



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20555-0001

PHILADELPHIA ELECTRIC COMPANY
DOCKET NO. 50-352
LIMERICK GENERATING STATION, UNIT 1
AMENDMENT TO FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE

Amendment No. 124
License No. NPF-39

1. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has found that:
 - A. The application for amendment by Philadelphia Electric Company (the licensee) dated October 24, 1997, complies with the standards and requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended (the Act), and the Commission's rules and regulations set forth in 10 CFR Chapter I;
 - B. The facility will operate in conformity with the application, the provisions of the Act, and the rules and regulations of the Commission;
 - C. There is reasonable assurance (i) that the activities authorized by this amendment can be conducted without endangering the health and safety of the public, and (ii) that such activities will be conducted in compliance with the Commission's regulations;
 - D. The issuance of this amendment will not be inimical to the common defense and security or to the health and safety of the public; and
 - E. The issuance of this amendment is in accordance with 10 CFR Part 51 of the Commission's regulations and all applicable requirements have been satisfied.


2. Accordingly, the license is amended by changes to the Technical Specifications as indicated in the attachment to this license amendment, and paragraph 2.C.(2) of Facility Operating License No. NPF-39 is hereby amended to read as follows:

Technical Specifications

The Technical Specifications contained in Appendix A and the Environmental Protection Plan contained in Appendix B, as revised through Amendment No. 124, are hereby incorporated in the license. Philadelphia Electric Company shall operate the facility in accordance with the Technical Specifications and the Environmental Protection Plan.

3. This license amendment is effective as of its date of issuance, and shall be implemented within 30 days.

FOR THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION



John F. Stolz, Director
Project Directorate 1-2
Division of Reactor Projects - I/II
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

Attachment: Changes to the Technical
Specifications

Date of Issuance: January 16, 1998

ATTACHMENT TO LICENSE AMENDMENT NO. 124

FACILITY OPERATING LICENSE NO. NPF-39

DOCKET NO. 50-352

Replace the following pages of the Appendix A Technical Specifications with the attached pages. The revised pages are identified by Amendment number and contain vertical lines indicating the area of change.

Remove

3/4 1-11

3/4 1-12

Insert

3/4 1-11

3/4 1-12

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

CONTROL ROD DRIVE COUPLING

LIMITING CONDITION FOR OPERATION

3.1.3.6 All control rods shall be coupled to their drive mechanisms.

APPLICABILITY: OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1, 2, and 5*.

ACTION:

- a. In OPERATIONAL CONDITIONS 1 and 2 with one control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours:
 1. If permitted by the RWM, insert the control rod drive mechanism to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod, and:
 - a) Observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation, and
 - b) Demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the over-travel position.Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
 2. If recoupling is not accomplished on the first attempt or, if not permitted by the RWM, then except as in 3.1.3.6.d or until permitted by the RWM, declare the control rod inoperable, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:
 - a) Electrically, or
 - b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.Otherwise, be in at least HOT SHUTDOWN within the next 12 hours.
- b. In OPERATIONAL CONDITION 5* with a withdrawn control rod not coupled to its associated drive mechanism, within 2 hours either:
 1. Insert the control rod to accomplish recoupling and verify recoupling by withdrawing the control rod and demonstrating that the control rod will not go to the overtravel position, or
 2. If recoupling is not accomplished, insert the control rod and disarm the associated directional control valves** either:
 - a) Electrically, or
 - b) Hydraulically by closing the drive water and exhaust water isolation valves.
- c. The provisions of Specification 3.0.4 are not applicable.
- d. For control rod 50-27, for the remainder of Unit 1 Cycle 7, if coupling can not be established the uncoupled rod may be withdrawn when rated thermal power exceeds 10% only if all the following conditions are satisfied:
 - 1) The uncoupled control rod may not be withdrawn past notch position 46, and
 - 2) No other uncoupled control rod is withdrawn.

* At least each withdrawn control rod. Not applicable to control rods removed per Specification 3.9.10.1 or 3.9.10.2.

** May be rearmed intermittently, under administrative control, to permit testing associated with restoring the control rod to OPERABLE status.

REACTIVITY CONTROL SYSTEMS

SURVEILLANCE REQUIREMENTS

4.1.3.6 Each affected control rod shall be demonstrated to be coupled to its drive mechanism by observing any indicated response of the nuclear instrumentation while withdrawing the control rod to the fully withdrawn position and then verifying that the control rod drive does not go to the overtravel position:

- a. Prior to reactor criticality after completing CORE ALTERATIONS that could have affected the control rod drive coupling integrity,
- b. Anytime the control rod is withdrawn to the "Full out" position in subsequent operation,
- c. Following maintenance on or modification to the control rod or control rod drive system which could have affected the control rod drive coupling integrity, and
- d. When repositioning the uncoupled control rod per Specification 3.1.3.6.d the uncoupled rod's position shall be verified to have followed the control rod drive by neutron instrumentation (LPRM or TIP). If the control blade can not be verified to have followed the drive out to its final position, then the rod shall be completely inserted and the control rod directional valves disarmed as stated in 3.1.3.6.a.2.