1998

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555

ATTENTION: Document Control Desk

SUBJECT: Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
Unit Nos. 1 & 2; Docket Nos. 50-317 & 50-318
Penetration Fire Barriers Special Report
Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a

Per the requirements of Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a, we hereby submit the attached Special Report concerning inoperable fire barrier penetrations. Specifically, the Control Room Vestibule to Turbine Building Door, No. 401, was inoperable for greater than seven days.

Should you have questions regarding this matter, we will be pleased to discuss them with you.

Very truly yours,

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PEK/JKK/bjd

Attachment

cc: R. S. Fleishman, Esquire
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ATTACHMENT (1)

PENETRATION FIRE BARRIERS -- SPECIAL REPORT

We submit this Special Report due to an inoperable penetration fire barrier, as required by Technical Specifications 3.7.12, Action Statement a.

ACTION TAKEN

On January 1, 1998, the Control Room Vestibule to Turbine Building Door, No. 401, failed to automatically close as designed. Subsequent investigation determined that the door was held open by air pressure from the ventilation system. At 2135, Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a was entered, because Door No. 401 is part of the fire barrier that separates the Control Room complex from the Turbine Building. In accordance with Technical Specification 3.7.12, Action Statement a, the operability of the fire detectors on at least one side of the inoperable fire barrier was verified within one hour, and an hourly fire watch patrol was established. The function of the door as a fire barrier separation was maintained by placing a sign on the door directing personnel using the door to verify that the door closes and latches. The Action Statement for Door No. 401 remained in effect in excess of seven days, thereby requiring a Special Report to be submitted.

CAUSE OF INOPERABILITY

The Control Room ventilation system was operating in the Winter mode, and the maximum amount of outside air was being pulled in. The ventilation configuration increased vestibule pressure, preventing Door No. 401 from properly closing and latching.

The potential for fire spread between the Turbine Building and the Control Room Complex via the open door is considered small. The vestibule has other doors between Door No. 401, the Control Room, and the stair tower that remained in the closed position. The combustible loading in the vestibule is less than one hour, preventing fire propagation through the vestibule. There is fire detection in the Control Room, and in the Control Room ventilation system, which will identify a fire in an incipient stage. Door No. 401 was Operable as long as the door was maintained closed and latched. However, the Action Statement continued to be implemented as a conservative measure.

PLANS AND SCHEDULES FOR RESTORING THE SYSTEM TO OPERABLE STATUS

The Action Statement for Door No. 401 was exited on January 12, 1998, after adjustments were made to the door's automatic closure mechanism. A modification to reduce the outside air flow to the Control Room to 10 percent of full system flow has been developed and is scheduled to be completed in March 1998. The modification will reduce the air flow that is holding open Door No. 401.