



Unclassified

United States
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November 5, 1997

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Region III
801 Warrenville Road
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SERIAL: GDP-97-1041

Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant (PGDP) - Docket No. 70-7001 - 10CFR95.25 Report

In accordance with 10CFR95.25(h), this report summarizes the actions taken as a result of the discovery of four security containers unlocked and unattended in trailer C-200A. Attachment 1 is the "actions taken" to preclude recurrence.

On October 7, 1997, at approximately 11:00 a.m. the custodian for four security containers was preparing to depart trailer C-200A for the day, due to a scheduled medical appointment. She initialed and entered the time (11:00 a.m.) on the SF 702, "Classified Container Check Sheet," on all the security containers and departed the area. At approximately 3:35 p.m. the employee's supervisor conducted a double-check of the containers and discovered that the drawers were closed, but not locked. He locked the containers and initiated a problem report, which was submitted at approximately 6:00 p.m. to the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) for further processing. Because the possibility of compromise could not be ruled out, due to the unlocked and unattended security containers, a one-hour notification was made to NRC in accordance with 10CFR 95.57(b).

On October 7, 1997, at approximately 9:30 p.m. the custodian was telephonically informed by her supervisor that the security containers in her office had been discovered unlocked and she was instructed to report to work to check the security containers. At approximately 10:00 p.m. she arrived at her office and confirmed that the containers were locked. She opened one container and stated: "there were three large red envelopes, one small red envelope, and three black books." The contents of the envelopes and the black books were not examined. It was later confirmed that the red envelopes contained secret restricted data (SRD), but the black books contained unclassified information. The SRD documents contained in the red envelopes were not under document accountability because the documents were awaiting review for possible downgrading, or declassification; therefore, a formal inventory of the secret documents was not conducted.

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On October 8, 1997, the custodian provided a written statement and was interviewed on October 10, 1997, relative to the incident. She stated that on October 7, 1997, at approximately 11:00 a.m. she was preparing to depart for the day because of a scheduled (12:00 noon) doctor's appointment. In her office, at the time, was a sub-contractor who was trying to place some records in a box, which the custodian had entered into a database. The custodian stated she closed the security container drawers, initialed and placed the time on the SF 702s, and she was distracted while simultaneously attempting to assist the sub-contractor placing files in a box. She further stated she apparently failed to rotate the three-position combination locks on the containers and failed to operate the container's handle located on the drawer with the combination lock to assure the container was locked. As she was exiting the door to her office, she stated that she called to her supervisor to "please check me and lock my door." (The supervisor confirmed that he heard "lock my door," but did not hear "check me." He could not recall if he verbally responded to the custodian's request.)

On October 9, 1997, the custodian's supervisor was interviewed relative to the incident. He stated that on October 7, 1997, at approximately 3:35 p.m. he went to the custodian's office for the purpose of double-checking the security containers at the conclusion of the workday. The supervisor stated that the security container drawers were closed. However, when he pulled on the handle on the second drawer of the first container he checked, the drawer came open. The same condition existed on the remaining containers he checked. All drawers were closed, but the drawers were unlocked. He checked the SF 702s on each container and determined that they had been opened that morning.


The supervisor closed and locked three of the security containers, but allowed one to remain open for purposes of obtaining a verification from another employee of what he had discovered. After receiving the requested verification at approximately 3:35 p.m., the supervisor then informed his organization manager, as well as the Technical Security Manager (approximately 4:00 p.m.), of the open security containers. The supervisor stated he and other employees had been in and out of the trailer throughout the day and that no employee was absent from the trailer for periods longer than 10-15 minutes.

The possibility of compromise of the classified documents is considered remote. The container drawers were left in the closed position, which presented the appearance of being locked. Additionally, employees were in and out of the trailer throughout the day, with the longest single absence being 10-15 minutes. Further, on both entry and exit doors, there is a sign that reads "Q or L Access Authorization Required For Admittance." All uncleared personnel (employees and visitors) are required to be escorted.

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If you have any questions regarding this incident, please call Bill Sykes, Manager, Nuclear Regulatory Affairs at (502) 441-6796.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Steve Polston", with a stylized flourish at the end.

Steve Polston
General Manager
Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant

SP:WES:JLH:mcl

Attachment

cc: NRC Division of Security
NRC Document Control Desk
NRC Senior Resident Inspector, PGDP

UNLOCKED SECURITY CONTAINERS - ACTIONS TAKEN

1. On October 8, 1997, the combinations to the four security containers were changed.
2. On October 9, 1997, a security bulletin was forwarded to all classified document custodians which reiterated the requirement to assure that the combination lock is rotated four times in each direction after the containers are locked. Further, it was reemphasized that custodians should pull on each container drawer to assure that it is secure.
3. On October 13, 1997, an office form was developed which will provide information relative to the status, location, and disposition of all classified documents in trailer C-200A.
4. On September 17, 1997, an action plan which addresses a significant condition adverse to quality (SCAQ) relative to the security program was approved for implementation. The action plan, although approved prior to this incident, includes a plant-wide review of many facets of security comprising areas relevant to this incident such as security education/awareness, effectiveness of security procedures, effectiveness of self-assessments, and enforcement of security requirements.
5. On October 27, 1997, a Site and Facilities Support memorandum was published that directs all secret documents, which are determined not to be under the document accountability system, to be immediately reviewed by an authorized derivative declassifier (ADD) to ascertain whether the documents may be downgraded or declassified. If the documents cannot be downgraded or declassified, they must be placed into accountability.