NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

January 4, 1988

R. Condit, GHP

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Thomas A. Fehm, Assistant for Operations Office of the Executive Director for Operations

Themas E. Murley, Director Office of Muclear Peactor Regulation

Frank: J. Hiraglia, Associate Director : for Projects Office of Muclear Reactor Regulation

Dennis M: Crutchfield, Director : Division of Reactor: Projects - III, IV. V and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Practor Regulation

FROM:

Jose A. Calvo, Director Project Directorate: - IV Division of Reactor: Projects - III. IV. V and: Special Projects Office of Muclear Reactor Regulation.

SUBJECT:

SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT (STP) PLAN FOR EVALUATION AND RESOLUTION OF ALLEGATIONS PROVIDED BY THE GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY PROJECT (GAP)

The plan for the evaluation and resolution of STP allegations provided by GAP is presented in Enclosure 1.

The MPC Safety Significance Assessment Team (SSAT) (Enclosure 2) has completed a preliminary review of the ellegations and associated materials at CAP offices in Washington, D.C., and has compiled, summarized, and categorized them by discipline or topics (see Enclosure 4). It is important to note that the SSAT had difficulty during its review in assessing the safety significance of many of the allegations due to the lack of specificity and detail of the identifica-tion of a particular component or system provided by the allegers (referred to by GAP as concerned individuals - CIS).

Because of the general lack of specificity of the allegations, it is imperative that the SSAT contact the allegers and determine if they can identify locations or components that exhibit the conditions that they have a concern over at STP. This will facilitate the SSAT subsequent inspection to substantiate the concerns or determine that the concern has been satisfactorily corrected. If an alleger cannot be contacted or if the contact yields no additional specific information to focus the inspection on a particular area or component, the individual allegation will be dispositioned as unsubstantiated and the general subject matter will be pursued further only if other related allegations provide some basis to assume that there is validity to the concern.

8803110056 880229 PDR ADOCK 05000498 PDR The SSAT wrote a brief description of each allegation reviewed. We feel that the subject matter used in some of the allegation descriptions might reveal the identity of the alleger. Thus, the GAP allegation descriptions prepared by SSAT must remain confidential until such a time that the need for the confidentiality of the allegers is no longer required.

Enclosure 5 lists the 10 primary allegations that the SSAT will investigate at STP. Enclosure 6 lists the secondary allegations that will also be considered along with the primary allegations due to their similarities to the primary allegations.

The proposed SSAT inspection team (Enclosure 7) are the same individuals that performed the initial review, evaluation, and screening of the allegations. Given the time remaining to prepare for the inspection and the general non-specific rature of the allegations, the utilization of these experienced reviewers or inspection team members will greatly facilitate the effort.

GAP has been contacted and given the primary and secondary allegation lists to allow them to contact the appropriate allegers and any others that may provide any additional information concerning the allegations selected for inspection. Depending on the results of GAP contact with the allegers, the proposed tentative schedule for the inspection effort will commence during the week of January 11, 1988.

Should you have any questions reparding these matters, please contact re at 127460.

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Jose A, Calvo, Director Project Directorate + IV Division of Reactor Projects - IJI, IV. and Special Projects Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation

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cc w/enclosures: SSAT Members V. Stello, EDO W. Parler, OGC J. Sniezek, NRR F. Martin, PIV W. Pussell, RI W. Johnston, RI L. Shao, NRR :! J. Roe, KRR J. Partlow, MRR T E. Hayes, OI W. Briggs, CGC K. Smith, CGC J. Lieberman, OE R. Brady, NRR T. Martin, EDO R. Carde, GAP: P. Condit. GAP

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONS REVIEW

SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT

STATUS REPORT

1. BACKGROUND

Direct interaction between NRC staff and The Government Accountability Project (GAP): on the matter of South Texas Project safety concerns outside of the litigation arers, began on November 19.1987. A meeting was held in the Office of the Executive Director of Aperations (EDD), Bethesde. with Thomas A: Rehm leading the NRC:staff representatives and Billie F. Farde leading the GAP representatives. The backdrop for this meeting was the decision by the US District Court deted October 27, 1987. The Court had ruled to deny enforcement of a NPC subpoend on Ms. Garde because of the possibility of "abridonment of constitutionelly protected associational intrusion on associational rights must be carefully and conscientiously explored before resort may be had to the court's process."

Prior to the meeting of November 19, 1987, agreement had been reached between the EDC and Ms. Garde on the mein elements of a process that would provide the NRC staff limited access to information which might be of relevance in the forthcoming licensing decisions regarding South Texas Project. Consequently on November 19, 1987, MRC staff reviewers were permitted to see brief summaries of the allegations in the possession of GAP. An attempt was made by the technical experts present to assess the safety significance of the allegations. Unfortunately, the information : made available to the staff was so lacking in specificity that no conclusions on safety significance could be reached. In order for the MRC staff to gain access to more detailed information. arrangements were agreed upon for the MRC technical staff to visit the GAP offices in Washington, D.C. The protocol for the MRC staff's work at the GAP offices was agreed upon. to protect, to GAP's satisfaction, the identity of individuals who have made the allegations. The MRC staff has completed its preliminary review of the information made available by GAP as described below within the framework of agreements reached with GAP thus far. In addition, it is understood that GAP has provided the Office of Investigations (01) allegations of harassment and intimidation and wrongdoing. To assure that ell CAP identified allegations are reviewed and evaluated, the NRC Safety Significance Assessment Team (SSAT), which was assembled to perform the initial review of GAP's records, will forward to DI all allegations that they reviewed and categorized as harassment and intimidation or wrongdoing.

2. INITIAL NEC STAFF REVIEW OF ALLEGATIONS

An NRC team was essembled, referred hereinafter as the SSAT (sefety significance assessment team), to review GAP records of interviews with allegers (referred by GAP as concerned individuals (CIs)) and individual allegations that FAP enumerated from the interviews. Enclosure 2 presents the KRC SSAT participants as well as the disciplines that were involved in this initial review of GAP's allegations documentation. As agreed, MRC SSAT reviewed GAP's records at GAP's offices in Washington D.C. These records consisted of audio tapes of most of the interviews conducted by a GAP consultant with the CIs, the consultant hand-written text extrapolated from the tapes, and allegation data sheets that contained each allegation's unique alpha-numeric code and a brief description of the concern.

The GAP consultant's hand-written text was assembled in numbered files which contained reference materials related to allegations. There are approximately 30 files with varying quantities of text and reference materials and two-3 ring binders containing the 576 individual allegation data sheets. GAP has categorized the allegations into the following areas: safety-related; intimidation and harassment, wrongdoing, and non safety-related. Enclosure 3 presents the categorization and designation of allegations used by GAP.

The MRC initial screening was performed by NRC SSAT members with expertise in particular areas of encorn: mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, civil/structural engineering. Ouality Assurance and Control, and management: (including the safety-related aspects derived from harassment and intimidation, and wrongdoing concerns).

The GAP consultant was available to the team to explain where and how the records were kept and assembled and to answer any questions for the team.

SSAT members reviewed each allepation, its associated interview text and reference material file in their area of expertise. Screening also included listening to selected audio tapes to verify the accuracy of the written text extrapolated from them.

The results of the SSAT review and initial screening were documented and identified by allegation number. Each SSAT member wrote a brief description of each allegation as identified by GAP's consultant and indicated if the concern appeared to be safety-related or non safety-related. Also, SSAT members noted if other disciplines may be involved with a particular allegation and whether the CI needs to be contacted for additional information.

Generally, the SSAT's initial screening determined that a large majority of the allegations lacked specificity in identifying a particular location, component, or system about which the CI was concerned.

The individual SSAT member's data was summined and recategorize into allegation groups: Mechanical; Flectrical; Civil/Structural; QA/QC; Harassment and Intimidation; Wrongdoing; NPC Region IV; and Management

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issues. Each category has several subsets that was used to specify more closely; issues that each allegation appears to be addressing. Enclosure 4 identifies the allogation groups used by the NRC SSAT.

3. COMPILING ALLEGATION DATA

A brief summary was prepared for each allegation that was made available by GAP. Three files containing approximately 50 allegations have been withheld by GAP due to confidentiality concerns on the part of the

The allegation summaries have been entered into a computerized data base along with the SSAT's preliminary categorization of the safety significance of the allegation, the grouping of common or similar allegations, and determination whether the alleger must be contacted to provide specific information needed by the SSAT to determine the safety significance of the allegation.

GAP's initial categorization of these allegations listed duplicate concerns under different review disciplines. Because of this, the SSAT initially had to consider approximately 700 concerns. When these duplications were reconciled there were 576 concerns, representing the same number of allegations, identified by GAP. Of these, 159 concerns are variations of an initial concern relating additional facets of the original concern such as possible documentation problems, or intimidation or harassment related

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The remaining concerns have been combined into groups with similar concerns (allegations) and will be reviewed together to assure that the magnitude of each issue is recognized and that common concerns are detected. Also, the grouping of the concerns will ensure a certain degree of protection of the identity of allegers. In addition, GAP will advise whether the allegations withheld from MRC review because of reasons of confidentiality or because they involved members of the MRC staff, are covered by the established MRC SSAT allegation groups. The MRC allegation (concern) grouping scheme is shown in Enclosure 4.

The SSAT's primary effort will be expended on these allegations that are identified as safety-related concerns. These issues will be initially examined to determined whether they could affect criticality or power ascension either because these operations could represent unacceptable safety risks due to the alleger's concerns or because the allegation would be uninspectable after the plant starts up. Following this, the most safety significant allegations will be identified and reviewed in detail by the SSAT.

Pecause there is very little specificity included in the GAP allegations, it is imperative that the SSAT contact the alleners and ask them to identify specific locations, systems, or components that exhibit the conditions that they allege to prist at South Texas Project so that the staff can substantiate the allegers concer, or conclude that the concern has been satisfactorily corrected.

4. ALLEGATIONS SELECTED FOR SITE INSPECTIONS

Enclosure 5 lists the 10 primary allegations that the SSAT will investigate at South Texas: Enclosure 6 lists the secondary allegations that will also be considered along with these primary allegations due to their similarities to the primary allegation.

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Out of the 576 GAP allegations enumerated, only those 16 concerns identified in Enclosure 6:as "specific" can be tied to a specific location, system, or component. The rest refer only in general terms to items of concern. It is therefore imperative that the SSAT contact the allegers in the remaining concerns to obtain enough specific information to conduct a detailed review. Some of the GAP's allegers will require that a confidentiality agreement be completed by NRC before they agree to deal with us.

If an alleger cannot be contacted or if the contact yields no additional i specific information to focus the investigation or a particular system, component or location, the individual allegation will be dispositioned as unsubstantiated and the general subject matter will be pursued further only if other related allegations provide some basis to assume that there is validity to the concern.

In addition to the SSAT inspection on site, other sources of information such as Regional inspection reports pertaining to the resolution of South. Texas Project allegations, MRR inspections data and safety avaluation reports, the licensee's SAFETEAM records, and other documentation that currently exists will be reviewed to determine whether they provide any additional information related to an alleger's concern. These supplemental investigations will not focus explicitly on an individual alleger's concern, they will also include other unrelated issues such that the alleger's identity will be protected, if required.

5. STAT INSPECTION ROLE

The SSAT will inspect the selected GAP allegations at the South Teres Project (STP) site. The SSAT consists of experts in construction and inspection activities in nuclear power plants. The proposed organization of the MRC inspection team, as well as the inspectors names and their assignments are presented in Enclosure 7. The staff selected for the inspection team are the same individuals that performed the initial review, evaluation, and screening of the allegations. Given the time remaining to prepare for the inspection and the general non-specific nature of the allegations, the use of these experienced reviewers as inspection team members will greatly facilitate the effort.

A major concern of the allegation review and inspection process is the protection of the confidentiality of the allegers (concerned individuals). Arrangements will be made to contact the allegers by GAP. If required, the NRC will draw-up any confidentiality agreements with the allegers.

In addition, the inspection plan will consider combining other related or unrelated concerns with the selected GAP ellegations to ensure that the substance of the allegations does not reveal the identity of these allegers requesting confidentiality.

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A detailed inspection plan will be prepared by the SSAT leader and its deputy with assistance from the team membars. Inspector guidance will be established prior to the commencement of the inspection to assure consistency in the inspection process. Exphasis will be placed on root cause determinations of any substantiated allegations including the identification of any generic implications. To further facilitate the selected allegation resolution process. the SSAT will utilize available Region IV inspection reports on disposition of allegations, as well as any MRR inspection reports and safety evaluation reports for STP.

The following tentative schedule is proposed for this inspection. effort:

- December 28, 1987 January 1, 1988
 - Initial planning - Selection of GAP allegations to be inspected - Selection of inspection term members - Present identified allegations to be inspected to GAP (All the above actions have been completed)
- January 4 8, 1988 -

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- Detailed inspection planning and inspector guidance preparation Arrangements with GAP to contact allegers
- January 11 15, 1988
 - Interview allegers 1" NRC is successful in arranging interviews. through GAP
 - Tentative start of onsite inspection depending on number of allegers: to be interviewed :
- January 18 22, 1988
 - Onsite inspection of selected allepations:
- January 25 26, 1988
 - Summary of allegation inspection results
- January 25 February 3, 1988
 - Allegetion inspection report preparation .
- Februery 1, 1988
 - Tentative Commission briefing on full power license for STP. Unit 1

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SOUTH TEXAS PPRJECT ALLEGATIONS

NPC SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE ASSESSMENT TEAM (SSAT' MEMBERS

INVOLVED IN THE INITIAL REVIEW OF GAP RECORDS

MEMBER	ORGANIZATION	DISCIPLINE	
Paul O'Connor	PD-TV/NRR	Project Panager	
- Edward Tomlinson	PO- IN/NRR	Eleci, Irst. & Misc.	
Jaf Fajan	EMEB/NRR !	Mechanical:	
Pomuald Lipinski	ESAR/NRR	Civil/Structurel	
Hansrej Ashar	ESGR/KRP .	Civil/Structure1	
Jaque Durr	Region I	QA/QC	
Patrick Hilano	OF	OA/CC	
Richard Correta	LQAB/NRP I		
George Johnson	EPTB/NRR I		
Jose Calvo	PD-TV/NRR	Project Director	
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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONS

GAP ALLEGATION CATEGORIZATION AND DESIGNATION

SECTION*	DISCIPLINE	CATEGORY	ALLEGATION	RELATED ALLEGATIONS
I - Safety Balated	A- Piping/Mech/Inst	a. Hardware	0001 -9999**	.1, .2, .3, etc.
II - Intimid/Harass.	B- Electrical C- Civil/Structural		4	·•, ·ɛ, ·ɔ, etc.
III - Wrongdoing	D- HVAC E- Engr/Design	b. Doc./Drwgs. c. Insp./Testing	1	
V - Non-Safety Rel.	F: Procurement/Purchas G- Equipment Qualif. H- Fire Protection I- QA/QC/N-5/Systems	d. Other	Ì	
	J- Welding K- Safety/security	b ,	1	
	L- 112			
	H- Seismic & Environmental N- Generic (all disc)		EXAMPLES	
	0- Personnel P- Management	1	I A a - 0001= Sa	afety related/Piping/hardwarn mecific allegation number
	Q- Training R- MRC S- Safeteam			Ber sette attender and a
	T- EBASCO U- HLAP		IA 6 - 0001.1 ((same), subset documentation
	V- S.C & I/O W- ANI			
	X- Qualification of Personnel		1	
	Y- Bechtel 2- Document Control		•	
Note: MRC allegation a computarized Allegation numbers ar	numbers use Arabic numbers 1 data base. e cross referenced to actual 6	through 4 rather th	an Roman numerals	to facilitate use of

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONSS

NRC SSAT ALLEGATION GROUPS

MECH	ANICAL AND PIPI	ING			
1.	PIPING I	A. 8.	Pipe: Hydro	Ç. 0.	Configuration Chloride Contamination
2.	VALVES	A. B.	Limitorque Installation	¢.	Missing
3.	MATERIALS	A. B.	Traceability Compatability		
4.	HVAC	A. 8	Procorement	6. 0.	Fabrication Testing
5.	SESIMIC QUALIF	ICATI	DN ·		
6.	FASTENERS	۸.	Counterfeit/Foreign		
7.	WELDING	A. 8.	Weld Rod : Qualifications	¢.	Welder ID Traceability
0.	OTHER				

8. ELECTRICAL

A.

1. SPLICES :

A. Raychem

- 2. CABLE AND CONDUIT
- 3. INSTRUMENTATION

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- 4. ENVIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION :
- D. OTHER

- 1. CONCRETE
- 2. SOILS
- 3. COATINGS
- O. OTHER
- D. QA/QC
 - 1. DESIGN CONTROL
 - 2. PROCUREMENT
 - 3. DOCUMENT CONTROL
 - 4. QC INSPECTION
 - A. Inspection Records
 - 8. 1 Travellers
 - C. Hold Point
 - D. | Authorized Nuclear Inspector.
 - E. I NCRS
 - 5. ASBUILT VS DESIGN
 - 6. SYSTEM TURNOVER
 - 7. FSAR/SPECIFICATIONS
 - 8. PROCEDURES
 - O. OTHER
- E. HARRASSMENT & INTIMIDATION (SAFETY RELATED ISSUES ONLY)
- F. WRONG DOING (SAFETY RELATED ISSUES ONLY)
- G. NRC
- H. MANAGEMENT
 - 1. HLLP
 - 2. BECHTEL
 - 3. EBASCO
 - 4. INTERMECH
 - 5. PERSONNEL PRACTICES
 - 5. TRAINING 7. SAFETEAM
 - 0. OTHER
 - v. vinen
- O. OTHER

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONS

FRIMARY ALLEGATIONS SELECTED FOR INSPECTION

1.	Mechanicel Piping LAs-0560 - CI concerned with the quality of pipe joints.
11.	Valves - 1As-0563 - CI concerned that many valves are installed backwards.
111.	HVAC - 1Ja-0356 - CI concerned with adequecy of HVAC welds.
14.	Fasteners - 1Fe-0082 - CI concerned that counterfeit fasteners are installed at STP.
۷.	Welding - 1Js-0130 - CI concerned with the adequacy/quelity of weld. not used at STP.
¥1.	Electrical Cable/Instrumentation - 18s-0119 - CI concerned with the adequacy of Raychem splices at STP.
¥11.	A) Civil/Structural 1Cs-0638 - CI concerned with concrete drilling through reber.
	E) 1Ca-0494:- CI concerned with crack in bottom of fuel.handling
VIII.	Coatings - 1Ra-0059 - CI concerned with coatings used on the structures and equipment.
18.	QA/QC - 17a-DA01.1 - CI concerned with "as built" vs. "as designed" configurations of walves.

NRC/Recton IV - 1Ae-0554 - CI called NRC several times concerning certair problems and had no return response. X.

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SOUTH TEXAS PROJECT ALLEGATIONS

SECONDARY ALLEGATIONS

CATEGORY - MECHANICAL/PIPING

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Pliegation No.	Description
1Aa-0560 1Aa-0162 1Ba-0307 1Eg-0754 1Pa-C279 1Ea-0556 16a-314 1Ea-0556 1Ea-0432	Deficient Pipe Joints Pipe to Tank Connections Filmer Screens: in MSSS Loop - Specific (sp.) Installation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments Installation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments Installation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments Steam Generator Installation (sp.) Installation of Pumps, Valves, Instruments Pipe Materials:(sp.).

VALVES

1Aa-0563 Valve Installation (See 1Eg-0754 above) Valve Paintenance (sp.). Valve Installation Valve Installation 180-0081 16a-0305.1 1A4-0445

MATEPIALS (Covered under other categories)

HVAC

1Ca-0046.1	Bush web to be
1Da-0109	Puctwork Welds
100-0117	HVAC Installations
10a-0296	MYAC Material Traceability
1Da-0337	MVAC. Installations
	HVAC. Seal Material (sp.)
1.4-0356	HVAC. Welds
104-0450	HVAC. Damper (sp.)
103-0504	HVAC, Material
1Ab-0714	HVAC: Installation
1Mc-0619	(fee 10a-0296)

FASTENERS

Allegations Mn.

Description

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140-0036		Bolts Installation	
1Fa-0048		Bolt Traceability	
1Fa-C084		Bolt Traceobility	
114-0387	Restriction and and the set of the	Bolt Traceability	
		Polt Installation	
'Fa-0011		Bolt Traceabildty	
1Fa-0022		Bally Tressed they	1
110-0082		Bolit Traceability	
		Bolt Traceability (sp.)	
1Ya-0087		Bolt Traceability	
148-0132		Bally Treesbilling	
1Fa-0164		Bolk Traceability	
		Bolt Traceahility	
1Fa-0488.1		Bolt Traceability	

WELDING

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1Ja-0104 1Ja-130 17d-0571 Wa-0687.1 104-0120 1.10-0102 1.1. -0354.2 1Jb-0053 1. 4-0064

Weld Rod Traceability Weld Rod Traceability Welders Welders (sp.) Velders Welders Welders Velders Weld Rod Traceshility

ELECTPICAL TAC COMPONENTS

18a-0119 18a-0175 18a-0449 18a-0008 18a-0008 18a-0126 18a-0126 18a-0465 1Aa-0126 1Aa-128	Cable Installations Cable Installations Cable Installations Cable Installations Cable Installations Incore Instrumentation Shielding for Panels (sp.) Instrument Valves (sp.) Flow Transmitter Installation (sp.)
1Ca-CE38	Concrete Prilling
1Ca-O494	Concrete Settlements (sp.)
1Cc-O114	Fill
2Id-O121.1	Fill

COATINGS

Allegation No.

1Ga-0059

Rescription

Coating Traceability/Application (sp.)

QA/DC

11d-0040 1fb-0034 1fa-0601.1 1Eb-0612 1Jb-0705 1Jb-0751 1Db-0790 1Ga-314 1Eb-159 1Eb-0159.2 1Ja-0254 1Eb-0612 1Ab-0174 1Cb-0638.1


NRC/F.TV

15d-0267.1 1Aa-0554 1Ja-0555 Configuration Control Configuration Control Configuration Control Configuration Control Configuration Control Configuration Control Records S. G. Inspection Pipe Whip Restraint Inspection Pipe Whip Restraint Inspection Pipe Whip Restraint Inspection PVAC Weld Inspection Support Installation Inspection HVAC Installation Inspection Concrete Drilling Inspection

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
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Confidentiality: Deficiencies (sp.) Deficiencies (sp.)



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Texas Nuclear Plant Probed for Violations

Workers Filed Hundreds of Complaints

By Case Potentian

The Nucleur Regulatory Correminutes has immeched a last-minute inspection of a Texas success prever plant after, sprinwing hundreds of allegentions from dosens of workers that the plant is poorly anginesered, was constructed with substandard schowink and easy violate activity dynastics.

Het wongers of the South Texas Nuclear Penjact near Bay City and the NRC mg sold them the inspaction will and affect their application for a full-power locease, which may he approved as early as next month-

The South Texas Nuclear Project is one of a hendful of success plants awaiting licensing by the NRC. The two-onic power station is owned by a four-utility consortium beseled by the Hauston Power & Light Co. (HP&L) and has been under construction for more than 12 years. The first cost of the \$5.5 billion project was freied last month and is expected to begin low-power operation this 'south.

Unlike the Seabrack and Shorebam success plants still semiting NRC Scruss in the Northeast, the South ', exas plant has not been a target of antinuclear activists or community opposition. However, it has been dogged by allegations of shoddy construction and inept management as its cost soured to more than 400 percent of the initial \$1 billion estimate.

The NEC fixed HPAL \$100,000 in 1980, coing inadequacies in qualfly-control programs. A year later the stillty fired its main contractor, Brown & Root, and hired-the Becktal engineering and construction firm to complete the plant.

NRC officials sent as inspection team to Bay City last weak after reviewing more than 600 complaints of wrongdoing under Bachtei's management, about half involving potential mfety defects. According to an NRC document, the alleged problems range from valves being installed backward to the use of welding materials, soft and bolts that may not have been designed to handle the stress of a nuclear plant.

The allegations were made by more than 50 plant workers through the Government Accountability Project (GAP), an organismtion that defends whilethe-blowers. GAP has refused to divalge memors of the workers, who fear retailation, but allowed the bIRC to examine the complaints after a federal judge rebuffed NRC's effort to get the workers' memor through a subposna.

HP&L spokesman Graham Painter said the utility had not been allowed to see the allegations but said plant officials think that they are "old complaints."

"If that's the case, we're not concerned." Painter said. "If we looked at it, either we took correction action or it didn't a nount to such."

Edna Ottney, a nuclear consul-

"If 10 percent of these allegations are true, that plant is not safe I would not live close to the South Texas plant." that who investigated the compliants for GAP, said the adequations "scath just about everythical." from improper installation of adaty devices to faintfacture (the many detries on a faintfacture (the many detries of the many detries of the many de-

"It 10 percent of these distributes are true, that plant is not only," sold Ottony, who has investigated danflar completence for the NRC. As an employee of a committing firm under contract to the NRC, Ottrary several years ago investigated worker completes about the Tennessee Valley Asthority machen plants, all of which are now closed for celety resears.

Scuth Texas, also said, "Is worse than TVA. I would not live cheese to the South Texas plant."

John Corder, a former South Texas worker who agreed to be interviewed on the record, acknowledged that he reported problems to plant and NEC officials before tabing them to GAP, but he conteraded that anthing was done to correct them.

Corder, a 27-year Declatei employee who describes bimenif as a "good company man." was a superintendent at South Texas until be, was discussed last November as part of what the company said was a work force cuthack.

"Nobody cares," he said. "Nobody wants to hear it. They're behind schedule and out of money. They sky they'll fix it after the plant is running."

Corder accompanied the MRC imprection terms on a tour Tunneloy of the South Texas plant, where in had complete of of memerane conservence deficientias in the recentby complete during in the recentby completed Unit 1 of the plant for while the NRC and were accurity related. Corder and he was able to point out identical problems with motal fasteners on an electrical panel in Unit 2.

The fasteners are goos. Missing." he seld. "The panel is just stuck up thank." The panel is a protective covering over high-weakage owitch plates that control electrical equipment is the plant.

Centur declined to characterize the plant as ade or usade. "It's modelled." he said. "I still worry about it at night." NRC spokesment for Gilliant confirmed that Corder had earlier pointed out construction defects to an agency inspector. Gilliand said he did not know how serious the defects were or what corrections, if any, the agency had ordered.

According to NEC and GAP doemenents, other workers have raised questions about the adequacy of electrical splices, pipe joints and weight. While the individual complaints may appear minor, Ottory alid, they suggest that the plant's quit ity-control program is defective.

The NRC inspects relatively little of a mathem power plant before deciding whether to grant it an opersting hornes. Instead, the openrelive barely on a "piper trail" of gentity-ansurance documents that are supposed for deamonds that needs NRC mandic to so it is being built.

Ottney and sevend quality-control importors and har that they were instructed act to verify construction decomments and that most and they completed for fame of basing their jobs. "The passage part of rolling over any 5 shade field and found Terms are shade field and found Terms are shade field and found Terms are shade field and found to the are shade field and found to the set of the shade to other jobs for them. I wan the net berrah."

" expect that's a fait they off Corder, who warked on my if then a had-down, exclose plants are been tol deting back to the ear's plate. " have pointed out erclatering flows before, and it was almore an arm-wreath. But it never before led to a wandette against employees lies it has hare."

Painter said MRC officials had told the utility that "it's typical to have these allegations at the just minute" and that the review "should have to affect on incefaing."

NRC spokesman Gilliand sold the agency may have told HP&L that the intest inspaction "has not been a delaying factor" in the hoensing process because a commission vote on the licence has been postponed for other reacons.

Lerropower tet's ware datapad inst musth which the plant doveloped an energieinod vibration in its cooling system, and the NIC is analyring a potential problem with its "thimble tubes," shafts that arr used to introduce ascripting equipment into the reactor. The tabas corrocied in a similar plant in Reigium, allowing radioactive water to apdi into the reactor building.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon the addressees listed below, by hand delivery on January 26, 1988.

1. NRC Commissioners:

L. W. Zech, Jr., Chairman Thomas M. Roberts Kennith Rogers Frederick M. Bernthal Kenneth M. (Carr

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

 Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C.

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