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6730-97-2269

November 19, 1997

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Attn.: Document Control Desk Washington, DC 20555

Dear Sir:

Subject: Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station

Docket No. 50-219

Licensee Event Report 97-013: Reactor Building Ventilation Ductwork May

Not Meet Its Seismic Design Basis Since

Original Construction

Enclosed is Licensee Event Report 97-013. This event did not impact the health and safety of the public.

If any additional information or assistance is required, please contact Mr. Paul Czaya of my staff at (509) 971-4139.

Very truly yours,

Michael B. Roche

Michael B Roche

Vice President and Director

Oyster Creek

MBR/PFC Enclosure

> Oyster Creek NRC Project Manager Administrator, Region I Senior Resident Inspector

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NRC FORM 366 APPROVED BY OMB NO. 3150-0104 (4-95) **EXPIRES 04/30/98** ESTIMATED BURDEN PER RESPONSE TO COMPLY WITH THIS MANDATORY INFORMATION COLLECTION REQUEST SO I HRS. REPORTED LESSONS LEARNED ARE INCORPUSATED INTO THE LICENSING PROCESS AND PED BACK TO BY AUSTRALY. POR WARD COMMENTS REGARDING RUNDEN ENTIMATE TO THE INFORMATION AND RECORDS MANAGEMENT BRANCH (1-6 F33), U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, WASHINGTON, DC 7691-50001, AND TO THE PAPER WORK REDULT TON PROJECT (3) 50-01(44), OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BULKET, WASHINGTON, D. 2093. LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER) FAGE (3) FACILITY NAME (II DOCKET NUMBER /2 50-219 1 of 4 Oyster Creek Unit 1 TTTTTTT Reactor Building Ventilation Ductwork May Not Meet Its Seismic Design Basis Since Original Construction OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED (8) EVENT DATE (5) ER NUMBER (6) REPORT DATE (7) MONTH DAY YEAR VEAR SEQUENTIAL REVISION MONTH DAV YEAR NUMBER NUMBER 05000 DOCKET NUMBER FACILITY NAME 20 97 97 97 10 013 00 05000 OPERATING MODE (9) THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR 6. (Check one or more) (11) Run 26.2203(a)(2)(v) 50.73(a)(2)(i) 50.73(a)(2)(x) POWER 20.2203(a)(3)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(ii) 20.2203(a)(1) 100 LEVEL (10) 73.71 20.2203(a)(2)(i) 20.2203(ax3xii) 50.73(a)(2)(iii) OTHER 2(2203(a)(4) 50.73(a)(2)(iv) 20.2203(#X2)(ii) 50.73(a)(2)(v) 20.220" a K2 Kill 50.36(c)(1) 50.73(a)(2)(vii) 20.2203(ax2xiv) 50.36(0)(2) LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER (12 ELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) NAME Ronald J. Miranda (201) 316-7372 COMPRETEONIZATION PROFESOR PACIFICOMPONENTS AUTHORITIES DESCRIBED INTRIBUTED IN

ABSTRACT (Limit to 1400 spaces, i.e., approximately 15 single-spaced typewritten lines) (16)

SUPPLEME

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The design of the reactor building ventilation system ductwork comprising the secondary containment boundary may not be in compliance with the requirements of its intended function. It is, however, installed in accordance with the original procurement specification for equipment installation. The functions of the ductwork are to provide a conduit for normal reactor building ventilation and remain intact when secondary containment integrity is required. The specific issue relates to the ductwork's ability to withstand the effects of a seismic event. An operability review in conjunction with a field walkdown was performed. The results of the operability review concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the ductwork will continue to perform its function following an operating basis seismic event. GPU Nuclear also received information from a seismic consultant that supported this conclusion. Seismic verification walkdowns are in progress to verify seismic adequacy of the existing installations while further reviews of design basis information are being conducted.

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U.S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

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DATE OF DISCOVERY

The condition described herein was identified on October 20, 1997.

IDENTIFICATION OF OCCURRENCE

The reactor building (EIIS-NG) ventilation system (EIIS-VA) ductwork (EIIC-DUCT) comprising the secondary containment boundary may not be in compliance with its design basis. The specific issue relates to the ductwork's ability to withstand the effects of a seismic event. A review to determine the design basis was inconclusive. The existing configuration was constructed in accordance with the original equipment specification.

This report is submitted to comply with the schedular requirement of 10CFR 50.73(d) as a follow-up to a 10CFR 50.72(b)(1)(ii)(B) notification made on October 20, 1997.

CONDITIONS PRIOR TO DISCOVERY

The plant was operating at approximately 100% power. System pressures and temperatures were normal for full power operation. Since the condition has existed since initial construction, the plant has been in various modes over time.

DESCRIPTION OF OCCURRENCE

While addressing an open item resulting from the preparation of a system design basis document, (SDBD) a portion of the design basis for the ductwork that comprises secondary containment boundaries came into question. The ductwork is the portion of the supply duct between the first isolation valve (EIIC-ISV) inboard of the reactor building penetration (EIIC-PEN) and the reactor building wall. After review of the updated Final Safety Analysis Report and original Facility Description and Safety Analysis Report (FDSAR), it was ascertained that these ducts should be designed and installed to withstand operating basis earthquake loading. Further review of the FDSAR yielded conflicting information. A notification pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(i)(ii)(B) was made and an operability review in conjunction with a field walkdown was performed. The results of the operability review concluded that there is reasonable assurance that the ductwork will continue to perform its function following a seismic event. In addition, GPU Nuclear received information from a seismic consultant that supported this conclusion.

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APPARENT CAUSE OF OCCURRENCE

The identified condition represents a conflict within the design basis. A significant contributing cause is the age and lack of clarity of the original licensing documents.

ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT

A portion of the reactor building ventilation system ductwork forms a secondary containment boundary between the reactor building wall penetration and the redundant isolation valves in the inlet lines. The functions of the ductwork are to provide a conduit for normal reactor building ventilation and remain intact when secondary containment integrity is required. Secondary containment integrity is required such that the standby gas treatment system (SGTS) can maintain a ¼ inch water vacuum in the reactor building should SGTS be actuated. There are no flow requirements for this duct in this condition. The duct is required to pass flow during normal plant operation but these flow requirements are not a safety function.

If a postulated failure on this portion of the duct resulting from an earthquake would occur, SGTS may not be able to maintain the Technical Specification requirement of ¼ inch water vacuum in the reactor building. As a result, the system may not be able to provide a controlled, elevated and filtered release of the reactor building atmosphere under accident conditions. The duct may not be intact nor remain functional to provide a controlled release of reactor building atmosphere.

Inherent seismic ruggedness of ventilation ductwork ensures leaktightness as attested to by considerable seismic experience data. Ventilation duct systems that are not typically designed to withstand earthquake forces have been proven generally rugged enough to maintain pressure integrity during earthquakes equal to and greater than the Oyster Creek design basis earthquake. The secondary containment isolation valves, dampers and associated accumulators were also verified using seismic experience data.

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ANALYSIS OF OCCURRENCE AND SAFETY ASSESSMENT (continued)

Walkdowns were performed to as less the current condition of the ductwork. No visible deficiencies were noted nor were any abnormables with respect to the duct discovered except that one hanger was missing one of two support rods. It was concluded that the current configuration of the duct matches the original plant installation drawings after the missing rod is replaced.

The safety significance of this occurrence is minimal since the characteristics of the existing installation provide reasonable assurance that the secondary containment boundary will be maintained if a seismic event were to occur. A simultaneous occurrence of a seismic event and a design basis accident is not considered part of a Oyster Creek design basis.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

Seismic verification walkdown to verify seismic adequacy of the specific installations have been completed.

Conflicts within the design basis will be evaluated and resolved.

SIMILAR EVENTS

None