DEC 1 5 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Movak, Assistant Director for Licensing

Division of Licensing

FROM: R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety

Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT: WMP-2: IE BULLETIN 80-06, "ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES

RESET CONTROL"

Plant Hame: WNP-2 Docket No.: 50-397 Licensing Status: OL

Responsible Branch: LB #2 Project Manager: R. Auluck Responsible Branch: ICSB

Review Status: Complete For This Item


Enclosed is Instrumentation and Control System Branch (ICSB) input for Chapter 7 (Instrumentation and Controls) of the WNP-2 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Report (SSER). This input addresses SER License Condition 1.9(6) regarding the subject IE Bulletin. Specifically, the applicant was required to conduct preoperational tests to verify that all safety related equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal of the actuating signal and/or reset. The applicant has performed the required tests and has documented the results in letters GO2-83-1059 dated November 15, 1983 and GO2-83-1131 dated December 9, 1983. Previous correspondence regarding these tests was provided by the applicant in letter GO2-82-445 dated May 14, 1982.

As a result of these tests, the applicant has identified four containment isolation valves in the nitrogen inerting system that do not comply with the requirements of IE Bulletin 80-06. The applicant has committed to make modifications to the control circuits for these valves to bring them into compliance prior to the time that containment inerting is required (approximately six to eight months after initial criticality). In the interim, the containment isolation function of these valves will be assured by leaving them in the closed position with the power removed. This is acceptable to the staff.

In order to ensure that the isolation function of these valves (CSP-V-93, 96, 97, and 98) is not compromised prior to completion of the circuit modifications, we recommend that Region V be requested to verify that the applicant has taken appropriate precautionary measures to

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DATE



ensure that these valves are left in the closed position with the power removed. Additionally, subsequent to the modifications to the valves, Region V should verify that preoperational tests are performed to ensure that the valves operate as designed (i.e., will not change position upon a reset).

Original Signed By R. Wayno Houston

R. Wayne Houston, Assistant Director for Reactor Safety Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure: As stated

cc: R. Mattson

A. Schwencer R. Auluck DISTRIBUTION:

Docket File -

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RC FORM 318 (10-80) NRCM 0240

7.3.2.7 IE BULLETIN 80-06, "ENGINEERED SAFETY FEATURES RESET CONTROL"

The staff requested that the applicant review schematic level drawings for all systems serving safety-related functions (1) to determine whether or not, upon reset of an engineered safety feature (ESF) actuation signal, safety-related equipment remains in its emergency mode and (2) to propose corrective action for those which do not. As part of this review the applicant performed preoperational tests to verify whether all equipment remains in its emergency mode upon removal and/or reset of the various actuating signals. These tests were required by SER license condition 1.9(6).

As a result of these tests, the applicant identified certain valves as not complying with the requirements of IE Bulletin 80-06. The reset control circuitry for these valves has been modified to prevent them from reopening upon the reset of the associated actuation signal.

During a re-review of balance of plant (BOP) component compliance to IE Bulletin 80-06, four containment isolation valves associated with the nitrogen inerting system

were identified as non-conforming. The applicant has committed to modify the reset control circuitry for these valves prior to the time that inerting is required. In the interim, the applicant has committed to leave each of these valves in the closed position with the power removed. This will ensure that the containment isolation function performed by the valves will not be compromised. This approach is acceptable to the staff.

Based on the staff's review of the preoperational test results provided by the applicant, and the applicant's commitments to modify the circuitry for the four remaining valves (CSP-V-93, 96, 97, and 98) and to leave these valves closed with power removed in the interim, it is concluded that the provisions of SER license condition 1.9(6) have been met. Therefore, this issue is resolved.