

ALLEGER IDENTIFICATION SHEET

AMS NO: RIII-86-A-0052

FACILITY: Fermi

ALLEGER: Anonymous

8611060002 861031  
PDR FOIA  
PUNTE86-A-146 PDR

*AM*  
SECRET  
11/20/86

ALLEGATION DATA INPUT

A. RECEIVING OFFICE

\*1 FACILITY

DOCKET NUMBER	NAME (40 characters)	UNIT NUMBER (1 character)	DOCKET NUMBER	NAME (40 characters)	UNIT NUMBER (1 character)
0500006	FEENE	1			
05000341	FEENE	2			

\*2 TYPE OF REGULATED ACTIVITY (Check all applicable boxes)

<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> REACTOR	<input type="checkbox"/> SAFEGUARDS	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)
<input type="checkbox"/> MATERIAL LICENSE NUMBER(S)	<input type="checkbox"/> CONSTRUCTION	<input type="checkbox"/> ON-SITE HEALTH AND SAFETY
<input type="checkbox"/> OPERATIONS	<input type="checkbox"/> EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS	<input type="checkbox"/> SAFEGUARDS
<input type="checkbox"/> TRANSPORTATION	<input type="checkbox"/> OFF-SITE HEALTH AND SAFETY	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER HEALTH AND SAFETY

\*4 FUNCTIONAL AREA(S) (Check all applicable)

DESCRIPTION (400 characters)

IMPLEMENT DECONTAMINATION @ SOOTY DRYING OPERATIONS @ PARTS OF RADIATION AREA @ FEENEY NOWKEEPING @ BREATHING AIR SYSTEM VALVES, NEWTONS, PIPING @ MISSING SOURCE @ STEAM/PIPING @ CALIBRATION @ NATIONAL BUREAU OF STANDARDS NOT USE TO CHARACTER EQUIPMENT @ REACTOR FUEL FLOOR HVAC NOT WORKING @ UNQUALIFIED RADIATION PROTECTION SUPERVISORS. CONTINUED IN REMARKS

NUMBER OF CONSENTS: 17

\*7 SOURCE (Check one)

<input type="checkbox"/> CONTRACTOR EMPLOYEE	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ANONYMOUS (50 characters for "a" or "b")	<input type="checkbox"/> YES
<input type="checkbox"/> LICENSEE EMPLOYEE	<input type="checkbox"/> ORGANIZATION (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> NO
<input type="checkbox"/> FORMER LICENSEE EMPLOYEE	<input type="checkbox"/> OTHER (Specify)	<input type="checkbox"/> IMPLIED
<input type="checkbox"/> DATE RECEIVED	YEAR MONTH DAY	
860328	C.H. WELLS	
<input type="checkbox"/> ALLEGATION RECEIVED	YEAR MONTH DAY	
	860627	
<input type="checkbox"/> OFFICE RECEIVING ALLEGATION (first two initials, last name)	R3	

B. ACTION OFFICE

*1 ALLEGATION NUMBER	*2 CONTACT (first two initials, last name)	*3 CONTACT'S TELEPHONE	*4 SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE
RIII-86-1A-0053	L.R. GREBEL	FTS 3AP-5644	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO <input type="checkbox"/> UNKNOWN
*5 OPEN	DATE COMPLETION SCHEDULED	YEAR MONTH DAY	*6 STATUS
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	860627		<input type="checkbox"/> OPEN <input type="checkbox"/> CLOSED <input type="checkbox"/> PARTIALLY
*7 ALLEGATION WAS SUBSTANTIATED			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input type="checkbox"/> NO			
*8 ALLEGER NOTIFIED OF CLOSEOUT			
<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO			
*9 REMARKS (800 characters, use additional page if necessary)			
DISCRETION CONTINUED: @ CIRCULATING WATER PUMP LEAK @ DRESSING AREA NOT ROUTINELY MAINTAINED @ LACK OF PROTECTIVE: ALL NEUTRONIC, FRIAL, SMOKE, WASH BODY COUNTING, THERM ANOMALY, PROTECTIVE CLOTHING @ Licensees will entry @ independent health physics technician @ inappropriate training @ FEAR @			
THE REASON I PUNISHED REUSE BECAUSE HIT ON RECONSTRUCTION AREA @			
*10 ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO	*11 REPORT NUMBER	

\* REQUIRED ENTRIES  
\* REQUIRED IF STATUS IS CLOSED







UNITED STATES  
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION  
REGION III  
799 ROOSEVELT ROAD  
GLEN ELLYN, ILLINOIS 60137

Well

April 3, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. A. Hind, Director, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards

FROM: C. H. Weil, Investigation and Compliance Specialist

SUBJECT: ALLEGATIONS RE: RADIATION PROTECTION AT FERMI 1 AND 2 (50-16; 50-341) (AMS NO: RIII-86-A-0053)

On March 28, 1986, an anonymous male telephoned Region III and provided the following information concerning radiation protection at the Fermi Plant Units 1 and 2:

Employment Discrimination

He indicated he had been working in the radiation protection field for more than twenty-one years, including naval service in that field. He was employed in the Fermi Radiation Protection Department for eleven months. He was terminated in May 1985, for having identified radiation protection concerns to the Fermi Health Physics Supervisor, William Lipton (phonetic spelling) and to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (Loren Hueter and two other inspectors. The caller could not identify the other two NRC inspectors, other than they performed a weekend inspection in approximately May 1985.) The caller claimed he complained to Hueter about the Breathing Air System. The caller claimed he had two witnesses to support his claim of employment discrimination, but he declined to identify them. The caller indicated that he had retained an attorney to sue Detroit Edison for his firing and he wanted "to file whistleblower charges under 10 CFR 19." The caller was informed that the thirty day filing period with the Department of Labor had lapsed, (he was terminated in May 1985), and he should consult his attorney on that issue. Additionally, he indicated other employees had been terminated for the same reason and he would attempt to have those people contact Region III. He would not furnish their names.

Fermi 1 Issues

1. Sodium drumming was done without regard for radiation protection. The operations people wanted the drumming completed as soon as possible and the drumming operation "did not conform to good health physics principals."
  - a. The caller stated that too many sodium filled drums were stacked in the area and that respiratory protection was not provided.
  - b. According to the caller, the only personal protection equipment furnished were gloves and welders' eye shields. No respirators were provided.

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SECRET 3  
A. J. F. H.



2. The Fermi 1 facility was improperly posted. According to the caller, a person can enter the contaminated drumming area from the turbine hallway and not know that he had entered a radiation area because the area was not posted at that hallway.
3. The caller contended that the Fermi 1 facility was "a mess" and no one cared about cleanliness.

#### Fermi 2 Issues

1. The caller's primary concern was with the breathing air system.
  - a. The caller stated that the breathing air system shares much of the same piping with the system used to "backflush spent resins" and no check valves were installed to prevent contamination of the breathing air.
  - b. The breathing air system did not have any inline radiation monitors installed.
  - c. The breathing air system was almost non-existent in many places and contained only a minimal amount of piping and "a few CARDOX bottles."

The caller contended that the breathing air system was inadequate.

2. The caller stated that 500 radiation sources had been received at Fermi over the years. He was assigned to inventory those sources and "many" were missing. He could not specify how many sources were actually missing. (The caller was asked if the sources were specifically licensed or generally licensed by the NRC. His answer was that some were "controlled by 10 CFR Part 19 and Part 20." He indicated that many of the missing sources were from "SPINGS and PINGS.")
3. The caller had several concerns with SPINGS/PINGS.
  - a. The caller contended that the Fermi 2 SPINGS and PINGS were improperly piped (e.g., pipe runs too long, pipe too narrow) to be able to obtain "a true reading." He stated that 3/4" diameter pipe was used in 300' to 400' runs between the SPING/PING and the collection point and that was too long to obtain accurate readings.
  - b. Some of the calibration technicians (not named) were unqualified.
  - c. Many of the devices were not properly calibrated because the calibration devices were not calibrated.
  - d. The SPING/PING calibration procedures did not adequately incorporate NUREG guidance.

He stated he had identified the above concerns (numbers 1, 2 and 3) to his supervisor, Lipton and nothing had been done to correct his concerns.

4. According to the caller, the calibration devices had never been calibrated to a National Bureau of Standards standard; therefore, none of the plant's radiation protection instrumentation was properly calibrated.
5. The air condition system for the "Reactor Fuel Floor, the fifth floor" has never worked properly, and 48" diameter "portable" fans were installed to circulate the air on a permanent basis.
6. Harold Higgins, the Radiation Protection Superintendent for Operations, was not qualified for his position. According to the caller, Higgins has six years of experience in the U.S. Navy and did not have any experience at a commercial power plant. The caller stated that Higgins was required to have two years of commercial power plant experience to hold his position.
7. "Nothing has ever been done to fix a leak in the drywell area." According to the caller, the "circulating" water pumps leak and have never been repaired. The only thing that has been done is to rope off the area and post it as a radiation area.
8. Radiation protection personnel do not routinely monitor the dressing area. Therefore, many employees ignore requirements to "double bootee" or "double glove." "A bad attitude" exists on the part of the employees when dressing.
9. Fermi 2 does not have procedures or has inadequate procedures in the following areas:
  - a. No procedure to compare air monitoring results to MPC hours/minutes.
  - b. No procedure to specify when nasal smears are to be taken.
  - c. Inadequate procedure to specify when whole body counting should be done.
  - d. No trend analysis program for air sampling.
  - e. No procedure to specify when to use protective clothing and equipment under the ALARA Program.
10. Operations personnel expect the radiation protection personnel to enter the Condenser Well to take radiation readings. The caller noted that based on his experience at other nuclear power plants, the Condenser Well will be an extremely high radiation area during operations and should not be entered.
11. Many health physics technicians were hired without any prior experience. Their inexperience was demonstrated in the low scores they achieved in their qualification examinations. Also, Hydro Nuclear identified this problem during an audit and Detroit Edison did not take any corrective action.

April 3, 1986

12. "The only real training at Fermi is in reactor operations. All other training is done by computer."
  - a. The computer method has built in problems, including the "wrong answers in the programs for breathing air and MPC hours."
  - b. The computer programs do not use the latest reference materials, including "Reg Guides and 10 CFR 20." "The whole emphasis is on self teaching and it's not effective."
13. "Fermi does not comply with the FSAR in HP and operations." The caller could not give specific examples, but agreed to call back with the information.

On April 1, 1986, the matter was discussed with Eugene T. Pawlik, Director, Office of Investigations Region III Field Office. It was concluded that an investigation into the alleged employment discrimination could not be initiated without the alleged's identity. Further, the remaining issues did not suggest wrongdoing. Accordingly, this matter was assigned within the Allegation Management System to the Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards for resolution.



Charles H. Weil  
Investigation and  
Compliance Specialist

Enclosure: AMS Form

cc w/enclosure:  
RIII:RAO  
RIII:DRP  
OI:RIII  
E. G. Greenman  
W. D. Shafer  
L. R. Greger  
G. C. Wright