



UNITED STATES
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555




NOTE TO: E. Weiss
D. Neighbors
J. Wilson
R. Bosnak
H. Rood
P. Moriette
H. Nicolaras
W. Jones
G. Hammer

FROM: Daniele Tarnoff

SUBJECT: OPERATING REACTORS EVENTS BRIEFING

The NRR Operating Reactor Events Briefing originally scheduled for July 16, 1985 has been rescheduled for Tuesday, July 23, 1985 at 3:00 P.M. in Conference Room P-422. The agenda for the meeting is shown in Enclosure 1. The dry run held July 16, 1985 will not be held again.

Thank you for your cooperation.


Daniele Tarnoff, X29526

cc: G. Edison	K. Seyfrit	J. Stolz
R. Hernan	J. Hannon	L. Olshan
G. Holahan	C. Thomas	K. Jabbour
E. Rossi	B. Sheron	T. Alexion
R. Baer	G. Knighton	P. O'Connor
M. Srinivasan	S. Varga	B. D. Liaw
F. Cherney	G. Lanik	P. Kadambi
D. Osborne		

ENCLOSURE 1

TENTATIVE AGENDA

OPERATING REACTOR EVENTS BRIEFING (85-12)

JULY 23, 1985

<u>PLANT</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>PRESENTER</u>
1. INDIAN POINT UNIT 3	STEAM GENERATOR WELD INDICATIONS	D. NEIGHBORS
2. SEABROOK	MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVE TEST FAILURE	G. HAMMER
3. OCONEE UNIT 2	EXTENDED BLOW DOWN FROM MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES	H. NICOLARAS
4. WATERFORD UNIT 3	PLANT TRIPS JULY 4-7, 1985	J. WILSON
5. WATERFORD/WOLFCREEK CALLAWAY/CATAWBA/BYRON	STARTUP EXPERIENCE COMPARISON	IE, W. JONES
6. COMBUSTION ENGINEERING	LOCA ANALYSIS ERROR	H. ROOD
7. MOJAVE GENERATING STATION	REHEAT LINE FAILURE	R. BOSNAK
8. PALUEL UNITS 1, 2	IN-CORE INSTRUMENTATION TUBE VIBRATION PROBLEMS	P. MORIETTE

OTHER EVENTS OF INTEREST*

MILLSTONE 2	PRESSURIZER SPRAY VALVE FAILURES	D. OSBORNE
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*THIS EVENT IS NOT SCHEDULED TO BE PRESENTED; BULLET DUE 7/22/85

~~SECRET~~ BRIEFING

DENTON RECOMMENDS:

FOLLOW-UP ON MJSY LIFT PROBLEM

DSI - SYSTEM ASPECTS OF INADEQUATE CAPACITY?

DE - VALVE ASPECTS?

OCONEE 1,2,+3 - 31 excessive blowdown events

Frank,
Rough draft to
Mark Causey (copy)

IE INFORMATION NOTICE No. _____ : INADEQUATE CAPACITY OF
MAIN STEAM SAFETY VALVES
IN PWR PLANTS

Addresses:

All PWR nuclear power reactor facilities holding ^{operating license} 2₁(OL) or 2₁(CP) ^{construction permit}

Purpose:

This information notice is being provided as a notification of a potentially significant problem pertaining to spring-actuated main steam safety valves (MSSVs), that may possess less than ^{the} full rated flow ^{capacity} ~~capability~~ required for overpressure protection of the secondary cooling system in PWRs.

It is expected that recipients will review the information for applicability to their facilities and consider actions, if appropriate, to preclude a similar problem ~~occurring~~ at their facilities. However, suggestions contained in this information notice do not constitute NRC requirements; therefore, no specific action or written response is required.

Description of Circumstances:

Between October 16, 1984 and ~~November~~ ^{December} 1, 1984, Wyle Laboratories conducted several full flow steam tests on two separate Main Steam Safety valves (MSSVs) manufactured by Crosby Valve and Gage

Company. These ~~two~~ Crosby 6R10 MSSVs
are to be installed by Public Service of
New Hampshire on the Seabrook main steam
secondary cooling system. The tests were
conducted in order to determine the
adequacy of various MSSV discharge piping
arrangements. During the tests the valves were
instrumented to measure valve disk lift. The
valves were set up on the test facility with the
Crosby recommended settings of the valve adjusting
rings. With these factory ring settings the valve
achieved only about 50% of the full disk lift
required to develop full steam flow capacity
within the required 3% accumulated overpressure
limit. Adequate lift was not achieved for

either value with the factory ring settings,
 even for the largest diameter vent pipe tested.
~~The rings were~~ subsequently adjusted. The middle
 ring of both valves was subsequently adjusted
 a significant amount (150 notches) ~~in the~~
 during the course of testing and full disk
 lift was achieved.

These types of full flow tests are
 normally not performed by either utility or
 valve vendor on ~~the safety valves~~ MSSVs,
 nor are such tests required for capacity
 certification according to the American Society
 of Mechanical Engineers ^(ASME) Boiler and Pressure Vessel
 Code, Section III. In general, these valves are

capacity certified by ~~testing~~ tests on much smaller ^{size} $PWR S_A$ values which are then extrapolated

to larger size values. The MSSVs ~~are~~ on most ^{while not ~~the~~ necessarily the same model,}

$PWR S_A$ are like those ^{set} ~~on~~ Seabrook in that

these values are ^{generally} S_A at the upper end of the

valve size range. This raises the concern

that full flow functional demonstration of

these values may never have been performed.

It was revealed during the industry sponsored

EPRI Electric Power Research Institute testing

of the PWR pressurizer safety valves that full

flow capacity of spring-actuated safety valves ~~is~~ ^{can be}

~~is~~ sensitive to valve ring settings.

No specific action or written response is required by this information notice. If you have any questions about this matter, please contact the Regional Administrator of the appropriate regional office or this office.

Edward L. Jordan, Director
Division of Emergency Preparedness
and Engineering Response
Office of Inspection and Enforcement

Mark,
Attached is
a clean copy
to type on.




FIGURE 1
Typical Spring
Safety Valve

