

U. S. NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

REGION III

Report No. 50-461/86042(DRP)

Docket No. 50-461

License No. CPPR-137

Licensee: Illinois Power Company
500 South 27th Street
Decatur, IL 62525

Facility Name: Clinton Power Station

Inspection At: Clinton Site, Clinton, IL

Inspection Conducted: June 2-6 and 9-13, 1986

Inspector: C. H. Scheibelhut

Approved By: R. C. Knop, Chief
Reactor Projects Section 1B

6/24/86
Date

6/30/86
Date

Inspection Summary

Inspection on June 2-6 and 9-13, 1986 (Report No. 50-461/86042 (DRP))

Areas Inspected: Routine safety inspection by a Regional Inspector of applicant actions on previous inspection findings, evaluation of applicant action with regard to Three Mile Island action plan requirements, IE Bulletins and Circulars, 10CFR21 and 10CFR50.55(e) items, and review of allegations.

Results: Of the five areas inspected, no violations, deviations or safety significant issues were identified.

DETAILS

1. Personnel Contacted

Illinois Power Company (IP)

- *K. A. Baker, Supervisor, I and E Interface
- *W. N. Connell, Manager, Quality Assurance
- *J. H. Greene, Manager, Startup
- *D. W. Hillyer, Director, Radiation Protection
- *E. W. Kant, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Station Engineering Department
- *J. E. Loomis, Construction Manager
- *J. A. Miller, Assistant Manager, Startup
- *D. R. Morris, Director, Nuclear Program Scheduling
- *J. S. Perry, Manager, Nuclear Program Coordination
- *J. D. Weaver, Director, Licensing
- *J. W. Wilson, Plant Manager

*Denotes those attending the exit meeting.

The inspector also contacted others of the construction project and operations staff.

2. Applicant Actions on Previously Identified Items (92701)

- a. (Closed) Safety Evaluation Report (SER) Confirmation Item
(461/85005-33): "Verify that the automatic recirculation pump trip is installed and ATWS operating procedures are in place."

The applicant performed preoperational test procedure PTP-RD-02, "Alternate Rod Insertion/ATWS Recirculation Pump Trip", and the test results were approved April 10, 1986. The test was performed to demonstrate that the Alternate Rod Insertion and Anticipated Transient Without Scram Recirculation Pump Trip System (ARI/ATWS RPT) would perform as intended in both the automatic and manual mode.

The SER section 15.2.1 stated that the procedure for mitigating ATWS, CPS No. 4404.01, "Reactivity Control - Emergency," would be reviewed under the emergency operating procedure program as described in Section 13.6.3 of the FSAR and that the results of the review would be reported in a supplement to the SER.

A supplement was issued and an open item was assigned to SSER 4, paragraph 13.6.3.1 (Open Item 85015-07). It required verification of revisions to emergency procedures guidelines (EPGs), upgrading of emergency off-normal procedures and plant operator training prior to fuel load. The NRC reviewed IP's response to this issue and found the EPG, status of EOP revisions, and operator training were acceptable with the exception of the combustible gas control EPG and EOP which were deferred to 5% power per 10CFR50.44(c)(3)(vii)(B). This review was documented in Inspection Report 50-461/85053. The applicant approved Revision 3 of CPS No. 4404.01, "Reactivity Control-Emergency", on February 22, 1986.

The inspector reviewed the results of PTP-RD-02 and found that the test did demonstrate proper operation of the ARI/ATWS RPT system. The inspector also reviewed the procedure No. 4401.01 and found it to be satisfactory and in accord with the EPG. Since the remaining combustible gas control EPG and EOP, are being tracked under open item 461/85015-07, this item is closed.

- b. (Open) Open Item (461/85039-01): "Demonstration of capability to augment the onsite staff to meet the 30- and 60-minute goals of table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Revision 1."

In the case of a site emergency, key personnel must respond to augment onsite personnel in the manning of the Technical Support Center (TSC), the Operations Support Center (OSC), and the Emergency Operations Facility (EOF). Table B-1 of NUREG-0654, Revision 1, delineates minimum personnel and time response goals to activate the facilities. The item was left open because shift augmentation capability had not been demonstrated.

The applicant conducted an actual shift augmentation drill (personnel called and arrival at the site logged) on February 13, 1986. Analysis of the results of the drill showed a weakness in the notification scheme that led to an excessive number of late arrivals. To shorten the notification time, additional pagers were issued to reduce the number of autodial calls and thereby reduce the notification time. On April 4, 1986, the applicant conducted another actual shift augmentation drill but limited it to groups that had shown excessive late arrivals in the first drill. This drill was judged successful by the applicant.

To demonstrate their overall capability in this area, the applicant will conduct a call-out drill of all pertinent personnel. The item remains open pending an inspection of the results of the call-out drill. During discussions with the applicant on this matter, it was discovered that the applicant's program did not require drills of this nature on a periodic basis as required in NUREG-0654. This is considered an open item until a future inspection of the program shows that the drills will be conducted on a periodic basis (461/86042-01).

- c. (Open) Deviation (461/86018-02): "Failure to provide for periodic testing of instrument air for particulate contamination, failure to provide for acceptance criteria concerning the size of particulates present in the instrument air, and failure to provide for testing of instrument air quality following repair or modification of the instrument air system."

The inspector contacted applicant personnel to determine the progress made on the corrective actions taken and the corrective actions taken to prevent recurrence. These actions were delineated in the applicant's response to the Notice of Deviation in a letter to the NRC dated May 25, 1986. The inspector found the following:

1. Vendors of safety-related equipment have been contacted and the maximum contaminant particle size that the components can accept in the air stream and maintain operational reliability was determined.
2. The smallest of the above particle sizes has been set as the new acceptance criterion for the Instrument Air (IA) system. Amendment 38 to the Final Safety Analysis Report incorporates the criterion in section 9.3.1. The amendment was mailed to the NRC on June 20, 1986.
3. Testing of the IA system to the new criteria has not been accomplished.
4. The required procedure changes have not received final approval.
5. Personnel training in accordance with the revised procedures will follow procedure approval.

The inspector was also told that during a functional test of the reactor Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) the applicant found that some of the control air solenoids did not completely close after use. While this failure did not prevent operation of the system, the leaking solenoid valves could have bled the stored air in the accumulators if the instrument air system failed and thereby render the Automatic Depressurization System (ADS) inoperable. The applicant wrote Condition Report CR-1-8603-124 to investigate the problem and provide a disposition.

The applicant disassembled the leaking solenoids and found that contamination with dirt was preventing proper closure. All of the control air solenoids were then disassembled and 14 of the 16 valves found contaminated with dirt. Corrective action calls for a cleaning of all ADS air piping and a plant modification calls for the addition of an air filter at the point where the instrument air system supplies the ADS air subsystem. The corrective action also calls for inspection and cleaning of the Main Steam Isolation Valve (MSIV) air subsystem and the installation of a filter at the point where the instrument air system supplies the MSIV air subsystem. The investigation found that the air subsystem that supplies the control rod drives had been flushed with a hot trisodium phosphate solution and provided with an entrance filter as part of the original design.

After a review of these activities, the inspector concluded that when the corrective actions required by the condition report are completed, the Deviation will no longer be considered a constraint on fuel load. The Deviation will then be considered a constraint on a full power license.

- (Closed) SER Confirmation Item (461/85015-06): "Verify Nuclear Steam Supply System vendor review of low power testing, power ascension and emergency operating procedures is complete prior to fuel load."

In Inspection Report 50-461/86010, the inspector determined that the NSSS vendor, General Electric, had reviewed the low power and emergency operating procedures.

The inspector determined that all of the power ascension procedures have been written with all but two having final approval. The inspector reviewed the applicant's records associated with these procedures and found that all had been reviewed by General Electric personnel. The applicant's administrative controls also require General Electric review of any revision to the procedures. Therefore, this item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

3. Evaluation of Applicant Action with Regard to Three Mile Island (TMI) Action Plan Requirements (25401)

The NRC Office of Inspection and Enforcement issued Temporary Instruction (TI) 2514/01, Revision 2, dated December 15, 1980, to supplement the Inspection and Enforcement Manual. The TI provides TMI-related inspection requirements for operating license applicants during the phase between prelicensing and licensing for full power operation. The TI was used as the basis for inspection of the following TMI items found in NUREG-0737, "Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements."

(Closed) Item I.C.7: "NSSS Vendor Review of Procedures." This item is identical to open item 461/85015-06. Since the open item has been closed (see paragraph 2.d above) this item is also closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

4. Applicant Actions on 10CFR21 Items (92700)

- a. (Closed) 10CFR21 Item (461/83004-PP): "Design of Control Rod Drive (CRD) housing band clamps." A construction subcontractor informed the applicant that the CRD band clamps supplied by General Electric had not been qualified in accordance with the ASME code (Section III, subsection NF). The applicant's evaluation determined that it was a reportable condition and reported it to the NRC because calculations showed that clamp failure could lead to failure of control rod hydraulic insert and withdrawal lines. The situation arose because of misunderstanding. General Electric considered the clamps to be shipping clamps. The buyers considered the clamps to be essential to the piping design.

In conjunction with another utility with the same problem, ASME code qualified clamps were designed and fabricated. The applicant removed the General Electric supplied shipping clamps and installed the qualified clamps.

The inspector reviewed the records and found that the replacement clamps were designed and fabricated in accordance with ASME Section III, subsection NF and 10CFR50 Appendix B requirements. The records also indicated that the old clamps were removed and the new clamps

installed with proper quality assurance controls. This item is closed.

- b. (Closed) 10CFR21 Item (461/85004-PP): "TEC Model 914-1 acoustic valve flow monitor." The manufacturer of the equipment used to monitor steam flow through the main steam line Safety Relief Valves (SRVs) informed the applicant that an electronic module (914-1) contained in their equipment may contain a defective component. The defect would result in failure of the flow indicator to return to zero after flow through the SRV went to zero, a condition known as bar graph "latch-up."

An investigation and evaluation by the applicant showed that the system provided an alarm function only and was supplemented by a diverse source of flow information in the form of thermocouples next to each acoustic sensor. Since modules that contained the defective part would still provide the alarm function, the applicant concluded that the condition was not reportable because the system was not necessary to assure integrity of the reactor coolant boundary, or capability to shut down the reactor, or capability to prevent or mitigate consequences of accidents. The manufacturer made available an equivalent electronic module (914-2) that did not contain the potentially defective part. The applicant replaced the 914-1 modules in the equipment with the 914-2 modules.

The inspector reviewed the results of the applicant's investigation and evaluation and concurred in the conclusion that the condition was not reportable. This item is closed.

- c. (Closed) 10CFR21 Item (461/85008-PP): "Yarway Corp. Weldbond valves with potential internal voids in 1/2 and 3/4 inch valve stems." The manufacturer (Yarway Corp.) of certain 1/2 and 3/4 inch Weldbond globe valves informed the applicant that the valves containing valve stems of a certain heat number may have defective valve stems. Valves containing the defective stems could leak through the stems when the valve was in the open position. Yarway identified the valves supplied to Clinton that may contain the defective stems. Yarway also offered to replace the potentially defective stems with stems without the potential defect.

The applicant determined that 15 of the valves were installed in safety-related systems at Clinton. It was also determined that 44 of the valves were normally closed low point drain valves which could have no impact on safety if the valve stems were defective. The remaining valve was an isolation valve for a pressure indicator in a non-radioactive water system and leakage would have no impact on safety. The applicant concluded that the condition was not reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21. The applicant replaced all of the potentially defective valve stems with replacement stems supplied by the vendor.

The inspector reviewed the results of the applicant's investigation and evaluation and concurred with the applicant's conclusion that the condition was not reportable. The inspector also reviewed the

Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) used to replace the stems and found that the work was performed in accordance with the quality assurance program for safety-related work. This item is closed.

- d. (Closed) 10CFR21 Item (461/86003-PP): "Loose stem clamp collars on motor operated valve stems." During preoperational testing activities the applicant's start-up organization issued a Condition Report (CR No. 1-85-02-075 dated 2/21/85) to document the stem clamp failure of two valves in safety-related systems. Stem clamp collars on valves of the type affected prevent stem rotation when the motor operator is actuating the valve. If the stem clamp fails, the stem rotates and the valve will not actuate when required. The applicant considered the condition reportable under the provisions of 10CFR21 and reported the condition to the NRC. The applicant wrote a Non-conforming Material Report (NCMR No. 1-0686 dated 4/1/85) to provide an engineering evaluation and approved disposition. The engineering evaluation found the following: Anchor Darling globe valves of the type used at Clinton were designed with a stem collar to prevent the stem from rotating. The stem collar is held in place with a combination of valve stem key way and set screw. If for any reason (such as vibration) the set screw comes loose, the stem clamp collar will slide down the stem and off the key way, resulting in the free rotation of the stem, thereby rendering the valve inoperable. The applicant determined that 36 Anchor Darling valves utilizing this design were installed in safety-related systems at Clinton. To prevent recurrence, the applicant developed a mechanical staking procedure that prevents loosening of the set screws. The applicant wrote MWRC13246 to stake the set screws on the 36 Anchor Darling valves. This activity was completed 2/1/86. The applicant revised plant maintenance procedure CPS No. 8120.06 to include the staking of the set screw after removal and re-installation of the stem clamp during maintenance or repair activities. Revision 2 of the procedure was issued 4/12/85. Anchor Darling Instruction Manual K-2866A was revised to add re-staking of the set screws following removal of the stem clamp. This revision was completed 11/16/85.

The inspector reviewed the engineering evaluation and concurred with the findings. The inspector reviewed the maintenance procedure and instruction manual and found that the staking procedure had been incorporated in both. The inspector reviewed the MWR and found that the set screw staking had been done in accordance with the quality assurance program. This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

5. Applicant Action on 10CFR50.55(e) Items (92700)

(Open) 10CFR50.55(e) Item (461/85016-EE): "Namco EA-170 and 180 limit switches not torqued: EQ implications." On December 27, 1985, the applicant notified the NRC of a potentially reportable deficiency concerning the torquing of cover plate screws on certain Namco limit switches. The condition was documented in a Condition Report (CR1-85-12-038) written by a construction quality assurance person who noted that while the Namco installation instruction EA189 9006 required 20 inch-

pounds torque for cover screws for EA170 and EA180 limit switches identified in the Equipment Qualification Program, this was not being required or performed during installation, terminations or startup testing. Further investigation of the CR determined that for the EA-180 switches that were used in areas considered as a harsh environment, improper torquing of the cover plate screws could negate the environmental qualifications of the switches. Since the switches are used in the control and alarm circuits of safety-related systems, failure would make the system inoperable. Therefore the condition was considered reportable. The applicant performed an investigation of the deficiency and found the following:

- (1) The torquing requirement is contained in the equipment qualification package, EQ-CL008. Installation instruction drawings EA189 90006, EA189 90008, and EA189 90009 require twenty inch-pounds of torque be applied to the cover plate screws.
- (2) The requirement was not addressed in design, installation or testing documents.
- (3) The vendor's installation/operation/maintenance manuals did not contain the torquing requirements.
- (4) Temporary adhesive labels on the affected switches gave the requirements, but were removed on installation.
- (5) EA740 limit switches were installed in areas of harsh environment and had no requirement to torque the cover plate screws.
- (6) A total of 145 EA180 and 28 EA740 limit switches were identified as being deficient.
- (7) To determine if the deficiency was an isolated case, all pertinent documents associated with ASCO, PYCO, GOULD, and VALCOR devices were reviewed. No similar deficiencies were found and it was concluded that the subject deficiency was an isolated case of non-issuance of engineering instructions.
- (8) The root cause was determined to be the vendor's method of issuing torque requirements with the equipment (i.e. adhesive labels on the switches) instead of the normal industry practice of issuing the requirements in published installation/operation/maintenance manuals.

The applicant initiated corrective action by having the Architect-Engineer, Sargent and Lundy, issue Field Engineering Change Notices (FECNs) 13714 and 13715 to document engineering instructions concerning torque requirements for the cover plate screws. Based on the FECNs, 173 MWRs were written to torque the cover plate screws on the deficient switches. The FECNs were also posted against the installation specification (K-2999) and the associated vendor manuals.

The inspector reviewed the FECNs and a sampling of the closed MWRs and concluded that all of the identified limit switches had their cover plate

screws properly torqued. The inspector verified that the FECNs were posted against the installation specification. However, the inspector did not verify that the FECNs were posted against the pertinent vendor manuals and did not review the applicant's pertinent maintenance procedures to determine if the torque requirements were present. Therefore, this item remains open pending review during a future inspection.

No violations or deviations were identified.

6. Applicant Actions on IE Circulars and Bulletins Not Requiring a Response (92701)

- a. (Closed) IE Circular 81-11 (461/81011-CC): "Inadequate Decay Heat Removal During Reactor Shutdown." Several instances of loss of decay heat removal capability were reported at operating boiling water reactors during shutdown conditions. As a result, certain recommended actions were included in the Circular to strengthen procedures and administrative controls relating to decay heat removal during reactor shutdown. These recommended actions included:
- (1) A review of procedures and administrative controls that relate to decay heat removal during reactor shutdown. The review was to determine the adequacy of monitoring and responding to events involving lost or degraded decay heat removal.
 - (2) A determination that administrative controls provide that
 - (a) Redundant or diverse decay heat removal methods are available during all modes of plant operation. However, only one power source needs to be operable in order to consider the decay heat removal system operable while in modes 4 and 5.
 - (b) In those cases where single failure or other actions result in only one decay heat removal train being available, an alternate means of decay heat removal is provided or an expeditious means for the restoration of the lost train is provided.
 - (c) The maximum coolant temperature remains below the saturation temperature during periods of low flow or no flow. Consideration should be given to maintaining water level in the reactor vessel sufficiently high to enable natural circulation at all times.
 - (d) Monitoring of the reactor coolant temperature and pressure is done at a specified frequency.

In response to the above recommendations, the applicant took the following actions:

(1) The decay heat removal methods for Operating Modes 3, 4, and 5 were outlined in Technical Specification Sections 3.4.9.1, "Residual Heat Removal - Hot Shutdown", 3.4.9.2, "Residual Heat Removal - Cold Shutdown", 3.9.11.1, "Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - High Water Level", and 3.9.11.2, "Residual Heat Removal and Coolant Circulation - Low Water Level". The action statements of Technical Specification Sections 3.4.9.1.b and 3.4.9.2.b required that reactor coolant temperature and pressure be monitored hourly when the minimum number of RHR pumps and heat exchangers were not operable. The action statements of Technical Specification Sections 3.9.11.1.b and 3.9.11.2.b required that reactor coolant temperature be monitored hourly when the minimum number of RHR pumps and heat exchangers were not operable. CPS Procedures 3312.01, "Residual Heat Removal", and 4403.01, "Cooldown - Emergency", defined the alternate methods for removing decay heat.

- (2) (a) Normal and diverse methods of removing decay heat are identified in Item (1) above.
- (b) Alternate methods of removing decay heat are identified in Item (1) above.
- (c,d) CPS Procedure 9000.06, "Preliminary Plant Temperature Log", Section 8.1, and the Heatup/Cooldown, Inservice Leak, and Hydrostatic Testing 30 minute Temperature Log required the monitoring of the reactor coolant temperature every thirty minutes during a forced heatup or cooldown until 3 consecutive readings do not differ by more than 10 degrees F from the first to the third. Sections 8.1 and 8.3 of this procedure required the reactor coolant temperature be monitored every two hours when the 30 minute temperature log is discontinued, until shutdown cooling is no longer in operation. Natural circulation in the core was assured by keeping the vessel water level at or above +61 inches on the Upset Range Monitor or +44 inches on the Shutdown Range Monitor. This water level was specified in Section 8.1.14 of CPS Procedure 3312.01, "Residual Heat Removal".

The inspector reviewed the referenced Technical Specifications and procedures. The review showed that the recommendations of the Circular were included in the Technical Specifications and procedures. This item is closed.

- b. (Closed) IE Bulletin 78-14 (461/78014-BB): "Deterioration of Buna-N Components in ASCO Solenoids." Problems at several operating boiling water reactors involving slow response times of control rod insertion following a scram were reported. Subsequent investigation revealed that deterioration of Buna-N components in the scram pilot solenoid valves had caused malfunction of the valves. The bulletin essentially required establishment of a preventive maintenance

program to replace all Buna-N material in all CRD scram pilot valves, backup scram valves, scram discharge volume vent and drain pilot valves, and scram discharge volume test valves at periodic intervals. It was noted that the GE design specification for Buna-N material specified a minimum design life of three years.

To comply with the Bulletin and reduce future maintenance expense and time, the CRD scram pilot valves and backup scram valves were rebuilt using Viton parts except for the body gasket and diaphragm assembly which remain Buna-N. During the rebuilding process, new diaphragm assemblies and body gaskets were installed. This change was concurred in by the Architect-Engineer, Sargent and Lundy, and the valve manufacturer, ASCO. The scram discharge volume vent and drain pilot valves were replaced with Valcor solenoid valves. This change was concurred in by the NSSS supplier, General Electric. The Valcor valves require replacement of one "O" ring every five years to remain environmentally qualified for forty years. The Clinton design does not utilize scram discharge volume test valves. The applicant had Sargent and Lundy perform an independent review of the environmental qualification life of the rebuilt ASCO solenoid valves. They determined that the valves were environmentally qualified for forty years of service provided that the diaphragm assembly and body gasket were replaced every three years. This was reflected in environmental qualification package MEQ CL-075 and was being scheduled for the scram pilot valves by preventive maintenance items EMRDMO-001S, 002S, 003S, and 004S using CPS No. 8523.01, "Scram Pilot Valve Maintenance" and for the backup scram valves by preventive maintenance item EMRDMO-008S using CPS No. 8523.03, "Backup Scram Pilot Valve A and B Maintenance." The preventive maintenance items were listed in the applicant's computerized preventive maintenance scheduling system, "SURVTRAC."

The inspector reviewed a sampling of the Maintenance Work Requests (MWRs) utilized in the valve rebuilding program and found that they accomplished the stated replacements. The inspector reviewed the SURVTRAC scheduling system and found that the valves were scheduled to have the Buna-N components replaced every three years. The inspector concluded that the applicant has complied with the intent of the Bulletin. This item is closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

7. Applicant Actions on Allegations (99014)

(Closed) Allegation (RIII-86-A-0055 (#185)): "Unqualified Nuclear Station Engineering Department Instrumentation and Control Section Supervisor." The NRC received a signed letter from an individual (individual A) who was concerned that the acting supervisor (individual B) of the Control and Instrumentation (C&I) section of the Nuclear Station Engineering Department (NSED) may be incompetent to function in the position. Individual A also sent copies of the letter to the applicant's management.

NRC Review

The applicant's position description for the position included the requirements for a BS degree in the appropriate discipline plus 10 years of experience in the supervision and direction of the activities of engineers. It also called for the providing of technical guidance to the C&I staff. On receipt of the letter, the applicant conducted an investigation of the concern. The applicant found that individual B had a BS degree in management; had been a qualified reactor operator in the nuclear navy; and had spent 16 years, 12 years in supervisory positions, in nuclear construction activities at three reactor sites in the areas of electrical and I&C construction. The department of human resources confirmed individual B's resume by letters and considered him qualified. A review by the manager of NSED concluded that he was qualified. The concernee was interviewed by IP Quality Assurance and the NSED Manager. In both interviews, the concernee stated that he knew of no quality or hardware problems that existed in the plant. The CPS Safeteam, which is an independent IP organization, interviewed some of individual A's coworkers. These interviews tended to corroborate the concernee's concern. However, none of the persons interviewed knew of any quality or hardware problems in the plant. The applicant wrote letters to the concernee and the NRC concluding that individual B was qualified. Individual B terminated his employment and left the site on May 30, 1986.

The inspector reviewed the applicant's files and found they supported the information given above in all instances. The inspector interviewed individual A. The interview showed that he still had his original concerns despite the applicant's investigation and conclusion. He was concerned that the applicant still could consider individual B competent. Individual A knew of no new quality or hardware problems that may have come about since he wrote his original letter. The inspector interviewed four of individual A's coworkers. Two of the four had been interviewed previously by the Safeteam. In all instances the persons interviewed shared individual A's concerns about individual B's technical competence. They considered individual B as a manager but not one they could turn to for technical help or guidance. In no case did they know of any quality or hardware problems in the plant. They attributed this to the technical competence of his staff.

Results

Neither individual A nor other personnel interviewed by the inspector and/or the CPS Safeteam identified any concern or evidence of hardware or quality problems brought about by individual B's employment. Based on the inspector's review of individual B's qualification records and the results of personnel interviews by the inspector and the CPS Safeteam, the inspector concluded that individual B did not fully meet the position description provided by the applicant. Nevertheless, the applicant had evaluated individual B's capability and had concluded that he was qualified for the position.

Since individual B terminated employment and since there was no concern or evidence of quality or hardware problems resulting from his

employment, the inspection did not include a review of individual B's work. The applicant's quality assurance program was in accordance with 10CFR50, Appendix B, which requires that all safety-related tests, design changes, procurements and other similar activities be performed in accordance with written documents that provide for independent review and verification of the work. That review process greatly reduces the possibility of quality or hardware problems being caused by a single individual. Therefore, the inspector considers the allegation to be closed.

No violations or deviations were identified.

8. Open Items

Open items are matters which have been discussed with the applicant, which will be reviewed further by the inspector, and which involve some action on the part of the NRC or applicant or both. One open item disclosed during this inspection, is discussed in paragraph 2.b.

9. Exit Meeting

The inspector met with the resident inspector and applicant representatives (denoted in paragraph 1) at the conclusion of the inspection on June 13, 1986. The resident inspector summarized the scope and findings of the inspection. The applicant acknowledged the inspector's findings. The applicant did not indicate that any of the information disclosed during the inspection could be considered proprietary in nature.