December 1, 1998

Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc.
ATTN: Mr. D. N. Morey
Vice President
P.O. Box 1295
Birmingham, Al 35201

SUBJECT: INSPECTION PLAN - FARLEY PLANT

Dear Mr. Morey:

On November 2, 1998, the NRC staff completed an inspection resource planning meeting. The staff conducted this review for all operating nuclear power plants in Region II to develop an integrated inspection plan. We conducted this meeting in lieu of the semiannual Plant Performance Review, which the staff has moved to February 1999 because of the agency's shift to an annual Senior Management Meeting cycle.

This letter advises you of our planned inspection effort resulting from the inspection planning meeting. We have provided it to minimize the resource impact on your staff and to allow for scheduling conflicts and personnel availability to be resolved before the inspector's arrival onsite. Enclosure 1 details our inspection plan for the next 4 months. We have provided the rationale or basis for each inspection outside the core inspection program so that you are aware of the reason for emphasis in these program areas. Resident inspections are not listed due to their ongoing and continuous nature.

During this scheduling cycle, we will continue to focus some of our discretionary inspection effort on the resolution of open inspection items. Therefore, we may conduct additional inspections, which are not listed on Enclosure 1, to close open inspection items that are ready to be resolved. We will notify you at least 3 weeks before the start of these inspections.

The NRC's general policy for reactor inspections is that we will announce each inspection, unless announcing the inspection could compromise the objectives of the inspectors. Therefore, we may not have included some specific inspections on Enclosure 1, such as in the security and radiological protection areas, and these inspections may not be announced.

Enclosure 2 contains a historical listing of plant issues, called the Plant Issues Matrix (PIM). The PIM includes only items from inspection reports or other docketed correspondence between the NRC and Southern Nuclear Operating Company, Inc. This material will be placed in the public document room.

IE45

IE01

We will inform you of any changes to the enclosed inspection plan. If you have any questions, please contact me at 404-562-4520.

Sincerely,

(Original signed by
Pierce H. Skinner)

Pierce H. Skinner, Chief
Reactor Projects Branch 2
Division of Reactor Projects

Docket Nos. 50-348, 50-364
License Nos. NPF-2 and NPF-8

Enclosures: 1. Inspection Plan
2. Plant Issues Matrix

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OFFICE	RII:DRP		RII:DRS		RII:DRS		RII:DRS					
SIGNATURE												
NAME	CWRapp:dka		KBarr		ABeasley		PFredrickson		KLanelis			
DATE	11/ /98		11/30/98		11/30/98		11/ /98		11/30/98		11/ /98	11/ /98
COPY?	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES	NO	YES NO	YES NO

OFFICIAL RECORD COPY DOCUMENT NAME: G:\FARLEY\PPRFAR.WPD

FARLEY
INSPECTION PLAN

INSPECTION PROCEDURE/ TEMPORARY INSTRUCTION	TITLE/PROGRAM AREA	NUMBER OF INSPECTORS	PLANNED INSPECTION DATES	TYPE OF INSPECTION - COMMENTS
92904	Fire Protection Followup	1	January, 1999	Regional Initiative
37550	Engineering	3	February, 1999	Core Program
37550	Engineering	3	March, 1999	Core Program
81700	Security	4	March, 1999	Core Program
83750	Rad. Protection	1	March, 1999	Core Program

Enclosure 1

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II
FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
10/30/1998	1998003	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 4B Sec: Ter:	Changes, tests and experiments were properly screened for 10 CFR 50.59 applicability, and adequately evaluated to ensure an unreviewed safety question (USQ) did not exist.
10/22/1998	136	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	LIC	Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter:	Technical content of the initial license amendment (U1 - #136, and U2 - #128) request to revise and relocate TS Pressure-Temperature curves was not complete. Important information needed to approve this amendment was lacking. Also, the licensee did not clearly justify the liberty they took in deviating from methodologies referenced in their submittals.
08/29/1998	1998005-01	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4C Sec: 5A Ter: 5C	Licensee determined that the service water lines were moderate energy lines; therefore, flooding due to line breaks was not required to be analyzed.
07/11/1998	1998004-04	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 4A Sec: 4B Ter:	Use of non-conservative fluid temperatures in the Component Cooling Water and Spent Fuel Pool pipe stress analysis calculations.
07/01/1998	1998003-04	Pri: ENG Sec: OPS	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 3A Sec: 5B Ter:	The original safety assessment for LER 97-10 failed to address the safety consequences of the possible inability to achieve and maintain the plant in a safe shutdown condition.
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 4C Sec: Ter:	Licensee had established suitable programmatic guidance to ensure that the regulatory requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 would be met by the various onsite and offsite organizations. Training of safety evaluation preparers and reviewers was adequate. Personnel preparing and reviewing safety evaluations were qualified.
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	WK	Pri: 4C Sec: 3A Ter:	Documentation that addressed the 10 CFR 50.59 USQ criteria in several safety evaluations lacked specificity and very few of the safety evaluation forms provided any direct evidence of a cross-disciplinary review.
04/11/1998	1998002	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter: 5B	A Deficiency Report dated 9/16/97 identified leakage on the 1B RHR pump but the leakage was not included in total primary leakage. The licensee initially did not use any type of measuring device to accurately quantify the leakrate. Also, the primary leakage procedure did not provide specific directions to evaluate leaks under actual operating conditions.

Enclosure 2

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II
FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
02/21/1998	1998001	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 4A Sec: 5A Ter: 5B	The licensee's self-initiated safety system assessment of the containment ventilation and spent fuel pool systems were thorough and effective in identifying design discrepancies and weak areas.
12/29/1997	1997014-05	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 2A Sec: 4A Ter: 1C	The TDAWFP pump vent stack was not housed in a Cat 1 structure to protect against tornado generated missles.
11/17/1997	1997011-02	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 1C Sec: 4B Ter: 5A	Inservice testing (IST) program did not include revese flow testing of the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater (TDAFW) pump discharge check valve.
11/17/1997	1997011-04	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 1C Sec: 2A Ter: 4B	Lack of a service test program for the TDAFW pump uninteruptible power supply (UPS) battery to ensure required duty cycles would be met.
11/17/1997	1997011-05	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 4C Sec: 3A Ter:	Design control measures did not ensure that calculations were verified and controlled adequately.
11/17/1997	1997011-06	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter: 5C	Adequate corrective actions were not taken to resolve differences between plant procedures and CCW system P&IDs identified by a licensee 1990 self-assessment.
11/17/1997	1997011-07	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter: 5A	Surveillance testing acceptance criteria for the auxiliary building vital 125 VDC batteries were revised without recognizing that they exceeded TS requirements.
11/17/1997	1997011-03	Pri: ENG Sec: MAINT	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter: 3A	Inappropriate IST acceptance criteria for forward flow testing of a TDAFW check valve and failure to follow drawings in the installation of Unit 2 TDAFW battery structural/electrical components.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II

FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
10/18/1997	1997011	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter: 5C	Resolution of UFSAR discrepancy #089, of the UFSAR Reverification Program, was not thorough and used non-conservative calculations.
10/18/1997	1997011	Pri: ENG Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 4B Ter: 5C	Licensee actions to assess and correct corroded conditions of the service water discharge piping were prompt and effective.
10/18/1997	1997011	Pri: ENG Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 4B Sec: 4C Ter: 5C	NRC staff determined that SNC's compensatory measures, reporting, and safety assessment in response to GL 95-05 were adequate.
10/06/1997	1997010-08	Pri: ENG Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 4A Sec: 4B Ter: 5A	Installation of Half-hour Kaowool Fire Barriers Without Appendix R Exemption.
07/11/1998	1998004	Pri: MAINT Sec: OPS	NRC	STR	Pri: 3A Sec: 2B Ter: 3B	Maintenance and surveillance testing activities were generally conducted in a thorough and competent manner by qualified individuals in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions. Close coordination was maintained with the main control room during surveillance testing activities. (Also IR 98-01, 02, 03, 05)
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 5B Sec: 5C Ter:	The corrective actions following several dropped rod events appeared to be comprehensive and effective, pending completion of the licensee's root cause determination.
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: MAINT Sec: ENG	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2B Sec: 4B Ter:	The licensee issued a procedure that permited the use of high temperature liquid penetrant outside the allowable temperature range of 60 F to 125 F without first qualifiying the procedure as required by the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel code.
04/11/1998	1998002	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 2B Ter: 3B	[illegible] team Safety Valve testing was performed by knowledgeable contractor personnel with oversight by the assigned licensee personnel. Technical issues were resolved promptly and conservatively.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II
FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
02/21/1998	1998001	Pri: MAINT Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 3A Ter: 5B	Surveillance testing of the 2A Containment Spray pump was adequately performed and the personnel demonstrated caution while trying to determine source and extent of the system vibrations.
01/10/1998	1997015-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 1C Ter: 3C	Craft personnel failed to sign-in on the Personnel and Material Accountability Log when working in the controlled refueling area boundary as required by plant procedure.
11/29/1997	1997014	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 2B Sec: Ter:	Corrective actions to address multiple pre-action sprinkler system failures identified in 1996 have been comprehensive, thorough, and successful. An additional corrective action plan was initiated to resolve the small number of remaining failures.
11/29/1997	1997014-02	Pri: MAINT Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 3C Ter:	During observations of work on safety related equipment, maintenance personnel were not signing off completed steps of "Continous Use" procedures.
11/29/1997	1997014-04	Pri: MAINT Sec: OPS	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 3C Ter:	During maintenance activities, both trains of automatic Service Water isolation to the Turbine Building were rendered inoperable.
10/18/1997	1997011	Pri: MAINT Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter: 2B	Maintenance and testing activities associated with the replacement of Unit 2 pressurizer pressure transmitter (PT 456) were well controlled, performed in accordance with plant procedures and work instructions, and accomplished without incident.
10/17/1998	1998006	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 1C Sec: 5A Ter:	The minor departure process lacked pre-implementation independent review by system specialists, quality assurance, and the onsite safety committee. The lack of these reviews contributed to an error in developing a minor departure.
10/17/1998	1998006	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 1A Sec: 1B Ter: 3A	Operator response to abnormal and routine plant conditions was strong, including a Unit 1 automatic reactor trip, a startup of Unit 1 following a steam generator tube repair activity, a shutdown of Unit 1 for refueling, and Unit 2 partial loss of cooling to the reactor coolant pumps.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II

FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
10/17/1998	1998006-01	Pri: OPS Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	NCV	Pri: 1C Sec: 3A Ter:	Operations staff failed to assemble the fire brigade as required by AOP-29.0 for hydrogen stack fires on three seperate occassions.
08/29/1998	1998005	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter: 3A	The licensee adequately prepared for and satisfactorily conducted Unit 1 mid-loop operations. All level indicators were operable and closely monitored by the operators. (Also IR 98-03)
08/29/1998	1998005	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: 3A Ter: 5A	Response to Unit 1 Circulating Water Pump trip and Component Cooling Water heat exchanger tube leak was prompt, demonstrated good plant awarness, and was well coordinated. Supervisory command and control was evident.
08/29/1998	1998005	Pri: OPS Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 3B Ter:	The licensee appropriately and conservatively responded to steam generator tube leakage including enhanced training and plant procedure revisions.
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 2A Ter: 3A	Mode transitions, initial startup and power ascension following refueling were well controlled and performed in a conscientious and conservative manner. (Also IR 97-03, 97-06, 98-02, 96-15)
05/30/1998	1998004	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 3A Ter:	Operator attentiveness to MCB alarms and changing plant conditions were excellent. Operators were consistently aware of plant status and ongoing work activities. Onshift SRO command and control, and Ops management oversight remained at a high level. (Also IR 97-15, 14, 10, 08, 06, 05, 98-01, 98-02, 03)
04/11/1998	1998002	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter: 1C	The assigned prioritization did not ensure that freeze protection equipment for safety-related equipment was corrected or compensated for in a timely manner. The guidance in the Cold Weather Contingencies procedure did not distinguish between safety and non-safety related freeze protection circuits. (Also IR 96-15, 97-14)
04/11/1998	1998002-01	Pri: OPS Sec: PLTSUP	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 1B Ter:	The Shift Supervisor failed to use Emergency Response Procedure placekeeping aids during response to a manual reactor trip initiated for a dropped control rod. This was previously identified as a negative training issue.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II
FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
03/08/1998	1998002	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	NRC	POS	Pri: 1B Sec: 1C Ter:	Licensee response to elevated river levels due to heavy rain was appropriate. Sufficient preparations were made and necessary equipment obtained as conditions worsened.
02/21/1998	1998001-01	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 5A Ter: 3C	Conduct of Operations procedure required oncoming system operators to walkdown all areas unter their responsibility after completing turnover. Observations of and interviews with system operators found they were only touring areas identified on the data loggers or as directed by the Main Control Room. Since the data loggers did not address all areas under the opeators responsibility, many areas were not routinely toured.
02/11/1998	1998001	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 1B Ter:	Plant operators performed well during on-line replacement of the 1B Main Feedwater Regulating Valve control driver card. The Shift Supervisor maintained command and communications with the operators and technicians during the power reduction and card replacement. Troubleshooting activities correctly diagnosed the problem with the control driver card.
01/10/1998	1997015-01	Pri: OPS Sec: ENG	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter: 4B	THE CONTAINMENT AIR COOLER CONDENSATE LEVEL MONITORING (CCLM) SYSTEM WAS INOPERABLE (DUE TO MISPOSITIONED VALVES) WHILE THE CONTAINMENT ATMOSPHERE GASEOUS AND PARTICULATE RADITION MONITORING SYSTEMS (R-11 AND R-12) WERE SIMULTANEOUSLY INOPERABLE. THIS CONSTITUTED A CONDITION PROHIBITED BY TS. The procedures for the cntmnt air cooler cond level monitoring (CCLM) system failed to list the throttled position for the drain valves rendering the CCLM inoperable.
11/29/1997	1997014-01	Pri: OPS Sec: MAINT	NRC	NCV	Pri: 2B Sec: 3C Ter:	Major portions of "Extreme Cold Weather Contingencies" were not complete prior to below freezing temperatures, including operations and maintenance responsibilties.
10/18/1997	1997011	Pri: OPS Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 1C Sec: 3A Ter: 5C	Operations management implemented prompt and effective compensatory measures (i.e., reduced RCS activity limit) to address safety concerns regarding a projected increase in end-of-cycle SG conditional tube leakage.
10/18/1997	1997011	Pri: OPS Sec: ENG	NRC	POS	Pri: 1A Sec: 1C Ter: 4B	Engineering test procedure (ETP-3607) for fully withdrawing Unit 2 control rods to a new position was well written and controlled. The evolution was conducted in a smooth and deliberate manner.
10/17/1998	1998006	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NEG	Pri: 3A Sec: 3C Ter:	Two instances of inattentive Security Guards were observed. These appeared to be isolated cases.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II
FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
07/11/1998	1998004	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	POS	Pri: 3A Sec: 2B Ter:	A reactor vessel specimen transfer from the Spent Fuel Pool to the transfer cask was properly executed and adequately planned. Personnel were properly trained and briefed. Conducting the transfer underwater significantly reduced accumulated dose.
07/01/1998	1998003-07	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 3A Sec: 2B Ter:	The failure to include a documented process in access control procedures for contractors to timely inform the Security Department of terminated individuals contributed to a violation for failure follow procedure to immediately terminate eight individuals' unescorted access.
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3A Sec: 5B Ter: 3B	Worker Shallow Dose Equivalent (SDE) exposures resulting from personnel contamination events and work activities during refueling activities were evaluated properly. Controls for minimizing workers' internal exposure during refueling activities were effective. Respiratory protection training, fit tests, medical qualifications, and equipment status met 10 CFR 20.1703 requirements. The Health Physics (HP) and Dosimetry (DOS) observation program continued to be implemented effectively and contributed to the reduced personnel errors. (Also IR 97-14)
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	STR	Pri: 3C Sec: Ter:	Emergency Response Facilities (ERFs) were well-equipped and operationally ready to support an emergency response. Emergency response personnel were adequately trained and responded appropriately to a scheduled drill. The emergency declaration on March 8, 1998, was made in accordance with the Emergency Plan.
05/30/1998	1998003	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: MAINT	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter:	The evaluated Radiation Monitor System (RMS) equipment was installed properly and the reviewed detector calibrations and functional tests were conducted in accordance with and met procedural, 10 CFR Part 20, and Offsite Dose Calculation Manual (ODCM) requirements
03/23/1998	1998001-08	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: MAINT	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 3A Sec: 3B Ter: 1C	During observed maintenance activities in contaminated areas, the inspectors witnessed several examples of improper contamination control pratices. Workers removed PCs outside the contaminated area boundary and breached the boundary during work.
02/21/1998	1998001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: ENG	NRC	NEG	Pri: 2A Sec: 5B Ter: 5C	Additional pre-action sprinkler system failures indicate that prior corrective actions were not completely effective.
02/21/1998	1998001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: MAINT	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter:	Immediate corrective actions for pre-action fire protection sprinkler system failures were prompt and conservative.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission

PLANT ISSUE MATRIX

By Primary Functional Area

Region II
FARLEY

Date	Source	Functional Area	ID	Type	Template Codes	Item Description
02/21/1998	1998001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: OPS	NRC	POS	Pri: 3B Sec: 1C Ter:	The licensee's requalification program complied with the requirements and standards of plant procedures as well as the requirements of 10 CFR 55.59 for the areas inspected. The licensee developed and administered simulator examinations that effectively identified areas in need of improvement.
02/21/1998	1998001	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: OTHER	NRC	POS	Pri: 2A Sec: 2B Ter:	Licensee actions in response to SAER HP, Chemistry and Radwaste audit findings were thorough and appropriate.
11/29/1997	1997014-06	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: 3A Sec: 1C Ter:	HP personnel used the current date and time instead of the intake date and time to perform followup assessments of radionuclide intakes for two individuals. Reanalysis using the correct date and time did not significantly change the assessment results.
11/29/1997	1997014-07	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Equipment failures, poor procedures, and inadequate personnel followup were root causes for not taking routine grab samples when both Unit 2 gaseous and particulate radiation monitors were inoperable.
11/29/1997	1997014-08	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	NCV	Pri: Sec: Ter:	Individual failed to conduct required Emergency Preparedness equipment inventories and falsified the checklists to hide this failure.
11/17/1997	1997011-08	Pri: PLTSUP Sec:	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 1C Sec: 3A Ter: 5A	Copies of the site security plan, contigency plan, and procedures were being stored in an unlocked drawer in the control room without maintaining positive control at all times
10/06/1997	1997010-05	Pri: PLTSUP Sec: ENG	NRC	VIO IV	Pri: 2A Sec: 4A Ter: 5A	Corrugated flexible steel tubing and plastic hose used in samlpe lines for various plant vent and containmnet pugre particulate samplers instead of smooth stainlees steel tubing with minimum bend radii.

United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
PLANT ISSUE MATRIX
By Primary Functional Area

Legend

Type Codes:

BU	Bulletin
CDR	Construction
DEV	Deviation
EEI	Escalated Enforcement Item
IFI	Inspector follow-up item
LER	Licensee Event Report
LIC	Licensing Issue
MISC	Miscellaneous
MV	Minor Violation
NCV	NonCited Violation
NEG	Negative
NOED	Notice of Enforcement Discretion
NON	Notice of Non-Conformance
P21	Part 21
POS	Positive
SGI	Safeguard Event Report
STR	Strength
URI	Unresolved item
VIO	Violation
WK	Weakness

Template Codes:

1A	Normal Operations
1B	Operations During Transients
1C	Programs and Processes
2A	Equipment Condition
2B	Programs and Processes
3A	Work Performance
3B	KSA
3C	Work Environment
4A	Design
4B	Engineering Support
4C	Programs and Processes
5A	Identification
5B	Analysis
5C	Resolution

ID Codes:

NRC	NRC
Self	Self-Revealed
Licensee	Licensee

Functional Areas:

OPS.	Operations
MAINT	Maintenance
ENG	Engineering
PLTSUP	Plant Support
OTHER	Other

EEIs are apparent violations of NRC Requirements that are being considered for escalated enforcement action in accordance with the "General Statement of Policy and Procedure for NRC Enforcement Action" (Enforcement Policy), NUREG-1600. However, the NRC has not reached its final enforcement decision on the issues identified by the EEIs and the PIM entries may be modified when the final decisions are made.

URIs are unresolved items about which more information is required to determine whether the issue in question is an acceptable item, a deviation, a nonconformance, or a violation. A URI may also be a potential violation that is not likely to be considered for escalated enforcement action. However, the NRC has not reached its final conclusions on the issues, and the PIM entries may be modified when the final conclusions are made.